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Abstract
During the 1990’s, medical euthanasia and “physician assisted suicide” became 
controversial. The latter was variously criminalized, decriminalized and legalized. This 
dissertation analyses some of the factors leading to changes in de jure and de facto 
criminal law. With special reference to the 1990s criminal trials of Dr. Jack Kevorkian (a 
retired pathologist who became a self-styled “Dr. Death”), it considers the creation and 
implementation of criminal law regarding medically hastened death in Michigan.
I examine the social roles of chief prosecutors, judges, juries, family members of the 
decedents, and the media. This method of analysis presents a unique opportunity to study 
key players and how they may have influenced (or been influenced by) the court 
processes during the emergence of an important issue in a specific jurisdiction.
The longitudinal study focuses upon one defendant in one locale, but also examines 
different statutes and cases. Thus, it becomes possible to scrutinize alternative legal 
theories of the prosecutions of the cases, along with the development of law in the books 
and law in action.
Anchoring this study is Kevorkian’s 1999 trial culminating in a conviction for 
euthanasia murder and related drug delivery charges. A landmark was a tape-recording 
of the consensual euthanasia, which Kevorkian made for broadcast on national television, 
and whose use by the media, the prosecution, and by Kevorkian, proved highly revealing. 
In short, the thesis supplies a detailed empirical and analytic examination of critical legal, 
social and political issues in the public response to physician assisted suicide and medical 
euthanasia. One principal conclusion is that in those Kevorkian cases in which the 
politics of death and the emerging assisted suicide debate were factors, the result was 
acquittal by juries. In sharp contrast, when the trial was limited to the elements of the 
crime, and eliminated questions of patient suffering and the families, the prosecution 
obtained a conviction.
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Introduction
This doctoral study in law and sociology began as an interest in the 
relationship between the criminal law and terminal illness. More specifically my 
interest was in the application of the criminal law to those in the medical profession 
who hastened the deaths of consenting adults who were terminally ill. First, as an 
initial matter, I offer a set of personal factors that drew me to the research I am about 
to present, emulating one of my chosen examiners (Howarth 1996, pp. 1-9). I note 
that this also had roots in questions asked by Leonard Leigh and Paul Rock, which I 
pretended not to hear for nearly two years, and which they politely pretended not to 
notice that I was not answering. I do, however, need to acknowledge a formative 
conversation with Glennys Howarth at the LSE in 1993, in which she told me about 
an experience of her own viva -- in which she had to face some personally sensitive 
questions from her external examiner. This prompted me to start to “answer” 
personal questions related to the germination of my academic research (to pre-empt 
surprise questions). The first open question, in a surprise setting, came in the form of 
a third party question at my first conference paper, given at a 1993 conference on the 
“Social Contexts of Death, Dying and Disposal,” organized by Glennys Howarth and 
Peter Jupp, and at which Glennys Howarth chaired my talk. The third party question 
was “what are your personal experiences and views?” and my answer was that I had 
had personal experiences tending to support both in favour, and in opposition, of 
euthanasia. Before I could (as I feared) cease breathing, Dr. Howarth intervened, and 
said “well spoken, indeed.”
This gave me courage to write a short introduction to a volume she and Peter 
Jupp edited in 1996 (which I honestly expected to be redlined out in the galleys), and 
that gave me courage to begin to speak about sensitive topics. As I shall develop in
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this dissertation, many involved with, and interviewed for, this dissertation told their 
stories, and those of their families, and those who became their families (such as 
jurors). In their honour, is only fair that I commence with sharing my own story.
As a young girl, I had experienced the death trajectory of a parent who had a 
long-term and incurable fatal illness, which was genetically transmitted by a dominant 
gene. This meant that I had a 50 per cent chance of inheriting the disease and 
decline, which in turn had a 100 per cent chance of manifesting itself, assuming no 
intervening cause of death, such as accident. Likewise, unless there was a successful 
suicide, either altruistic or otherwise, the illness would inexorably rob physical ability 
and intellectual lucidity. In this regard, I was mindful of my father’s own experience. 
After he became ill, he attempted an unsuccessful suicide which had disastrous 
consequences for him, as I have discussed (Pappas 1996, 167). I shall amplify 
further, since I subsequently learned during the Kevorkian cases and my interviews, 
that was neither unique on the part of the would-be suicidant or its effects on the 
people around him.
I was deeply concerned and intellectually perplexed by the lack of de jure law 
and de facto criminal justice in response to these underlying illnesses and their terrible 
death trajectories. By this, I mean that there was a total lack of effective and decisive 
law, as I shall amplify upon in Chapters 3 and 4. Likewise, since I was at-risk for 
this particular form of death, I felt a compelling need to learn as much as I could 
about possibilities of voluntarily-induced death -  how to choose the time and manner 
of death, if there was no choice in potentially contracting a fatal genetic illness in 
mid-life with a 10-20 year trajectory.
Like others, I was bom into a family which shrouded the illness and death of 
my father’s mother in myth and secrecy, and which engaged in patterns of denial so
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unreal as to approach psychosis when my father began to manifest symptoms of the 
same illness that claimed four of the eight siblings of his mother’s family, I developed 
an obsessive need to learn about the illness (Huntington’s Disease) that spent two 
decades claiming his life and placed my own at risk of inexorable and uncontrollable 
decline. When family members became ill and died, there was little or no discussion 
-  unless the deaths were accidental or immediately explainable (such as by heart 
attack). Those who did try to discuss it were dismissed as “senile” (my grandfather) 
or “liar” (as with me, once I was told about my father’s defined illness in my 20’s) or 
“crazy” (as with both of us) and systematically denounced and/or exiled from the 
family, only to be summoned back to do “the dirty work” of caring for the infirm that 
the “deniers” refused to accept once there was a possibility (Cohen 2001) of being 
publicly polluted by the disease, a living embodiment of an homage phrase -  purity 
and danger (Douglass, 2002). Dlness went unacknowledged, as though to 
acknowledge it was to contract it; thus, there was a silent practice of social death 
associated with the family illness (or long term illness, as with my maternal 
grandfather, who was institutionalized after a debilitating stroke). I offer a rhetorical 
question here -  while it is beyond the scope of this research project, are not the 
nursing homes of today simply a sanitized and medicalised version of what former 
generations used to house the infirm and the insane?
Having accepted (although not embraced) my family’s behaviour as the norm 
during my childhood and adolescence, it was not until early adulthood that I had my 
first experiences of discussing and explaining my father’s illness, which had been 
evident for the preceding decade as a totally unexplained intellectual and physical 
decline (not altogether unlike full-blown AIDS). My grandfather had been assisting 
in the care of my father, and my father’s estranged sister’s husband was beginning the
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task of assisting in the care of my aunt. In hindsight, the shocking news I received at 
age 22, of the naming of my father’s illness, and the recitals of what had been 
happening and what would happen in due course, had been clearly collaborated on. 
The revelations from the grandfather I revered and from the distant uncle came within 
weeks of one another, despite the seemingly opportunistic nature of the kitchen table 
conversations.
Thus, in short order, the categories into which my father belonged, and the 
identifying labels of both him and his condition were thrust into rapid and 
kaleidoscopic shifts. Simultaneously, I became aware of his illness and what would 
be his certain mortality, and that of his sister, and a 50-50 chance my own. This was 
accompanied by an awareness that death was a part of (his) living, and potentially my 
own, and those of others in my life (as well as my potential offspring). Pain and 
bewilderment of grief, illness and unexplained illness are often met with avoidance 
and embarrassed silences. Furthermore, and particularly where the illness or death is 
marked by personality changes and movement disorders, embarrassed silences are 
almost as often met by embarrassingly pointed questions, exclusions form society, or 
even aggression that are horrifying to someone who has been deliberately left in the 
dark of lack of information concomitant with misinformation.
So I had been trained (by negative reinforcement) to be silent (ironically by 
my mother and her family, not my father and his family) about the problem, which 
left me voiceless, even as I battled the ignorance and the exile foisted upon me. I 
found the solution and solace to be in unfettered reading and writing about those who 
were similarly afflicted or isolated, and expanded into other areas of reading and 
writing (and later, teaching) about those who were marginalized by families and 
societies. (One such example of the latter was the gay and same-sex marriage
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debate.). For example, Clausen and Yarrow (1955) detailed the differences in the so 
called “meaning” of mental illness to various people in a 33 family study. Clausen 
and Yarrow observed that various persons, including the patient, had effects of these 
“semantic” positions in shaping their paths to, through and from the mental hospital. 
Davies (1961) considered deviance disavowal, where there was a refusal on the part 
of the patient to accept the characterization of deviant -  for the physically 
handicapped, this reflected an interest in minimizing the stigma of the deviance so as 
to appear normal (or to normalize interactions with others in a world of the able- 
bodied and sound minded). I would argue that decedents for whose deaths Kevorkian 
was tried were not only in a “sick role,” but were also at the end of life -  with the 
exception of Marjorie Wantz, as I shall amplify in Chapters 3 and 4. This was in a 
world of medicine, rather than one of religion.
Further, I been raised without religion and socialized to avoid social 
interaction that would bring anyone into a home of chaos and unpredictable violence 
(which was named only after the fact in medical terms of illness), there was no 
adolescent issue of embarrassing social situations with neighbors, friends or 
colleagues. In short, I was trained to be self-marginalising due to the social 
consequences of my father’s physically and psychologically-disabling biological 
condition, which went untreated for years.
These personal experiences of a long-term and largely unexplained process of 
trajectory and of my father’s lack of control over his destiny (he unsuccessfully tried 
to starve himself to death when I was 15, at which time my grandfather and elder 
sister intervened by having him institutionalized and force fed until he “recovered” 
enough to be controlled by pharmaceutical intervention) suggested to me that there 
were deficiencies in patient information and meaningful medical participation in
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treatment, and I began to question whether there was a need for informed medical 
choices in dying.
The same year that I was informed of the name and the nature of my father’s 
illness, I started a post-graduate law degree in the United States, and from 1982-1985, 
I received professional training that would prove to be the underpinnings of this 
academic study. That is to say, I learned to ask questions and to write arguments. A 
professional doctorate was quite a different experience from an academic doctoral 
exploration, and I shall discuss at length how I had to unlearn certain techniques of 
questioning and embrace new ones. A primary example is that lawyers are taught 
never to ask “why” (because it may elicit new information and thus send a trial or 
hearing testimony out of the lawyer’s control) and qualitative researchers are 
fundamentally taught to ask why and how (so as to obtain new facts and expand the 
information-gathering process). Only in the field did I learn that an elusive answer to 
a question about “why” may lead to further questions or spontaneous utterances as to 
other matter (whether why, or a new question line, or a new source to contact); I also 
learned that very few of the interviewees actually did try to be elusive in their answers 
or narratives (and those who were tended to be either lawyers or members of the 
press, both seeking to promote a particular “story”).
Similarly, during the years I was a legal practitioner, I was required to 
advocate a particular “side” of a case or decision, whereas as an academic researcher, 
arguments emerged and shifted in accordance with the research findings 
(unanticipated findings were, and remain, somewhat frightening, albeit that over time, 
they have become exciting invitations to the extraordinary). Throughout, my 
curiosity was sparked to know why a similar set of facts might lead to a different 
result among jurisdictions, and the question of procedural rules and their application
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enthralled me. Why would medical euthanasia be so seemingly acceptable in the 
Netherlands and be so seemingly unacceptable in the United States?
As I shall explicitly explain, a key answer seemed to lie with the doctor, more 
than with the patient, and this is a point that I shall return to repeatedly in the course 
of this dissertation. In the Netherlands, medically hastened death was generally a 
low-key matter, with respect for the patient’s privacy as paramount. In the United 
States, and particularly in regard to the criminal law, medically-hastened death was 
(when brought to the attention of the public by the media) more sensational and 
focused upon the doctor. However, this begged the question of whether the key 
answer was actually with the American media practices, rather than the American 
medical practices, as I shall amplify throughout the field chapters. At this point, I do 
need to offer the disclaimer that in a thesis which became more and more focused 
upon the media, I decided against considering religiously-framed politics of death.
Jack “Dr. Death” Kevorkian, who began a public campaign focused on his 
assisted deaths, created rituals that he brought to the media with flamboyance, so that 
my research questions -  originally focused on a lacuna in the criminal law relating to 
how, if at all, physicians had a formal, professional role in organising the end of life 
and on an attempt to understand the Anglo-American criminal justice perspectives -  
became an exploration of a (as opposed to “the”) character and activities of particular 
person repeatedly in the public eye and the criminal courts. Kevorkian, a former 
pathologist, exerted a powerful control over methodologies designed to assist in the 
death of a consenting -  indeed, beseeching -  practice. The parallel profession of 
funeral directors “liaise with all other agencies and coordinate the after-death system 
to provide a service which aims to resolve and dispose of mortal remains with the 
least amount of ‘fuss’ and the maximum amount of ‘dignity’,” (Howarth 1996, p.2). I
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shall argue that many a physician also acts in the shadows of the criminal (as well as 
the administrative, law), but that Kevorkian arguably created a maximum amount of 
fuss and a minimum amount of patient dignity in the drama of his (purportedly) 
medical practice (as I shall amplify at length in Chapter 6). Thus, rather than offering 
an interpretation of releasing society from the dirty work of patient care of those who 
were beyond treatment, hope and hospice, Kevorkian provided an “in your face” 
shock approach relating to the practical and psychological aspects of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide (a term made common world-wide as a result of his activities).
I had originally planned, in the early 1990s, to engage in a comparative study 
of the criminal law and the criminal justice system in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, with a focus on the lack of legal clarity in this area. I had not planned a 
qualitative ethnographic study, but that is what the project became. Although I 
selected the time when I began the academic research, selecting Michigan (one of the 
50 states) as the focus for this research proved to be an opportunity that rapidly 
evolved, as did Kevorkian’s activities. Not to have selected Michigan would have 
been a missed opportunity, although at the time, it simply seemed practical to one 
interested in studying criminal law and medical euthanasia.
Kevorkian was not the norm of physicians, as I shall discuss at length in 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 6. His conduct in Michigan was designed to violate 
the norms of particular counties in that state, as I shall amplify in Chapters 2 and 6. 
However, in the course of attending and juxtaposing a series of criminal trials for 
some of his earliest and some of his latest acts, commonalities emerged among those 
involved in the trials. I shall discuss this as a methodological matter in Part H of 
Chapter I. Here, I note that while I am not seeking to demonstrate that Kevorkian was 
typical of anything (indeed, I am arguing to the contrary in both the case histories and
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the case study), he did provoke the emergence of some interesting issues. Doctors in 
the United States share a common elite professional training -  they share a given 
status, similar values, knowledge, aims and objectives and they provide the product of 
health care. Over time, the profession rejected Kevorkian (and he was stripped of his 
licenses to practice medicine) and he was ejected from the trade. Kevorkian’s 
changes in (and challenges to) ritual and custom resulted in his loss of licensure and 
ejection from the profession, as compared with other doctors who hastened the deaths 
of their patients, as I shall discuss, for example, in Chapter 5. Thus, not only was 
Kevorkian no longer considered to share much in common with his colleagues, but he 
was rejected from being one of them (part of a lengthy pattern, as I shall discuss in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 6).
In examining the social worlds (plural deliberate) that were to become built on 
the Kevorkian cases (plural also deliberate), I adopted (and adapted) an ethnographic 
approach. As I shall amplify, I engaged in participant observation of (all but one of) 
the trials and a number of related hearings, read transcripts and appellate cases, and 
conducted in-depth interviews with doctors, lawyers, judges, jurors, legislators, 
clergymen, nurses, task force members, lobbyists, decedent family members and 
members of the media. My timing was fortunate, partly because I commenced the 
research at a fortuitous moment, and partly because I suspended and reactivated 
research as dictated by the events of the 1990s.
As I shall discuss in Chapter 1 and allude to in other chapters where pertinent, 
I was a beneficiary of institutional processes from which I learned how to deal with 
sensitive research topics (anti-stalking articles, as well as assisted death) and had my 
original aide-memoire bolstered by an Institutional Review Board and risk 
assessments. As a result of these, I had an approved IRB consent colloquy (which
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included asking for permission to conduct the interview, to tape the interview, to use 
the interview in my writings) from the University of Minnesota (March 1996). 
Unusual for an IRB request, I included in the consent colloquy a disclaimer 
disclaimed that confidentiality could not be guaranteed unless specifically requested, 
due to the practical matter that everyone involved was almost immediately 
identifiable by their role, and anonymity was a virtual impossibility.
That people were willing (indeed -- as I shall show in chapter after chapter 
regarding juror, judges, family members and those in the legislature, the media and 
the professions — eager) to meet with me in private to discuss public events was 
surprising enough. That they were willing to volunteer information (that I frankly did 
not necessarily know to ask about) regarding their private worlds, along with insights 
and experiences as to the nature of the public world, was nothing short of a miracle 
that repeatedly befell me. The rich irony was that Kevorkian and his mid-1990s 
lawyer did not themselves give me formal interviews. This made the miracle of 
formal access to those identified in my field chapters even more acutely appreciated, 
although I shall also devote an entire chapter to Kevorkian (along with Fieger and 
others) regarding control over media representations and narratives. In addition, both 
the informal discussions and the formal interviews tended to lead to access to other 
sources (such as the Miller parents, who granted me a formed kitchen table interview 
after one of Kevorkian’s acquittals) in a snowball effect. In this introduction, I must 
credit Paul Rock, who gave me the single best interview question of my academic and 
professional life -  “is there anything I haven’t asked about that you want to tell me or 
any information you want to give me?”, which with rare exception led to information 
or additional sources.
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My discussion here aims to present a series of ethnographic snapshots of the 
developments and implementation of criminal law and criminal justice policy in a 
particular geographic region of the United States, along with a Rashomonesque 
account of the social structures. This will come from the rich detail and narratives of 
lives and deaths and values from key players “in their own words.”
With verbal snapshots, I have to offer another disclaimer -  the language of 
medical euthanasia and physician assisted suicide developed in detail over the course 
of the decade in both written law and the culture of the courthouse, and was used in 
different ways by many different people. Thus, while I might have offered a 
vocabulary at the outset (as I have in other writings), different people used the same 
terms differently in ways that even one steeped in the events had to constantly 
distinguish. Words and phrases were frequently politically charged, and setting and 
demeanour charged them further. Thus, I repeatedly found myself engaging in 
revisions of vocabulary, and much of this work is devoted to taxonomy as a result, 
perhaps because words and phrases developed as spoken on many an occasion. I 
concluded that this itself was illuminating, and so I have sought to document the 
contested and nature of the phenomena I was studying as it developed, which I shall 
reveal throughout the chapters of this dissertation.
What I can (and shall, particularly in Chapter 6) offer the reader, the literal 
“seer” of the words is the actual words at trial (from transcripts and trial notes), media 
tapes and interviews, along with critical commentary (Hulme 1986). My exploration 
of issues pertaining to demeanour and dramaturgy developed over time and became 
such a fascination to me that I even found myself focusing upon visual detail of 
transcripts, as a differentiating factor of status (one such example was reference to 
Kevorkian as “Dr. Kevorkian” notwithstanding his loss of licensure and status).
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Similarly, I became fascinated with plays and movies relating to the law and 
“workshopped” some of these during grant studies funded by Seton Hall University 
(including a Teaching, Learning and Technology Center grant relating to demeanour; 
an Oral Infusion grant relating to communication and dramaturgy; and a Reading and 
Writing grant relating to juries and media issues). That said, I shall repeat at various 
points, that “seeing was believing,” and some of what was visually and auditorily 
available did not readily translate to the printed page. In some cases, I have 
documented visual cues (a habit developed from my work as an appellate lawyer, 
when panel judges would say that the record did not describe this or that in the scene). 
However, I realized that the whole of what I saw and heard amounted in practice to 
more than the sum of the parts, or the words spoken.
Also, some of what I saw and heard (including some transcript matters and 
Kevorkian’s comments on the network television tape that he prompted, which in turn 
prompted the indictment and trial under which he was finally convicted) sounds 
literally unreal or mistaken. In most of those instances, I have taken pains to cite the 
primary sources for my. In some, cases, I asked people at interviews if they heard or 
saw some particular thing, as much to confirm my own experience, as well as to invite 
their comment about their own experience, One such example was when I asked 
reporter Jack Lessenberry in our March 1996 post-acquittal interview if he had seen a 
famous COURT TV reporter — who shall remain nameless — snap his fingers and 
shoosh Kevorkian and the press gaggle, which was setting up shots of him pitching 
dimes during deliberations in March 1996, with Kevorkian complaining that they 
should be using pennies). To me, the gallery photo-op shoot was a shocking example 
of setting up a press photograph in the first instance, while the television reporter 
editing out the noise and excitement was additionally shocking to me for making the
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COURT TV reporter, rather than the actual newsworthy defendant, the focus. Matters 
such as these will get further attention in Chapter 6.
Professional survival was a factor among the professions practiced by the 
elites involved in the Kevorkian cases, yet the theatrical practices felled not only 
Kevorkian, but some involved in the cases (such as Chief Prosecuting Attorney 
Richard Thompson, as I shall discuss). While Kevorkian and his agents (including 
legal and media workers, as I shall also discuss) staged displays as a way of 
promoting the issue and the man, the 1999 conviction sent a message that this did not 
advertise a quality of service that prior juries found compelling to the point of 
acquittal. I shall argue that part of this was inevitably due to the 1998 media display 
of medical euthanasia, rather than assisted suicide. Whereas Kevorkian played out 
scenes for the public, physicians generally kept these end-of-life tableaux private 
(and I shall argue that issues of the perception of patient respect and dignity came into 
play in this regard).
One consequence of the changing rituals, both public and private, was that 
physician-assisted suicide became a “coming out” issue during the 1990s, not unlike 
women’s suffrage at the beginning of that century or same-sex marriage at the 
beginning of the new millennium. An argument which I did not make explicitly 
earlier, but now see implicit in hindsight, was that this was perhaps my own 
experience as well, in terms of my father’s illness and its social consequences, my 
various choices (including embarking upon, and completing, this research project) and 
their legal consequences. (For example, a writer for the New Scientist brought this out 
with regard to insurability of those at risk of certain genetic and other illnesses, 
ironically this was an issue that was not of much interest to me in my decision to seek 
testing for Huntington’s Disease in 1993, the moment non-linkage testing was put into
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clinical trials to establish protocols in the U.K., where I resided.) During an interview 
with Lord Mustill on March 10, 1994,1 was told that Americans were rights-based, 
whereas the British were duties based, in their approaches to life and death matters.
Although I decided to reserve my interviews of members of the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics and the simultaneously convened 
Michigan Commission on Death and Dying for anther piece of writing, this comment 
was one that I found to be an excellent clue as to how the two jurisdiction should be 
juxtaposed, which I shall take one step further. Those favoring legal assisted suicide 
in Michigan spoke of rights, whereas those in opposition spoke more of duties, which 
I found to be consistent with Lord Mustill’s observation. These frames were not 
limited to assisted suicide, they could, like spectacle frames, fit end-of-life health care 
issues in a variety of ways that seemed implicit in what they (whoever the “they” 
happened to be) said and how they said it. While the assisted suicide and euthanasia 
trials of Kevorkian may have been a theatre in which both sides had (and created) 
their share of drama, this was a quiet undercurrent of the script played for the 
audience. To see the drama, one needed metaphoric bifocals, and to hear it, one 
needed parallel text.
Trial lawyers make a drama for a jury from a crisis of an alleged crime, and as 
a profession, have had hundreds of years to perfect this art, this trade. In Michigan, 
for Chief Prosecuting Attorneys and Judges, I note that as elected officials (even from 
behind the scenes, as with the chiefs), they may also play to the gallery in ways that 
their British counterparts do not. While the legal justification is that the public has 
been harmed by a crime, the bereaved family members seemed to find the ritual of 
trial offensive, and seemed to embrace the narrative process (whether by interview or 
at sentencing) to overcome the trauma they felt done to their dignity, as well as to the
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dignity of their loved ones. This interpretation may be similar to families of victims 
of homicide (Rock 2004) generally, or of families of offenders (Condry 2007), but 
these Kevorkian families were families proclaimed, not families shamed. The rituals 
of court pegged each of the groups I shall examine into a role, and nobody was 
unfettered (except perhaps Kevorkian himself, and society punished him duly with the 
progressive events of loss of licensure, loss of trial, and loss of liberty).
The chapters that follow will be divided into two sections. The first is general 
in nature, and it touches upon the social and legal consequences of death and of the 
death rituals comprising hastened death. The question of how medical euthanasia 
and physician assisted suicide came to be considered by the criminal justice system in 
the 1990s, implicit in the master’s thesis that led to this project, is expanded upon, yet 
refocused in a kaleidoscopic fashion.
The second part of this dissertation will present an ethnographic account of a 
series of criminal trials in Michigan. I should say that I am neither arguing in favor of 
nor in opposition to assisted suicide or euthanasia (which is a finding in and of itself, 
since I started the work with a definite position). I do not aim to condemn or endorse 
any views or arguments in the debate, which I truly believe to be in good faith on 
both, or all (given that there is a range of gray, in addition to black and white), sides. 
By providing a critical interpretation of the roles of those in the medical euthanasia 
and physician assisted suicide controversy in Michigan, this project is concerned with 
perceptions and organizations of roles in criminal trials of a man, as much as an 
emerging debate.
In Chapter 1 ,1 consider some of the circumstances leading to the possibility 
of a phenomenon like Jack Kevorkian. I also have brief discussions of literature 
reviews outlining debates and historical perspectives, as well as a methodology
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statement. The word “abbreviated” may perhaps be the most important signal word of 
the last sentence for any future reader, and warrant an explanation (or road map). The 
original debates were outlined in a master’s thesis of some 17,000 words (where 
10,000 was the requirement) subsequently published by the Michigan Commission on 
Death and Dying (Pappas 1994), the historical perspectives outlined in a 3,500 word 
article (Pappas 1996), and the methodology outlined in a number of essays and 
articles (Pappas 1997, 2000), and the original draft chapters totaled more than 120 
pages (approximately 50,000 words). Two matters came together to formulate the 
decision to abbreviate (or even truncate). First, because I am considering a variety of 
social and legal constructions in the four field chapters, theoretical matters are raised 
throughout. Second, in a dissertation and a topic which inextricably intertwines many 
theoretical matters, to properly address theory would have meant going nearly into a 
parallel (or second) full-length work, and still not have read (let alone discussed) 
everything in a burgeoning topic. The solution (for me) was to take up a suggestion 
in Writing Up Qualitative Research (Wolcott 2001, chapter 4). His “proposed 
alternative to devoting an entire chapter to examining the underpinnings of your 
inquiry is that other than presenting a brief justification for your study, you draw on 
the work of others on a when and as needed basis” (Wolcott 2001, 74). Thus, for the 
required literature review, “I also touch upon which literatures I am including in 
terms of history, theory, prior research, social significance of the problem, 
philosophical underpinnings of inquiry, implications for policy, applications to 
practice, and so on” (Wolcott 2001, 72) (emphasis in original for “literatures,” 
emphasis added for “which”) I have prepared in such a way as to introduce the case 
study.
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Chapter 2 considers how medical euthanasia and physician assisted suicide 
came to be an issue in Michigan in the early 1990s. In a sense, it is a bridge from the 
general to the particular, the bridge of the specific. Chapter 3 draws upon fieldwork 
conducted in Michigan and introduces the Chief Prosecuting Attorneys who initiated 
charges against Kevorkian, and the judges who managed the trials. In a very real 
sense, Chapter 3 also introduces the trials against Kevorkian that are at the center of 
this study. Chapter 4 considers the Kevorkian juries and the voir dire juror selection 
process. In the course of Chapter 4 ,1 examine the roles, values and beliefs of medical 
professionals (especially nurses) at the end of life. The ordinary citizens of a standard 
jury pool provided access to a small indicative study of a variety of attributes of 
Michiganders. In addition, the bird’s eye view of a jury sitting in judgment of 
Kevorkian (and assisted suicide) in the mid-1990s showed how the jury interpreted 
both the facts of the case before them, and the debate of the larger issue of the law.
A further interpretation of the Kevorkian trials is offered in Chapter 5, 
regarding the families of the decedents whose deaths Kevorkian hastened (either by 
assisting in suicide or by medical euthanasia). It is in this chapter that a theme 
emerges about Kevorkian’s patients engaging in a process similar to that of coming 
out (as opposed to coming forward). In Chapter 5, family members who gave 
interviews (in the acquittal cases) or gave narrative statements at the Kevorkian 
sentencing (after the 1999 conviction) sounded less bereaved and more political 
(particularly in comments about the criminal justice system). Chapter 6 analyses the 
social and legal constructions of (and by) the media in the Kevorkian cases, in which 
the media precipitated news as much as reported upon it, and literally created the 
1999 prosecution. Parallels between the drama on the small screen and drama in the 
courtroom are explored further in this chapter. In this chapter, theatrical analogies are
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themselves kaleidoscopically shifted, then placed under the microscope, bringing the
metaphors of drama and visual lenses together.
At the end of the field chapters, the concluding chapter considers some of the
inextricably intertwined issues that emerged in this comparative case study of the
criminal trials of Jack “Dr. Death” Kevorkian. This final Chapter reviews the
development of the politics of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide in Michigan.
In addition, by the concluding chapter, I shall hope to have shown that that the
families at the Kevorkian trials were clear that the decedents were atypical of
Durkheim’s suicidants. By this, I mean that the types of suicide-inducing social
pressures of the patients began to develop in patterns showing social integration of the
decedents. I shall also have shown that Kevorkian was atypical of the doctors
originally under consideration in the 1950s by Glanville Williams, Norman St. John-
Stevas, and Yale Kamisar.1 While the Kevorkian cases did not postulate a typical
case, the trials are indicative of a pattern (Pappas 1993; Smith, Blagg, and Derricourt
1988). These matters were all the more highlighted by the interviews with the
prosecutors, judges, jurors and members of the media.
Ultimately, my uneasy conclusion was that the systems of values were never
internally consistent (let alone externally so), as regarded the hastening the death of a
willing, indeed requesting, patient, were not resoluble. Michael Ignatieff, writing the
biographical A Life: Isaiah Berlin, put it well. He said:
[sjystems of values were never internally consistent. The conflict of values - - 
liberty versus mercy; tolerance versus order; liberty versus social justice; 
resistance versus prudence -was intrinsic to human life (Ignatieff 1998, 
p.285).
1 While Kamisar, a Michigander, and Kevorkian were antagonistic to one another in the 1990s, their 
personal animus is beyond the scope of this dissertation, relying upon the 1950s theoretical criminal 
law.
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I take some comfort in that greater minds than mine have wrestled with issues 
that led to no winners, only more matches. Robert Reiner, in an essay honouring the 
work of Stan Cohen,, went further backward and forward in time, noting that “Weber 
contrasted two moralities that politicians may be guided by: the ethics of 
responsibility and the ethics of conviction, or “ultimate end (Reiner 2007,409). In 
matters of assisted death, there are discrepant goods which are not complementary, 
and the attempts to litigate, legislate, and relitigate made them neither compatible nor 
resolvable. Any one system (legal, social, political, medical) had contradictory 
elements internally. Kevorkian’s trials, and the legislation that made efforts to keep 
apace, showed that there were no easy answers to these questions, which continued to 
emerge on both sides of the Atlantic. What I argue is certain is that in the Kevorkian 
cases, “[individuals who had hitherto been separated ... came together and they 
experienced in their encounters] ... meaning, structure, purpose and identity” (Rock 
1998, pp. 324-325). Prosecutors, judges, jurors, family members, members of the 
media, and Kevorkian himself found meaning, purpose and identity in the course of 
these trials, played out in the drama of the courtroom (Goffman 1959, p.211).
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Chapter One: History, Literature Review, Methodology
Introduction
This dissertation seeks to fulfill elements for a doctorate in law and sociology. 
I shall aim in this chapter to fulfill certain required elements of the dissertation. In 
this chapter, I shall include relevant versions (some of which have been published at 
length elsewhere, as noted) of historical perspectives and literature review outlining 
debates, as well as a methodology statement. These will expand upon the original 
theoretical criminological debates about medical euthanasia that I outlined in my 
M.Sc. thesis (Pappas 1992) and an article about the “then” recent historical 
perspectives pertaining to both medical euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
(Pappas 1996) an article about comparative perspectives amongst the U.K., U.S and 
the Netherlands in a paper also published in 1996, but orally presented at the first of a 
series of conferences about Death, Dying and Bereavement, organized by Glennys 
Howarth and Peter Jupp (1993). Interspersed will be information gathered along the 
way for other pieces and talks, but with the ultimate focus upon this dissertation.
I also note that because I am considering a variety of social and legal 
constructions in the four fieldwork chapters, theoretical matters are raised throughout. 
In addition, I came to the work after a number of years in a variety of roles as a legal 
practitioner as a criminal trial and appellate lawyer and judicial appellate clerk. Thus, 
I did not arrive at sociology and criminology from the traditional route. If I had, I 
might have been at home with those who, as Robert Reiner wrote in “Copping A 
Plea,” felt at ease with “theory, everyone’s first love” (Reiner 1998, p. 75). 
Moreover, I was working on a rapidly developing and evolving set of cases and 
hearings, and had to (sometimes literally) run around libraries to acquire theoretical
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knowledge about sociological,2 criminological,3 anthropological and bioethics,4 as 
well as criminal legal theory.5 I found myself seeking to study the history, theory and 
methodology possibilities as work proceeded, as well as to acquire and to participate 
in the burgeoning sociology of death.
I shall, in large measure, defer defining euthanasia and assisted suicide, 
because the terms themselves were subject to renaming (and naming, as to the latter) 
throughout the decade in a variety of ways, including (but not limited to) court 
decisions and testimony, as well as interviewees for this dissertation. Rather than 
simple definitions from which to work, these became politically charged phrase 
subject to fluidity. I found myself in the good company of task forces (including the 
Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, as well as the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics, both of which issued reports in 1994), as well as 
legislatures (including Michigan, on more than one occasion, and Oregon) in this 
regard.
Was the subject defendant, Jack Kevorkian a “Dr.” since he was formally 
medically trained? Or a “Mr.” since he had been stripped of his licenses or simply a 
status stripped “defendant?” Hulme (1984) pointed me to visual representations of 
words and names ordinarily left oral; in the Kevorkian cases, it rendered a murder 
defendant an expert. Labeling also became a politically charged matter (Downes and 
Rock 1998 pp. 177-178), particularly in the arena of victim decedents and family
2 The LSE was my initial introduction to readings and conversations in this regard.
3 During my Master’s year, I was fortunate to be permitted to audit a course taught by Paul Rock and 
David Downes on :”The Sociology of Deviance,” in addition to the core course chaired by Rock, 
Downes and Robert Reiner.
4 To compensate for this, I spent a year as a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Minnesota 
Center for Bioethics, from 1995-1996 (the basis of which was my JD credential). In order to learn 
more, I developed a university level Special Topics course regarding “Life, Death and the Law,” and 
later took on teaching in a course “Sociology/Anthropology of Health and Medicine.”
5 1 took a course in “Theoretical and Comparative Criminal Law” with Leonard Leigh and Ian Dennis 
to acquire a theoretical background in this regard, but found myself reaching further to learn more 
about issues of causation (particularly novus intervenous or supervening cause of death) and intention, 
as well as homicide.
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members (Rock 2004, Condry 2007). A great challenge for me was to use the 
phrases that others used to self-identify in this work. While the actus reus and the 
mens rea were being legally defined, I found myself drawn again and again to the 
difference between euthanasia “victim,” “client.” “patient,” Tom Youk, and the 
possibilities of the Youk family as “victims,” “bereaved,” “activists.” These were 
categories that other families, such as the family, friend and clergy of Kevorkian 
client, Merian Frederick, also struggled.
Thus, at different times and in different ways, I shall define, refine, and 
redefine, as per either the words of interviewees, testimony or legislative 
enactments. However, at this time, I shall make two broad comments. First, 
because I started this research as a criminal lawyer, I made certain 
taxonomical distinctions from the outset; these were, to my surprise and 
dismay, not at all universally accepted (or even understood). So it is that I 
now wish to state what my initial assumptions were in defining (and to note 
that these definitions were challenged over time, as I shall develop throughout 
the dissertation). I (originally) assumed a patient who had the legal capacity 
(over 18, with nothing diminished by insanity, drugs or alcohol, or mental 
illness or defect) to voluntarily (without duress) request that a medical doctor 
(in license, i.e., someone who had professional training, and a member of the 
profession in good standing) administer or help administer drugs or 
pharmaceuticals (this will also be subject to some redefining) to the patient at 
the behest of the patient; in short, I assumed informed consent (Katz 1999, pp. 
76-77). However, under Anglo-American legal theory, “[tjhough we are 
inclined to think of homicide as a secular interest, the historical background of 
desecration is essential to an adequate understanding of both the history of
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homicide and the current survival of many homicide assumptions. For 
example, consent is not a defence to homicide” Fletcher 2001, p. 236). I shall 
argue later, and particularly in Chapter 6, that this was an avenue of 
Kevorkian’s downfall, met at the street comer of publicity (Rojek 2001).
There were both question and implied answer that I brought to the 
research: "Patients' Orders and Doctors' Duties When Healing Hands are 
Requested to Render Lethal Aid: Should There be a Review of Criminal 
Justice Policy Regarding Physicians who Perform Active Euthanasia?", 
subsequently admitted into evidence as Document A-128 Michigan 
Commission on Death and Dying (1993). In that document, I spent a good 
deal of time enumerating definitions. However, since I shall be parsing a great 
deal, and the voices and writings of others will be issuing delimitations, I shall 
now state only that the original assumption did not include children, the 
incompetent (such as one in a persistent vegetative state or the clinically 
insane), or those without biological terminal illness that would result in 
imminent death in less than one year..
Second, in the original assumption, only the patient (not the patient’s 
husband/wife or family members) could be the source of the consent, by oral 
request or written document enumerating the conditions of the request (such as 
an advance directive) and the consent had to be voluntary (not flowing from 
duress or psychiatric infirmity). I found my construction to be, consistent with 
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (also known as Measure 16 of 1994). 
(Hilliard and Dombrink 2001). I shall at various points in the dissertation, deal 
with distinctions that interviewees, enactments or cases employed. Whether I 
agreed with these distinctions or not may perhaps be less important than that
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they existed. Indeed, I shall argue at various points that the simple existence 
of point and counter-point constituted a finding, when the same words were 
used to express different things or ideas.6 In the process of this, I traveled 
along a path in Michigan, learning “what is a crime?”. The Law Commission 
of Canada offered a useful secular analysis by Jean-Paul Brodeur and 
Genevieve Oulette, by discussing the “criminalized behaviour” a phrase that 
stayed with me (Brodeux and Oulette 2004, p.8), although it did not address 
purportedly consensual assisted suicide, and certainly not euthanasia. In Part 
I, I shall seek to examine some of this “criminalized behaviour.”
Part I: Recent Historical Perspectives
In this part, I shall discuss why medical hastening and/or termination 
of life, whether by euthanasia or assisted suicide, became one of the most
i.L
hotly debated topics of the end of the 20 century. While euthanasia had been 
a subject of controversy for thousands of years, the historical influences vis a 
vis the medical profession were primarily rooted in the hundred years prior to 
Kevorkian’s 1990s practice.
I shall now explore some of these historical developments which had 
an impact on the emergence of medical euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide as legal and regulatory matters My objective in so doing is to
6 A relatively easy example of this is, what is the definition of “terminally ill” when the time a patient 
was predicted to live was itself subject to interpretation. Should one have a year or less to live, or six 
months or less to live, before they are to be considered in a terminal condition? What if the illness is 
fatal, but has a long death trajectory? What if an illness will make a sane and competent person lose 
their mental and competency facilities? The simple answer must be that it was not so simple, although 
earnest minds and groups of people worked hard to deliberate to conclusions.
7 Earlier versions of this Part were presented in D. Pappas, “Recent Historical Perspectives Regarding 
Medical Euthanasia and Physician-assisted suicide,” in G.R. Dunstan and P J. Lachmann (ed.), 
Euthanasia (British Medical Bulletin) Vol. 52, No. 2 (Royal Society of Medicine Press for the British 
Council,)(1996) and in “Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Twentieth Century Chronicle,” at the 
New England Historical Association (2003).
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juxtapose events in a way that relates historical fact (and fiction) to events and 
debates of the 1990s. Sociology, law, medicine, bioethics each had roles in the 
emerging debate previously limited to philosophy and theology. As a lawyer 
commencing a research project on an area of law replete with lacunae, I took 
comfort in an analogy to what Howarth and Jefferys offered in their 1996 
article, “Euthanasia: Sociological Perspectives,” that “sociologists [were] 
beginning to study the circumstances surrounding the issues and the wider 
societal implications of possible changes in the law, professional practices and 
normative values [and t]heir work may well begin to influence public policy as 
well as private practice.” (Howarth and Jefferys 1996, p. 376).
In Part I, I shall use the term “medical aid in dying” as a term which 
euphemises the concept of medical assistance in the termination of life, and 
embraces the practices of both euthanasia (as performed by members of the 
health care team) and physician-assisted suicide. I feel obliged to note that 
while I was comfortable with that phrase in 1996,1 became less so over the 
next decade. The word “aid” specifically became one which was infused with 
politics as to both practitioners and patients.. Equally cumbersome phrases 
(such as “medical hastening of death,” an expression that wholly omits 
assisted suicide) were either incomplete or politically charged or both. Hence, 
I shall use the phrase in this Part (with departures in wording as noted).
By any nomenclature, medical aid in dying had arguably become the 
most important issue facing the medical profession, and a number of 
professions and trades having a relation to medicine. Assisted or hastened 
death also became important to an increasingly consumerist and sophisticated 
base of patients (whether terminally or chronically ill) and their families, as I
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shall especially show in Chapters 5 and 6. This argument will be supported by 
sua sponte statements of interviewees in the field chapters, including judges, 
jurors, decedent family members, and members of the media, among others. 
That said, “social phenomena do not appear spontaneously and 
autonomously.... [History] can generate an understanding of the processes of 
social change and document how a multitude of factors have served to shape 
the present” (Vago 2006, p. 425)
Developing a historical perspective of medical euthanasia .started with 
the dictionary definition of history offered by J.M. Hawkins in The Oxford 
Paperback Dictionary (1990, p.383) as the “continuous methodical record of 
important or public events ... the study of past events, especially of human 
affairs.” I accepted that history was the record of human society. This said, 
the first difficulty for a criminal lawyer developing a historical perspective on 
medical euthanasia (and I use that phrase deliberately, as pre-dating the 1990s 
construction of physician-assisted suicide) was the fact that essays advocating 
(legally permissible) active euthanasia in the context of modem medicine first 
appeared in the US and the UK in the 1870s (Kemp 2002; New York State 
Task Force on Life and the Law 1994, p. 81). This was nearly 
contemporaneous with the emergence of eugenics; a concept defined in 1883 
by British scientist Francis Galton with reference to a scientific and social 
movement whereby better breeding could be effected by manipulating 
heredity (Kemp 2002, pp. 87-89; Stepan 1991, pp. 1-2), notwithstanding 
millennia of debate of the topic in other disciplines.
I argue that this is unsurprising given that the modem hospital was 
considered to have existed for approximately 100 years and that its function
26
and efficacy had changed dramatically. Hoefler and Kamoie, in Deathright:
Culture, Medicine Politics and the Right to Die (1994, pp.67-68) observed that 
before the twentieth century, 25% patient mortality rates and 10% medical 
staff mortality rates were not uncommon annual figures, and that many 
members of both groups succumbed to acute infections derivative of their 
presence, rather than their role, in hospital.8 Therefore, in considering medical 
aid in dying, my exploration of historical perspectives ultimately found itself 
rooted in the early part of the 20th century (Kuepper 1981, p.56 n.84; Kemp 
2002, p.45-46).
With the modernization of medicine, religion was replaced by 
medicine as the major institutional moulder of cultural death fears and 
immortality desires. This was because modem medicine, like religion and the 
law, sought to discover, control and eradicate undesirable elements (Kearl 
1989: 406). Breakthroughs during the 20th century empowered doctors to 
successfully battle acute infections and to perform life saving surgeries; in 
turn, the hospital was transformed from a place essentially functioning as a 
hospice to an institution for the sick and injured to receive medical, surgical 
and curative treatment (Fins 2006, pp. 63-64). Technological advances further 
armed the medical profession, enabling success in the battle against untimely 
deaths brought on by failing organs (Fins 2006, pp. 64-67) (I note explicitly 
that the technology related to organ failure and transplantation is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, other than to say that it exists). The roles of doctors
8 Hoefler and Kamoie, after citing these astonishing statistics, went on to attribute subsequent reduced 
hospital mortality rates to Florence Nightingale’s crusade against unsanitary conditions in hospitals, 
which she waged during the 1880s’s (sic) (Hoeffler and Kamoie 1994, p. 67-68), before which 
hospitals were relegated to being primarily religious and charitable places for warehousing the sick and 
the poor (1994, p.67). I am grateful to Glennys Howarth and to David Downes for pointing out that 
Nightingale’s activism in this regard was primarily during the 1860s.
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in relation to the dying came to bear even less similarity to their counterparts 
of two centuries ago than hospitals.
Consider, for example, how doctors were involved with hastening the 
death of George Washington, the first President of the United States. In 1799, 
President Washington developed a sore throat; his doctors, in the two days 
before his death, “bled” five pints of blood from him, in accordance with what 
was then the state-of-the-art in medicine. Washington’s death was probably 
(and obviously inadvertently) as likely to have been caused by physical shock 
and loss of blood as by the strep throat (for which he also gargled). Hoeffler 
and Kamoie in recounting this series of presidential events (1994, p. 46-47) 
went one step short of what I shall now say -- this may well have been the 
first publicized (though neither intended nor prosecuted) “assisted death” by a 
physician in America. Of course, in the present day, Washington would likely 
have received any number of antibiotics, retained his-life blood, and likely 
lived to die of one of the degenerative diseases now common to old age.
t l iWith public health awareness and medical technology, the 20 century 
saw the defeat of acute and infectious disease. That of course, left aside the 
advent of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, which was infectious, degenerative and 
terminal and raised the question of a young and vigorous population seeking 
assisted death (Ogden 1994) in cases where there was no cure and insufficient 
(albeit much improved) medical management. Overall, degenerative illness 
rose into prominence at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
centuries. These fuelled the beginnings of the modem medical euthanasia 
controversy. Degenerative and late onset illnesses increased in visibility as 
society changed, and life expectancy doubled from a norm of 40 years in 1851
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(Taylor 1993, p. 43-44). One measure of this was that between 1886 and 
1913, cancer deaths in New England and the Mid-Atlantic area of the United 
States rose from 41 per100,000 to 90 per 100,000. I would note that cancer 
also served as the paradigmatic referent for chronic and degenerative disease 
in discussions of suicide and euthanasia in the early 1900s. One early example 
of this, on the cusp of the century, was an 1899 editorial in The Lancet, 
advising a physician that in the use of morphine and chloroform to relieve the 
pain of a patient with ovarian caner:
We consider that a practitioner is perfectly justified in pushing 
such treatment to an extreme degree, if that is the only way of 
affording freedom from acute suffering ... [and] we are of the opinion 
that even should death result, the medical man has done the best he can 
for his patient (Editorial, The Lancet 1899/1, p. 532).
When I wrote about this in 1996,1 commented “thus, the introduction
of the concept of double effect of medication as a response to intolerable
degenerative disease has an introduction into mainstream, modem medical
practice” (Pappas 1996, p. 3/8). While I still argue that this 1899 editorial in
The Lancet advocated the use of morphine in abundance for pain relief, even if
it inadvertently led to the secondary effect of hastening death, I shall now
make additional comments. First, note that the “medical man” in this opinion
piece was treating ovarian cancer -  a female specific form of the illness. Later
in this thesis, I shall recall and to contemplate the gender specific aspect in
that Kevorkian was acquitted of hastening the death of Marjorie Wantz in
1996, where her central complaint was vuvladenia, euphemized as “chronic
pelvic pain.” In drafting this dissertation, a rhetorical question emerged -
were we always prepared to silence female pain and suffering? Would the
same piece have found friendly placement in The Lancet had the pain
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complained of been associated with testicular cancer, and would Kevorkian 
have assisted in the death of a man complaining of chronic penile pain? Do 
we as a society medicalise” and “treat” female pain? Did the 1899 piece, 
which regarded hysterical pain in the literal biological sense, suggest and that 
the shortening of life for female pain was perhaps more acceptable? Or was 
there a possibility that women were more literally vocal about their pain, and 
the professional trend was that male doctors in question were more 
professionally comfortable with medicating the pain away and silencing the 
female complaints (Strauss and Glaser 1970, p.21)..
Next, I would like to consider the concept of double effect (Biggs 
2001, pp. 54-59) The primary intention is of medication is purportedly to 
alleviate pain, yet the drugs cause a secondary or inadvertent effect of 
shortening life, i.e., hastening death). This affirmative (and, if successful, 
complete) defence to homicide charges was introduced as a response to 
intolerable degenerative disease or whether it was a medical response to 
complaints of pain and suffering, it nevertheless was introduced and did arise 
in modem medical practice (Devlin 1985). Moreover, as I shall argue later, 
some pro-life advocates argued a “bastardized” version of double effect, as a 
fall back position, rather than assisted suicide or euthanasia. In such an 
instance, the truth of the matter asserted would be that the drugs were actually 
being used to hasten death, rather than to alleviate pain. In another 
“bastardization” based upon the historical theory of double effect, Kevorkian 
was able to use this to great effect in the mid-1990s trials, even in cases of 
asphyxiation by gas mask.
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I that this gave perspective to much of the activity in the modem 
medical aid in dying movement to legalize euthanasia (where the doctor was 
the primary actor) and physician-assisted suicide (where the doctor provided 
the means to a patient, who was then the primary actor). For example, interest 
groups who devoted time and economic support to campaigns in America to 
legalize assisted suicide in Washington State (the failed Proposition Initiative 
779 in 1991) and California (failed California State Terminal Illness 
Assistance in Dying Initiative 161 in 1992) were heavily supported in time and 
money by the AIDS lobbies. Russell Ogden, particularly acknowledged the 
community of Persons With Aids (PWA) as welcoming in his study, 
Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide &AIDS (1994).
I argue that AIDS (and other fatal degenerative illnesses, such as ALS, 
MS and Huntington’s Disease, all of which have adult onset) became the late 
century referent in the euthanasia and developing assisted suicide legalization 
debates. Ogden wrote:
In an article on the ethics of euthanasia and AIDS, Yamell and 
Battin (1988) argue[d] that AIDS is the disease that makes the case for 
euthanasia, since for many AIDS patients, it is not a matter of choosing 
between life and death, but between choosing to die now or to die later. 
They (Yamell and Battin) suggested] that taboo ethics, based on rigid 
moral rules, govern current laws and regulations with respect to 
euthanasia (Ogden 1994, p. 38).
Steve Kuepper, whose 1981 doctoral dissertation for Rutgers 
University, entitled “Euthanasia in America, 1890-1960: The Controversy, 
The Movement and The Law,” used cancer as the paradigmatic referent. I met 
Kuepper in Minnesota in 1995, when he told me that he had had (and 
survived) cancer, with treatment unavailable in the early part of the century.
To me, this presented a juxtaposition to a highly publicized witness at the
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March 4, 1994 public hearing (which I attended) of the Michigan Commission 
on Death and Dying -  a 37 year old woman who had what she testified to as 
“a 97 percent probability of developing Huntington’s Disease,” a fatal 
degenerative dominant genetic neurological illness (of a 10-20 year duration, 
during which a patient would inevitably and inexorably experience a “parade 
of horrors”9 commensurate with the loss of physical and mental abilities
Take together the following. First, consider a historical perspective of 
Kuepper’s (unpublished) 1981 thesis,. Second, consider Ogden’s 1994 book 
(which started out as a master’s dissertation),. Third, consider the perspective 
of 1994 testimony of the woman at risk (who appeared to be exhibiting 
Huntington’s physiologic impairment).
Considering them together leads to an important question. What does 
it actually mean to be terminally ill? Opportunistic and acute illnesses which 
would have resulted in death are now sometimes treatable or medically 
manageable, as with cancer. Degenerative illnesses, with their related 
syndromes and parades of horrors have now emerged as the central vehicle 
carrying us to natural (read, biological) death. I argue that this was, in fact 
the case and that the equally inevitable result was that our concept of illness, 
as well as our perspectives of how to manage it, has changed radically.
However, not only were doctors’ powers expanded by medical technology and 
pharmaceuticals, but patients’ roles and rights were, with a heavy emphasis on 
patient autonomy. Indeed, I argue that patients became consumers of the 
health care industry, rather than passive recipients of medical treatment, and I
9 In 1994, Dr. Howard Brody, former Chair of the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, was the 
first person to use this expression with regard to this illness in my presence, and I have used the phrase 
since. In Huntington’s Disease, a patient loses lucidity and mobility relentlessly, until rendered 
effectively bed bound in a persistent vegetative state.
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shall amplify this in Chapter 5, along with family participation in health care 
decision; related issues will arise in Chapters 3 and 4.
It was with these questions in mind that I shall next proceed to briefly 
review some of the literatures (plural deliberate) relevant to this dissertation. 
In so doing, I shall explore the historical perspectives of Nazi doctors and 
euthanasia, and some of the theoretical perspectives regarding medical 
euthanasia in the post-War period, and consider some of the relevant topics in 
the sociology of death.
Part II: Literature/s Review
In the course of the field chapters relating to chief prosecuting 
attorneys/judges, juries, families and the media, I shall point the reader to a 
embedded literature for reference, I am deliberately not taking a position 
either in favour of, or in opposition to, medical euthanasia and physician- 
assisted suicide in this dissertation. Rather, I am inviting any reader of this 
piece to draw his/her own conclusions. Thus, I do need to make a disclaimer 
at this point. .Life-spans expanded, medical technology improved, treatments 
became available. This invited older patients, who were proceeding with less 
urgency, to contemplate the issue (Kuepper 1981, Ogden 1994).
Nonetheless, the essential questions remained the same. That is, 
should competent adult patients be allowed to renegotiate death? If so, should 
the law provide either for a policy whereby doctors would not be prosecuted 
for participating or should there be a legal regulatory mechanism to allow for 
medical euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide? Suicide was 
decriminalized as a matter of Anglo-American law throughout the United
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States in state by state legislation (and in the United Kingdom by The Suicide 
Act 1961, which read, in pertinent part, “a person who aids, abets, counsels, or 
procures the suicide [defined as the act of intentionally ending one’s own life] 
of another or attempt by another to commit suicide shall be liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years).”
Fletcher commented on “the tension ... in particular circumstances by 
recognizing a special offense of killing on request,” which he likened in a 
footnote was, in the German code, “killing on demand” ... an infelicitous 
association [of language] with the phrase “abortion on demand”:
This offense of “killing on request should be distinguished 
from related variations of homicide. First, voluntary euthanasia 
obviously should be distinguished from involuntary euthanasia where 
the victim has not requested or consented to the termination of his life.
Secondly, killing by request should be distinguished from 
assisting another person to commit suicide. The difference between 
the two types of offense is a matter of degree.
Killing by request requires that the suspect be the active party 
in the termination of life; assisting someone else to commit suicide 
implies that the suicidant is the prime mover in bringing on his own 
death. If the defendant lays hands on the party wishing to die -  the 
case is readily classified as killing by request. If on the other hand, he 
merely makes pills available to the suicidant, the degree of 
participation comes closer to merely aiding in someone else’s active 
decision (Fletcher 2000, p.322)(paragraph breaks inserted).
Whereas doctors in the past were left to watch helplessly (or arguably
inadvertently hasten) the deaths of their patients, then modem medicine, with
its treatments and cures (or life-prolonging technologies) created a
circumstance whereby both doctors and patients began to renegotiate death.
Notwithstanding the fact that the doctor-patient relationship is key; doctors
and families of patients also were engaged in negotiations. An example of this
was the death of King George V in 1936, which I argue was predictive of the
families of those who are imminently terminally ill might intervene. It was
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said that the King’s personal physician, Lord Dawson of Penn, allegedly 
ascertained that Queen Mary “saw no virtue in allowing the King’s suffering 
to continue,” and took whatever steps were necessary to cut it short 
(Barrington 1990, p.87). In 1992 Nigel Cox was prosecuted in Winchester, 
where family members made similar statements (after which he injected his 
dying patient, in hospital, with potassium chloride). Dr. Jack Kevorkian was 
convicted In 1999 of euthanasia murder, for he injecting patient Tom Youk 
with a lethal cocktail (including potassium chloride, the same death inducing 
compound Cox used), notwithstanding the fact that their families were similar 
in mindset. Ronald Dworkin suggested that “the crucial question is whether a 
state can impose [the majority’s] conception of the sacred on everyone” 
(Dworkin 1993, p. 109). A number of ways of answering this question are 
available (as to doctors, patients, and families), depending on the literature one 
wishes to train their lens upon, and I shall offer some choices.
If one wanted to answer this in terms of moral issues expressed in law, 
Glanville Williams’ The Sanctity o f Life and the Criminal Law (1961),
Norman St-John Stevas’ Life, Death and the Law: A Study o f the Relationship 
between Law and Christian Morals in the English and American Legal 
Systems (1961) and Yale Kamisar’s seminal article in 46 Minnesota Law 
Review 969, “Some Non-Religious Views against Proposed “Mercy Killing 
Legislation” (1958) formulated a trinity of arguments. These three engaged 
in a debate long before assisted suicide was introduced as a concept in 
medico-legal literature or technology. Williams argued for permissive 
legislation regarding euthanasia. He suggested that the “purpose of such 
legislation would be to set doctors free from their fear of the law so that they
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can think only of the relief of their patients [and that] one result of the measure 
that doctors would welcome is that by legalizing euthanasia it would bring the 
whole subject within ordinary medical practice” (Williams 1958, p.305).
St. John-Stevas wrote against euthanasia as a theological, as well as a 
legal, matter. He noted that a criticism he had to contend with was that the 
Christian conservative attitude toward suffering was “sadistic” (St. John- 
Stevas 1961, p.272). Kamisar noted that the law on the books condemns all 
mercy killings, but that “the Law in Action is as malleable as the Law on The 
Books is uncompromising. The high incidence of failures to indict, acquittals, 
suspended sentences, and reprieves lend considerable support (sic)99 (Kamisar 
1958, p.971).
Were one to apply these three constructions to the 1936 actions of Lord 
Dawson, the 1992 case of Cox and the 1999 case of Kevorkian, the outcomes 
might not be so different. Lord Dawson of Penn was engaged in a private 
matter, operating in the shadows of the law (notwithstanding the Queen’s 
request). This appears to be the case, although he might have been providing a 
drug that would have fallen within the technical double effect principle as 
regards relieving suffering as the primary intention (with death as a result), 
and was not prosecuted. In Chapter 2 ,1 shall argue further about how the 
double effect principle may be misapplied.
Cox operated within the shadows of the law, using a heart stopping 
dmg that had no therapeutic effect. Nonetheless, he received the criminal 
justice system’s equivalent of a slap on the wrist when the court imposed a 
suspended sentence after trial. Likewise, the General Medical Council 
required him to take a palliative care course, and required him to be supervised
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for six months. (I would note that hospice physician Dr. Timothy Quill, who 
provided an illegal prescription for an overdose to a cancer patient, was given 
an even greater pass by a grand jury in New York in 1992, by refusing to 
indict him).
Kevorkian, as I shall argue in the field chapters, operated publicly and 
with self-promoted publicity. He was, in 1991, stripped of his licenses to 
practice medicine after his second and third assisted suicides (conducted on 
the same occasion). However, he succeeded in persuading more than one jury 
that he was alleviating pain and suffering by providing carbon monoxide to 
patient clients. This fit both within the double effect and within Kamisar’s 
theory of acquittals. Kevorkian was only convicted and sentenced after he 
precipitated a national of medical euthanasia by injection.
Vago (2006: 425) suggested that “the study of history .. .informs us 
who we are and that we are links who connect the past with the present and 
the future.” Thus as an analytical matter, it is interesting to point to the timing 
of the politics of euthanasia. Williams, St. John-Stevas and Kamisar were not 
writing in an academic vacuum. During the-1950s (and in what I would 
suggest was not many publication cycles earlier) doctors in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom were brought to criminal trial for alleged 
euthanasia or medical murder.
In 1950, Dr. Hermann Sander was prosecuted (and acquitted) in New 
Hampshire after he administered four injections of air into the arm of a patient, 
in circumstances strikingly similar to the 1992 Cox case. The theory of the 
defence was that Sander’s patient was “already dead” when he administered
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the injections. Thus, an intervening cause of death broke the chain of 
causation.
In the United Kingdom, Dr. John Bodkin Adams was acquitted in a 
mere 44 minutes following a defence that “treatment” was to relieve pain.
Lord Devlin, in this case, issued the first jury instruction regarding the “double 
effect” principle. That where medicine was administered to relieve pain, but 
death was hastened, the requisite intent for homicide was absent (and hence a 
not guilty verdict appropriate). I read this jury instruction in an extant 
transcript at the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies in London. Further, I 
argue that the prosecutions may well have precipitated the line of academic 
contemplation.
At this point, I shall make a disclaimer, with regard to language. I 
shall use the phrase “mercy killing” to distinguish from medical euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide cases in which a husband shoots or suffocates a 
terminally ill wife, or a parent commits such acts on a child who is ill. I would 
note that mercy killing has itself remained a political term. For example, in 
the Written Evicence of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical 
Ethics (Volume II 1994, p. 18) the Home Office included a table, “Offenses 
Recorded as Homicide where Circumstance was Coded as Mercy Killing: for 
a 10-year period of 1982-1991; the table was illuminating of more than the 
number of deaths and arrests -  of the 22 cases, only one was prosecuted as a 
murder, and in that case, the perpetrator was an “acquaintance male,” who was 
convicted and received a life sentence, and the only other case involving an 
“acquaintance male” resulted in a two year period of incarceration. I question 
whether these acquaintance males were homosexual partners. I also question
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whether the victims, who were aged 50 and 25, respectively, were persons 
with AIDS. I further question whether the criminal justice system 
marginalised people already marginalised by their sexual preference.10
I argue that legislative histories also yielded a number of intriguing 
questions for Williams, Kamisar and St. John-Stevas. For example, King 
George V’s death in 1936 coincided with the year in which the then-recently 
formed Voluntary Euthanasia Society initiated The Voluntary Euthanasia 
(Legislation) Bill in the House o f Lords, “to legalize under certain conditions 
the administration of euthanasia to persons desiring it and who are suffering 
from illness of a fatal and incurable character involving severe pain.” The 
1936 bill, and a subsequent motion to introduce some years later (in 1950) an 
investigation by the House of Lords into the matter of legalizing voluntary 
euthanasia, were both defeated (Williams 1958, p. 293-311), just as the House 
of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics rejected this possibility in 1994. 
Similar legislation to the 1936 bill and efforts to legalize voluntary euthanasia 
of adults were paralleled in the United States by the birth of the Euthanasia 
Society of America, and an unsuccessful bill in Nebraska, also in 1936.
A principal objection to proposals to allow for voluntary euthanasia 
would be the “thin edge of the wedge” in allowing for any hastening of death.
Over the course of the next four chapters, I shall argue that Kevorkian 
managed to put a wedge in the legal door in Michigan, and widened it
10 The remaining 20 cases in the Home Office survey involved family members. These were variously 
prosecuted for manslaughter, infanticide or not at all. Two were imprisoned, one for 18 months and 
one for four months, twelve were put on probation, and two received suspended sentences. A related 
table of convictions under Section 2 of The Suicide Act 1961, reflected that 31 individuals had been 
convicted, but there were no statements as to what, if  any, sentence was imposed on these individuals. 
I shall offer a contrasting case in Chapter 5, of a mother who shot two sons dying of Huntington’s 
Disease, and was permitted to plead guilty to a lesser charge of assisted suicide, rather than murder, 
served minimal time and received felony probation.
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considerably, until the 1998 Youk euthanasia and 1999 conviction. This 
wedge argument should be distinguished from the theological objection which 
is that the sanctity of life must not be violated by the taking of a human life 
through medical euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, or otherwise, even 
where there is a compassionate motive.
There are again two literatures to juxtapose here. First is legislative 
task force literature, such as the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, 
which issued a report with a split recommendation in 1994 as “a group of 
people” since the legislation enacting it was invalidated on judicial appeal. I 
shall argue in the next Chapter that the MCDD may perhaps have been 
destined to fail from the outset, and I note here that Senator Fred Dillingham 
told me in interview that as a member of the Michigan Legislature’s 
Appropriations Committee, he was able to help ensure that it would not have 
funding. Other legislative task forces were treated with respect. The House 
of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, was a blue ribbon panel that 
issued a unanimous report in 1994, after a retreat that was partially intended to 
find unanimity. The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, which 
also issued a report in 1994, was a gubenatorially appointed commission with 
interdisciplinary backgrounds that promoted the sanctity of life while 
recognizing patient autonomy
These 1990s task forces were convened in response to physician 
prosecution. In New York, the prosecution was that of hospice physician Dr. 
Timothy Quill who was not indicted by the grand jury. In the United 
Kingdom, convening the Select Committee on Medical Ethics was partially in 
response to the prosecution and conviction of Dr. Nigel Cox. Named as one of
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two factors, the other was a declaratory judgment action brought with regard 
to whether to discontinue care of Tony Bland after the Hillsborough soccer 
stadium tragedy left him in a persistent vegetative state. In Michigan, the 
legislative task force was created in response to Dr. Jack Kevorkian in a piece 
of legislation that, similarly to the United Kingdom, had a civil root as well 
(which I shall discuss in Chapter 2). Each of these task forces expressed 
concern that to allow for doctors to engage euthanasia or assisted suicide in 
even the most sympathetic and compassionate of circumstances, would allow 
for an ultimate breakdown of accepted legal standards and medical ethics. At 
that time (early 1990s), assisted death was not legal in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions.11
Each of the task forces was concerned about the perspectives relating 
to Nazi doctors and euthanasia, and many were concerned as to whether there 
was a slippery slope in the Dutch experience. While the Dutch experience is 
generally beyond the scope of this dissertation, other than where used as a 
specific referent. The former was held to be the paradigmatic referent of the 
slippery slope from the voluntary to the most grotesquely involuntary of 
euthanasia programmes, abuse of medical technology, and erosion of 
traditional medical ethics.
In 1986, Yale Kamisar observed that the original Nazi euthanasia 
program was to have been a benefit to the elite, “the blessing of [which] was 
only to be granted to [true] Germans.” (Kamisar 1986, p. 140). The notorious 
“euthanasia Aktion T4” regarding the killing of the mentally ill and
11 Since then, Oregon, by ballot initiative, enacted assisted suicide legislation, including tightly 
regulated safeguards. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act survived an effort to repeal it in 1997 and a 
procedural challenge in the United States Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
At the end of 2009, the population of Washington State also voted to allow for physician-assisted 
suicide.
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handicapped in 1940 and 1941 and the “Aktion 14 f 3” which led to the 
involuntary “medical euthanasia of some 275,000 people, were actually -  and 
as a matter of law -  criminal in nature, whereas voluntary euthanasia, as 
originally contemplated had been rejected by the Nazi dominated Reichstag in 
1933. Many doctors who participated in the programme did so with impunity 
(not indicted at Nuremburg), profited from the unique opportunity to 
experiment on living human beings and they supported the Nazi utopian view 
of a society cleansed of everything sick, alien and disturbing” (Pross 1992, 
p.38). The doctors were described as “average” physicians in terms of their 
attitude, thinking and daily routines whose diaries and journals have only 
come to light in the ten years prior to the 1990s.
In stark contrast, Humphrey and Wickett noted that there was no 
record of the Nazi doctors either killing or assisting in the suicide of a patient 
who was suffering intolerably from a fatal disease” (Humphrey and Wickett 
1986: 23). Another aside was that it was nearly 50 years before a full-length 
study was published in English with regard to the Nazi euthanasia programme, 
Burleigh (1994). Moreover, Caplan (1992, p.vi) commented that it took him a 
decade to organize a two-day conference to examine “The Meaning of the 
Holocaust,” for the University of Minnesota Center for Bioethics. Caplan 
observed that there was a question as to why it was that “bioethics had paid so 
little attention to the obvious dilemma raised by the reality that Nazi doctors 
and scientists had ground their actions in moral language and ethical 
justifications, a question that was largely overlooked initially in the last 
Kevorkian case, in favour of a “crime story. A conclusion emerged from the 
50 year dearth of study of the Nazi doctors, taken together with studies during
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the 1990s polling American doctors about their attitudes and private conduct 
relating to hastening death. The Nazi journals emerged decades after the fact, 
and doctors engaging in euthanasia in the 1990s and 2000s were protected by 
quiet complicity of patients (with the exception of Kevorkian’s clients and 
cases) and by doctor-patient privilege.
The three legislative task forces, each interdisciplinary in membership 
and composition, had concern as to the potential erosion of the doctor-patient 
relationship. Perhaps the greatest are of concern here is vulnerable 
populations. John Sanford, the sole African American on the Michigan 
Commission on Death and Dying pointed out that blacks were the new 
population to have to worry about a slippery slope (Sanford Interview: March 
1994), an interesting commentary given that he was also disabled (that said, 
there were a number of disability interest groups represented on the MCDD). 
Howarth (2007, p. 151) noted that Seale and Addington-Hall (1995) found that 
“women were more likely than men to have asked for help in dying.” This 
was also an issue raised by Michigan Medical Examiner Dragovic with regard 
to the fact that an overwhelming proportion of Kevorkian’s clients were 
women, as I shall discuss further in Chapters 5 and 6.
While Seale and Addington-Hall posited that women are particularly 
vulnerable in the final years of life and are less likely to have people 
emotionally close to them, most of Kevorkian’s female clients were middle- 
aged. This raises the question of whether the “final years of life” refer to an 
emotional decline, a physical decline or advanced age. Moreover, as Howarth 
commented, “as people age, they may no longer think of death as appropriate 
at 65, 75, or even 85” (2007, p. 17). This raised for me a question as to
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whether Kevorkian’s female clients were vulnerable due to “final years” in life
(as might be the case with ALS or MS) or whether they lacked social support
systems. This is something that I shall draw further attention to in Chapter 5.
The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law noted that “the
Hippocratic Oath enjoins physicians not to harm patients and in particular not
to ‘give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor... make as suggestion to
this effect” (1994: 302). It went on to comment:
The debate about assisted suicide and euthanasia raises complex 
questions about the duties of physicians and the goals of the medical 
profession. What is a physician’s obligation when a patient requests 
assisted suicide or euthanasia? How does this obligation relate in the 
central goal of medicine? Is response to the growing public debate, the 
organized medical community has focused on the special questions 
posed for its profession (New York State Task Force on Life and the 
Law 1994, p. 103).
This concern was not singular, and it was reasonable to conclude that 
erosion of the profession by the practice was a central concern. However, this 
both Oregon and Washington State passed assisted suicide laws during, and 
after the Kevorkian cases, respectively. These statutes provide for prescription 
medication to be dispensed upon request, under strict regulatory schemes; 
however, these statutes also specify that physicians do the dispensing. In 
Chapter 4 ,1 shall consider some of the arguments and views of doctors and 
nurses in regard to assisted suicide and euthanasia.
I chose to not define euthanasia or assisted suicide until dealing with 
either cases, statutes or interviews, because these terms were in flux during the 
period of study (itself a finding), perhaps these reflected a public and political 
perception that assisted suicide. However, I note a comment by Ian 
Kennedy, in his essay, “The Last Taboo,” in The Unmasking o f Medicine 
(1981, p. 169), in discussing a potential right to die versus euthanasia, which
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included an axiom that the right to die was a right belonging to the patient (not
the doctor or medical team):
[The right to die is the] right to be allowed to die without further 
medical intervention ... the call for the ultimate right to self- 
determination and control, the right to have your own death” (Kennedy 
1981, p.159).
The sociological perspectives of euthanasia, “however that is defined,” 
(Howarth and Jefferys 1996, p.376) continued to have evolving definitions, 
while and assisted suicide was a new topic and evolving during the 1990s. 
Howarth and Jefferys noted that a sociological application would “seek 
explanations for observed variations in normative practices, beliefs and 
values” (Howarth and Jefferys 1996, p.376). A reasonable conclusion, which 
I shall discuss and argue at length in Chapter 5 is that the Kevorkian clients in 
the cases tried were not the alienated and marginalized suicidants suggested by 
Durkheim’s Suicide: A Study in Sociology (1951 translation). Rather, and 
within the ambit described by Howarth and Jefferys, they had strong families. 
From these families Kevorkian required consent. The cases that were brought 
to trial regarded patients who were fighting against degenerative illnesses that 
medical technology could not improve or stop. With Kuepper’s thesis in 
mind, whereas cancer was a referent now less involved, so too may some of 
the neurologic disorders become).
The Dutch compromise was for many years a source of discomfort to 
one practiced in the adversarial system of Anglo-American law, though in 
other publications, I have given some discussion to the Dutch (Pappas 1996, 
Pappas 1994). This said, it is not only the legal culture that is distinguishable, 
since “social policy in the Netherlands reflects the country’s cultural 
commitment to social equity and socially [and] virtually everyone in the
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Netherlands is covered by health insurance (with less than 1% of the 
population having no health insurance) (Griffiths et al. 1998, p.: 31). Prior to 
legalization, perhaps the most important case, which regarded non-somatic 
suffering, regarded the 1991 case of a psychiatrist, Dr. Chabot (Griffiths et al., 
pp. 80-82). Chabot prescribed lethal drugs, which his depressed patient took 
in his presence. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found a defense 
of necessity. However, the Supreme Court ruled that a defense of necessity 
would only be viable if there were two conflicting duties and chose to perform 
the one of greater weight -  which in a non-terminal case would not be 
applicable (Griffiths et al. 1998, p. 81). Such a decision was consistent with 
the mitigating excuse of necessity articulated by Fletcher (2001, pp.818-829).
I suggest that this Dutch case highlighted the inappropriateness of Kevorkian’s 
assisted suicide of gynecology patient Marjorie Wantz, which I shall discuss at 
length in Chapters 4 and 5.
Kevorkian’s procedures, as I shall amplify, did not have the protections 
of confirmed terminal illness and second opinions, as would have been 
required in the then comparable Australian Northern Territory Rights of the 
Terminally 111 Act (Keown 2000, pp. 153-166).. While the law was nullified in 
1997 by the federal Parliament by the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997, this was 
effectuated by removing the Northern Territories’ constitutional ability to 
legislate lawful euthanasia. While I hold to my commentary and the criticism 
that will follow in later chapters regarding gender vulnerability, citing in 
particular the example of Marjorie Wantz, I do note that the first person to 
have voluntary euthanasia under the Northern Territory Rights of the 
Terminally 111 Act was a prostate cancer patient named Bob Dent. I also note
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that once the law was nullified, the response of the first doctor to administer 
voluntary euthanasia founded Exit International; this activistic measure will 
stand in contrast to Kevorkian’s repeated
Also, I have left to the side civil challenges such as Quill (allowing for 
disconnection of a life support of a woman in a persistent vegetative state), 
Cruzan (what is the clear and convincing evidence of what a patient now in a 
persistent vegetative state would have wanted), Glucksberg and Quill (by 
which the United States rejected a liberty interest and an equal protection 
claim alleging a right to assisted suicide), and Gonzales (by which the 
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Oregon statute allowing for 
regulated assisted suicide). I had at one point viewed my work as picking up 
from the point where Dr. Carlos Gomez left off in 1991 in Regulating Death: 
Euthanasia and the Case o f the Netherlands',; Gomez, a medical doctor 
engaged in hospice, provided a counterpoint to Dr. Timothy Quill’s 1996 book 
A Midwife Through the Dying Process: Stories o f Healing and Hard Choices 
at the End o f Life. Gomez, in particular, conducted a small study of Dutch 
doctors who had been involved in euthanasia cases (which were technically 
illegal at the time, and only recently legislated as non-crimes).
Part 111: Methodology Statement
A. Field Research
When I began this study (for a master’s dissertation), the common 
parlance for the conduct I was investigating was “euthanasia,” or “medical 
euthanasia,” or as Kevorkian initially contemplated it “medicide” (Kevorkian 
1991). During my master’s year, Kevorkian made the papers for his 1991
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assisted suicides of Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller (which I shall discuss at 
various points in this dissertation, most particularly Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) 
and I was invited to engage in doctoral study. My original application process 
had no contemplation of fieldwork or field methods, and much of what I 
learned in this regard over the years was prompted by sudden questions as 
opportunities presented or challenges occurred.12 It was only over the course 
of innumerable micro steps over a dozen years that my study became about 
those surrounding the man in the defendant’s chair, an homage to Harry F.
Wolcott’s The Man in the Principal’s Office: An Ethnography. In 1973,
Wolcott defined ethnography as the “science of cultural description.” To be in 
the same room as the group, let alone to gain an insider’s perspective of the 
beliefs values and norms (McIntyre 2006), was something I had not 
contemplated.
Certainly, my prior work as an appellate lawyer, dealing with 
transcripts, was qualitative in nature (rather than quantitative). However, the 
point of a lawyer was not so much “to gain access to the conceptual world in 
which our subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense of the term, 
converse with them” (Geertz 1973, p.24). The role of the legal system for the 
legal professional (which I was in practice) is very different from the 
sociological eye in reviewing the prosecutor, defendant, witnesses, family or 
decedent, a social construction that Lisa McIntyre articulated in her case study 
of convicted murderer Hernando Washington (McIntyre 2002, p. 18-20).
12 In this regard, I must make two additional acknowledgments of my supervisors. I am particularly 
grateful to Paul Rock, who was invariably curious and informative during random stops in elevator 
wells and hallways. I am equally grateful to Robert Reiner, whom I called from more than one phone 
booth in Michigan when I found myself confronted with thorny issues, many of which have found their 
way into this dissertation in a far more articulate phone than my original queries. Both were especially 
supportive of my field efforts and taught me everything from how to ask a question to how to interpret 
a response.
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Studying the criminal trials of Jack Kevorkian entailed studying 
aspects of Michigan and Michiganders (Quinlan 2004, p/5). The site selected 
itself, because it was replete with litigation (as I shall discuss in the field 
chapters) and press (as I shall discuss in detail in Chapter 6). Michigan was 
geographically, politically and socially new territory for me, and the language 
of assisted suicide was new to virtually everyone involved (Quinlan 2004, 
p.5), and developing apace.
Ethnography requires considerable investment of time in the field, 
which translates into economic investment, as well. For me, that was not just 
travel costs, but it was also forfeited income opportunities. While I never 
resided formally in Michigan, I went there on extended (multi-week) trips 
from 1993 through 1999. These coincided with the trials, with civil litigation, 
and other events until 2004, when (with considerable uneasiness) I withdrew 
from everyone I had associated with in Michigan.13 My purpose at the 
Kevorkian trials was literally academic, and thus different from those at the 
scene of the trials, as one of “peripheral membership” (Condry 2007, p. 191;
Adler and Adler 1985, p.85).
The fieldwork for this study took place in trips of varying lengths 
(ranging from a week to six weeks) over this relatively long time period 
(approximately 10 years) and in numerous locations in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Primarily, the setting, site and 
population were in areas of Michigan, bounded into the Kevorkian 
phenomenon (Marshall and Rossman 2006, p.61). Within Michigan, and 
similarly to Condry (2007, p. 191), “the research was not tightly bound,
131 am grateful to Glennys Howarth who discussed this issue with me in a formative conversation in 
May 1993.
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temporally or geographically, but can still be broadly defined as an 
ethnographic study. The ethnographic methods employed were treated 
flexibly and adapted to fit the research problem and the environment.”
Individuals involved in the Kevorkian cases lived and worked far apart (other 
than at times when they may have converged on courts for trial, and some 
acted behind the scenes), but shared a culture of emerging criminal law and 
criminal justice policy. I would suggest that their folkways and ways of 
understanding or communicating with each other were shared, even if their 
positions in the debate and/or roles in the cases were divergent. Some groups 
(such as trial judges, chief prosecuting attorneys and members of the media) 
shared ways by which they understood each other and networks developed 
among many with similarly situated persons (such as family members, who 
developed a support group, as I shall discuss) This research provided for 
“reflexivity” in that the social research was part of the very world I studied 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1983).
When confronted by arguments that quantitative data, supposedly 
neutral and objective by sheer fact of numbers, I was forced to re-examine my 
choice of the case method and of ethnography within the case method.14 I 
found reassurance in the construction of case law as setting precedent, whereas 
surveys might be used to establish a large amount of data collected at one time 
Vago (2006, pp.427-435). However, a series of precedent setting (in both the 
legal and colloquial sense of the phrase) cases provided an opportunity to 
study trends in opinion and behaviour over time (Vago 2006: 432) and to 
tease out cultural understanding about the emerging vocabulary and debate
141 am grateful to David Field, who helped me to tease this out after a conference paper I gave in 1994.
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about (lawful or unlawful) assisted death, and its relationship not only to 
illness, but to deviance (cf. Quinlan 2004, p.5). This was not necessarily a 
debate about positivism as opposed to naturalism (Glaser and Strauss 1967), 
but rather an eclectic combination of methods as issues arose. Among these 
issues were historical debates (Williams 1958; Kamisar 1958 St. John Stevas 
2002), case studies (Glaser and Strauss 1957 et seq.) interviews (Rock: 1993, 
1998; Howarth 1996) and judicial writings (as cited in the body of the 
dissertation).
In the course of the dissertation, I shall have an opportunity to consider 
preconceived ideas (Chapter 4), as well as shifts and trends among professions 
(Chapters 3 and 6), families (Chapter 5). What was in common amongst all 
the groups in the study is that they had associations with death and with Jack 
Kevorkian, even if their association with the latter was not first-hand (as with 
jurors and legislators). As I shall discuss, some considered Kevorkian to be a 
folk devil. Others saw him as a crusader precipitating a moral panic about the 
mode, rather than the fact, of death and dying. Perhaps he was a dark and 
mysterious figure seldom encountered in any environment other than the work 
he did (compare, Howarth 1996). However, that would place him in the 
company of medical examiners and morticians throughout the country (if not 
the world), most of whom are not prosecuted for unlawful activity. A question 
(perhaps never to be answered) emerged: was Jack Kevorkian a dark 
unknown or was he a white knight?
In seeking to find the answer, over a long period of time, some of these 
elements were bounded by time (in a particular trial, for jurors). Others were 
negotiated or renegotiated (such as the ouster of one chief prosecuting attorney
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by local electoral politics, based upon willingness or lack of willingness to 
prosecute Kevorkian; or of one judge who was favourable to Kevorkian in 
1996, but harsh in sentencing him in 1999). Common language and phrasing 
evolved over time in Michigan, in ways that I shall note as they arise, but 
which I now call “colloquial terms of art” (such as “jury nullification,” which 
took on a special meaning in Michigan in the Kevorkian cases, not necessarily 
in common with academic or legal commentators). Some information was 
communicated “off the record,” yet meant for public consumption; to the part 
of me that was (and still self-identifies) as a criminal lawyer, I did not repeat 
these pieces of information. However, much more information that was 
formally “on the record” either in court transcripts or interviews would seem 
shocking to an outsider, yet seemed for the course of the cases (to which I, and 
others, became regular attendees).
My aim became progressively more focused upon the culture of the 
criminal trials (Goffman 1959, p.211). The goal became to understand and 
depict how some of the legal elite and some seemingly ordinary people who 
were pulled into the cases. How they made sense of the Kevorkian cases often 
was couched in how they made sense of their own lives, or in how they were 
seeking to do so.
It would behoove me to alert the reader to this (unanticipated) 
development over time, across racial and socio-economic boundaries, and 
professional status. While I did not go into the project with the intention of 
being absorbed by the legal culture, the trials ultimately did serve to build up 
relationships among those with “familiar faces,” in a belonging within the 
court culture. While I attended proceedings as a stranger to the matter (as
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contrasted with Kevorkian’s 1999 comments to Judge Cooper that he was a 
self-invited “guest” or defendant), over time, everyone got to know everyone 
(whether they wanted to or not) (compare, Condry 2007). There was only one 
cafeteria in the suburban Oakland County courthouse where the 1996 trials 
and the 1999 trial took place, and only one “real” restaurant in the town of 
Ionia (location of the 1997 mistrial).
I was in the same gallery as the media (and in the second 1996 trial, 
occasionally the designated room). Over time and over trials, people would 
began to recognize me, include me in conversations and lunches (one of which 
was with Kevorkian and his entourage during the deliberations of the second 
1996 trial, where the entire table was exhibiting stress, except for Kevorkian, 
who complained about the 35 cent cup of coffee). People in the gallery shared 
notes, comments, resources, insights, although in theory they were peripheral 
members (Condry 2007, p. 191, citing Adler and Adler 1998, p.5). My role as 
an academic observer was somehow in flux, as was my interaction with 
different participants in the proceedings (for example, going from a student 
sitting in a gallery to interviewing a judge to a nodding acquaintance in 
hallways). My status as a (relatively) young female of diminutive stature 
somehow served to have a largely male group of lawyers seem more willing to 
explain things to me; I felt extremely uncomfortable about this initially, until 
someone told me that “if [I was] a guy, I’d go to the squash court with the 
guys and get information.”
Initially, I did not know if I would be granted any interviews, nor did I 
know how I would conduct them. Because my first field trip was precipitated 
by unpredictable events (an indictment), and I was a neophyte at interviewing
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in a non-adversarial setting, I sought guidance. David Downes suggested to 
me that I compose an “aide memoire, ” when I expressed concern that I would 
not be able to remember my lists of questions. This proved to be excellent 
advice, as I could outline in a few words on one page my main “points” (a 
phrase literally taken from the points of an appellate brief). As interviewees 
answered questions, I could check off items; as interviewees brought up new 
topics, I simply added phrases to my hand-scribed lists on my yellow legal 
pads.
The IRB procedure I underwent in 1996 did not much alter this, other 
than to include a colloquy prior to interviews. In that colloquy, which became 
somewhat ritualistic (for me) in nature, I would state my name, and affiliation. 
I would ask for consent to do the interview for the thesis and its affiliation. In 
the colloquy, I would state why I wanted to interview individuals (read, what 
their role in the Kevorkian case/Michigan Commission on Death and 
Dying/civil legal challenges, etc. was) and ask their permission. I would also 
ask permission to record the interview (with a small hand held tape recorder), 
offer to go off the record when requested, and provide my additional contact 
details and offer interviewees opportunities subsequent to the interview to add 
to (this sometimes happened) or subtract from (this did not happen) their 
comments.. While the IRB process was not required at LSE during the period 
of research, my IRB process was in compliance with mechanisms later put 
into place.
The IRB process was essentially set to ensure that research subjects 
(interviewees) were voluntary in their participation and that they consented to 
participate by an informed consent process. Generally an IRB process
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provides for confidentiality, but my IRB colloquy had a clause in it to the 
effect that because people could be easily identified by their role in the cases 
(or other proceedings), I could not guarantee confidentiality unless specifically 
asked. Rarely was this request made, and when it was, I noted in large letters 
(usually underlined) and did not use the material requested to be confidential. 
Ironically, while I thought that it would be difficult access the raw data of 
interviews (a phrase that I am still not comfortable with, because I feel that it 
depersonalizes), to my surprise, people were not only willing, but eager to 
talk. To speak unfettered seemed -  over and over again -  to be a chance to 
unburden the unspeakable, whether it be the stress of the trials (Chapters 3 and 
6) or about how the media constructed what people said (Chapters 3 and 5) or 
to have a chance to speak out other than by a verdict (Chapter 4) or about their 
own professions (Chapters 3 and 6).
I would bring my yellow pads and lists to my interviews, which took 
place in times and locations agreed upon. Over time, I noticed that family 
members (and the juror I interviewed) generally had a preference for home or 
kitchen interviews, while a number of professionals preferred to meet in 
offices or local restaurants. In these interviews, and surprisingly to me, 
interviewees were grateful of the chance to talk about issues that in ordinary 
life might seem too sensitive for discussion (cf. Howarth 1996).
This said, there was no question that I had extraordinarily good luck 
with access to interviews, which were preceded (starting in 1996) by an 
Institutional Review Board approved colloquy designed to protect human 
subjects (interviewees). This was approved by the University of Minnesota 
IRB in March 1996 (interviews prior to then were ruled exempt under the
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guideline). Reviewing tapes and notes years later, I found that the 
ethnographic work developed through a conversation, and I sought to keep this 
intact in the analysis phase and writing up. In the next section, I shall touch 
upon some areas where I either had to acquire new skills or place myself in a 
new role. I had to “listen hard” as Paul Rock instructed, and to hear the 
cultural silences in a criminal court context, so as to draw inferences I might 
have been reluctant to in practice (especially in appellate practice, which is 
largely a paper profession bounded by a particular trial record).
In briefly recapitulating this subsection, I aruge that while ethnography 
might be one side of the qualitative/quantitative continuum, it was a valuable 
way to show insight into the life of the trials of Jack “Dr. Death” Kevorkian. I 
shall argue throughout this dissertation that the ethnography ensured that the 
social world of the Kevorkian trials would not be irretrievably lost to those 
who were not in the courtrooms interacting with the key actors. In concluding 
this subsection, I argue that the combination of interviews, the categorization 
of interviews, is original. That is to say that while I interviewed people in a 
variety of roles in the cases (and related matters, such as the Michigan 
Commission on Death and Dying and the civil challenges), how I chose to 
group the interviews for presentation in this sensitive and political debate was 
where a I had to meet a great challenge (cf. Condry 2007; Howarth 1996).
B. Analysis
I took cues for writing up from a variety of sources. I was captured by 
the anecdotal approach to case recitation that Hazel Biggs offered in 
Euthanasia: Death with Dignity and the Law (2001) and Rose Weitz offered
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in chapter introductions in The Sociology o f Health, Illness and Health Care:
A Critical Approach (4th ed.) (2007). I suggest that this was a likely outgrowth 
of my original training in law, where students read cases, and had to discern 
facts, issues of law, court holdings and rationales. A confession is necessary 
in this regard -  it was ingrained in me to develop and marshal facts in 
evidence and principles of law, and to lead a jury or appellate panel to an 
inevitable conclusion. In writing up, others would comment that I had not 
made conclusions that were clearly intended by the descriptive facts and 
analytical tools. It was alternately liberating and terrifying for me to say what 
my conclusions were, which seemed unseemly to the core of me that self­
identified as a lawyer. I shall hopefully demonstrate that I have drawn (or at 
least offered) reasonable conclusions, and linked up the research to theory.
As I wrote, I emulated sources such as Jessica Blank and Erik Jensen’s 
play, The Exonerated (2003), composed of the words of six former Death Row 
inmates, who had been exonerated post-sentence. I deliberately chose to allow 
the words to speak, rather than to account for behaviour of any one person at 
any one time or at any one place. In this regard, I allowed the record made by 
interviewees to speak for them (in a “flip side” to the argument that I shall 
make later in this dissertation with regard to demeanour). This was, in part, 
also due to the many complaints about constraints made by the court or 
misinterpretations of members of the media. I offer this as a mirror image of 
the promise that confidentiality would, when requested, be guaranteed (but not 
otherwise). That is to say, that information communicated because 
interviewees felt that had not been heard (family members) or that they could 
not otherwise voice their concerns (judges) was given sensitivity of allowing
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them to be heard, which is generally the reverse of what sensitive analysis of 
the circumstances is ordinarily perceived. Here, the sensitivity was in giving 
the interviewees voice, their voice.15
With the interviews, I also grouped thematic elements (factors) across 
a longitudinal study of participants (actors) in the drama that was the 
Kevorkian cases (drama singular as representative of a long term project, cases 
as representative of individual trials over time). By use of paired interviewees,
I juxtaposed the court statements, testimony, argument., appellate matters. In 
a different form of the narrative, in a way similarly to Hillary Jordan’s 
Mudbound (2008) or David Hare’s Murmuring Judges (1995). This was done 
with purpose, so as to create a Rashomonesque three dimensional experience 
for a curious reader, and to deploy the dramaturgical metaphor (Goffman 
1959, to which I shall frequently allude. In Chapter 6 ,1 shall take the 
dramaturgical metaphor to the courtroom itself, where Kevorkian offered 
explanations of his use of props, technical and visual aids, refined medical 
consent colloquy protocol (or “script”) and lead (Kevorkian) and minor 
(patient) roles; whether one views these as medical protocols or ritualized 
homicide is up to them.16
As I shall specify in depth in field chapters, I worked from 
accumulated field notes of interviews, trials, the full transcript of the final 
1999 Kevorkian trial and sentencing, appellate cases, and academic writings. 
Interviews were not confidential (unless confidentiality was expressly 
requested, in which case it was honored), initially because participants were
15 In response to the possible challenge that I am interpreting by using what I consider to be important 
in the tapes and in my notes, I offer the reply that another person could take the tapes or notes (with 
redactions for any matter that was communicated off-the-record).
161 am grateful to Dr. Linda Wasserman and to Olga Sekulic, Esq. for challenging me to consider this.
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readily identifiable by their roles. Only in the course of interpretation and 
writing up actively did I realize that many of the interviewees not only did not 
have no problem in either granting me access or information; in a number of 
cases (especially judges, family members and one juror), this was their 
opportunity to speak unencumbered by the role they had to play in the drama 
of the court. This was only revealed in time, and over time, and after 
reviewing notes and tapes many times. Time itself was a factor in the work -  
as much in the writing up and detecting patterns as in the good fortune of 
access.
Hand notes on yellow legal paper were my primary recordkeeping and 
record retrieval system in writing up. I took comfort in spreading these pads 
around me and flipping through the pages and, in time, became familiar 
enough with some so as to know which pad, which day, which person to look 
for. Because some events and/or statements were shocking, I looked for 
secondary backup (sometimes listening again to tapes).
Sometimes, however, the comments themselves were social action. In 
Chapter 6 ,1 shall consider legal interpretations of Kevorkian’s statements 
relating to a broadcast “segment” (an American term for a self-contained 7-18 
minute piece of a television broadcast, most usually referring to a news chat 
show or news magazine). I shall juxtapose this with Kevorkian’s narrative 
account, in which he sought to reconstruct, as well as to justify the events. 
This is in contrast to the possibility of excuse, which would have promoted a 
manslaughter conviction, or mitigation of sentence to probation (rather than 
incarceration) This was also the case with testimony at sentencing by family
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members (compare Condry 2007, p. 192-193), in which they sought to locate 
their own actions within a social frame of reference.
Taking the private world of a family member’s deathbed out into the 
public world of the criminal justice system was not limited to the family 
members of the Kevorkian decedents. It was a revelation (to me) that 
influences of family illnesses and deaths permeated almost every aspect of the 
proceedings and that almost everyone involved in any way in the Kevorkian 
cases brought these experiences into the courtroom with them, whether openly 
stated or not. It was only in the analysis and writing up that the imprint of this 
pattern became obvious, perhaps because I had believed the law to be an 
objective instrument.
C. Skills Acquired in the Course o f this Doctoral Project
During the course of both the research and the writing of this project, I 
was confronted with skill limitations. I would like to briefly list some of 
these. In fieldwork, I had to learn to drive, or more accurately become a driver 
(cf. Becker 1963). In New York, where I grew up, a rite of passage was to 
take a Drivers’ Education course at 16, get a license at 17, and use it as 
identification. I had driven for a cumulative two weeks in the 15 years after 
that, and someone kindly took me on a driving detail in the Wall Street area 
the Sunday before my first field trip. For all intents and purposes, I learned 
how to drive, and learned the rules of the road, on the highways and byways of 
Michigan.
Likewise, I spent a number of years on crutches and in physical 
therapy in the course of this project. The most important of these during the
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research period was 1996, when I postponed surgery for a number of months 
so as to attend the two Kevorkian trials in Michigan. This was not a 
responsible decision (I was on crutches and canes in snow and ice, and driving 
in addition), but it was one for which I daily took responsibility (and have no 
regret). Twice again I had to do this, in 2004/2005 and 2006/2007, when 
recoveries were slower. In recounting the 1996 experience, a colleague 
(seeking to compliment me) told me that I was “committed,” to which I 
reflexively commented that I was “insane.” A number of years later, I read 
and taught D.L. Rosenhaun’s piece in Science, “On Being Sane in Insane 
Places” (1973, p.250-258), and came to the conclusion that many (myself 
included) did things that were not within the norm, yet seemed normal in the 
context of the Kevorkian trials. For me, it was a practical matter, since I had 
the knowledge that the trials would take place, with or without my ability to be 
present; hence, I was present for the proceedings, in a matter-of-fact way.
In addition to the field related skills pertaining to driving and walking,
I found that I had to unlearn certain folkways of lawyers. A prime example of 
this was “unlearning” not asking (double negative deliberate) “why,” for the 
reason of not knowing what the answer would be on trial), while maintaining 
the professional standards and demeanour of a lawyer.
In 1994/1995,1 underwent genetic counseling and testing for 
Huntington’s Disease, and cast myself in the role of the client. This is inn 
what I now consider a political use of language, I did not conform with the 
mores, norms and customs derivative from the established practices of medical 
society. Since I did not consider myself a patient, because I was 
asymptomatic of the disease, which I learned at age 34 that I did not have the
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dominant gene for (this was well-into my field work, but nevertheless 
challenged me as to whether I was “entitled” to write about these issues).. I 
gave invited talks about the testing process, and wrote about it at length in 
1996 in an essay entitled, “Am I My Father’s Daughter?”
In hindsight, I did not learn how to be a patient, or perhaps I refused to 
be one. I called the doctors and nurses by their first names, as they did me. , I 
was never subjected to the mortification rituals associated with being one 
(such as disrobing and putting on a hospital gown, and dealing with successive 
waiting rooms). During the year long process, I was impatient with protocols 
at the Institute for Neurology in Queens Square, protocols to which I was 
subjected (and which were designed to ensure psychological security, as well 
as to develop a medical record and family history).
I was, in a sense, a deviant as a patient, by not learning how to be one 
(cf. Becker1963; Katz’ 1999 Consistent with a compelling need to know and 
to learn about medical processes and culture, I developed a special topics 
course in 2004, “Life, Death and the Law” (an homage to St. John-Stevas’
1961 book) and later, in 2006 and 2007, taught an advanced class in 
Sociology/Anthropology o f Health and Medicine, in which I focused upon 
issues relating to end-of-life and patients with chronic and terminal illnesses.
In a related vein, I created and taught courses on Crime and Civil 
Rights and Crime, Law and Society. During the former, I deployed a project 
relating to various aspects of demeanour in court, inspired in part by 
Goffman’s 1967 essay “The Nature and Deference and Demeanor” in 
Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior -  that of lawyers (I used 
the 1990 movie Reversal o f Fortune for this), defendants (I used the 1998
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Kevorkian euthanasia television segment for this), judges (I used the 1992 
movie My Cousin Vinny and court visits for this) and convicted felons who 
were exonerated after they were put on Death Row (I used the 2002 movie The 
Exonerated for this). I affectionately dubbed the grant project “The My 
Cousin Vinny grant.” In actuality, the only one of these not to actually be 
related to an actual criminal case (or a half dozen, in the case of The 
Exonerated) and post-conviction proceedings was My Cousin Vinny. In a 
related vein, I showed the Kevorkian tape and read transcript cuts in the course 
of two teaching grants, in which I focused on (respectively) the jury and the 
media aspects of the case. Some of what I developed there, I decided to write 
up in the dissertation (and vice versa). What I discovered was that in choosing 
what “clips” to include for student viewing, I was learning to edit myself with 
instructional technology (specifically wikis).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced some of the recent historical 
perspectives and literature that created an environment where doctors might 
either have been within or outside of medical practice when engaging in 
medical euthanasia or assisting in suicide. Of particular concern was that 
doctors (either acting alone or, as with the Nazi doctors) could go from 
granting a compassionate benefit of relief to the elite down a slippery slope of 
involuntary or non-voluntary euthanasia. I have also argued and justified use 
of legal case studies and ethnographic methodologies. The field work that I 
shall discuss in the following chapters will regard adult patients, who had the 
mental capacity to consent and seek assistance in ending and their lives.
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However, as this chapter has shown, some of the concepts were flexible in 
nature, and could therefore be subject to abuse under all but (or even) the most 
stringent regulation. Also, there are valid concerns that even with the strictest 
of regulations, abuse could occur, and this theme will emerge repeatedly.
In the next chapter, I shall proceed from some of the general concepts 
discussed here to the specific social and legal background of Michigan that 
existed when Jack Kevorkian commenced his activities. I shall also introduce 
some of the controversies and players in Michigan, and then move on to the 
heart of the ethnographic field work in the chapters that follow.
64
Chapter Two: The Comings of Kevorkian 
Introduction
In the first chapter, I examined how a confluence of factors came together to 
create the elements for a perfect storm of hurricane strength in which judicial 
approaches, legislative responses and prosecutorial policies would hail. First, were 
largely theoretical and academic debates over euthanasia and physician assisted 
suicide. Second, were recent historical perspectives of medically hastened death. 
Third were issues created by emerging medical technology.
In this chapter, I shall begin the process of delimiting this dissertation. The 
title of this chapter was constructed as an invitation to the reader to follow the first of 
a series of less-than-intuitive leaps in this regard. This chapter will best be described 
as a specific introduction to how euthanasia and physician assisted suicide became hot 
topics in the emerging criminal justice policy and in the criminal law in Michigan, as 
the result of the activities of Jack “Dr. Death” Kevorkian. By the end of this chapter,
I shall have set the stage for comparing a variety of outcome-determinative factors in 
the Kevorkian cases during the 1990s.
First, to set the stage, my examination here has a “before” and an “after” 
element, which will be an ongoing thematic issue in the course of this dissertation. 
This will be further reflected by chapters divided into Part I and Part n, and each part 
subdivided with A, B, C and so on. In this chapter, the “before” will relate to matters 
before Kevorkian began his Michigan assisted death activities (which will be 
discussed more fully throughout this thesis). The “after” will relate to events 
emerging after he began his practice, but prior to his first trial in 1994) Second, there 
will also be information introducing the de jure (on the books) law of Michigan, and 
the de facto law of Michigan. This will set up the comparisons between trials, which
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at first blush may seem identical in nature. However, they were legally different -
i n
partly because Kevorkian’s activities prompted changes in the law, but also partly 
because Kevorkian himself changed some of his activities. This was perhaps in 
response to the law and what I shall infer was his intention to flout it (although my 
arguments will be not necessarily be the same as those espoused by prosecutors).18
Third, while comments as to the scope (or more correctly, that which I am 
delimiting and enumerating as beyond the scope) of this thesis will be made as 
particular issues arise, I shall offer one at the outset in this chapter. During my 
fieldwork, my focus was on the state of Michigan, on criminal prosecutions for 
hastened death, and for those against Kevorkian. It was not on the Netherlands, nor 
was it on civil litigation in Anglo-American law (for example, seeking declarations of 
the validity or invalidity of law). There are many important studies relating to the 
Dutch experience (Griffiths et al. 1998; Keown 2007; Gomez 1991) and to the 
developments in civil challenges to Anglo-American law,19 which I shall amplify in 
pertinent part as relates to relevant portions of this dissertation. The Dutch experience 
was fairly well settled in its trajectory from de facto decriminalisation to de jure 
legalisation by the time I began this study (as I alluded to in the “Bitter Pill,” Pappas 
1996 ) and the civil challenges were fairly well funded and academically explored 
(largely as a result of pro-bono litigation and amici).
I do, however, wish to make two comments in this regard. First, is a 
comparative observation of the media regarding Dutch experience versus the
17 Although this was widely accepted as a given, it was also explicitly stated by legislators involved in 
the initial passage of anti-assisted suicide legislation in Michigan, as I shall discuss herein.
18 Some of these changes were practical in nature, as in the different modus operandi in the 
Wantz/Miller assisted suicides, because one methodology of hastening death did not work for both 
women he assisted at the time and place of the double occurrence. Other changes were deliberative and 
political in nature, such as the Youk euthanasia, which I shall explore at great length throughout this 
dissertation, but will be considered in terms of evidence most particularly in Chapter 6.
19 Some of these were timed during the Kevorkian prosecutions and trials, although one might argue 
that this was due to a social issue that was in legal turmoil, as opposed to any plan.
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American social and legal responses to medical euthanasia Nationally broadcast 
programmes depicting medical euthanasia in these respective jurisdictions had 
different outcomes. Since the latter was Kevorkian’s medical euthanasia of Tom 
Youk, for which Kevorkian was prosecuted and convicted a brief juxtaposition is 
warranted here.
On March 16, 1995, the BBC aired the death of Cees van Wendel de Joode by 
euthanasia in a documentary called “Dutch on Request.” Controversy weeks in 
advance of the broadcast of the medical euthanasia of the retired cafe owner (who had 
a progressive degenerative disorder) focused upon the fact that the BBC “won the 
right to show the segment only after agreeing not to cut the Dutch film.”20 After the 
broadcast, the Late Show scheduled a discussion about euthanasia.
In 1995,1 watched the broadcasts on television with a flatmate, who remarked 
that it was interesting that euthanasia was then illegal in the Netherlands, but the 
doctor was called in for the patient’s “birthday euthanasia” and not prosecuted. Less 
than three years later, Jack Kevorkian would be on the CBS network broadcast of 
Tom Youk’s euthanasia, the cornerstone case of the prosecutions I shall discuss in this 
thesis. The media aspect of this is the basis of an entire chapter, Chapter 6.
The CBS network and 60 Minutes programme aired the Youk euthanasia with 
immediacy and with a lack of balance (which I shall discuss further in Part I of 
Chapter 6), so that the network produced another segment for national broadcast 
around the time of the Kevorkian (1999) trial and sponsored a full-day conference in 
Ann Arbor regarding euthanasia, the law and the media.21 I shall limit my comment 
here to the specific note that the legal responses to the two euthanasia acts (and
201 am grateful to Jacquie Gauntlett, who gave me a clipping of an article by Richard Brooks, Media 
Editor of The Observer, entitled “’Sick’ BBC to screen Dutch mercy killing,” with a hand noted date of 
29-1-95, i.e., weeks before the broadcast.
21 This conference, which I attended, is a central focus of Part I of Chapter 6.
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doctors) were different and that the social responses and media filters were different. 
The BBC perhaps did a better or more thorough job than CBS, but I argue that the 
Dutch euthanasia was advertised and perceived as a segment about a general social 
issue, whereas the Kevorkian euthanasia was perceived as a segment about a specific 
social deviant.
My second comment, which is also one of delimitation with a note, regards the 
civil challenges to bans on assisted suicide in the United States. Little known is that 
the first such major challenge took place in Michigan, and would ultimately be the 
1994 Hobbins case considered by the Michigan Supreme Court. In a related case, the 
same appellate panel reinstated Kevorkian prosecutions for the 1991 Wantz/Miller 
deaths and the Frederick/Khalili assisted suicides, which I shall discuss further The 
famous civil challenges brought by Compassion in Dying (among others) that went to 
the United States Supreme Court in 1997 (brought by groups of plaintiffs, including 
Dr. Timothy Quill in the New York challenge that became the Vacco v. Quill case) 
were actually initiated later, as Michigan ACLU Legal Director Paul Denenfeld told 
me.
Denenfeld speculated in the mid-1990s that the reason that the United States 
Supreme Court would not take the Michigan case was because Dr. Kevorkian’s name 
was attached to it, although that was by virtue of consolidated appeals. I offer two 
other possible factors. First, the Compassion in Dying cases were jointly constructed 
and filed (on opposite sides of the country) with plaintiffs chosen for their level of 
professional respect (again, I cite the example of hospice physician and author Quill) 
and patients chosen for their level of illness (such as end stage AIDS). Second, these 
cases were brought as declaratory judgment actions in federal court, and travelled a 
fast paper path with a minimal record, citing administrative, civil and criminal
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liability as concerns for doctors (although Quill had briefly been brought before a
00grand jury in New York, which declined to indict him). During the course of those 
fast paths, they were cited and implicitly argued in the Kevorkian cases in the mid- 
1990s (especially the two 1996 trials). This was actually a in a construction of the 
debate having nothing to do with the factual matters at trial in Michigan. Again, 
because my focus was more and more trained on Michigan, I set the federal cases to 
the side.
Part I. The Michigan Back Stories (Pre-Kevorkian)
It may be difficult to ever ascertain how many doctors were asked to assist 
their patients in dying before (or, for that matter, after) Jack Kevorkian become a 
household name. In 1994, Ward and Tate argued that 60% of British, 40% of 
Australian and 75% of Dutch doctors had patients who requested their assistance in 
hastening death (1994, p.323). As I shall discuss later in this dissertation, at the end 
of the 1990s a survey of Michigan doctors was reported on in The New England 
Journal o f Medicine, but that was only after Kevorkian had been tried several times. 
Thus, I would argue, these surveys could not be considered without considering 
Kevorkian as a factor.23 However, at a conference regarding “Euthanasia: The 
Unfinished Debate,” on 21 May 1994, Dr. Sam Ahmedzai (then of the Trent Palliative 
Care Centre) said that it was a widely common, if unspoken, practice.24 In 1992,
Drey and Giszcack reported that a poll by Physician's Management Magazine
22 This was not unlike the Bland (1993) AC 789 case brought in the United Kingdom.
23 The article, by Jerald G. Bachman et al., “Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward 
Legalizing Physician-assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia,” appeared in The New England 
Journal of Medicine on February 1, 1996, v. 334 pp.303-309.
24 This represented a recurring theme -  that as long as assisted death was a private matter, it was tacitly 
allowed; if hastened death was made (especially by medical personnel) into a public mater, civil and 
criminal liability issues were raised. A question kept occurring to me -  was it assisted suicide and 
euthanasia that were being condemned by administrative and legal authorities or was it 
acknowledgement (or worse, publicity)?
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reported that some 10% of 500 physicians responding to a survey stated that they had 
“deliberately taken clinical actions that would directly cause a patient’s death and 
3.7% said they had provided information that could be used to cause a patient’s 
death.”
There was, however, one doctor in Michigan, who was unquestionably 
assisting people in dying. The criminal trials of Jack Kevorkian, who was arguably 
the most controversial (former) doctor alive in the 1990s, became the focus of this 
research. In terms of percentages, his impact was perhaps seemingly small. 
Nevertheless, he and the principles involved in his cases arguably precipitated an 
internationally famous law reform movement. Besides Kevorkian, there were other 
lawyers, judges, legislators and private citizens who left their mark on the cases. 
Perhaps they needed Kevorkian (or someone like him) to be a focal point for medical 
changes (such as improving palliative and hospice care), legal regulation (such as 
delimiting what would be lawful, as well as what would be legally banned), and social 
changes (such as how family members related to lengthier death trajectories from 
chronic, rather than acute, disease).
One of the central issues in the early 1990s, during which Kevorkian ended the 
lives of Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller, was that there was no law against assisted 
suicide or medical euthanasia in Michigan. This was the basis for a decision by Judge 
David Breck, in which he dismissed charges against Kevorkian. However, the 
charges were reinstated on appeal in 1994, and the cases were subsequently tried in 
1996 (before Judge Breck, as I shall develop more in my analysis of my interview of 
him in the next chapter). Sherry Miller and Marjorie Wantz, both from Michigan, died 
together in the fall of 1991 in an Oakland County $35-a-day cabin bare of furnishings 
and lacked electricity and indoor plumbing. The two were Kevorkian’s second and
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third assisted deaths. According to the autopsy prepared by Medical Examiner 
Dragovic:
This 58-year-old white female, Marjorie Wantz, died as a result o f poisoning by 
multiple drug injection administered by a system o f intravenous lines into the 
cubital vein o f the immobilized right arm. In consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding this death, investigation of the scene, the autopsy findings and the 
toxicological findings, the manner of death is homicide (Autopsy Report for 
Marjorie Wantz: October 24, 1991) (emphasis added).
However, Dragovic’s autopsy of Sherry Miller, the same day, concluded:
This 43-year-old white female, Sherry A. Miller, died as a result o f poisoning by 
carbon monoxide administered by a facial mask connected via a tube to a 
commercial pressurized carbon monoxide tank. In consideration of the 
circumstances surrounding this death, examination of the scene of death, the 
autopsy findings, and the toxicological findings, the manner of death is homicide 
(Autopsy Report for Sherry Miller: October 24, 1991)(emphasis added).
I offer a rhetorical question here. If a non-physician male defendant, who was 
further a casual acquaintance, ended the lives of two women in the same remote cabin 
by lethally injecting one and asphyxiating the other, what would the likely criminal 
justice consequences be?
A. 1990s Rivlin (Right to Die), Harper (Acquitted Assisting Husband),and the Earlier 
Appellate Precedents Roberts (Plea Bargaining Husband) and Campbell ( “Hopeful” 
Friend)
I would argue that the Michigan controversy actually began in 1990, with a 
civil request for a right to commit suicide, brought by David Rivlin. A source of 
information about this case was my interview with Janet Good — variously President 
of Hemlock (when I interviewed her on August 19, 1993), a Vice Chair of the 
Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, a Kevorkian advocate,. She was also a 
Kevorkian co-conspirator — she was initially indicted as a participant in the Ionia 
assisted suicide of Loretta Peabody, for which Kevorkian was prosecuted to mistrial 
in June 1997, while her charges were dropped as a compassionate measure). Last,
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Janet Good was a Kevorkian decedent (in August 1997, attended by Kevorkian and 
his then-lawyer Fieger, after she choose to give up a battle against pancreatic cancer).
Good, who was quite probably the person with the most social roles in these 
cases, told me that Rivlin’s civil suit brought no legal relief for the competent, but 
dying, man (Good Interview: August 19,1993). Around the same time, the criminal 
trial of Bertram Harper, who was prosecuted for second-degree murder in Wayne 
County after he helped his wife commit suicide, resulted in acquittal. Last, there was 
a brief effort in Oakland County to prosecute Jack Kevorkian for the assisting in 
hastening in his first death, that of Janet Adkins (which I have deeming beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, as one of the cases not tried).
Inextricably intertwined was what Good perceived (in 1993) as a lack of 
resulting changes in the law in Michigan.25 Timothy Kenney, then Assistant 
Prosecutor, who tried and lost the Harper case found himself assigned in 1994 by 
Chief Prosecuting Attorney John O’Hair to try the Wayne County Kevorkian 
prosecution. Kenney offered an explanation in interview the Harper case Kenney 
stated that Harper was a distraught husband who wanted to help his terminally ill wife 
of 28 years, to commit suicide. Because the couple knew that California had 
criminalized assisted suicide, they came to Michigan (Kenney Interview: August 20, 
1993).
Kenney identified Kevorkian as one of the reasons the Harpers went to 
Michigan for the suicide. He told me this was because it appeared that Kevorkian
25 During my 1993 interviews, I began to delimit Kevorkian’s first assisted death, that of Janet Adkins, 
as beyond the scope of the dissertation. In reviewing the interviews, I realised that a primary reason 
why I did this was that they -  the interviewees -  did so. Oakland County Chief Prosecuting Attorney 
mentioned the Adkins death and unsuccessful effort to prosecute as a reason why he began to seek 
legislative clarity, but otherwise, the Adkins case did not seem to be given much attention. For 
example, Good did not consider the Adkins case as presenting a lacuna. However, I offer a conclusion 
in this regard — for people who were pro-assisted suicide, the unsuccessful prosecution was a 
favorable outcome, whereas for Thompson, it was a negative outcome, which served as kindling for his 
anti-assisted death (or anti-Kevorkian) activism).
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would not be subject to criminal liability for assisting in his first case, that of Janet 
Adkins (Kenney Interview: August 20, 1993). In concept, the Harpers (albeit as 
patients) followed the same procedure as did New York hospice physician Timothy 
Quill. They sought to obtain an unlawful result by lawful means. Quill provided his 
patient, Diane, with sufficient drugs for an overdose. However, they arranged for her 
to take them when he was not present, so as to avoid criminal liability and for him not 
to know when the death would take place. Similarly, the Harpers went to a place 
where the conduct they were engaging in would not be considered to be a crime.
Harper was both less and more fortunate than Quill. Harper was, unlike Quill, 
indicted in Michigan for first-degree murder, whereas the New York grand jury 
refused to indict the doctor. Kenney, a line trial prosecutor, said that “she tried to put 
the bag over her head three times and failed, so after she fell asleep, he put the bag 
over her head and she died” (Kenney Interview: August 20, 1993). In our interview 
regarding the freshly indicted Kevorkian, I asked Kenney why the prosecutor’s office 
(headed by Chief Prosecuting Attorney O’Hair, whose interview I shall discuss in the 
next chapter), which was openly sympathetic to the issue of assisted suicide, did not 
simply decline to prosecute. This was a question that Kenney politely did not take a 
position in answering, and declined to comment upon. I shall argue in the next 
chapter that O’Hair’s decision to prosecute Kevorkian was actually politically 
motivated to further the issue.
Kenney was candid regarding what he believed to be the reasons for the 
Harper acquittal. He told me that “with the state of the law then, we had to charge 
Harper with murder -  there was a real sympathy factor” (Kenney Phone Interview: 
March 1, 1994). I now argue that Harper was more fortunate than Quill because he
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had open and consistent public backing in Michigan. Quill accumulated progressively 
over time after he was briefly prosecuted in New York.
Moreover, Harper had the sympathetic support of the judge in his case. Judge 
Isidore B. Torres contributed to the defendant Harper’s cause by instructing the jury 
“that if they found Defendant only assisted the suicide, then he would not be guilty.” 
The source of this jury instruction, which would normally not be available after an 
acquittal, was the original writing of Judge Breck in People v. Kevorkian CR 92- 
115190-FC, 92-DA 5303 in which he initially dismissed the charges against 
Kevorkian for the Wantz/Miller deaths. In an earlier draft of this chapter in 1994,1 
wrote, “[n]ote that this instruction, which went (unsurprisingly) unchallenged in the 
Wantz/Miller (Breck) appeal, could devastate the prosecution for open murder if it is 
deemed to be the law of the case” (Pappas draft chapter 2/1994, p.7). The 
Wantz/Miller cases, which were reinstated upon appeal by the prosecution in the 
course of the Hobbins/Kevorkian (1994) cases, were in fact subsequently tried, to 
acquittal, although, as I shall discuss in Chapter 4, the jury members did not identify 
this as a line of thought as they proceeded to a pair of acquittals in May 1996.
The social construction of the Harper legal case was explained by the then- 
state-of-the-law, which pointed to a social construction of the Kevorkian 
Wantz/Miller case as well. Betram Harper claimed that they understood that they 
would not be prosecuted because of Michigan’s “gray law,” according to a 1993 
publication by Hemlock, Cases o f Euthanasia, Mercy Killing, Suicide and Assisted 
Suicide. This was similar to the experience of Oakland County Chief Prosecuting 
Attorney Richard Thompson, who complained that he could not secure a prosecution 
against Kevorkian for the death of Janet Adkins. The latter, the first of Kevorkian’s
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hastened deaths, resulted in a dismissal because the law allowed for murder charges, 
but not assisted suicide,
Thus in both cases, prosecutors were dealing with an undefined set of laws. 
Two cases were at the center of the 1990s controversy regarding this lacuna: People 
v. Roberts, a 1920 Michigan Supreme Court case, and People v. Campbell, a 1984 
Michigan Court of Appeals case.
In Roberts, just as in the Harper case that would follow 70 years later, a 
husband assisted a wife in suicide. Unlike Harper, who affixed a plastic bag over his 
wife’s head (and thus engaged in the final act) Roberts gave his wife poison, so that 
she could end her life (and thus assisted her in the final act). Katie Roberts’ life was 
intolerable and beyond recovery from the illness of multiple sclerosis, a progressive, 
degenerative and always fatal illness, and Roberts entered a plea of guilty to a charge 
of murder. The coroner gave considerable evidence that the wife had had a “long, 
drawn out sickness [and that] her body was considerably wasted” (211 Mich, at 190). 
There was, in addition, evidence that Mrs. Roberts had tried, but failed, to commit 
suicide to end her suffering on previous occasions; this was similar to testimony by 
Marjorie Wantz’ husband Bill during the 1996 (2) trial.27 However, Medical
26 As a point of information, the Court of Appeals is an intermediate court of appellate jurisdiction in 
Michigan, whereas the Supreme Court is the high court. The Supreme Court can overrule the Court of 
Appeals, but not vice-versa; thus, where two opinions are in conflict, the Supreme Court governs.
271 was present for the trial testimony of Mr. Wantz, whom defense attorney Geoff Fieger reduced to 
tears on the stand. I have to make two comments, albeit fleetingly, in this regard. First, Fieger was not 
attacking Wantz; rather, Wantz was clearly pained to relive his wife’s medical and psychiatric history. 
Second, Marjorie Wantz was suffering from vulvadenia, euphemized by the media as “chronic pelvic 
pain,” which has repeatedly prompted the query from me as to what would Kevorkian have done if a 
man came to him complaining that penile pain made him want to end his life? This gendered question 
is rhetorical in nature, but points to an issue that was also raised in an article printed in The Detroit 
Free Press in 2000, that 71% of Kevorkian’s clientele were women. The article “2000 Study Connects 
Many of Kevorkian’s Cases: Vulerability Chief Among Traits of People Asking Him to Help Them 
Commit Suicide,” written by Patricia Anstett and originally published December 7, 2000, identified 
Wantz as one of a number of patients who had no organic chronic or terminal illness, but who did have 
major depression, and was reporting upon a work in progress by Medical Examiner Dragovic.and three 
University of South Florida psychologists whose preliminary findings were in a short piece in The New 
England Journal o f Medicine, “Dr. Jack Kevorkian and Cases of Euthanasia in Oakland County, 
Michigan, 1990-1998” (Dragovic etal. 2000, pp.1735-1736).
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Examiner. Dragovic did not find physical evidence of a terminal illness, in Marjorie 
Wantz and testimony at the ultimate 1996 trial (while compelling) referred to chronic 
Wantz’ vaginal pain that did not respond to treatment. I therefore conclude that the 
set of facts adduced was quite different from those regarding Roberts.
In the Roberts decision, the court pointedly noted with regard to Roberts’
claim:
that defendant’s wife committed no offense in committing suicide, that if she 
as a principle committed no offense in committing suicide, defendant 
committed none as an accessory before the fact” (211 Mich, at 195)... if 
defendant were charged with being guilty as an accessory of the offense of 
suicide, counsel’s argument would be more persuasive than it is. But 
defendant is not charged with that offense... He is charged with murder and 
the theory is that he committed the crime by means o f poison. He came into 
court and confessed (211 Mich. 190)(emphasis added).
The court, in concluding that Roberts’ conviction should be upheld, reiterated,
“the real criminal act charged here is not suicide, but the administering o f poison.
And to this criminal act there may be accessories and principals in the second degree”
(211 Mich, at 197, emphasis in original). Thus, the court rejected the concept of a
theory of common law accessorial liability and issued what was thereafter called “a
strong public policy statement against those who assisted suicides” (Jezewski 1991,
p. 1930). I argue that whether or not the court collectively thought that Roberts’s
conduct was detestable in supporting his wife’s suicide, his plea of guilt undermined
what may have been a colourable claim on appeal. The appellate court was faced
with a statement of culpability and a legal tradition that had no category in which to
place it. Query whether, had Mr. Roberts proceeded to trial, a jury would have
convicted him on sympathetic facts and sent him to prison for the rest of his life, or
whether it would have sent him home for the rest of his life.
In discussing the case with Oakland County Chief Prosecuting Attorney
Richard Thompson, the unswervingly pro-life prosecutor told me, “the husband [in
76
Roberts] prepared the poison, he killed the wife, its first degree murder, that’s the 
Michigan law. Or was i t ...” (Thompson Interview: April 28, 1993). The “it” 
Thompson was questioning was a reference to People v. Campbell, in which the 
intermediate appellate court was asked to “consider whether the Roberts case still 
represents the law of Michigan, and [held[that it does not” (124 Mich. App. at 337). 
Thompson (in my opinion, correctly) took the Michigan Court of Appeals to task for 
taking upon itself to overrule (and usurp) the Supreme Court of the state. While 
Thompson’s expressed view was that the intermediate court was required to follow 
Roberts, my conclusion is that the facts were easily distinguishable, thus removing the 
defendant in Campbell from the ambit of any criminal law or criminal justice policy 
flowing from the Roberts decision. Unfortunately, this potentially availing claim was 
an argument that went unmade.
The facts of the Campbell case were simple. The defendant and the decedent 
got drunk one night two weeks after the defendant had found the decedent in bed with 
the defendant’s wife. During a drunken escapade, the decedent spoke of committing 
suicide, which he had apparently never spoken of previously. The defendant initially 
refused to give the decedent a gun, but later changed his mind and further 
“encourage[ed] Kevin [the decedent[ to purchase a gun and alternately ridiculed him” 
(136 Mich. App. at 336). The decedent’s girlfriend knew of this, but told nobody, 
because the defendant had told her that the bullets were blanks and that the firing pin 
would not work. The former were not, and the latter did; thus, the decedent wrote a 
suicide note and killed himself. The defendant and the decedent’s girlfriend had 
already left the subject premises when the suicide took place.
The Campbell court noted (in my opinion, correctly) that, “defendant had no 
present intention to kill. He merely provided the weapon and departed. Defendant
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hoped Basnaw would kill himself, but hope alone is not the degree of intention 
requisite to a charge of murder” (136 Mich App. at 339). The court’s inquiry should 
have ended there. Instead, the court went on to discuss “the common law as an 
emerging process” in a reach beyond the simple facts of the case, which would have 
led to a simple holding, consistent with the 64-year-old precedent. The Campbell 
court, not finding a case on point in Michigan, went on to conduct an analysis of those 
cases which were on point in other jurisdictions (which is proper). However, the 
intermediate appellate court set aside the (higher authority of the) Supreme Court case 
because there was supposedly “doubt on the vitality of the 1920 Roberts decision (p. 
337). Note that it was not a case of properly overruling either the precedent of 
Roberts or of a statute nullifying the case.
Chief Judge Hohen, in writing for the 1983 appellate court, displayed an 
uncanny vision as to what the future would hold for Michigan. In dicta he wrote, 
“[wjhether incitement to suicide is a crime under the common law is extremely 
doubtful.... The remedy for this situation is in the legislature. We invite them to 
adopt legislation on the subject” (p. 341). In 1983, Kevorkian was in California, as 
were the Harpers, and Ron and Janet Adkins were enjoying their life in Oregon, 
before the players began to focus upon Michigan. Nonetheless, the stage was set.
Part II. Jack Kevorkian as Dramatis Persona
My discussion in the last section was to consider the Michigan cases that 
brought the possibility of a Jack Kevorkian to the state stage. An incredible number 
of lawyers and legislators invested time, money, energy, reputations and careers in the 
prosecutions of Kevorkian. As a general matter, the principals at a criminal trial are 
the prosecutor initiating, the defense attorney, complaining witness or victim, the
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judge, the jury, and the defendant. In addition to these key players is the jury, which 
like an audience at the theatre, has a large unspoken role until the end, at which time 
they proclaim their reaction by verdict (rather than applause or jeers).
In this series of cases, the central characters had major roles in more than the 
mere drama of the trial, as I shall argue in later chapters. Elite chief prosecuting 
attorneys and judges shall have their own chapter, in the next chapter. Kevorkian was 
his own defense attorney at the final trial, but references will be made to his prior 
lawyer and to the lawyer who represented Kevorkian at sentencing and on appeal. 
Moving from elites to ordinary people, the jury and its members (and potential 
members, in the prosecution for the Youk euthanasia) have a chapter. The 
complaining witness in each of these cases involving a death (whether by euthanasia 
or assisted suicide) was the state of Michigan, a sore point for family members of the 
Kevorkian decedents, in the chapter pertaining to families. The media was (and 
generally, I use the phrase “media was” as an American usage, as I shall amplify in 
Chapter 6, regarding the media’s own self-construction) also on trial in the fined 
Kevorkian case, although as a metaphorical unindicted co-conspirator, as I shall 
discuss in the final chapter.
r y a
Because I shall discuss aspects of Kevorkian’s criminal conduct and criminal
justice system interactions in all of these chapters, my introduction at this time is a
consideration of how he came to be an instrument of social and legal change in
Michigan. Deeply limited in scope, I took this decision because others had ample
information for more than one biography. First, in Mike Betzhold’s 1993 critical
book, An Appointment with Doctor Death as I shall argue in Chapter 6 that reporter
Jack Lessenberry sought to create in his articles during the 1990s and by his
281 shall detail and comment upon Kevorkian-related arguments between former Detroit Free Press 
reporter Betzhold and former New York Times “stringer” (occasional reporter) Lessenberry at length in 
Chapter 6.
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participation as a key player in the Youk tape delivery to network television 
producers. Second, a formal biography Between the Dying and the Dead: Dr. Jack 
Kevorkian’s Life and the Battle to Legalize Euthanasia, written by friends Neal 
Nichol and Harry Wylie in 2006, was written in collaboration with Kevorkian.
However, one aspect that I would like to explore is how a pathologist became 
an instrument of social and legal change in Michigan. The culture of pathologists is 
an under explored area, but I took as a comparative point Pearl Katz’ 1999 book, The 
Scalpel’s Edge: The Culture o f Surgeons and put this together with information from 
early interviewees in the Michigan legislature, Senator Fred Dillingham (Dillingham 
Interview: August 23, 1993) and House Representative Nick Ciamaritaro (March 3, 
1994). Both Dillingham and Ciamaritaro were pro-life and anti-Kevorkian. 
Dillingham brought one more qualification to the interview -  he was, in fact, a death 
worker, and had been a mortician prior to taking office in the Senate (Dillingham 
Interview: August 23, 1993).
The 1993 Dillingham interview obviously took place before I read the book 
Howarth authored in 1996, Last Rites: The Work o f the Modem Funeral Director 
and was shortly before I began to seek to expand my knowledge into the arena of the 
sociology of death. Although I am not writing a biography of Dillingham in this piece 
of research, I do think that some commentary is warranted. Generally, the pro-choice 
people I met with in Michigan pointedly mocked Dillingham as a non-lawyer, as a 
man obsessed with death, as defined by his job and his choice of legislation.
Ironically, Dillingham may have been more qualified than some of the lawyers 
involved, because he had an acute social awareness of death and death rituals (which I 
would argue euthanasia and assisted suicide sociologically are, although physicians 
would label them medical procedures and lawyers would label them crimes or
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justifiable or excused homicide). I would someday like to write a piece comparing 
the two death workers, Dillingham the pro-life mortician and Kevorkian the pro-death 
doctor, but that is beyond the scope of this writing, both of whom were equally 
professionally involved with death.
Here I shall make an argument similar to that in Chapter 6. As a preview, in 
Chapter 6 ,1 shall argue that Medical Examiner Dragovic and Kevorkian (representing 
himself at trial, and therefore cross-examining Dragovic) were arguing substantial 
points on a higher level of expertise. They assumed axioms in seeking to prove their 
theories of the Youk euthanasia case, so that neither lawyers (prosecutor and judge, as 
a legally trained character) nor jurors (ordinary people, with no medical professionals) 
may have followed a crucial and colourable argument regarding lack of criminal 
causation. Moreover, unlike surgeons, other specialists (save, perhaps, radiology) and 
general practitioners, pathologists do not have a client base, and therefore do not see 
(and deal) with large (or even small) numbers of people in their offices, operating 
rooms and hospital wards;. Neither do pathologists see patients for specialized tasks 
such as diagnosis, operations, or post-operative recovery (cf. Katz 1999, ix, in which 
Katz is actually criticizing a “negligible opportunity for a surgeon to become 
acquainted with an follow a particular patient through his surgical illness,” from 
which pathologists are even more removed, academic and esoteric).
Similarly to the two pathologists, my argument here is that Dillingham 
actually may have brought a higher level of understanding to the Kevorkian issue, and 
that this may have been overlooked (perhaps this is not unlike my assessment in the 
next chapter of the prescience of Richard Thompson as to the Kevorkian conduct 
trajectory over time). I have to underscore that I shall not be advocating either a pro-
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life or a pro-choice position in this argument, nor shall I be advocating a pro- 
Dillingham or a pro-Kevorkian position.
Jack Kevorkian was called a “serial mercy killer” by Dr. Arthur Caplan, who 
was then Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota. 
Kevorkian’s response was to say that “society is making ‘Dr. Death’... why can’t they 
see I’m Dr. Life!”, according to an article entitled “Suicide’s Partner: Is Jack 
Kevorkian an Angel of Mercy or is he a Killer as Some Critics Charge?” by P. 
Warrick, in the Los Angeles Times (December 6, 1992, E l c. 2). I argue that both 
statements could be true, and were in Kevorkian’s case. While Kevorkian originated 
the public moniker with The Detroit Free Press on or about February 6, 1991,29 the 
nickname is one generally associated with pathologists and medical examiners, who 
deal with medical and forensic matters (such as autopsy of the dead). Kevorkian’s 
1991 book, Prescription Medicide: The Goodness o f Planned Death was a public 
prompt for local media attention that expanded to national exposure over the course of 
the decade.
The man “Jack Kevorkian” was an enigma in the early 1990s. At the time of 
his first trial in 1994, he was 65 years old and had never been married. Biographer 
Mike Betzold said this was his sole regret (Betzold 1993). Kevorkian was, however, 
very close to his two sisters, one of whom (Margot Janus) I had a telephone interview
29 During the early 1990s, I was very fortunate to have a contact in research at the Detroit Free Press, 
Mr. Apollinaris Mwila, who gave me a computer printout — that was some 862 pages — of all the 
“Freep” articles naming Kevorkian. As of March 2, 1994, these numbered some 481 from 1988 
through March 1994, and I obtained this piece of information from page 765 of the March 2,1994  
printout. The sheer number of articles, which were not subject to a content analysis, was particularly 
staggering considering that this was before any of the trials or appellate proceedings took place. The 
juxtaposition of this, and the 1,400 articles Art Caplan and his colleagues in Pennsylvania found 
between the date the Youk euthanasia was broadcast by CBS (November 22,1998) and the Ann Arbor 
conference on assisted death, the law and the media (February 22, 1999) was intriguing as a pair of 
before and after snapshots. Because Mwila lost his job in the course of a notorious strike at the 
“Freep”, I did not have ongoing access to such computer runs, which at the time I considered a 
methodological limitation. However, because my focus shifted to the trials themselves, this became a 
de minimis issue for me.
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with on March 2, 1994 and the other of whom (Flora Holzheimer) I met and spoke
'lA
with on numerous occasions, but did not formally interview. Margot, now deceased, 
served as Kevorkian’s assistant both in terms of his assisted suicides (NBC Now 
Interview: January 13,1994) and administratively, running the campaign for a failed 
1994 referendum to make aid in dying legal in Michigan (Janus Interview: March 2, 
1994). Flora, who was living abroad, flew back to the states to attend Kevorkian’s 
trials. Kevorkian’s Armenian family was conservative -- his father owned a small 
contracting business and his mother was a deeply religious Armenian Orthodox 
woman who cared for her first-generation American children.
People I met in the early 1990s made repeated references to Kevorkian’s 
intellect. Janet Good told me he spoke five languages with fluency (Good Interview: 
August 19,1993). He painted (indeed, after his conviction, there was a gallery 
showing of his work which was a fundraiser) and he played the flute. Neal Nichol 
noted that during the Youk prosecution, he would play the flute with advocate/juror 
consultant Ruth Holmes’ daughter, while he was staying at their home. Kevorkian 
was a graduate of the University of Michigan Medical School, a top student, and 
served as a medical officer in Korea. He later practiced medicine as a pathologist in 
California and Michigan, but never practiced internal or clinical medicine and did not 
have or see patients.
From a social standpoint, pathology is an intellectual practice in medicine, 
focused upon solving puzzles (rather than curing people). Further, pathologists do not 
communicate with patients at all (compare, Katz 1999, chapter 6). Katz made the 
argument that patients are separated from clinical practitioners and surgeons by
30 The last of these occasions was at the home of Kevorkian advocate and juror consultant Ruth 
Holmes, where Flora, the wife of an ambassador was stirring pots of food in the kitchen and on the 
phone with Kevorkian, who was in prison and in the process of appeal. A reasonable conclusion is that 
the Kevorkian’s “family” expanded to include members of the defendant’s team over time, a social 
construction of extended family by criminal prosecution (cf. Condry 2007).
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costume (patients’ robes v. doctors’ white coats) and a series of mortification 
exercises (example, progressive waiting rooms for the patients) designed to 
emphasize the difference in status between doctor and patient. Unlike Katz’ 
Goffmanesque (1967, 47-93) depiction of surgeons and their patients, my argument is 
that pathologists do not have even a relationship to be characterized by a power 
imbalance.
An argument that came up repeatedly in the course of both interviews and 
trials (especially the 1999 trial, as I shall discuss in Part II of Chapter 6) was that 
Kevorkian did not have respect for patient dignity when hastening their deaths. 
Whereas in the 1999 trial, the line prosecutor commented on Kevorkian not taking the 
time to close Tom Youk’s mouth as a gesture of respect (or of lack of respect),
Senator Dillingham put it far more colorfully in our interview: “if we want to live, we 
dial 911; if we want to die, we dial Kevorkian” (Dillingham Interview: August 23, 
1993). In a prior writing, I commented that Dillingham, a central player in the Senate 
in producing an anti-assisted suicide bill, was colourful and lively in his usage of 
language, which at the time surprised me generally because he was a legislator and “a 
striking feature all the more so given his profession prior to legislation -  he was a 
mortician” (Pappas 1994, p. 27). I shall now reflect upon that comment, and consider 
it along with what will develop as some of Kevorkian’s colourful comments in the 
course of the chapters that follow on. I argue that Kevorkian the pathologist and 
Dillingham the mortician were so lively in their usage of language, not despite the 
fact that they had lifelong careers in death work (Kevorkian’s post-pathology assisted 
death career and Dillingham’s post-mortician pro-life and anti-assisted suicide 
legislative career, continued the trend for both), but because of the fact that they had 
lifelong careers in death work.
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In retrospect, Kevorkian and the prime mover of the anti-assisted legislation 
(in the Senate) were mirror images of one another. Kevorkian never married and 
never had children; Dillingham was a single father of five with a very definite 
interest in dating. Kevorkian and Dillingham both came to -  and furthered -- the 
assisted suicide and euthanasia debates after other end-of-life careers. Both were 
mocked, yet both were vindicated to a certain extent. Assisted suicide is now a 
legally regulated medical procedure in Oregon and Washington State (in a sense 
vindicating Kevorkian). However, assisted suicide is now illegal in Michigan (with 
the original 1993 temporary ban sponsored by Dillingham replaced by a permanent 
ban that went undefeated by a voter initiative in 1998). I project that the issue of 
assisted suicide will ultimately reach the United States Supreme Court again (perhaps 
in a procedural challenge similar to that made against the Oregon legislation), but 
decline to wager what the outcome will be.
Kevorkian had never been involved with the criminal justice system, or with 
the law at all, until the first of his assisted suicides -  that of Janet Adkins in June 
1990.32 Subsequent to Kevorkian’s second and third assisted deaths -  the 
Wantz/Miller double cases in October 1991 — Kevorkian was stripped of his medical 
licenses in Michigan and in California, according to Chief Prosecuting Attorney 
Thompson (Thompson Phone Interview: April 28, 1993). Initially Kevorkian sought 
reinstatement, which was denied on August 21, 1992 {Matter o f Jack Kevorkian, M.D.
31 That said, Kevorkian authored a book in 1960, Medical Research and the Death Penalty, in which he 
advocated harvesting organs of Death Row prisoners while they were still alive, but under deep 
anesthesia. This book was unavailable to me, but cited by Jack Lessenberry in his New York Times 
article, “In Tactical Changes, Kevorkian Promises to Halt Suicide Aid,” (December 26, 1993, p .l, c. 
24).
32 Kevorkian’s first brush with the law was a civil suit he filed in February 1991 against a storage 
company for loss incurred when the company apparently sent some of his belongings, including 
surrealistic paintings by Kevorkian, to Australia by mistake. The paintings were controversial in their 
nature -  for example, one piece Kevorkian called “Genocide” was a nightmarish depiction with its 
frame painted in outdated blood from a blood bank, as reported by the Los Angeles Times on December 
6, 1992.
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State of Michigan Department of Commerce, Bureau of Occupational & Professional 
Regulation, Board of Medicine, Case No. 92-0070), for the stated reason that the 
Wantz/Miller deaths violated the public health code of Michigan.
Kevorkian himself did not testify at the original July 15,1992 administrative 
hearing, which was a follow-up to the original suspension of Kevorkian’s license on 
or about November 20, 1991 (less than one month after the October 23,1991 
Wantz/Miller deaths). Kevorkian subsequently told the Associated Press that “[t]he 
license is immaterial to me as long as I can help suffering humans” according to C. J. 
Castanea, in an article entitled, “Two States Target Kevorkian,” printed in USA Today 
on February 24, 1993.
Nobody questioned that Kevorkian was a man of strong views, with the 
courage of his convictions (in the colloquial sense of the phrase). He took no money
' I ' j
for assisting in the suicides or euthanasia deaths of his clients. Chief Prosecuting 
Attorney Richard Thompson offered me a different interpretation of this seemingly 
altruistic refusal of funds, that fame was the currency for Kevorkian; “Kevorkian is 
getting a benefit, even if its not financial... fame is a benefit” (Thompson Interview: 
August 20, 1993) This is consistent with arguments made by Rojek (2001). On 
occasions when Kevorkian was threatened with jail, he countered with threats to go 
on a hunger strike. When jailed he carried out the threat on two occasions in the early 
1990s (although, as I shall comment upon in Chapter 6, he did not do so when
33 At various times, I shall identify those individuals whom Kevorkian assisted as clients, patients, 
decedents, and on occasion by death number order. By phrasing such as this, I shall demonstrate my 
own shifting taxonomy, as well as the shifting taxonomy and language o f interviewees and those 
involved in the Kevorkian cases. IA reasonable conclusion to be had from this is that the social role of 
the decedent changed based upon the context of the discussion. However, I would suggest that there is 
another conclusion -  the social construction of the acts and participants were in flux throughout the 
period of research and that the definitions and labels of the conduct and the actors were similarly 
variable and evolving.
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imprisoned after conviction).34 The first hunger strike ended when another lawyer, a 
/lort-supporter, bailed Kevorkian out with $20,000, because “[Kevorkian] was holding 
our legal system hostage.” The second lasted nearly three weeks before Judge Cooper 
issued a decision, dismissing the prosecution for assisting in the suicide of Dr. Khalili 
(#20)35 and the Kaufman decision, dismissing the O’Keefe (#18) assisted suicide, 
which resulted in Kevorkian’s liberty on December 17, 1993. Initially, Kevorkian 
eschewed counsel, since he argued that he had broken no laws -  he was soon to 
acquire a lawyer, Geoffrey Nels Fieger, who conversely did not have a reputation for 
taking on “causes.”
Kevorkian represented himself during the 1999 trial for the Youk euthanasia at 
which he was convicted, and which I shall discuss in detail over the course of the next 
four chapters. The mid-1990s representation of Fieger resulted in acquittal after 
acquittal after acquittal (with one mistrial, precipitated by Fieger as I shall discuss at 
length in the next chapter). I would argue (and shall implicitly in the chapters 
following on) that a major part of those favorable endings was Fieger himself. If the 
stage is a metaphor for a trial court (Goffman 1967, p.93), Fieger was literally 
schooled in the art -  he had an M.A. in theatre and speech from the University of 
Michigan. The lawyer’s son who had wanted to be a rock star36 worked pro bono for 
the penniless physician, because he “relished the idea of spearheading one of the 
nation’s most visible causes” (This statement he made to B. Rasher, for an article 
entitled, “Tale of the Terminator,” in the Sunday Magazine of The Chicago Tribune 
on February 19, 1993).
34 Jail time is generally considered to be incarceration of less than one year in a local facility, whereas 
prison is generally a post-conviction incarceration in a state facility.
5 This case was subsequently reinstated by the Michigan appellate courts, and tried to acquittal in 
1996.
36 Fieger’s brother, Doug, actually was briefly a rock star as a member of “The Knack,” most famous 
for the song “My Sharona.”
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A reasonable conclusion to be had from this is that Fieger became involved 
with the Kevorkian cases not because of Kevorkian or the cause he was furthering, 
but because assisted suicide was a cause celebre and that Fieger was himself 
(successfully) seeking fame. Lisa Gleicher, an attorney at Goodman, Millender and 
Eden, who was working on a civil challenge to assisted suicide legislation in the mid- 
1990s made the comment that “he brings back big verdicts [in civil tort cases], he is 
very good at what he does; Geoffrey Fieger is a story” (Gleicher Interview: August 
19, 1993). Although Fieger was not the focus of my story, without Fieger (or 
someone who was similarly an extreme dramatist), there would not have been a story 
about Kevorkian, let alone a decade long one. To give a flavour of the story, Oakland 
County Chief Prosecuting Attorney Richard Thompson of the Wantz/Miller cases 
called Fieger a “circus ringmaster,”37 in reference to near daily media events Fieger 
arranged on behalf of Kevorkian (a compliment Fieger returned in kind, calling 
Thompson a “certified raving loon” among other things).
B. Michigan’s Assisted Suicide Enactment and the First (1994) Kevorkian Trial
When Oakland County’s Chief Prosecuting Attorney found himself frustrated 
in his initial efforts to prosecute Kevorkian, facing dismissal for lack of an appropriate 
law (the Breck decision in the Wantz/Miller assisted suicides), he successfully 
appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which reinstated the indictment of 
Kevorkian on May 10, 1993. This followed on the heels of Thompson’s unsuccessful 
effort to prosecuted Kevorkian for the first assisted suicide, that of Janet Adkins in 
1990. In an interview (which I shall discuss at further length in the next chapter),
37 The circus analogy was one that came up on more than one occasion -  both Chief Prosecuting 
Attorneys and Judges referred to the “media circus” repeatedly.
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Thompson told me “I started with Adkins to get legislation to legalize (sic) physician 
assisted suicide” (Thompson Interview: August 20, 1993).
Legislating Death: The Michigan Ban/s and Legislative/Legislator Perspectives 
Fowlerville Republican and ardently pro-life Senator Fred Dillingham, 
mentioned previously as a comparative to Kevorkian as a death worker, was the first 
to introduce a bill to criminalize assisted suicide in December 1990. The bill, known 
colloquially as the “Anti-Kevorkian Bill” went through several changes and two 
legislative sessions before it was ultimately passed as HB 4501, Public Act 270. 
When questioned about the appellation, Dillingham originally said “I have been 
accused of trying to write this law against Kevorkian, [but] I did it to show Michigan 
is not the physician assisted suicide mecca in (sic) the world.”
Dillingham’s bills had the support of Right to Life, speaking through its
•2 0
lobbyist and Legislative Director, Ed Rivet (who was also a Commissioner of the
381 met with Rivet on a number of occasions in the course of this research, first in his office and last in 
his home. While Rivet was not a visible member of the Kevorkian prosecutions (and was not a 
lawyer), he provided information and insights on the several occasions that we met. I would comment 
at this time in two regards. First, our meetings became more informal and more relaxed over time; 
proceeding from him sitting behind a desk and my taking notes to us drinking iced tea on his porch, 
while his wife and children were about. This represented a shift in our interactions, as well; going 
from interview and quasi-adversarial to informal conversational over several years. Second, Rivet was 
involved with almost all of the pro-life and anti-Kevorkian individuals I met with, who almost 
constantly (and certainly in 1993-1994) referred me to him as a source. This demonstrated great 
importance in the role of the young man who had joined Michigan Right to Life in 1988, after three 
years as a legislative aide in the Michigan House of Representatives, and two years before Kevorkian 
began his campaign. A conclusion I began to reach in the 1993-1994 field trips, which I have since 
decided was a very reasonable one (and not just an intuitive leap), was that Rivet was as much an 
conductor of a pro-life orchestra made up of sections including legislators, lawyers, activists (during a 
March 4, 1994 protest of a Michigan Commission on Death and Dying hearing, I overheard 
Ciamaritaro asking Dillingham “[w]here is Rivet?” in a way of demeanour that suggested to me not an 
absent child, but a missing principal). During our last meeting in April 1999,1 remarked about his 
generosity in opening his home to me, to discuss the Kevorkian conviction, and he told me stories of 
his father’s decline and how that confronted him in his beliefs, and later joshed about how he “got 
Pappas” (to see his arguments, which he saw as a possibility of a shift of my embracing them). His 
comments about his father prompted a lengthy discussion about how both of us had been confronted by 
a variety of experiences during the Kevorkian years, and the impact those various experiences had upon 
us, our views, and our ongoing work. At the time of this writing, Rivet was still the Legislative 
Director of Michigan Right to Life, but I would suggest that his (as well as my) views of the social and 
legal debates had taken on more textures than when the work began. A reasonable conclusion to be
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Michigan Commission on Death and Dying). While Dillingham was noted for his 
Right to Life views, he in fact was sympathetic of the concept of death with dignity.
This was a theme which was echoed by House Representative Nick 
Ciamaritaro, who told me that even if assisted suicide was permanently banned,39 “we 
still have double effect” (Ciamaritaro Interview: March 3, 1994). To me, this was an 
extremely surprising (actually quite shocking) statement from a pro-life legislator, 
because the double effect principle states that the primary effect of a drug (such as 
morphine) that hastens the death of a patient in pain or discomfort is to ease pain, with 
the unintended ancillary or secondary result of shortening life, the purpose of the drug 
was not to hasten death.
An uncomfortable, conclusion that I reached was that it was not the death, or 
perhaps even the shortening of life, that was objectionable, but rather the public 
spectacle of a Kevorkian (as reflecting a lack of dignity for the event and a lack of 
respect for the patient and/or bereaved family) or perhaps the institutional intrusion of 
the criminal law into a private family matter. Thus, Ciamaritaro’s comment led me to 
consider that a hastened death in the context of the private family and physician with 
overdose by painkiller was somehow axiomatically and quietly acceptable to pro-life 
advocates, notwithstanding their public efforts to legislate. In this writing, I shall 
repeatedly find that I need to say that there were gray areas where one might have 
expected black and white.
Rather than concluding (as I initially did in 1994) that Ciamaritaro did not 
understand the double effect principle, I now conclude that this was a bastardized
reached would be to underscore his empathy for a variety of circumstances, while remaining committed 
to his political agenda. Although this is an aside to the actual Kevorkian prosecutions and legislation, I 
would argue that laws would not have been passed without Rivet, although his role was one behind the 
scenes.
39 Michigan had a temporary 18-month legislative ban on assisted suicide at the time of the Ciamaritaro 
interview, on March 3, 1994.
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construction of the double effect. I further conclude that this was perhaps long 
accepted part of the death trajectory for many in a cultural sense that was inconsistent 
with political or religious views. While I shall have to say that I perhaps cannot 
explain it (other than by a series of intuitive leaps), I have come to accept it as a view 
stated by more than one person. The reportable finding, in this regard, was the 
existence of this dichotomy, and I shall leave it to others to research and explain the 
reasons for the inconsistency.
This may explain why, after the Wantz/Miller deaths, Dillingham told the 
press, “we need to punch Kevorkian’s lights out right now by taking his medical 
licenses away” (October 25, 1991).40 When I met Dillingham in 1993, he was 
parenting a physically, emotionally and mentally handicapped 19-year-old daughter, 
which was said to have had an impact upon his personal and political views as a pro­
life legislator. Whether or not that was the case, he unquestionably was the leader of 
the Kevorkian opposition in Lansing (the state capitol and legislative seat) and he 
successfully sought to promote legislation banning assisted suicide at the same time 
that Kevorkian started his practice.
The result was Public Act 270, which enacted two things. First, it created a 
Commission on Death and Dying, to consider the pluses and minuses of assisted 
suicide. Second, it created an 18-month ban on assisted suicide, i.e., the law made 
physician (or otherwise) assisted suicide a crime. Thus, at the same time that 
Kevorkian was being asocialized from the profession of medicine, the legislative and
40 This quote was taken from my “DFP run, October 25, 1991, p. 728-719), with gratitude to 
Appolinaris Mwila, formerly of the Detroit Free Press. As I previously indicated, Kevorkian was 
stripped of his Michigan license to practice medicine on or about November 20, 1991, Mtr. o f Jack 
Kevorkian, M.D. No. 92-0070, for the specified reason that the Wantz/Miller deaths violated the public 
health code of Michigan. I shall expand upon the Wantz/Miller scenario in discussion of my interview 
of Oakland County Chief Prosecuting Attorney Richard Thompson, as well as by juror and family 
interviews in the relevant chapters.
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legal institutions of Michigan were preparing to socialize him for the role of 
defendant at trial.
B. Wayne County Kevorkian Prosecution: Statutory Assisted Suicide (Tom Hyde #17)
Creating law has already had a flavour of Right to Life and Hemlock. In the 
Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, nearly two-dozen interest group 
advocates made their presence known, although only half of those were officially 
commissioners. Their role regarded politicalization of the issue of assisted suicide, 
while Kevorkian’s was about the trial of the cases -  in theory.
In reality, there was a great deal of overlap (for example, both Chief 
Prosecuting Attorneys O’Hair and Thompson were on the Commission, as was -  
initially, until she resigned -  Hemlock President and Kevorkian advocate Janet 
Good). The Wayne Country (John O’Hair’s) Prosecutor’s office declined to 
prosecute a pre-HB 4501 assisted suicide, and also declined to prosecute the first post- 
4501 assisted suicide, that of Ron Masur (#16). However, O’Hair found himself with 
a highly publicized, seemingly airtight case to prosecute in August 1993, that of 
Thomas (Tom) Hyde (#17).
While the next chapter will compare views of O’Hair and Thompson, I am 
discussing the Hyde case here. A central reason for this decision is that this was the 
sole trial that I was unable to attend (due to commitments in London). Hence, I shall 
not be examining the various actors and their roles in the same way as the 
forthcoming chapters, while a concise version at this time acknowledges the case, and 
some of the issues it raised, particularly on defendant’s behalf at trial.
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The facts41 of the case in prosecuting Kevorkian for his participation in 
hastening the death of Tom Hyde, Kevorkian’s 17th client, seemed simple 42 The 
skeletal legal facts were as follows. On August 4, 1993, Thomas Hyde, a landscape 
designer suffering from ALS,43 inhaled carbon monoxide through a mask, with 
Kevorkian’s assistance and participation. Hyde made the “traditional,” or arguably 
ritual, videotape with Kevorkian. In that tape, Hyde’s voice was so slurred from 
muscular degeneration as to barely be able to support speech, but he said, “I want to 
die.”44
There was never any question or dispute that Kevorkian assisted Hyde in his 
death. Neither was there any question that Kevorkian assisted in this suicide after the 
legislative ban against assisted suicide had both been enacted and implemented into 
law. What was to later become an area of hot dispute was the geographic location 
(and thus, the county of jurisdiction) over Hyde’s death. An initial report read as 
follows:
Hyde’s death came shortly before 8A.M. Wednesday. Fieger [Kevorkian's 
then attorneyJ notified police at the Belle Isle [Wayne CountyJ post that 
Kevorkian’s van was in the park. Police, following Fieger, spotted
41 The facts  o f the case, as I shall be using the phrase throughout this dissertation, is a term of art. A 
criminal trial is a matter of facts adduced, or proven, at trial and in evidence. In other words, a trial is 
about proof (in a criminal trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt), rather than “truth” or an 
interpretation of “truth.” While some interviewees made statements to the effect that juries can find the 
underlying truth of a case, this actually points to jury nullification, as I shall discuss at length in 
Chapter 4, regarding the Kevorkian juries. In his interview with me, Tim Kenney, gave a clear 
example o f this, stating with regard to the Harper acquittal, “with the state of the law then, we had to 
charge Harper with murder. There was a real sympathy factor [for the defendant Harper]. (Kenney 
Phone Interview, March 1, 1994)(emphasis added). The cultural construction of jury nullification in 
Michigan is a topic that came up over and over again in interviewees involved with the Kevorkian 
cases almost across the board (and indeed, Melody Youk referred to prosecutorial concerns about 
nullification in 1999 in her sentencing remarks to the court). Parsing the difference between facts 
adduced and emotional truths revealed represented a difficult task in this writing, because the 
colloquial meaning of facts is closer to the latter, whereas evidentiary facts are more specific.
42 “Seemed” is the key word of this sentence; there was a trick factual question regarding geographic 
jurisdiction that I shall discuss, and which was used to great effect in securing an acquittal in 1994.
43 ALS is amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or Lou Gehrig's disease, a fatal neurodegenerative illness. It 
was the same illness as that of Tom Youk, for whose euthanasia murder Kevorkian was convicted of, 
and sentenced for, in 1999, a case that will serve as the anchor for the remaining chapters of this 
dissertation.
441 observed this on a tape of NBC “NOW” made on January 13, 1994.
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Kevorkian’s van and Hyde’s body was found inside alongside carbon 
monoxide tanks {Detroit Free Press, August 5, 1993)(emphasis added).
Further, and to be juxtaposed shortly, another report read:
Kevorkian’s statement at the time was, “I supplied the van, which was my 
personal van. At no time was there anyone else in the van besides me and Mr. 
Hyde. I  drove him to Belle Isle. I supplied the gas {New York Times, August 7, 
1993, p. 28, c. l)(emphasis added).
Also contemporaneous with the Hyde assisted suicide, Fieger “admitted that 
although his client was committed to his cause and willing to go to jail, they wanted 
to avoid another confrontation with the Oakland County Prosecutor, Richard 
Thompson” (D. Terry, “Kevorkian Aids in Suicide, No. 17, Near Police Station,” New 
York Times, August 5, 1993, p. A14, c. 1-4); the article continued that, according to a 
press release, Kevorkian “said he picked up Mr. Hyde at his home ... then drove Mr. 
Hyde the 25 miles to Belle Isle, where the doctor fitted a mask over Mr. Hyde’s face”. 
During this time, Kevorkian lived in the quaint community of Royal Oak (in Oakland 
County).45
Kevorkian announced at press conferences how he put the mask on Hyde’s
face because he could not move much. He further detailed how he supplied the
necessary equipment for the Hyde “medicide,” including mask, tubing and carbon
monoxide. Fieger, who vigorously challenged the constitutionality of HB 4501 in
other cases, did not vigorously litigate the constitutionality of the Wayne County
Hyde case. Tim Kenney in a phone interview on March 1, 1994, told me (with equal
parts of incredulity as to seeming incompetence or exceedingly shrewd tactics), “he
[Fieger] want[ed] atrial” (Kenney Phone Interview: March 1, 1994).
The motion that Fieger did make was couched in terms of following other
lower courts (read, trial court level), rather than an attack on the assisted suicide
451 have been to Royal Oak, which is an upscale community perhaps not unlike Hampstead in London, 
although Kevorkian’s apartment was very modest (and I had not been to the actual apartment; my 
visits to Royal Oak were with interviewees and Michigan contacts for meals and social activities).
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enactment. The decision that (to paraphrase a theatrical adage), the trial must go on
- * i -  -  •  0  •
was reported in an (unattributed) article, “Trial is Ordered for Suicide Doctor, A
Judge Says Kevorkian Must Fast Last Charge, Though Others Were Quashed, “ New
York Times (February 19, 1994, p. 9, c. 1):
(Judge) Thomas E. Jackson46 of Wayne County Recorder's Court, refused a 
defense motion to dismiss charges against Dr. Kevorkian for assisting in the 
death of Thomas W. Hyde Jr., 30. Mr. Hyde, who suffered from Lou Gehrig's 
disease, inhaled carbon monoxide in Dr. Kevorkian's van on Aug. 4, 1993.
The judge scheduled a trial for April 19 after Geoffrey Fieger, the doctor's 
chief lawyer, asked for a speedy resolution of the case.
This seemingly straightforward reporting contained a number of politically
important pieces of information. First, the validity and constitutionality of the
legislation in question banning assisted suicide was actually then pending in the
Michigan Court of Appeals in the Hobbins/Kevorkian cases, which were argued on
January 6, 1994. Thus, while courts of similar level jurisdiction had determined that
the ban was invalid, the question of the law’s validity was actually pending on appeal
in a higher court. Had Kevorkian been convicted, there would have been a chance
that a conviction would have been rendered null and void by operation of law if the
legislation did not survive legal challenge.
Second, paperwork was neither Fieger’s forte nor his inclination; trial work
and the drama of a jury was. Fieger commented for the record in the same article, to
the effect that the “ruling doesn’t surprise me, [b]ut I want a trial. No jury will
convict jack Kevorkian.” Indeed, the desire for a speedy trial was made by Fieger,
although Chief Prosecuting Attorney John O’Hair proposed delaying the Hyde trial
until after the Hobbins/Kevorkian decision was released.
46 As I shall shortly discuss, Kevorkian was tried to acquittal in the Hyde case; however, I need to 
make a methodological disclaimer at this time. Because I did not attend the Wayne County trial in 
April 1994, and other matters were proceeding forward, I did not seek an interview with Judge Jackson. 
In hindsight, I believe that this self-imposed methodological limitation was an error, particularly since 
judges (as well as decedent family members, jurors, and others) involved in later Kevorkian cases 
provided richly detailed information.
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Had the trial been delayed (which it was not), and had the jury convicted 
(which it did not), Kevorkian’s lawyers could have made arguments of trial error on 
appeal. However, a trial ensured not only that Kevorkian would be in the news, but 
also that Fieger would be — in local, national, and international press. In the next 
chapter, I shall amplify Oakland County Chief Prosecuting Attorney Richard 
Thomspon’s commentary that while Kevorkian took no money, fame was a form of 
payment. Here, I would make the observation that a lawyer could not buy the 
advertising that the media coverage of the Kevorkian cases gave Fieger. The 
Kevorkian cases catapulted Fieger from a local (albeit successful) tort lawyer to an 
international presence as a trial lawyer likened to Clarence Darrow. A reasonable 
conclusion is while Fieger made the motion to dismiss so as to be competent as an 
attorney, he indeed wanted the trial to take place for the fame that translated into his 
own economic success (bigger cases, bigger fees) as well as fame.
Because I was in London when the Kevorkian/Hyde trial took place, my 
information was limited to a video-tape of the trial, media updates, and comments by 
interviewees (who had been sought relating to other trials). However, there were a 
few matters that are noteworthy. First, there was a 12 page questionnaire issued to the 
prospective jurors, which asked questions ranging from their personal situations to 
their views on abortion, religion, and euthanasia. While I shall examine the voir dire 
process of the 1999 Kevorkian/Youk trial and juror comments from the 1996 trials, I 
would comment that this extensive instrument, in and of itself, demonstrated the 
importance of the issues at hand (as opposed to simply the defendant on trial).
After the voir dire was concluded, and the jury seated, Fieger moved to 
dismiss, based upon a jurisdictional issue. The jurisdictional issue in specific was that 
Hyde had died not in Belle Isle (Wayne County, where the body was found), but in
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Kevorkian’s home in Royal Oak (Oakland County), after which Kevorkian drove the
body the 25 miles to Belle Isle. As Fieger put it when he moved to have the charges
dismissed, “you have to bring the case where the body was.” An unattributed article
(which reporter Jack Lessenberry, a subject of Chapter 6, later told me he had
authored) “Using Surprise Strategy, Kevorkian’s Lawyers Seek Acquittal,” New York
Times, April 22, 1994, reported:
Mr. Hyde's body was discovered in Dr. Kevorkian's van on Belle Isle, a 
Detroit city park, early that morning. But today, Mr. Fieger said Dr. Kevorkian 
had actually driven Mr. Hyde from his home in the Detroit suburb of Novi to 
Dr. Kevorkian's apartment in Royal Oak, where the suicide took place in a 
parking space behind the building. After the man was dead, Mr. Fieger said, 
Dr. Kevorkian drove to Belle Isle to surrender to the police. Addressing a jury 
that is mostly black and mostly female, Mr. Fieger said: "Thomas Hyde did 
not die in the city of Detroit and the county of Wayne on Belle Isle. His 
suicide took place in Royal Oak, Michigan, at Dr. Kevorkian's home, and they 
never even bothered to check."
I make two comments in this regard. First, if a county does not have territorial 
jurisdiction (which is to say that the crime, if any, did not occur within the prescribed 
geographic boundaries of the county or the territory’s authority), the case was brought 
in the wrong court. Second, by bringing this to the jury’s attention, Fieger 
accomplished two goals -  he depicted the state authorities as bumbling Keystone 
Kops to the jury and he undermined the jury’s authority to sit on the case in the first 
place. I suggest that the circumstances of pre-trial publicity (much generated by 
Fieger and Kevorkian themselves) would have provided ample opportunity to raise 
this issue and allow for Oakland County prosecuting authorities to take up the matter. 
My conclusion, especially when juxtaposed with other Kevorkian trials, was that 
Fieger ensured a “friendly” prosecutor and carried the matter forward until jury 
selection. By arguing this matter to the sworn jury, Fieger accomplished another, 
more legalistic, goal -  because the first juror had been sworn, the doctrine of double
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jeopardy would have prevented another prosecution if the case was dismissed by the 
trial judge.
I have another comment, which while seemingly stylistic, actually carries 
social and legal consequences. Fieger’s comment that “you have to bring the case 
where the body was” depersonalized Tom Hyde as a decedent, a client, and most 
importantly, as a victim. I would not necessarily construct this as a matter of pollution 
and uncleanness (as might Mary Douglas in her 1970 work, Purity and Danger), I 
suggest that by naming “the body” rather than Tom Hyde, it was the beginning of the 
process of subverting a person (who could be murdered) into a thing (which could not 
be). I would further argue that this “othering” and terminology of social death 
militated against conviction of a defendant for his conduct relating to the death of 
another human being, a person who had been “one of us” in society. Judge Jackson 
decided to leave the question of where the suicide had occurred to the jury, as the lay 
finder of the facts (rather than a judge as a professional fact finder, as would be the 
case in a bench trial), and consistent with arguments made by Jackson and Doran in 
“Judge and Jury: Towards a New Division of Labour in Criminal Trials (1997: 759).
Kevorkian took the stand in the 1994 trial, and testified that he originally 
planned to take Hyde to Belle Isle for the assisted suicide, but that he feared his 
“clunker” of a van would break down on the way or that he would be discovered 
while the suicide was in progress. Jack Lessenberry, writing for the New York Times 
in a Staff Article entitled, “Kevorkian Takes Stand in Own Defense, Says He Was 
Trying to Relieve Suffering,” (April 26, 1994, p.A16), focused upon the question of 
whether Kevorkian had legally culpable criminal intent, rather than the arcane 
sounding (and seldom argued) jurisdictional issue. After the lawyers concluded their 
evidence and gave their summations (closing remarks arguing how the jury should
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view the evidence adduced as facts), this theme continued to be viewed by the media 
as an ancillary issue. For example, Tamar Lewin wrote an article for The New York 
Times, entitled, “Side Issues May Decide Kevorkian Verdict” (April 29, 1994, 
p.A14). This article reported that in charging the jury (issuing final instructions as to 
how to construct evidence as facts versus arguments of the lawyers), Judge Jackson 
instructed that if the jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the death had 
occurred in Belle Isle Park, the juror would have to acquit Kevorkian. Half of ADA 
Tim Kenney’s trial summation was devoted to the inconsistencies between Fieger’s 
August 1993 press conference and his trial claim.
A reasonable conclusion is that any issue that may decide a verdict in any trial 
is not a side issue. By operational definition any question of fact whose answer could 
be outcome determinative would have had to be one that went to the heart of the case. 
By this I do not mean to suggest that jurisdiction was the only outcome determinative 
issue (there may well be more than one in any given case or trial). Rather, I argue that 
it is a reasonable conclusion that the jurisdictional issue, so very important in a legal 
context (there is a saying that first year legal procedure professors intone, that “s/he 
who knows the rules, wins”), was dismissed in the social construction by the media as 
one less enticing to the audience or readership. I observe that ADA Tim Kenney did 
not underestimate the importance of the jurisdictional issue, as he spent approximately 
one half of his trial summation on the inconsistencies between Fieger’s August press 
conference and his trial claims.
Nonetheless, and as an alternative theory of defense,47 Fieger elicited 
testimony from Kevorkian that, in giving Hyde carbon monoxide through a mask (as 
he had 16 other times, with but one exception, where he employed lethal injection), he
47 Alternative theories of defense are not necessarily inconsistent, and were not in this case.
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was seeking to alleviate suffering, not to kill. “I didn’t want Mr. Hyde to die, just as a 
surgeon doesn’t want to cut off a leg.... I wanted to help him to end his suffering 
with the only means known and available to me,” This statement was published in a 
“Staff Article” of The New York Times, “Kevorkian Takes Stand in Own Defense,
Says he was Trying to Relieve Suffering,” (April 26, 1994, A 16), with authorship 
later acknowledged to me by Jack Lessenberry. Such a claim by Kevorkian, if 
successful, might have been be a complete defense if credited by the jury, as it fell 
within Section 7 of the (temporary) assisted suicide law, under which Kevorkian was 
prosecuted. That exception to the ban on assisting in suicide, provided what I would 
call the “double effect” provision of the law:
(3) A licensed health care professional who administers, prescribes, or 
dispenses medications or procedures to relieve a person’s pain or discomfort, 
even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the risk of death, is 
not guilty of assistance to suicide under this section unless the medications or 
procedures are knowingly and intentionally administered, prescribed or 
dispensed to cause death (Public Act 270, 1993)(emphasis added).
Thus, the Kevorkian team was aiming for an acquittal under the doctrine of 
double effect that the carbon monoxide was administered to relieve pain and 
suffering, and as a secondary (unintended) effect, caused death. However, the 
provision required a “licensed health care professional,” which Kevorkian had not 
been since November 1991 (Michigan) or, even allowing for an out-of-state license, 
March 1992 (California). The Hyde assisted suicide was in August 1993. Curiously, 
this was apparently not argued by the prosecutor, who apparently focused on the 
outlandish claim that carbon monoxide was administered to relieve pain.
Nonetheless, the jury, after eight hours of deliberations over two days 
determined that both the jurisdictional challenge and the intent defense were sufficient 
to raise a reasonable doubt. Although I did not have an opportunity to speak with any
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of the jurors in this case, because I was in London at the time, some pertinent 
information was available and noteworthy. First, the jury asked for readbacks of 
Fieger’s statements in August and Kevorkian’s at trial, with regard to the location of 
the van, Hyde and Kevorkian (Barry Bassis Phone Conversation: May 1, 1994), as 
reported on national news. The jury resolved the issue in Kevorkian’s favour.
Second, a juror named Gwen Bryson gave a statement to the press, in which 
she said, “We [the jury] believe the intent was not to help Hyde commit suicide. We 
believe it was to relieve pain and suffering.” (The Evening Standard, 3 May 1994:
25). Members of the press openly mocked this (I would conclude reasonably). For 
example, one Staff Article entitled, ‘The Kindly Gas,” wryly reported,
“henceforward, carbon monoxide may be considered a therapeutic agent” (The 
Economist 7th May 1994, p.57), alluding to the bastardization of the double effect 
principle, so as to resolve the issue of Kevorkian’s intent in his favour, as well.
Now I shall make a brief argument with regard to something else that was an 
issue in the Kevorkian cases, generally — timing. Just as the Michigan legislature 
enacted law in response to Kevorkian’s conduct and brought the effective date of the 
law forward in response to escalation of Kevorkian’s practice, so too the Michigan 
courts seemed to behave in terms of their judicial response to Kevorkian. Kevorkian 
was acquitted of the Hyde assisted suicide charges on May 2, 1994. By the end of the 
month, he was again awaiting trial on “open murder,” as the Michigan Court of 
Appeals reinstated charges in Oakland County, regarding his simultaneous second and 
third assisted deaths (Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller). I shall discuss that case in 
the field chapters that follow on, as I attended the trial and interviewed a number of
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participants (including the Chief Prosecuting Attorney, a juror and the parents of 
Sherry Miller).
However, on May 10, 1994, in the same set of consolidated cases (Hobbins v. 
Attorney General, People v. Kevorkian and a second People v. Kevorkian), the 
Michigan Court of Appeals invalidated the law under which Kevorkian had been tried 
for the Hyde death (which was not subject to intermediate appeal). My argument is 
that the court deliberately held back the decision, pending the outcome of the first 
Kevorkian trial. I would suggest that it is reasonable to conclude this based upon my 
former experience at an intermediate level appellate court, where court orders and 
decisions were calendared for release. While I have no direct evidence if this was the 
case in Michigan (i.e., to see the outcome of a trial before releasing a decision 
invalidating the charging law), I would suggest that it is reasonable to conclude this 
based upon the legislative responses Senator Dillingham referred to in our interview, 
as well as press reports.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced the cases that preceded Kevorkian’s 
Michigan practice of assisted death, and discussed how and why those cases were 
relevant to Kevorkian’s practice. In addition, I have given background information 
about Kevorkian himself, and juxtaposed this to two other death workers, who each 
had prominent roles in the politics of euthanasia and the emerging politics of assisted 
suicide. First, and to be revisited in Chapter 6 (in which I shall analyse the 1999 trial 
at length), was a consideration of Chief Medical Examiner Dragovic, and the culture 
of pathologists. These intellectual medical doctors operated at a high level of debate 
(notwithstanding that each was personally colourful) in as close to an academic
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practice as physicians can get. When he trial testimony of the dueling doctors is later 
developed, and the missed opportunity Kevorkian forfeited to summarize a viable 
issue of causation that he raised with regard to Dragovic, I would encourage a reader 
to keep in mind that Kevorkian and Dragovic spoke a common medical language, 
above the general juror (or lawyer). They were a pair of worthy adversaries insofar 
as medical euthanasia went, and they each became comfortable in the criminal justice 
system -  Kevorkian as defendant, Dragovic as prosecutorial witness.
Second, Senator Fred Dillingham, a former mortician, was also a death worker 
like Kevorkian. Both Kevorkian and Dillingham made themselves present and vocal 
in Michigan politics in the early 1990s, with assisted suicide as the focus of their 
oppositional teaming in second careers. It is reasonable to conclude that, as with 
Dragovic and Kevorkian, the social construction of their professions infused their 
actions in the law and legislature in development of the criminal law under which 
Kevorkian was first prosecuted.
In this chapter, I also examined issues that were dispositive in Kevorkian’s 
first trial, regarding territorial jurisdiction and regarding Kevorkian’s intent. The first 
of these, while at least partially dispositive, was sheared off from the remaining 
criminal trials. The second was to be an issue in each of the trials, until his 
conviction. The mode and means of death were also politicized, as we saw with the 
jury decision that carbon monoxide inhalation was somehow a form of palliative care 
that resulted in a double effect of shortening life while relieving pain and suffering.
In the field related chapters that follow on from this one, questions of medical 
and legal causation will be revisited, as will questions of criminal culpability and 
intent. A theme that I shall seek to develop will be oppositional teaming of
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participants, who were not necessarily adversaries in the trials, but who had different 
political agendas or professional goals.
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Chapter Three: Kevorkian’s Chief Prosecuting Attorneys and Judges48
Introduction
The central focus of this study is the 1999 trial of Jack Kevorkian, also known 
as “the 60 Minutes case” or “the Youk prosecution.” The former of these is a 
reference to the fact that Kevorkian sent a narrated videotape of a case of euthanasia 
to CBS for broadcast,49 while the latter is the surname of the person to whom 
euthanasia was administered by Kevorkian. I chose this final trial as the center piece 
of the dissertation, a decision made based upon the following factors. First, I attended 
the trial. Second, a transcript of the trial was available to me. Third, I attended each 
of the other trials (with the one exception of the first trial in 1994, when I had to be in 
London). Fourth, there were interviews I conducted with comparable key players 
and/or public statements and/or testimony to juxtapose. Fifth, a key piece of evidence 
was a tape recording that Kevorkian arranged to have sent to the CBS television 
network to be played to a national audience.50
The 1990s was the decade during which physician-assisted suicide emerged as 
a bona fide issue51 in the fields of criminal law and criminal justice policy. In the 
context of debates about that issue, the trials conveyed a variety of portraits -
48 An abstract for a related paper, entitled, “Prosecutorial Discretion and Judicial Demeanour: The 
Mirrors, the Masks and the Motors,” was accepted for presentation at the 2009 annual conference of the 
British Society of Criminology.
49 In Chapter 6 ,1 shall focus at great length upon analysis of various versions of this tape, including the 
original 60 Minutes programme broadcast in November 1999, the prosecutor’s clips of the programme 
played during the March 1999 trial, and Kevorkian’s own tape of his September 1998 meetings with, 
and euthanasia of, Tom Youk.
50 This, along with the fact that Kevorkian acted as his own attorney at trial with opening and closing 
statements (as well as questioning witnesses and participating at sidebars), overcame the 
methodological limitation of not having had formal interview access to a criminal defendant (during 
prior trials, I had met Kevorkian, on several occasions, but he declined a formal interview, on advice of 
his then attorney Geoffrey Fieger).
51 In legal practice, a bona fide issue is a credible, real, and legitimate issue of fact or law, or a non- 
frivolous issue. (Motions are frequently made to seek dismissal of a case for not presenting a bona fide  
issue or case, and a cultural construction is to say that the case is “frivolous” or otherwise not meriting 
the time of the court or judicial administrators).
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snapshots, almost -- of Kevorkian as well as his actions and his poses. American (and 
international) media certainly found Kevorkian a character to study, as I shall amplify 
in Chapter 6.
I was enticed by the opportunity to examine the different elements and 
participants in a criminal trial which resulted in a conviction, and to juxtapose them 
with similar previous trials52 that ended in the acquittal of the same defendant, in the 
same jurisdiction,53 for similar or arguably the same conduct — I shall discuss these 
matters later in this dissertation when I turn to the autopsy of Loretta Peabody in Ionia 
versus Tom Youk’s autopsy in Oakland. Unlike my time as a criminal defender or as 
a judicial law clerk, and rather than being bound to a simple transcript of a single trial, 
I was able to conduct a longitudinal study of the like components of a number of trials 
— across trials of the same defendant.
This gave me a unique way of examining primary and secondary data, along 
with cases over the course of a decade during which I repeatedly closed, then 
reopened, and then expanded my research. I began to realize that any one trial might 
have served as the basis of a doctoral study, but the comparative provided a chance to 
consider emerging issues. Some of these were the development of medical 
technologies that prolonged life or postponed the death of those in persistent 
vegetative states; the concerns of an aging population fearful of losing control over 
the quality of their lives; an ever-hungry media whose representatives literally lined
521 am being a bit loose in my construction here, as technically, the 1994 Detroit trial was for assisted 
suicide under the 1993 temporary ban, as was the first 1996 double (two victims, on different dates) 
assisted suicide trial. There was a 1997 Ionia mistrial for assisted suicide (that I shall argue was 
actually a medical euthanasia). The second 1996 double (two victims at the same place and time, but 
with different methodologies) “open murder” “common law” trial was actually conducted as an 
assisted suicide trial (as I shall discuss later in this chapter). The final trial to conviction in 1999 was 
for murder (with assisted suicide charges dismissed shortly before trial upon motion of the prosecutor, 
as I shall also discuss later). The assisted suicide charge was under a law enacted in 1998, rather than 
the initial statute.
53 The jurisdiction was the same to the extent that Kevorkian’s trials were all in Michigan; however, 
the first trial was in Detroit (Wayne County), the 1997 mistrial was in Ionia (seat of Ionia County) and 
the remaining trials were conducted in Pointiac (county seat of Oakland County).
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the walls of the courtrooms in which Kevorkian’s trials took place and spilled along 
the nearby corridors and even onto the squares outside the courthouses; the task 
forces fortuitously and simultaneously convened in the US and the UK to study 
medical ethics and euthanasia related issues. Instead, for reasons of brevity and focus, 
I chose to view the broad area of euthanasia through a single lens of the Kevorkian 
cases.
In this chapter, I shall train the microscope to examine the part played by 
chief prosecuting attorneys and trial judges in the Kevorkian cases. In the next 
chapter, I shall turn from these elites to the jurors, those ordinary men and women 
who sat in judgment of the facts. In the chapter thereafter, I shall examine statements 
made by the family of Tom Youk at the Kevorkian sentencing, and compare the 
experiences of families from two of the mid-1990s trials. Last, I shall examine the 
role of the media in creating the “Death by Doctor” segment nationally broadcast by 
60 Minutes, and how the trial prosecutor created and used clips of that tape (as well as 
Kevorkian’s original tape) at trial.
In the final analysis, I shall show that this opportunity to examine some of the 
elements of the trials provided an exciting new way to examine any or all of the 
Kevorkian cases. Here I shall focus on two groups of elites. By elites, I refer to those 
having an elevated status, even within their profession. Here, judged and chief 
prosecutors are the governmental equivalent of partners in white shoe law firms.
Chief prosecuting attorneys had the elevated status of policymaking, while the judges 
ruled over the cases in the courtroom workgroup (Robinson, p.2005). The status of 
these politicians was heightened even beyond the training, licensure and oversight of 
the traditional definition of a professional. In Part I, I shall examine the roles of the 
chief prosecuting attorneys, and how the roles differed in the late 1990s from the
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earlier part of the decade. Inn Part II, I shall consider trial judges, their sentencing 
philosophies and conclude with an argument of what changes in circumstances finally 
led to Kevorkian’s incarceratory sentence of 10-25 years (for second degree murder) 
and concurrent sentence of 7 years (for delivery of controlled substances) People v. 
Kevorkian 248 MichApp. 373 (2001).
Part I. Prosecuting Change, Changing Prosecutors
Without a prosecutor willing to try a case of assisted suicide or euthanasia 
murder, a defendant with a consenting victim would in some ways be the proverbial 
tree falling in the (empty) forest. Ferguson offered the generally true and legally 
accurate argument in The Trial in American Life that “defendants come into criminal 
court on the state’s terms [and] prosecutors decide whether to prosecute, whom to 
prosecute at which level, and what charges to stress in shaping the case” (2007, p.38). 
This is the case notwithstanding what Kevorkian referred in 1999 as his status as a 
self-invited guest in court, who forced the party to take place.54 Each of the chief 
prosecuting attorneys chose whether to bring — or initiate — charges or to decline to 
prosecute in what Ferguson called the “loose variable” (2007, pp. 39-40) of 
prosecutorial discretion, as I shall discuss more fully.
Michigan chief prosecuting attorneys could choose from a large number of 
cases in which Kevorkian had been involved. There was a particularly rich array with 
regard to the acceptance or rejection of physician-assisted suicide, which has almost 
universally been claimed by and/or attributed to, the activities of Kevorkian. Perhaps 
it was an underdeveloped theme that no matter how prolific a crusader or killer 
Kevorkian may have been, there would have been no case without a prosecutor to
541 shall give Kevorkian’s self-assessment greater treatment in Chapter 6 .
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prosecute. An interesting question might be asked -  with so many cases, could a 
prosecution not have occurred? The short answer is that a non-prosecution could 
have been possible, notwithstanding the American criminal legal culture’s adage that 
a prosecutor could “get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich.” Indeed, I would argue 
that it was not that Kevorkian was prolific, so much as that he was repeatedly and 
increasingly public and self-publicising, in his activities.55
Pakes (2004, p.58) observed that “[pjrosecution is about filtering out cases 
that should not go to court.” Some 130 is an openly accepted number of Kevorkian 
hastened deaths. That is to say that Kevorkian publicly acknowledged that he had 
been present, and participated in some way, when at least 130 had people died by 
assisted suicide (whether by providing the means or opportunity to a patient or client 
who was the final actor) or euthanasia (by being himself the final actor, in the process 
of staging deaths and depositing the bodies of his deceased clients at local hospitals 
for autopsy). That is quite a lot of “filtering” Opportunities for the chief prosecuting 
attorneys.
The men who made the administrative and executive decisions in this process 
presented interesting case studies in their own right. The “line prosecutors,” in the 
actual courtroom trying the actual cases under differing theories of the case,56 were 
interesting to observe in court (and to speak with out of court), though my focus at 
this time is upon the elected chief prosecutors in the Kevorkian prosecutions, the 
executives in charge of the office. These men (and they were all men) presented 
differing philosophical, administrative and legal approaches. This had an impact not
55 Surveys of physicians’ attitudes and conduct, which I explore further in Chapter 6, lend support to 
this argument. One such example, however, was Jerald G. Bachman et al., “Attitudes of Michigan 
Physicians and the Public Toward Legalizing Physician-assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia,” 
in The New England Journal o f Medicine on February 1, 1996, v. 334 pp. 303-309.
56 Traditionally, the theory o f the case is what the prosecutor intends to prove using the available 
evidence, or what the defendant may seek to rebut by way of an alternate series of conclusions to be 
inferred from the same or additionally elicited facts.
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only upon the outcomes of the Kevorkian cases, but affected the constituencies that 
elected them, and their own electoral political futures.57
Rock (1993, p. 3) noted (referring primarily to legislators and “small policy 
making worlds”) that “[a] stable group may well be intellectually fertile, and it can 
certainly foster commitments and loyalties, but it is the instability of the small group 
that seems to provide the stronger immediate catalyst for the innovation and diffusion 
of ideas.” The chief prosecuting attorneys in general are traditionally referred to as 
the “named” attorney, as a reference to name of the elected or appointed attorney of 
record. In the Kevorkian cases, the named attorneys were officials heading services 
in their own jurisdictions, large or small. These chief operating executives formed a 
small group, one that provided invigorating catalysts for the creation and 
dissemination of new policies. In some ways, these chiefs were the embodiment of 
Rock’s 1993 theoretical argument that small numbers can be great catalysts, and the 
applied results of my study reflect its reality in fact. During the early 1990s, three 
chief prosecutors in three different Michigan jurisdictions (counties) became involved 
in the Kevorkian cases. One (Richard Thompson) was an overly zealous prosecutor. 
A second one (John O’Hair) was a seemingly reluctant prosecutor. The third chief 
prosecuting attorney (Carl Marlinga) was what I shall call a “declining prosecutor,” in 
the sense that he declined to prosecute Kevorkian to trial.
571 shall discuss the impact the Kevorkian cases had upon the electoral politics in terms of Chief 
Prosecuting Attorneys later in this chapter, specifically as to Oakland County Chief Prosecuting 
Attorney Richard Thompson, who was ousted following a campaign contest by opponent (and former 
employee) David Gorcyca. One of the planks upon which Gorcyca’s successful campaign was run was 
to stop the (losing) Kevorkian prosecutions, which cost tax dollars. I asked an election law expert, 
Hamline University Professor David Schultz about this sort of administrative philosophical difference 
in campaigns, to see if it was a widespread pattern of prosecutorial campaigning, to which he replied 
(by e-mail dated October 6, 2008), “[t]here are always accusations of prosecutors playing politics at 
election time but no good examples leap to my mind right now.” My argument is actually that the 
politics of the Kevorkian cases ultimately cost Thompson his office at what Schultz called “election 
time.” Thus, what had seemed to me to be an outcome that seemed fluid and obvious at the time may 
actually have been unique in nature.
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As a methodological limitation, I note that I had opportunities to interview
f O
Thompson and O’Hair, but due to time constraints, I did not seek an interview with 
Marlinga. This was because his case was over, and O’Hair’s was beginning, at the 
time I commenced fieldwork.
A. Carl Marlinga: The “Declining ” Prosecutor^9
Zalman et. al (1997, p. 923) noted that Macomb Chief Prosecutor Carl 
Marlinga, a Democrat from suburban Macomb county, “declined to prosecute, 
although the case was accompanied by a high level of publicity.” Although out of 
chronological order, I chose to discuss this case of Kevorkian’s 13th assisted suicide 
separately because Marlinga ultimately made a decision not to prosecute to trial, in a 
case in which I shall argue that timing was (almost) everything. Marlinga declined to 
prosecute to trial Kevorkian’s assistance in the death of Hugh Gale, which occurred 
on February 15, 1993.60 This activity took place subsequent to the passage of 
Michigan’s first legislative ban on assisted suicide. However, it was also prior to the 
originally scheduled March 31,1993 effective date of the ban imposed by 1992 Public 
Act 270. The Gale assisted suicide was part of a series of increasingly frequent
58 The facts leading to Marlinga’s preliminary prosecution of Kevorkian for conduct regarding assisting 
in the suicide of Hugh Gale on February 15, 1993, and ultimate resolution on April 27, 1993, took 
place before my first field trip to Michigan in August 1993 (for the Wayne County indictment and 
related matters).
59 In an homage to Lord Patrick Devlin’s Easing the Passing: The Trial o f Dr. John Bodkin Adams, I 
have taken a decision to offer “Dramatis Personae.” This I shall do so ongoingly as I present chapters, 
rather than have a non-paginated section so entitled, as did Lord Devlin. However, I note that Lord 
Devlin in fact cast a dramaturgical eye over his non-fiction rendition of the trial he presided over. The 
court as theatre is a theme that has emerged repeatedly in the Kevorkian cases, not least because of 
Kevorkian’s former trial attorney, Geoffrey Fieger, who had been a drama student and who used the 
courtroom as a theatrical venue, in my observations. In later chapters, the theme of drama will emerge 
in terms of juror perceptions, family experiences, and the media. However, the cases began with 
prosecutors and ended with judges in a highly ritualized space, complete with a formal audience (jury) 
and director (judge), as well as the lawyers and witnesses as players on the legal stage. Because the 
individuals involved were uniquely identifiable, confidentiality was never guaranteed, with the 
exception of “off the record” comments; ironically, it never seemed expected, with the exceptions of 
two administrators who are not named in this work.
601 shall discuss this case further in Part I of the Chapter 6.
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activities by Kevorkian that prompted the Legislature to hold an emergency vote on 
February 25, 1993, to bring forward the effective date of the law, in 1993 Public Act 
3, as Inoted in 1996 (Pappas 1996, p,172).
Hence, and further to this legislative intervention, on February 25, 1993, the 
Michigan ban on physician-assisted suicide became law immediately. This timing 
managed to place Kevorkian’s actions outside the newly-enacted ban (which some 
called the “anti-Kevorkian law61 Thus, the chief prosecutor in Macomb was relieved 
of his duty to prosecute an act that had not yet been implemented into law. Marlinga 
was therefore able to choose how to treat the Gale assisted suicide in a statuteless 
environment. Brovins and Oehmke (1993, pp.207-208) suggested that a “surprise 
deal” was offered to, and struck by, Marlinga at the inquest. This allowed for an 
“informal deposition” of widow, Cheryl Gale, in return for dismissal of the inquest. 
Although generally unavailable in 1993, Marlinga’s April 27, 1993 decision and 
“Memorandum Regarding Investigation into the Death of Hugh Gale” was 
subsequently posted on the internet site of Frontline,62 On the second page of the 15 
page document, is what might reasonably be argued to be the “deal”:
61 As a comment to this, I note that Oakland County Chief Prosecuting Attorney Richard Thompson 
was continuing (and ultimately successful) in his efforts to appeal a trial court dismissal of charges 
against Kevorkian for his role in the Wantz(injection)/Miller(inhalation) deaths during this period of 
time. I am not saying this either as an endorsement of, or condemnation for, either Marlinga’s or 
Thompson’s decision, which I believe were both quite rightly within the province of prosecutorial 
discretion. This is an administrative role of the chiefs, whereby they could proceed or decline to 
prosecute. In explaining the apparent inconsistency, I draw support from Fletcher, who wrote in 
Rethinking Criminal Law (2000, p. 719), “[t]he problem of imprecise standards is mitigated by the 
sound discretion of prosecuting officers.” Whatever factual distinctions may have existed, both Gale 
and Wantz/Miller were Kevorkian cases before the assisted suicides. Furthermore, the Gale case had a 
similar mode of death to the Miller case (carbon monoxide inhalation by mask) and was under the same 
rules of (common) law on the dates of occurrence.
62 The PBS (public television station) programme Frontline was similar to the UK series Panorama 
and had a mission of drawing attention to broad issues of social interest. Because I shall later be 
analyzing tapes of a CBS (network television) station programme 60 Minutes, I make the distinction 
that the CBS network generally targets a mass audience, whereas PBS generally targets an elite 
audience of people who might otherwise eschew television. The internet page, 
www/pbs.orgAvgbh/pates/frontline/Kevorkian/interviews/galesumary.html was very useful in 
subsequent information gathering.
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Because the goal of the prosecutor’s office was to determine the facts 
before charges were brought (2) (sic) and without procedural delay of 
convening a grand jury, another attempt was made to obtain witness 
statements on a voluntary basis.
Renewed discussion with the attorneys for the witnesses produced an 
agreement that full and complete depositions o f two witnesses, Mrs. Cheryl 
Gale and Mr. Neal N ico f3 would be taken on Sunday, March 28, 1993.
Theses depositions have produced the factual detail for a decision in 
this case.
It is my decision that no charges will be filed against Dr. Jack 
Kevorkian or any other person in connection with the death of Hugh Gale;
Mr. Gale’s death can only be regarded as a suicide (Memorandum Regarding 
Investigation into the Death of Hugh Gale, April 27, 1993: 2) (emphasis 
added).
This was phrased in the traditional language evocative of a plea bargain. 
Although it did not involve any guilty plea in this case, certainly it was a bargained 
arrangement -  the depositions for the dismissal, as a quid pro quo. Second, the 
agreement for Sunday depositions of potential defendants as opposed to a felony 
hearing to determine probably cause (an adversarial proceeding) or convening a grand 
jury (the more traditional practice in urban areas) was nearly unheard of. I conclude 
that this set, off centre stage of the courthouse and off the regularly schedule, could be 
argued to further or promote a quiet resolution.
Marlinga’s decision was that “[at the time of Hugh Gales’s death there was no 
law in Michigan making it a crime for a person to assist another in committing 
suicide,” (page 3, as to murder charges). Marlinga further determined, that “[i]n this 
case, it [was his] decision that [he] would not be able to prove to the satisfaction of a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt...” (page 9, regarding potential manslaughter 
charges). The Macomb chief prosecutor’s decision closed the case at a time during 
which he was engaged in a race for the United States Senate and, I conclude, was 
based upon two matters of prosecutorial discretion.
63 Nicol was the first author of the 2006 authorised biography of Kevorkian, as well as one of 
Kevorkian’s early assistants.
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First, Marlinga applied an intermediate 1984 Court of Appeals (People v. 
Campbell) case as overruling state law of a high court 1920 Supreme Court case 
CPeople v. Roberts). As I shall discuss in the next section (based upon interviews with 
then Oakland County Chief Prosecuting Attorney, Richard Thompson), this was 
legally incorrect. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court further so opined and held in 
the 1994 Kevorkian/Hobbins decision, although that case did not regard the Macomb 
County prosecution Second, as I shall argue in Chapter 6, there was evidence that a 
Kevorkian document was altered, and that the decedent had wanted to stop, as was 
explored by Mike Betzhold in an article in 1997.
A reasonable conclusion is that Marlinga (as chief prosecuting attorney) 
sought to defray any political damage that he (as Senatorial candidate) might have 
incurred by an unpopular prosecution of the then-popular Kevorkian. The issue for 
argument (between jurisdictions, as represented by their Chief Prosecuting 
Attorneys), then became whether Kevorkian’s acts were ones that might properly be 
prosecuted as crimes. The two views were represented by Oakland County Chief 
Prosecuting Attorney Richard Thompson, whose voice will be heard in the next 
section and by (as Marlinga and the deal that may have been struck, as implied by 
Marlinga’s memorandum absolving Kevorkian of both murder and assisted suicide 
charges.
As a transition to the next section, herein lies the heart of the concept of 
prosecutorial discretion -  whether and why to bring charges against a defendant for 
(allegedly criminal) conduct. I offer preliminary conclusions. First and as a legal 
construction, prosecutorial discretion, ordinarily out of the view of the public eye, 
may perhaps be where the greatest power of a prosecutor resides. Second and as a
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political construction, a prosecutor might further his own personal agenda, as well as 
a professional agenda, through this process, as demonstrated by Richard Thompson.
B. “Zealous” Prosecutor Richard Thompson and “Reluctant” Prosecutor John 
O'Hair64
Oakland County Chief Prosecutor Richard Thompson and Wayne County 
Chief Prosecutor John O’Hair each prosecuted Kevorkian, but had widely divergent 
approaches. My first field trip to Michigan took place, in August 1993, when it was 
timed to match the Wayne County indictment. Both Thompson and O’Hair were 
career prosecutors, with 8 and 18 years of experience respectively (although O’Hair 
had both previously and subsequently served as a jurist). However, the differences 
Republican Thompson and Democrat O’Hair brought to the cases were more marked 
than the similarities that one might reasonably have expected to flow from the fact 
that they were simultaneously the chief prosecutors of substantial offices in Michigan; 
Thompson’s Oakland County had a suburban population of approximately 1,250,000 
of the Greater Detroit population and was just north of O’Hair’s Wayne County. The 
latter, which included the city of Detroit, had an urban population of approximately 
2,000,000.
I interviewed O’Hair on August 19, 1993, and Thompson on August 20, 1993. 
This was during the week that O’Hair’s office successfully sought indictment of 
Kevorkian for his 17th assisted suicide, that of Thomas Hyde. Hyde was a 30-year-old
64 This section was inspired in part by a passage in Pappas (1996, pp. 165, 167) a piece informally 
referred to as “The Bitter Pill,” in which I noted that “[o]f two eminent prosecutors on the Michigan 
Commission on Death and Dying ... John O’Hair was avidly pro-choice, while the other, Richard 
Thomson was zealously pro-life, neither was anytheless committed to exploring and considering all the 
issues raised by the literal question of life and death” (emphasis in original). In hindsight, and based 
upon events in the Kevorkian cases which I later compared to interview statements, I conclude that 
both men furthered political agendas, as I shall amplify further in this section.
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man with advanced ALS65 (also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease), a progressive, 
degenerative neurological disorder with (at that time) no known origin and no known 
cure. O’Hair’s office held a press conference about the indictment, on August 17, 
1993 — which I also attended. Both Thompson and O’Hair were highly informative. 
Indeed, some of what they said in August 1993 was prophetic in nature as to the 
ultimate progress and outcomes of Kevorkian’s career trajectory in the criminal 
justice system, and I shall amplify this point later.
For example, O’Hair announced at his press conference that he was proposing 
a piece of legislation for consideration by the newly created Michigan Commission on 
Death and Dying. He did so at the press conference ostensibly called to announce 
Kevorkian’s indictment.66 He said that his proposed legislation would have the effect 
of allowing for assisted suicide under strict, enumerated circumstances for those who 
were terminally ill and had less than six months to live. Indeed, Zalman et. al (1997, 
p.924) asserted that O’Hair was considered by some as the “leader of the pro-assisted 
suicide group” of the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying -  a task force 
created by the same piece of legislation that had first outlawed physician-assisted 
suicide in 1993.67 Subsequently, O’Hair took on a prominent role in “Merian’s 
Friends,” a group named after Merian Frederick, one of Kevorkian’s Oakland
65 ALS is the abbreviation for Amotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, a rapidly progressive and fatal (barring 
an intervening cause of death, such as assisted suicide or euthanasia) neurodegenerative disease that 
undermines muscle control; it is the same illness Tom Youk had, and will be discussed further in 
Chapters 5 and 6.
66 The Michigan Commission on Death and Dying was enacted by the same piece of legislation the 
issued a temporary (18 month) ban on assisted suicide; this dual purpose statute was the subject of 
(unsuccessful) legal challenges in the paired Hobbins/Kevorkian cases of 1994.
67 Co-sponsor Senator Fred Dillingham told me in interview (Dillingham Interview: August 23, 1993) 
that this was effectively a compromise, which he and his pro-life colleagues sought to subvert (to the 
extent of not allocating and appropriating funds for the CDD to meet, while at the same time holding to 
the temporary ban on assisted suicide for prosecution purposes).
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patients, for whose assisted suicide Kevorkian was acquitted of after the first 1996 
trial I attended.68
In stark contrast, Richard Thompson was and remains a pro-life activist. If 
anything, his stance had become more and more firmly committed, which he 
attributed in large measure to his involvement in the Kevorkian cases. This was an 
involvement that began literally as Kevorkian began his assisted-death practice. In 
December 1990, Thompson sought the first of what would be dozens of indictments. 
That case was of Janet Adkins, a 54 year old Caucasian woman who had been 
exhibiting the early stages of Alzheimer’s Disease for approximately two years, and 
whom Kevorkian assisted on June 4, 1990. Thompson, relying upon a Michigan 
Supreme Court decision from the 1920s, People v. Roberts69, charged Kevorkian with 
what was called common law “open murder” charges70 that were dismissed prior to 
trial.
Thompson made the statement that he felt obliged to prosecute Kevorkian 
after Kevorkian’s first assisted suicide. Once that case was dismissed, Thompson
681 shall amplify upon this trial in Chapters 4 and 5.
69 The central reason People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187 (1920) was affirmed was because the defendant 
entered a plea of guilty, to the charge of murder in the first degree, in which he confessed to having 
mixed a poison (Paris green) with water and placed in wife Katie’s reach to enable her to end her own 
life. There are two most important aspects of the Roberts case.. First, Frank Roberts told the court in 
his plea colloquy (and in response to a direct inquiry from the court) that his wife had previously 
attempted suicide the summer before (211 Mich, at 192), and then knowingly drank the Paris green. 
This was in a way that would in today’s parlance and current Michigan law be deemed assisted suicide. 
I draw support for this conclusion from the coroner who performed the autopsy — who knew Katie 
Roberts while she was alive, had seen her “about three or four months before her death ... at her home 
where they lived... [and that] she was a bed patient [with] her body considerably wasted” (211 Mich, at 
190). Second, the issue in the challenge in Roberts was whether a murder trial was required subsequent 
to an allocuted guilty plea. The Michigan Supreme Court held that “there is no provision of the 
constitution which prevents a defendant from pleading guilty to the indictment instead of having a trial 
by jury. If he elects to plead guilty to the indictment the provision of the statute for determining the 
degree of the guilt for the purpose of fixing the punishment does not deprive him of any right of trial by 
jury” (211 Mich, at 194-195).
70 In Chapter 4, the 1996 “open” or “common law” murder trial was one in which jurors found 
themselves challenging what they perceived to be a made up law by the prosecutors, as opposed to the 
statutory trials held in Wayne in 1994 and the first of the Oakland trial in 1996. The latter was a 
staggering defeat under the statute. I conclude that if a trial based upon an elucidated statutory charge 
was met with defeat, then a prosecutorial theory of a common law crime involving the same defendant 
would be even more difficult to present, prove and secure a conviction of during the weeks thereafter.
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sought “clarification” from the legislature about the law regarding medical euthanasia 
and assisting in suicide (Thompson Interview: August 20, 1993). What he was 
seeking was to criminalize the conduct and to prosecute to successful conclusion.
This was an ambitious goal that was reasonable in the light of the statements he made 
to me, as well as statements of legislators Fred Dillingham and Nick Ciamaritaro,
71Right to Life Legislative Director Ed Rivet and others. Thompson was derided in 
the early 1990s and ousted by David Gorcyca (or by the constituents who voted 
Gorcyca into the office Thompson had held). However, Thompson was vindicated 
before the decade was over, albeit after he was literally run out of office. By 
century’s end, Kevorkian was in prison for euthanasia murder,72 as prosecuted by 
Gorcyca’s office,73 while Thompson had become a founding member of the Ave 
Maria School of Law, and giving conference presentations there such as that of March 
14, 2003, on "How Jack Kevorkian Converted Me to Catholicism.”
The interviews with O’Hair and Thompson were not limited to eliciting the 
views of the men as chief prosecutors, but also were an introduction to the 
politicalization of vocabularies that were then evolving in the pro-choice/pro-life 
debate.74 O’Hair repeatedly referred to issues of “family pressures” protecting family
71 Indeed, Thompson’s stance was taken as a given throughout the Kevorkian proceedings. Off the 
record, it was widely held that Kevorkian and his then-attomey Geoffrey Fieger took aim at the 
Oakland prosecutor, knowing that he would be both a provocative actor and easily provoked. There 
were numerous colorful statements made by both prosecutor and defendant/defense attorney, some of 
which were broadcast on the evening news
72 This became what I would call a colloquial term of art in Michigan during the 1990s, commonly 
used both in and out of court, especially during the 1999 Youk prosecution.
73 This final trial will be discussed in great detail in Part II of the Chapter 6, with great amplification as 
to the trial strategy of, and theory of the case presented by, line prosecutor John Skrzynski. This trial 
attorney had prosecuted Kevorkian without success during the first of the 1996 trials, under 
Thompson’s regime.
74 Definitions and taxonomy presented a challenge for me, and I repeatedly found social and legal 
constructions of language to be political in nature. However, one medical construction was offered by 
William Saletan on October 5, 2008, in an article entitled, “The Doctors who are Redefining Life and 
Death,” posted on www.washingtonpost.com. In this article, targeting a mass readership, the author 
argued that “dead” has different meanings in terms of organ harvestation -- including “brain dead,” 
“donation after cardiac death,” or “devastating neurologic injury”. This Kevorkian-friendly parsing, 
however, provided for a non-Kevorkian safety net, “[traditional safeguards, such as separation of the
118
“assets” during our interview and later meetings, while Thompson raised concerns 
about “insurance.” These regarded concerns about paying health care costs, as I shall 
now discuss.
These were mirror images of axiomatic concerns in the United States, where 
there is no scheme of national health provided by the government. Indeed, on May 30 
2008, almost exactly 15 years after these two statements had been made, the New 
York Times carried an article, “Study Finds City Hospitals Differ on Care at Life’s 
End,” by Anemona Hartocollis and Ford Fessenden. This reported on a study 
compiled by Consumer Union from a 15-year research project based at Dartmouth 
College, and it found “two starkly different paths toward death, one for elite private 
institutions, another for those at public hospitals” in New York City’s hospitals. It 
stated that the city’s private hospitals were “among the most aggressive [in patient 
testing/treatment] of about 3,000 hospitals studied across the nation, ranking in the
th  th94 percentile as a group, while the public hospitals landed in the 69 percentile, still 
above the national average” (Hartocollis and Fessenden, May 30, 2008, Bl).
That patients in elite, private teaching hospitals (such as NYU and Lenox Hill) 
provide most elderly patients deemed to be within the last two years of life “more 
intensive treatment, more tests, more days of hospitalization -  and more out of pocket 
costs” than do their counterparts at city municipal hospitals. The latter, which provide 
care to “the neediest New Yorkers,” was immediately identified as having “huge 
implications for administrators, doctors and patients as they consider which model of 
care is best for those suffering from chronic, fatal illnesses like cancer, congestive 
heart failure, lung disease and dementia” (Hartocollis and Fessenden, May 30, 2008: 
Bl). What makes this even more alarming is that the Dartmouth/Consumer Union
transplant team from the patient’s medical team, will prevent abuse.” I shall further explore this theme 
in Chapter 6.
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study was not looking at the totality of a person’s life chances, social behavioural 
habits and general quality of life, as compared hy Howarth: (2007:18) writing in 
“The Social Context of Death in Old Age.” Rather, the Dartmouth/Consumer Union 
study was simply considering the amount of consumer rankings of testing and 
treatment dollars that were going into the last two years of the lives of elderly 
patients.
The academic health center at Dartmouth joined Consumer Union in their 
2008 report, which targeted questions related to consumer rankings.. The study was 
not said to address “the question of whether longer stays and more intervention 
prolong patient’s lives, and the Dartmouth researchers argue[d] in general that less- 
aggressive treatment does not change the outcome, but spares patients the agony of 
unnecessary tests and reduces the risk of hospital-borne infections” (Hartocollis and 
Fessenden, May 30, 2008, Bl). This hearkened back to O’Hair’s press conference on 
August 17, 1993, when he said that “assets that may have been accumulated don’t go 
to the families, surviving spouse, son or daughter ... they go to the medical 
profession,” or, in other words, that a dying patient’s wealth was siphoned off to pay 
medical bills. A number of people commented in the mid-1990s on the recent decline 
and death of O’Hair’s father and a reasonable conclusion is that this may have been 
an influence on his views at the time and may have explained his comment to the 
press. A possibility is that the recent family experience of spending down assets had 
an impact upon O’Hair’s own views. In his August 17, 1993 press conference, he said 
that:
if Mr. Hyde [the consenting victim] had endured for a few weeks 
longer, he’d have been force fed, been on a respirator, been comatose ... what 
[O’Hair] found difficult is that he would have to wait that additional two 
weeks or whatever the time period that may be to go into a comatose state 
before he could have his voluntary choice fulfilled.
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Likewise, Thompson, in interview on August 20, 1993 commented that 
“there’s an unspoken and unwritten message going out to every elderly person in our 
society that once you become about 80 and start to become infirm, don’t waste our 
money -  kill yourself, because your life is not gonna be real.” Thompson might 
have answered the challenge presented in 2008 by Kenneth Raske. The latter, who 
was President of the Greater New York Hospital Association, which included public 
and private institutions, said that the Dartmouth “data was (sic) flawed because it (sic) 
worked backward from patients who died, rather than looking at the outcomes for 
patients who had the same treatment, but survived” (Hartocollis and Fessenden, May 
30,2008: B6).
Whether or not there were empirical flaws, the fact is that in July 2008, 
Consumer Reports joined with Dartmouth “to launch a new free web tool to rank 
nearly 3,000 U.S. hospitals for chronic care” specifically with regard to patient wealth 
(or lack thereof) at www.ConsumerReportsHealth.org. In a somewhat rhetorical 
conclusion, I shall now offer a question that may never be answered -  taking 
Thompson’s speculation and Raske’s lacuna together. What would be the 
comparative and cumulative results if the numbers of wealthy elites and impoverished 
ordinary people seeking assisted suicide or medical euthanasia had been the same or 
different?
This question, along with the 1993 interview statements of Chief Prosecuting 
Attorneys O’Hair and Thompson, might imply a slippery slope similar to that which I 
discussed in the background of recent historical perspectives of medically-assisted 
death in Pappas (1996). An implied question arose: would treatment of elites either 
in aggressive and expensive advanced care or in asset-and-insurance-saving 
euthanasia or assisted suicide become as bastardized as that imposed on the disabled
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or those deemed defective by the Nazi euthanasia programme, as articulated by 
Burleigh in Death and Deliverance: ‘Euthanasia * in Germany, 1940-1945 (1994) and 
echoed by Cohen in States o f Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (2001, 
p. 279).
O’Hair and Thompson continued to parse views and vocabularies of the 
proper use of economic resources (or medical “resource allocation,” a term which 
culturally embraced both the concept of “spending down” or asset-wasting, as well as 
health insurance expenditures and/or insurance denials) in their comments about 
euthanasia, assisted suicide, and those involved in the actual conduct (whether 
medical or criminal or overlapping in nature). While these were not references to the 
lack of national health service in the United States as a potential (or probable) source 
of incentive to assisted suicide, I note that in the Netherlands, “the Dutch have distinct 
social classes, but differences are not extreme [and] on every measure the Netherlands 
has one of the healthiest populations in the world. (Cockerham 2004, pp.336-337). 
Legal writers on both sides of the Dutch issue (Keown 2005, Griffiths 1998) and of 
the medical issue (Gomez 1991) have tended not to discuss socialized medicine as 
either promoting assisted death or mitigating it. O’Hair and Thompson may thus have 
seized upon a uniquely American matter.
Moving on, I shall now proceed to differentiate the distinctions articulated in 
the chief prosecuting attorneys’ language regarding doctors and the increased 
emergence (or increase of the reported)75 medical practice of illegally hastening death 
in Michigan
Perhaps most obviously divergent were how the two chief prosecutors 
expressed their views about Kevorkian himself, as an activist and as a doctor although
75 In Chapters 5 and 6„ I shall discuss physician surveys pertaining to beliefs and practices regarding 
assisted death in the 1990s, and what was a largely acknowledged, but rarely discussed, occurrence.
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as Thompson correctly pointed out, one who had been stripped of his licenses to 
practice medicine in both California and Michigan, and thus could no longer actually 
be called “Dr.” (Thompson Interview: August 20, 1993). In a press conference, 
O’Hair declared
I believe that Jack Kevorkian whether he is sincere or not -  and I know he is 
of questioned sincerity -  has tried to bring a focus on this assisted suicide 
issue and in doing so he has performed a public service. The disregarding of 
the law is something I cannot abide, but at the same time he has performed a 
public service by his effort and his crusade. I  share a concern with Dr. 
Kevorkian [about] the need to resolve this. (O’Hair Press Conference:
August 17, 1993)(emphasis added).
In other words, O’Hair viewed Kevorkian as precipitating a social and legal 
reform movement, in stark contrast to Thompson’s view that Kevorkian was simply 
acting criminally. Thompson emphatically told me only three days later in interview,
the issue [of assisted suicide] won’t go away because the medical profession I 
s now interested, but I  think that if  Jack Kevorkian left the scene, there would 
be a more rational discussion by the medical community about the pros and 
cons o f what makes this issue -  there are alternatives, such as hospice, [that 
have] not been discussed in our media” (Thompson Interview: August 20, 
1993).76
These statements, juxtaposed, show how one chief prosecuting administrator 
was using his position to advance the social and legal movement in favor of assisted 
suicide, while the other was doing the polar opposite. Thompson went further, talking 
about possibilities of resorting to hospice or anticipating palliative care. He was to 
say, “the medical profession maybe is starting to understand if we can’t cure them, we 
can care for them” (Thompson Interview: August 20, 1993). He also alluded to the 
“slippery slopes” argument: “once you say there is such a thing as life not worth to be
76 As I shall amplify in Part I of Chapter 6, this was a criticism that was echoed by inter alia, medical 
ethicists, and by members of the participating members of the media itself, at a conference held in 
February 1999 in Ann Arbor subsequent to the November 1998 CBS 60 Minutes national broadcast of 
the September 1998 Youk euthanasia, but prior to the Youk euthanasia trial in March 1999. This 
conference, and the background of it, will be discussed at length.
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lived it opens up ... slopes (sic) are coming to fruition in the Netherlands with babies, 
mentally defective babies.”77
Adults, with the legal (and medical) capacity to consent, are in an entirely 
different legal category than are under-age people and mentally-disabled infants who 
have no legal capacity to consent (and do not fall into the categories under 
consideration in this dissertation). However, I would also suggest that Thompson 
would have favoured my secular argument about the 2008 report on the Dartmouth 
study; while there were roles played by religious groups and individuals in the 
Kevorkian cases, I shall amplify these in the Juries and Families chapters, although 
not in my discussion of Thompson.78
As to the self-styled “Dr. Death,”79 Thompson said: “when I became 
prosecutor, this was not an issue we would talk about .. [it] wasn’t really an issue for 
us, it developed because Kevorkian was an Oakland County resident and he started 
killing people here in Oakland. But I want you to know we handle 20,000 felony 
cases a year in this office and we always maintain our focus on general 
responsibilities” [Thompson Interview: August 20, 1993]. This last phrase is a 
reference to the obligation to enforce law and order generally in the county (rather 
than to take on a specific issue or target a particular individual). One might argue (in 
fact, I shall comment in the next section that David Gorcyca did argue, when he
77 It is largely beyond the scope of this project to consider non-voluntary euthanasia of underage minors 
or those with mental incapacity, and further note that this project is considering Anglo-American, not 
the Dutch experience. This said, at the time of the 1993 interviews, the Netherlands was the 
jurisdiction of reference for de facto decriminalization of euthanasia.
78 Regarding Thompson, I would formally rely upon his move to become a Catholic and a founding 
member and Dean of Ave Maria Law School, rather than upon anecdotal commentary of others in deep 
background.
79 The traditional convention is to call a defendant by either his surname (“Mr. Kevorkian”) or by his 
status in the criminal justice system (“defendant” at the trial level; “defendant” or “appellant” in the 
course of appellate proceedings). Kevorkian used this title and reference on a number of occasions, as I 
shall reference in various chapters and formats. This, along with commentary by interviewees, 
prompted me to use the self-appellation, particularly where quoted from an interview or proceeding 
transcript.
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successfully challenged Thompson and was elected Oakland County Prosecuting
Attorney) that to target a specific individual or issue could lead to depletion of tax
dollars that could be used for other purposes. Another way of phrasing this argument
is that “we have to trust prosecutors to make a prudent discretionary decision”
(Fletcher 2000: 718)(emphasis added), and to repeatedly prosecute the same
defendant was economically imprudent to a frustrated taxpaying public. While there
may be occasions where exemplary prosecutions may be mounted with perfect
propriety, such as where an offence or an offender is especially egregious or where a
precedent is sought or a new law or legal interpretation is being tested, the economic
issue here was the repeated, prolonged and expensive trials of the same defendant for
similar conduct in the face of multiple acquittals.
Thompson was making statements in public and in interview that were
seemingly80 local and legally focused in nature, while his Wayne County counterpart
was doing otherwise. O’Hair’s comment on August 17, 1993, at his press conference,
was a good illustration:
Jack Kevorkian has certainly a national, probably an international 
recognition. I think I would rather characterize his status as being one of 
recognition throughout the county, whether or not he [Kevorkian] is destined 
fo r greatness. (O’Hair Press Conference: August 17, 1993)(emphasis added).
The surprise here was not that Chief Prosecuting Attorney O’Hair
acknowledged Kevorkian’s fame, but rather that he acknowledged a possibility of the
greatness (a positive attribute, without offering the alternative negative alternative that
one would expect from an indicting executive), with regard to the conduct for which
he was being indicted. In this case, being there made the difference -  the tone O’Hair
used was earnest, not ironic or tongue in cheek. This stood in comparison with
80 The use of the word “seemingly” is because the wealth of activity over the next several years would 
lead to the reasonable conclusion that Thompson was in fact quite focused upon Kevorkian, and upon 
the issue of hastening death.
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Thompson’s descriptions of the targeted defendant. Thompson was not alone in this
regard. According to the interview statements of Senator Fred Dillingham, among
others, of “Section 7” the 18-month temporary ban outlawing assisted suicide, was
commonly referred to as the “anti-Kevorkian law.”81
One fact that both prosecutors noted during August 199382 was that Kevorkian
was no longer licensed as a professional physician. O’Hair took the approach that:
Kevorkian is not a licensed physician. I’m not sure that the method used [in 
the assisted suicide of Thomas Hyde] wouldn’t be considered cruel by the 
medical profession. Thomas Hyde over in Belle Isle in a rusted broken down 
van [referring to the VW van owned by Kevorkian] inhaling carbon monoxide 
as a means of ending his life -  hard to characterize that as dignity ... type of 
thing we want to avoid (O’Hair Press Conference: August 17, 1993).
Whereas in the earlier quote, O’Hair was considering whether Kevorkian
would ascend to greatness, in this quote, he was contemplating whether Kevorkian
should more properly be called a cruel former physician. Thompson went further, and
observed that Kevorkian had already lost his license to practice in Michigan and his
license to practice in California, and that “Michigan” subsequently passed a specific
statute banning assisted suicide -  the temporary ban under which O’Hair’s office was
81 Reserved from discussing at this time is the concept that a law is not supposed to be enacted to target 
the activities o f one individual, as did Michigan. This said, legislation enacted in other states as a 
response to the issues that arose from Kevorkian’s activities included a statute in Georgia, which was 
used for the first time in 2006 to allow for the plea bargaining of a woman named Carol Carr, who shot 
and killed two sons who were bedridden with Huntington’s Disease. A Spalding County grand jury 
reportedly indicted Carr in August 2002 on two charges of felony murder and two charges of malice 
murder, even as “the surrounding community has reached out to the family, which has received 
hundreds of supportive letters (Scott, August 24, 2002). However, Carr was permitted to enter a plea 
of guilty to two charges of assisting in the commission of a suicide, and served two years of the five 
year sentence she was originally sentenced to, and was permitted to serve a five year sentence of 
probation on the second count, on condition that she not live with her 40 year old son James, afflicted 
with the early stages of HD (Stirgus, March 2, 2004). This creative prosecutorial use of plea 
bargaining as a compassionate legal tool for a woman who was neither physician nor assisting in the 
fatal act is a potential area of further legal exploration and examination within the past few years, 
largely deferred to later research as an example of the way forward as criminal law and the criminal 
justice system seek to deal with a newly emerging issue of family assisted suicide and prosecutorial 
responses thereto.
82 Somewhat surprisingly, Marlinga, in his April 27, 1993 document, did not seem concerned with this 
issue.
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the first to prosecute. Thompson added, “so, by his actions, [Kevorkian] has actually 
done the opposite” [of greatness] [Thompson Interview: August 20, 1993].
Moreover, O’Hair advocated methodologies of how to assist in death during 
our (August 19, 1993) interview. These included pills or “lethal injection,” a death- 
penalty methodology which might have been more a reflection of his own profession 
of criminal law enforcement. In other chapters, I shall discuss analogies regarding 
Kevorkian’s methodologies to those used in death penalty cases. As the Kevorkian 
cases progressed, this was an ongoing theme.
Further, timing had been highlighted by both prosecutors, who served as the 
named (executive) prosecutors and as participants in the Michigan Commission on 
Death and Dying during the period of my study. However, Thompson noted that 
Kevorkian’s timing was also acute -  he observed that the “Wantz/Miller” assisted 
suicides happened the week before the election [when California had a ballot 
measure] and the ME [Medical Examiner or Coroner] said the scene [of the 
Wantz/Miller Kevorkian assisted suicides] was bizarre, a cabin lit by candles.” 
Thompson’s description of the Wantz/Miller crime scene was a more vivid comment, 
but similar to that of O’Hair regarding lack of dignity in the Hyde assisted suicide -  a 
reasonable conclusion might be that the two chiefs were commenting on the issue of 
death with dignity by commenting on the lack of dignity at the Kevorkian cases.
As I shall note periodically, Kevorkian’s actions and conduct both escalated in 
response to activities in the political arena and, in fact, precipitated them. Indeed, this 
is true of the later chief prosecutors, as I shall now argue. However, Kevorkian did 
not operate in a vacuum, and these senior and experienced chiefs brought political 
agendas of their own to their Kevorkian cases, whether with regard to seeking further
83 These were the cases tried to acquittal in the second 1996 trial, which shall receive further treatment 
in Part II of this chapter (regarding judges), as well as Chapter 4 and Chapter 5s.
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electoral office (Marlinga), or to seeking legislation to address financial asset wasting 
(O’Hair) or the emerging religious concerns flowing from an academic concern of 
slippery slopes to Kevorkian as a one man slippery slope (Thompson). In the next 
section, I shall be examining young Turks who took office later (Ionia’s Voet) and 
even “away” (Oakland’s Gorcyca, who defeated Thompson in election) from the old 
guard, and had cases thrust upon them by Kevorkian, the media, and emerging issues 
not of their own creation.
C. Changing Prosecutors and the Chief Prosecuting Attorneys in the “Later'* 
Kevorkian Cases: Ray Voet (Ionia County) and David Gorcyca (Oakland County)
Changing chief prosecuting attorneys for the “later” Kevorkian prosecutions in 
1997 (Ionia County) and 1999 (Oakland County), introduced a new wave and younger 
generation of chief prosecutors. In Ionia County, Ray Voet, at age 30 in 1992, was 
the youngest chief prosecutor elected.in county history to that date. In Oakland 
County, David Gorcyca was similarly youthful when he won the Republican primary 
contest against 59-year-old Thompson. Lessenberry (August 8, 1996) noted that 
Gorcyca won 56 per cent of the 103,000 votes to Thompson’s 44 per cent. Chief 
among Gorcyca’s candidacy claims in running for office was that he would not 
prosecute Kevorkian again, because it was a waste of taxpayer dollars on a 
personalized political agenda. I briefly met and conversed with Gorcyca,84 although I 
did not formally interview him; Gorcyca literally was waiting outside the courtroom 
where Kevorkian was being tried on the other side of the door on the day Gorcyca 
first made the announcement that he was seeking to oust Thompson. It seemed to me
84 This was an ancillary benefit of my having had to wait for a break in court proceedings to re-enter 
the room, a procedural mechanism implemented by order of Judge Breck, as a mechanism to keep 
proceedings focused, as I shall discuss in Part II of this chapter. At the time, I was not pleased that I 
had to wait to re-enter the public proceedings. However, this proved to be the sole occasion upon 
which I met and spoke with Gorcyca (albeit informally).
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that Gorcyca was in his acts, as well as by his words, communicating that there was 
work to be done aside from prosecuting Kevorkian. In short, Gorcyca was saying that 
he would not prosecute Kevorkian (although he changed his position after the Youk 
euthanasia was broadcast on national television in 1998). So it was that the chief 
prosecuting attorneys had changed for the future Kevorkian cases, and brought 
different perspectives and prosecutorial responses to Kevorkian’s conduct from those 
of the “old guard.”
Rural Ionia County, located approximately 130 miles west of Detroit, was 
where Ray Voet ran a small office in a small town and county seat named for the 
district. Jack Lessenberry85wrote an article about country lawyer Voet, entitled 
“Prosecutor Goes Against Tide in Going After Kevorkian, published on Saturday, 
November 26, 1996 (page 12). Lessenberry noted that the young, fair-haired 
Republican, a wife who was a kindergarten teacher and three small children, became a 
Kevorkian prosecutor by phone. In Lessenberry’s rendition for The New York 
Times,*6 Voet received a “phone call after a lunchtime jog with the local sheriff,” and 
the Medical Examiner reported a problem during the call.87 The so-called problem 
was that a tape seized in Oakland County (obtained during a raid of88 a meeting with 
Kevorkian and potential assisted suicide patients) contained evidence about the 
recently-deceased Ionian resident, Loretta Peabody, and her husband. Peabody had
85 The role of reporter Jack Lessenberry in the Kevorkian case is discussed s at length in Part I of the 
Chapter 6.
86 Lessenberry’s report was similar in tone (what I would categorize here as slightly colorful, although 
some of the quotes in Chapter 6 Part I Fieger/Kevorkian/Lessenberry interactions will approach purple 
prose, and will demonstrate a certain flamboyance on the part of all three men) to that expressed in an 
article some years earlier, in which he was cultivating a relationship with Kevorkian’s then-attomey, 
Geoffrey Fieger. I shall comment upon the latter at further length in Part I of the Chapter 6, and use 
the former here as an informational source.
87 A reasonable, though unstated, conclusion that this points to is a showing of the changing of chief 
prosecuting attorneys to a young, vibrant family man who was not mired in matters of parental death 
(like O’Hair) or personal vendetta (like Thompson). This shows a movement toward a 
professionalization of the professionals involved to those distant and without any personal interest in 
the outcome of the case.
88 In American criminal justice practice, one does a “raid of,” rather than a “raid on.”
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advanced multiple sclerosis, and was allegedly assisted in dying by Kevorkian and his 
then associate (and subsequent patient), Janet Good.89
The grand jury Voet convened in Ionia was, according to Lessenberry, the first 
ever called in the history of the county. The trial opening statements made on June 
11, 1997 were the beginning and the end of the trial against Jack Kevorkian (the 
related charges against Janet Good having been previously dismissed by Voet, who 
was trial prosecutor as well as chief prosecuting attorney). Kevorkian’s then-lawyer 
Geoffrey Fieger made an opening statement that was colorful, legally objectionable 
and ultimately, grounds for a mistrial motion. This motion was granted from the 
bench after the opening statements were concluded. Among other commentary by 
Fieger on the prosecution of Kevorkian by Voet was that it was “selective 
prosecution”90 (Pappas, 1997 trial notes). There were references to “Christian 
martyrs” (Pappas, 1997 trial notes), personal commentary on second seat91 and the 
family of Michael Modelski. Modelski had formerly worked under Thompson in 
the Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office and, in 1997, was second seated 
prosecutor to Voet. As a general matter, if another lawyer’s family is relevant to the 
case at trial, that is grounds for either self-recusal, a recusal upon request of a
89 Janet Good had been the President of the Hemlock Society in Michigan, and was originally seated as 
the Vice-Chair of the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying in 1993-1994; however, due to 
personal conflict, she resigned from the CDD; Michigan attorney Elsa Shartsis, who was the ACLU 
representative on the CDD, became the Vice-Chair for the remainder of the group’s hearings and 
deliberations. While I met with, and conducted interviews of, both of these women during the 1990s, 
at this point in the thesis, it is Janet Good’s involvement as a Kevorkian co-defendant that is my focus.
90 A selective prosecution in legal culture refers to prosecuting one person, but not others, for the same 
conduct -  or targeting a particular person or group of people. To say this in an opening statement to a 
jury at trial was, I conclude,, actually a political statement being made to the judge or for the record of 
further appeal in the event of conviction.
91 Second seat is a traditionally used expression to designate the lawyer who is not the “lead lawyer” at 
trial. Second seats (and third seats), often do background work, prepare motions, and sometimes will 
prepare and examine certain witnesses;. However, lead counsel will make opening and closing 
arguments, and question most witnesses. A social construction of the status of second seats in terms of 
status is that they also often serve as the trial equivalent of what a theatre production might call an 
understudy -  that is to say that the second seat stands in for the lead counsel or takes over the role in 
the event of an emergency.
92 This is legally inappropriate commentary and argument during an opening or a closing statement -  
the family of another lawyer is irrelevant to the case at trial.
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defendant who knows of this, a recusal upon the court’s own motion, or potential 
reversible appellate error for a conflict of interest. However, as one who was there, I 
do conclude that Fieger went into this arena for the specific purpose of being 
inflammatory in his opening argument, as part of a deliberate strategy to provoke a 
mistrial. I shall amplify this further in both parts of this chapter.
Over consistent objections by the prosecutors, Fieger also made accusations that the 
Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office was conspiring with Voet and his 
office, notwithstanding a newly elected Oakland County Chief, David Gorcyca. It 
is legally objectionable, and generally considered to be a breach of etiquette to 
interrupt the flow of opening and closing arguments. That said, in the course of 
appellate review, where a defendant has not objected (for example to inflammatory 
statements made by a prosecutor on summation,94 a common appellate issue), s/he 
will often be deemed to have “waived” the issue or the error. What was most unusual 
here was that it was the defense attorney making the inflammatory statements, and the 
prosecutor who was objecting.
My conclusion to all of this was that Fieger,had essentially sought and secured 
jury nullification in both Wayne and Oakland Counties.in 1994 and 1995. The subject 
of jury nullification, where a jury acquits a defendant despite compelling evidence of
93 In my opinion,Voet and Gorcyca would have done anything to have avoided the experiences they 
did. One support I shall shortly draw for this argument is that Gorcyca actually dismissed all cases 
pending against Kevorkian when he took over the Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office,. 
Furthermore, t in 1998 (barely a year after the Ionia mistrial), Kevorkian had Lessenberry negotiate 
sending a tape of the Youk euthanasia to CBS for broadcast, and during the follow-up interview, 
Kevorkian told moderator Mike Wallace that he had to “force them [the Oakland County Prosecuting 
Attorney] to act”. If the Oakland and Ionia County Chief Prosecuting Attorneys were communicating 
with one another, it was as likely to have been to commiserate about having to deal with Kevorkian at 
all, as it was to conspire. By this I do not mean to suggest that they did not share information, such as 
the subject Peabody tape. My conclusion is that this was completely proper as across jurisdictions, 
rather than any unethical conspiracy to go after one man.
94 Examples of objectionable prosecutorial summation error are identifying with the jury, vouching for 
the People’s witnesses, racial/religious epithets (example “Devil worshipper”) regarding the defendant, 
personal attacks on clothing or grooming), references to a defendant’s failure to testify. This last 
actually was an issue on the appeal of the Kevorkian 1999 conviction, though the appellate court 
declined to grant Kevorkian relief and affirmed his sentence.
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causation and intention sufficient to establish the legal elements of the crime charged, 
is something that I shall amplify upon at length in the course of this dissertation in 
Chapters 4, 5 and Chapter 6. Accordingly, I defer a lengthy explanation of jury 
nullification theory and the realities of such cases for the substantive discussions in 
these subsequent chapters.
In 1997, Fieger had looked into the jury box of white, rural, and conservative 
people seated on the jury and found no friendly faces. With speedy deliberation 
approaching instinct, Fieger designed and provoked a mistrial. I have long held it 
axiomatic that trial lawyers (often called ’’stand up” lawyers, because they literally 
stand up in court to make an argument) have to have a progressively more developed 
set of internalized instincts. This, sub silentio, aspect of a lawyer’s strategy and 
demeanor is self-selecting in nature . Those who do not have it shall never become 
great trial lawyers, although they may become competent -  and some may not have a 
courtroom presence at all, which may serve in part to funnel them to choose a non­
litigation legal career. A fascinating article about the science of insight (and the 
ability to make intuitive leaps speedily and successfully), written by Jonah Lehrer, 
“The Eureka Hunt: Where in our Brains Do Insights Come From?” may be found in 
July 28, 2008 edition of The New Yorker pp. 40-45. While this does not contemplate 
legal intuition,, I conclude this is a parallel ability.
I further conclude that Fieger provoked a mistrial for a gamble so that the trial 
would not end in deliberations resulting in a verdict finding Kevorkian guilty. This 
conclusion was based upon my Ionia observations, and underscored by the cultural 
practice that opening statements are arguments where there is wide latitude and where
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mistrials are virtually unheard of, and of my repeated observations of Fieger on trial 
with Kevorkian.95
I was presented with a unique opportunity to interview Chief Prosecuting 
Attorney Ray Voet on June 13,1997, after the trial -  or more correctly, after the 
mistrial. I note that the Peabody case would never be tried again (a phrase I use 
deliberately as distinct from re-tried, which would suggest a case in which evidence 
was taken, arguments heard, and a verdict rendered). While that was not yet 
established in the immediate days after the trial, this was an assumption many made 
and I offer a brief explanation here. The Detroit (Belle Isle) case in Wayne County 
was in a large urban area with great funding resources. The cases tried in Oakland 
County were in the third wealthiest county in the nation, with wealth from the 
automobile industry, as I was repeatedly told (including by prosecutors). The Ionia 
case in tiny Ionia County (5,000 inhabitants) had prisons or correctional facilities as 
its central industry, was relatively poor and rural. Hence, as a matter of economics, it 
was a fair decision not to seek to expend public resources any further on Kevorkian, 
as I shall discuss.
In our interview, Voet noted that he had, prior to trial, brought a motion for 
“decorum” i.e., for rules of conduct and propriety in court at trial. An unintended 
consequence was that instead Voet’s motion might have been an inadvertent road map 
for Fieger. (Voet: 1997 Motion for Decorum:, 1-2).96 Voet ruefully commented that
951 am not suggesting that Fieger is not flamboyant, but rather that he has method to his madness.
Later in this chapter, I shall amplify with regard to Fieger’s summations (and especially how judges, 
who had seen them but once, reacted, in contrast to some in the gallery, such as myself, who began to 
see the repetitive aspects -  known in the legal community generally as “canned”). In particular, the 
summations mimicked that of Atticus Finch, as portrayed in 1962 by Gregory Peck in To Kill A 
Mockingbird. My conclusion is that Fieger had a very well internalized sense of what is going far and 
what is going too far, and when to do either. Indeed, I would suggest that this is a superior gift for a 
trial lawyer to have and to be able to deploy as needed (although I would suggest that this may also be 
due to Fieger’s earlier academic training in drama, which has many overlaps with trial law).
96 As a methodological limitation, I note that while I had a number of conversations with Fieger during 
the mid-1990s, I never had an opportunity to formally interview him. When I requested an interview
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he had observed the proceedings even as he participated in them during his and 
Fieger’s opening statements. He told me that his inner dialogue was, “here it comes, 
judge; there it goes; see, judge, it just went by” (Voet Interview: June 13, 1997) 
when referring to Fieger’s lack of decorum and misconduct during his opening to the 
jury. Voet further told me that he did communicate with other prosecutors about
0 7their experiences in their cases against Kevorkian, and that he relied heavily upon 
former-Oakland assistant prosecuting attorney Modelski; however Voet’s overall 
comment about the defense attorney’s opening was that, “Fieger had to commit jury 
arson” (Voet Interview: June 13, 1997). This I interpreted as a play on the phrase 
often used in court or on appeal that a statement is objectionable as “inflammatory” to 
the individual jurors or to the jury as a whole (and hence should be excluded and 
expunged from the record, with possible curative instructions or a necessitated 
mistrial).
While defense attorney Fieger may not have seen any friendly faces on the 
jury, I would argue that the “Certificate of Death,” of Loretta Peabody may have 
provided a prima facie defense regarding the legal cause of death, offering a viable 
defense due to novus intervenus or a potential intervening cause of death so as to raise 
a reasonable doubt.98 Further, while the Certificate of Death read that the “immediate 
cause of death” was “Death by IV injection,” it also listed as a “significant condition 
contributing to death, but not resulting in the underlying cause given in Part I,”
with him in March 1996, he told me that he “would never ever give an interview for anyone who 
worked with Art Caplan [who had been the Director for the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the 
University of Minnesota]. Caplan left prior to my fellowship year there, during which time there was 
an interim director and ongoing recruitment search. I had a number of conversations thereafter with 
Fieger “off the record,” in which he would occasionally tell me to tell Caplan something colorfully 
worded. However,, I did not have an opportunity to speak with him during or after the Ionia mistrial. I 
conclude that part of this may be due to the unfavorable circumstances he was experiencing in Ionia, 
which led him to keep closer to himself and to Jack Lessenberry (and which I shall amplify upon in 
Part I of Chapter 6).
97 This was not unique to the prosecutors -  the 1996 judges spoke to one another as well, particularly 
after Judge Cooper’s 1996 trial and before Judge Breck’s subsequent Kevorkian trial in tl996.
98 This and other issues of causation in the Kevorkian cases, will be discussed in Part II of Chapter 6.
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Peabody’s condition of “Multiple Sclerosis.” (Certificate of Death of Loretta Peabody 
1387861: September 3, 1996).
In a sense, this presented a colorable" issue of causation, or more accurately 
lack of causation (lack of sufficient evidence of the cause of death, an element of the 
crime). This line of colorable causation (or the legal fiction) challenges has been a 
successful defensive position to prosecutions against doctors for medically hastening 
death, as in the 1950s New Hampshire prosecution against Dr. Hermann Sander (who 
was acquitted) and the 1990s prosecution against England’s Dr. Nigel Cox (who 
admitted to given two ampoules of potassium chloride to a patient, who was 
terminally ill with rheumatoid arthritis -  a possible alternative or combination of 
causative factors that resulted in, and conviction of, a lesser charge of attempted 
murder, with a suspended sentence to the doctor -  who returned to practice following 
supervision and palliative care remedial training).100 The causation issues regarding 
the death of Loretta Peabody will likely forever remain legally unresolved after the 
mistrial (although one might medically draw the conclusion of medical euthanasia, 
and not assisted suicide, by a plain reading of the death certificate).101 That said, the 
case did no damage to Voet’s career, as he later became a judge in tiny Ionia County.
In Oakland County, David Gorcyca, a contemporary of Voet, was the only 
chief prosecutor to promise not to take Kevorkian to trial. Indeed, as I noted earlier, it
99 A colorable issue is an issue that is open to dispute; likewise a colorable argument is one that may 
be properly raised. During the ritualistic initiation of legal language in law school, when as many 
words and phrases were taught by classroom conversation as casebook, one common cultural 
expression unlikely to be found in a law text is that a colorable issue “passes the laugh test” (meaning 
that a lawyer would not get laughed out of court by a judge for raising it).
100 As I shall argue in Part II of Chapter 6, there was a colorable claim of lack of causation in the Youk 
prosecution. This Kevorkian, acting as his own attorney, raised in his cross-examination of the medical 
examiner. Unfortunately, he failed to shut the door during closing arguments by not arguing the 
potentially fatally flawed element in his summation.
My argument here is that this is the1997 Peabody case was the mirror image of the 1999Youk case. 
In the latter, the jury convicted of murder,, as I shall amplify in Part II of Chapter 6. The Ionia 
prosecutors were trying to charge Kevorkian within a statutory scheme that offered a possible 
conviction, rather than to charge Kevorkian within the medically provable facts. My conclusion is that 
this was because under a common law murder scheme. Thompson’s office had lost a year earlier.
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was a major plank of his (successful) campaign platform to displace Richard 
Thompson in a county-wide election. In an exercise of the prosecutorial discretion 
that came with his office, Gorcyca was also the only one to summarily dismiss 
indictments against Kevorkian (which Richard Thompson had filed prior to his 
departure in the wake of a lost election). However, Gorcyca subsequently had the 
distinction of being the only chief prosecuting attorney to file euthanasia murder and 
assisted suicide charges against Kevorkian. New charges, regarding the September 
1998 euthanasia of Thomas Youk, were filed following passage of a new piece of 
legislation regarding physician-assisted suicide and a new tape.102
These seemingly rich ironies, given Gorcyca’s campaign promise that he 
would not prosecute Jack Kevorkian with what he considered to be unenforceable 
laws were ones that line prosecutor John Skrzysnki was put in the awkward position 
of explaining during the 1999 trial. Gorcyca made the promises in the immediate 
wake of Thompson’s office having lost two sets of trials in rapid succession in 
between March and May of 1996 (the Frederick/Khalili and the Wantz/Miller 
prosecutions).103 Gorcyca’s campaign plank was that the prosecutions wasted both 
time and taxpayer dollars (Pakes 2004, p. 98).
102 The tape of Kevorkian administering euthanasia to Tom Youk, was the heart of the March 1999 
case. I shall devote an entire chapter to the tape. Part I of Chapter 6 will address social and legal 
consequences of making the tape and broadcasting the tape and a subsequent interview with Kevorkian, 
while Part II will address the ways in which the original Kevorkian tape, the 60 Minutes version and 
interview with Kevorkian, and the prosecutor’s cuts of the original tapes, were used at the 1999 trial
103 The first of these paired trials took place separately, whereas the Wantz/Miller cases took place 
previously and simultaneously, as the colorful description by Thompson indicated with regard to the 
crime scene. Thompson might have been more elegant at that time by addressing this as a death without 
dignity issue. His description did hearken back to the 1944 Cary Grant movie, Arsenic and Old Lace, 
where one of his elderly aunts, Aunt Abby, said that “we always wanted to have a double funeral” as a 
solution to a complicated problem in this farce.
As a brief abstract, in Arsenic and Old Lace, Mortimer Brewster’s (Grant’s) two elderly aunts 
dispensed with gentlemen who seemed lonely and unhappy with their later life. The aunts explained 
that they were deliberate and responsible ("It's one of our charities"), after which Mortimer wryly 
observed that his aunts had developed the "very bad habit" of ending the presumed suffering of lonely 
old bachelors by serving them elderberry wine spiked with arsenic strychnine, and "just a pinch of 
cyanide". In an aside, the movie was a farce, but had originally been written as a drama (which met 
with no success). In stark contrast, Thompson treated the Wantz/Miller cases as a drama that seemed
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Once elected, Gorcyca in fact dismissed charges against Kevorkian (and his
associates) relating to no less than 10 assisted suicides when he took office in January
1997, charges previously filed by the then-outgoing Chief Prosecuting Attorney
Richard Thompson (Ferguson 2007: 40). Gorcyca further kept his promise almost
immediately upon his arrival in office in January 1997, stating to the press:
Hypothetically, we can charge and convict Dr. Kevorkian 100 times, but since 
we aren’t making law nor are we setting precedents, what are we really 
accomplishing other than wasting a lot of taxpayer money? (Gorcyca Press 
Conference: January 6, 1997, as cited by Guest: January 7, 1997,7).
Gorcyca’s decision to decline to prosecute Kevorkian was announced two
days after the United States Supreme Court heard the paired assisted suicide cases that
challenged prohibitions on assisted suicide in New York and Washington, but it was
prior to decision (disallowing assisted suicide at that time). According to Thompson
(as quoted by Greta Guest, in an Associated Press article dated January 11, 1997,
entitled, “New Prosecutor Drops Charges Against Kevorkian,” now available on
www.newsmode.com), Gorcyca’s decision was simply “a giant excuse of why the law
should not be enforced.” However, I conclude that this was a clear example of the
classic concept of prosecutorial discretion. Thompson and Gorcyca simply had
opposing styles in their legal application of the right of the chief prosecuting attorney
(Pakes 2004, pp. 50-52).
It was less than one year before Gorcyca, as the new chief prosecuting
attorney of Oakland County, faced a new challenge from Kevorkian. This challenge
will serve as the anchor event to each element of this and the chapters that follow
(judges, juries, families, media). Kevorkian-tape recorded the euthanasia by
originally set up in an ironical way. A reasonable rhetorical question that emerged for me, in light of  
Kevorkian’s summation comment to the Youk jury (which I shall amplify in Part II of Chapter 6) that 
he was “not much of a producer”, was whether Kevorkian was responding to Thompson’s commentary 
about his staging of the Wantz/Miller cases. A second reasonable rhetorical question emerged in a 
historical sense -  would the Roberts case in Michigan have been treated more, or less, favorably had 
Arsenic and Old Lace been made previously, and in the collective consciousness of the judges?
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intravenous injection that he performed on Thomas Youk, a 52 year old man who had 
what was described by the Medical Examiner as end stage ALS (Lou Gehrig’s 
Disease).
On November 22, 1998, the CBS national television network broadcast a 
segment entitled “Death by Doctor” on its Sunday evening dinner hour programme 60 
Minutes. The Kevorkian tape was sent (by Kevorkian and journalist friend Jack 
Lessenberry, as I shall explain in Part I of Chapter 6) the day after Election Day104 to 
Moderating Editor Mike Wallace and his agents, and it was graphic in nature. The 
tape first showed Youk alive, consenting to the procedure in monosyllables. It then 
showed Kevorkian describing a lethal injection device, capable of delivering a series 
of drugs. The programme proceeded to show Kevorkian using the drug delivery 
system to end Youk’s life on September 17, 1998. Finally, it showed Youk slumped 
over and deceased, all while Kevorkian narrated. The broadcast also included an 
interview of Kevorkian by Mike Wallace, in which Kevorkian clearly and repeatedly 
said that he did end Youk’s life.
Chief Prosecuting Attorney Gorcyca, and his reaction to the “Death by 
Doctor” segment, and the words of Kevorkian, in the Mike Wallace 60 Minutes 
interview, were nationally broadcast during the November “sweeps” of American 
television programs. Sweeps week is traditionally when networks put forth their most 
attention (and audience) drawing material, to show a market share for potential 
advertisers. Hence it was on national television that Kevorkian threw down the 
gauntlet before Gorcyca, “they must charge me, because if they do not that means 
they do not think it was a crime.” Kevorkian told interviewer Wallace during the 
Sunday evening broadcast that he had deliberately crossed the line from doctor-
104 As I shall amplify in Part I of Chapter 6, this timing was important and deliberate in nature.
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assisted suicide to euthanasia in order to force Michigan to either arrest and prosecute 
him, or to give him a green light to practice assisted suicide and euthanasia. The 
juxtaposition of the Youk death and the Kevorkian comments did indeed result in 
charges -  of assisted suicide, murder, and drug delivery charges for the drugs that had 
made Youk first sleep, then stop breathing and, lastly for the potassium chloride that 
had caused Youk’s heart to cease beating. These events were the focus of the March 
1999 trial. However, as a backdrop to the drugs administered, I would argue that 
these were not only not in the opiate (example, morphine) class of drugs generally 
administered in cases where the issue of double effect arises (primary effect is to 
reduce pain, secondary unintended effect is to hasten death -  a defense used as a legal 
fiction to negate intent in some cases); rather, the lethal cocktail, while effective in its 
task, was similar to the lethal injection components that were the subject of a 2008 
United States Supreme Court case arguing (unsuccessfully) that lethal injection was a 
cruel and inhuman form of administering the death penalty Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439 
(Decided April 16, 2008).
Factors aside from Kevorkian’s televised and self-promoted euthanasia 
encouraged prosecution in November 1998 (I shall argue that this was by imposing a 
public and national loss of face as the alternative, as addressed by the trial prosecutor 
in summation in 1999). First, the citizens of Michigan rejected a ballot initiative to 
allow physician-assisted suicide ’’Proposition B,” on November 3, 1998, shortly 
before the 60 Minutes telecast. Second, the Michigan legislature introduced and 
passed a statute proscribing assisted suicide, and creating a crime punishable by up to 
five years in prison, a felony. A staff article in The Seattle Times (July 4, 1998, A4) 
correctly observed that the law was aimed at stopping Kevorkian — a conclusion of 
fact that I make based upon my interviews in 1994 with Senator Fred Dillingham and
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Representative Nick Ciamaritaro. The passing of the July 1998 law, which took 
effect on September 1,1998 was barely two weeks prior to the euthanasia of Youk. 
The timing of the Youk case mimicked Michigan’s 1993 “temporary” ban. Moreover, 
this might be analogized to Kevorkian’s increased 1993/1994 activities which I 
discussed with regard to the Chief Prosecutors of Macomb and Wayne County and to 
the prosecutions brought by these chief prosecuting attorneys. In 1998, Gorcyca, had 
been a chief prosecuting attorney in Oakland County for less than one year. 
Kevorkian’s actions were doubtless a provocative factor for the fresh chief 
prosecuting attorney had previously dismissed all pending assisted suicide charges 
against Kevorkian.
So it was that Jack Kevorkian was tried one more time, again in Oakland 
County, albeit at the initiation of the chief prosecuting attorney who had vowed not to 
do so, David Gorcyca. There were some policy decisions that surely had an impact 
upon the case. Chief among those was that Gorcyca’s office took a pre-trial gamble, 
moving to dismiss the assisted suicide charges, and placing all bets on conviction for 
murder.105 In a county that had repeatedly known juries acquit and engage in jury 
nullification106 in prior Kevorkian cases, this was a bold move, a high risk gamble.
1051 shall amplify this in Part II of Chapter 6.
106 There is an extensive discussion of jury nullification theory in the next chapter, regarding Juries; 
however, “jury nullification” became so inextricably intertwined as almost a folkway or a folk concept, 
a collective cultural phrasing and construction, as to almost become a term of local legal folk art in 
Michigan. This colloquial term of art in Michigan specifically regarding Kevorkian, that this goes 
beyond the vocabulary of legal training into another, undefined arena (yet implicitly understood to 
Michiganders, and to those in Michigan at the time of the Kevorkian cases). My closest analogy is one 
drawn from the art world, folk art specifically, and the work of Henry Darger specifically. Darger, a 
self-taught artist who created mythic work, and who had “a pervasive influence on the contemporary 
art discourse and ... the examination of the work of self-taught artists is essential for a full 
understanding of art history” Brooke Davis Anderson, Director and Curator of the Contemporary 
Center. Flyer for the American Folk Art Museum “Dargerism: Contemporary Artists and Henry 
Darger: April 15 -September 15, 2008). I conclude that Fieger and Kevorkian created jury 
nullification in Michigan as a new art form, consistent with what Brooke Davis Anderson (American 
Folk Art Museum: Dargerism Flyer 2008) “there is a long history of academically trained artists 
drawing inspiration from self-taught artists and thus freeing themselves to think in unexpected ways 
and on their own idiosyncratic terms, almost in defiance of what they were taught.” I would argue that 
Fieger and Kevorkian did exactly this with jury nullification, and that it was so implicitly accepted as
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In addition, Gorcyca’s choice to dismiss the lesser charge, and try the case of 
the higher charge, was a sharp contrast to Gorcyca’s prior administrative actions.
They were more consistent with what Fletcher wrote in Rethinking Criminal Law 
(2001), albeit that Fletcher was writing about legal excuses (which are in mitigation of 
sentence) rather than regarding trial and potential defense justifications and attribution 
(which regard exoneration from criminal liability). Fletcher further wrote that 
“[tjhere is no doubt that one can achieve individualized justice in less visible 
processes of prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification and executive clemency [, b]ut 
every legal system, one would think should think, should be committed to bringing 
the question of excuses out into open where claims on our compassion are public and 
subject to reasoned argumentation” (2001:, p.813). Gorcyca’s 1998/1999 policy shift 
further stood in has relief to the process engaged in by Macomb County Chief 
Prosecuting Attorney Marlinga, which I discussed in the previous section and where 
Marlinga was squarely within Fletcher’s argument of “individualized justice” (2001, 
p. 813), at least for Kevorkian and his cohorts.
Perhaps less high risk was that this was a case tried on simple facts -  the case 
that John O’Hair, some five years earlier, had predicted in interview would last “an 
hour and a half’ (O’Hair Interview: August 19, 1993), if it was not tried as a cause 
celebre. The trial, from opening statements to summations, lasted less than one week 
and tried the man and his conduct. The result was much less than the weeks’ long 
cases during the mid-1990s, in which the issue, as well as the defendant, faced trial 
(with mixed results on the issue, and with repeated acquittals of Kevorkian, as well as
such that it became part of the basic alphabet of nearly everyone conversant with the cases -  lawyers, 
jurors, friends and family members, and the media. Hence, I shall build a bridge in Chapter 4 between 
the theory and the reality of Kevorkian cases and jury nullification issues, with the disclaimer that some 
of what I heard and experienced in interviews and in court would seem to fly in the face of academic 
jury nullification theory and discourse. As a rhetorical question, I must ask what Kevorkian, a self- 
taught artist (whose work is largely political, although not technically proficient), would think if he 
were to see that I am drawing this analogy in terms of law and jury nullification.
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a defense attorney provoked mistrial). It was a powerful and understated 
prosecutorial strategy, lending authority to conviction.
Gorcyca’s tale to tell is, in a sense, self-explanatory -  he went from running a 
candidacy against Thompson on a platform of not prosecuting Kevorkian, to 
dismissing outstanding assisted suicide charges Thompson had initiated against 
Kevorkian, to prosecuting and supporting an indeterminate sentence consistent with 
the sentencing guidelines (10-25 years) for a charge and conviction of murder The 
sentencing minutes of April 13, 1999, at which line (trial) prosecutor John Skrzynski 
represented Gorcyca’s office (and administration), left little room or suggestion for a 
lesser sentence than the standard guideline issue, and septuagenarian Kevorkian was 
incarcerated.
107C. Summing Up on the Chief Prosecuting Attorneys
Chief prosecutors have a role in “filtering” the cases that are prosecuted or not,
but as this discussion has demonstrated, chiefs also make use of a variety of filters
with them, views of their own that may have an impact upon whether or not they
choose to prosecute a case, and if so, how. In this series of cases, the chiefs under
consideration were all men, the four prominently featured chiefs were all white, with
an “old guard” and a “young Turks” grouping (albeit 2-2, in this focused comparison,
an intriguing and unanticipated finding). I would propose a question exists as to how
a more diverse group, in terms of race or gender, might have come into play.
While my question might appear to stand alone, I note that Robinson (2005:
181 observed (generally) that “minorities and women are under-represented in the
American courtroom workgroup [made up of prosecutors, defense attorneys and
1071 am taking literary license with the phrase “summing up” here -  this phrasing is an homage to the 
concluding portion of a trial before sending a jury to deliberate on its verdict; the jury charge by the 
judge to the jury comes after the summations or closing arguments of the lawyers to the jury.
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judges [and as] Graham demonstrate[d] how African Americans are underrepresented 
as attorneys and judges.” (additional citations omitted). In this regard, I refer to an 
interview I had in 1994 with John Sanford, of the Michigan Commission on Death 
and Dying, who asked me whether I wanted to interview him because he was the sole 
black or one of a small number of disabled; this question elicited the response from 
me that whichever would get me the interview was the answer. During our interview, 
Sanford, who is also a lawyer, raised many unstated issues (particularly as to race, as 
the sole African American on the MCDD) that he thought were not receiving attention 
in the legislative task force process, a process in which both O’Hair and Thompson 
were vocal and active members. While the MCDD proceedings were generally 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, Sanford invited a question that, while not 
directed at the Chiefs expressly, included them in its ambit.
In terms of gender, I also have an unanswered question. Observations of the 
differences in Judge Cooper’s 1996 court and Judge Breck’s 1996 court seemed (to 
me) to implicitly suggest that members of the media and both sides thought they 
might try to overrun a female judge, but culturally accepted that they could not ride 
roughshod over a male judge, as I shall discuss in Part II of this chapter. I would 
observe, however, at this time, that both Cooper and Breck were proper in all respects 
in regard to their judicial demeanour in court. Indeed, the perception seemed to be of 
those lawyers and media members seeking to test the limits of the members of the 
bench. That said, Cooper, who was the also the judge in the 1999 Kevorkian trial, 
brooked no interference from either side or from the media. While I realize this 
question will never be answered as to the Chief Prosecuting Attorneys, and may only 
be hypothesized, that it was implicitly raised was its own small finding.
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Further, the old guard chiefs, both O’Hair on the pro-choice and Thompson 
the pro-life sides, used the media skillfully, if not always successfully. The rising 
young chiefs in some measure had the media forced upon them (in terms of 
prosecuting the Kevorkian cases), and encountered steep (though I would, suggest, 
ultimately successful) learning curves with the media machines.
I conclude that the weight of experience and age had an impact both upon the 
views of the old guard and on those of the young Turk prosecutors. O’Hair’s family 
circumstance clearly had an impact upon his articulated views, as did Thompson’s, 
where he talked about arguing his case vigorously with his sister, who took an 
opposing stance. I suggest that this was in part because they had dealt with aging 
parents, and were aging themselves (though they all had traditional families and 
Thompson was in his second marriage, with two young children).
It is necessary for me to acknowledge that while I was conducting the field work, I 
was a bit shocked that O’Hair and Thompson allowed their personal views and 
experiences to “bleed” so conspicuously into their prosecutorial policies, whilst 
neither Voet nor Gorcyca had done so. To me at the time, this reticence was a mark 
of the professionalism of Voet and Gorcyca, in a surprising contrast to their senior 
peers.
What if, however, the real finding was that O’Hair and Thompson simply had 
the confidence of their additional years of age and experience, and felt comfortable 
and confident in being open about these matters, notwithstanding the fact that 
prosecutors are supposed to be disinterested officers of the court (cf. Robinson 2005: 
183)? By this question, I shall not suggest that Voet or Gorcyca was unprofessional 
(if anything, quite the opposite was my opinion), but that O’Hair and Thompson had 
a different style of presentation, perhaps borne of an accumulation of wisdom or
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confidence, or perhaps because they did not have to prove themselves as competent 
chiefs. Although Thompson lost his office to Gorcyca, he went on to an equally- 
respected position as a law school Dean (and thus to a national presence). This said, 
all of these professionals were at the beginning decision-making stage of the process 
of trying Dr. Death, and the relationship was evidently trying to them as well,108 
although the challenges may have presented differently. In Part II of this chapter, I 
shall continue comparing factors and actors with another grouping of elite 
participants -  the judges in the Kevorkian cases.
Part II. Contemporaneous Recollections and Sentencing Philosophies o f the 
Kevorkian Trial Judges
Whereas in the chapters to follow, I shall examine aspects of the Kevorkian 
1999 trial (specifically, jurors, family members, and the role of the media) and 
juxtapose them with cases from the mid-1990s, in this chapter, my focus has been 
upon the roles of those initiating prosecutions (the chiefs).I shall now look at those 
managing the trials (the judges). In the Part I, I examined the prosecutors and their 
emerging Kevorkian policies, and in this part I shall consider three of the four trial 
judges and their contemporaneous reflections on their “imminently fresh.” I 
interviewed the judges within days in two cases, two months in the third, after their 
Kevorkian trials.109 The 2008 Broadway production of Thurgood, for which Laurence 
Fishbume received the Outstanding Solo Performance award for his portrayal of the 
first African-American Supreme Court Justice (Thurgood Marshall) highlighted the 
latter for me, and underscored anew that my 1996 and 1997 conversational interviews
108 In Part II o f this chapter, I shall discuss the issue of judicial experience of the stress of trying the 
Kevorkian cases, and I acknowledge that I was fortunate to have this opportunity to gather such deeply 
personal information from professionals who were, in my opinion, consummately professional in the 
courtroom.
109 The reason that the fourth, which was first in time, is not included is because I was unable to attend 
the 1994 trial, due to obligations in London, and I conducted no fieldwork pertaining to that trial.
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with these Kevorkian trial judges provided social, legal and dramaturgical insights to 
this series of trials.
If the chief prosecuting attorneys presented an opportunity to examine 
prosecutorial discretion, the judges presented an opportunity to examine demeanour. 
The difference in role between the judges and the chief prosecuting attorneys is that 
judges must manage not only the trials, but also their courtrooms, as a public space in 
the social world of the law (Rock 1993, p. 153). The judge is the “leader of the 
courtroom workgroup [and] has the goal of ensuring that proper legal procedures are 
followed as a case is processed through the courts [; t]he roles of judges include 
adjudicator (passing sentence), negotiator (referee between parties), and administrator 
(keeping up the docket)” (Robinson 2005, p. 185). The work has attendant stress, as I 
would argue was evident in a quote from an interview that I conducted with Circuit 
Judge Jessica Cooper, who presided over both a 1996 trial of Kevorkian to acquittal 
(two months before this interview was done) and the 1999 trial that resulted in 
Kevorkian’s conviction and incarceration.110
... it was very aggravating [but] you can’t ever let it show -  being a 
judge it doesn’t matter what you think, it matters how you conduct that 
courtroom, it matters what (sic) justice was being done here. It doesn’t matter 
if I was irritated with attorneys, it doesn’t matter if my nose was out of joint, it 
doesn’t matter how I feel about the subject -  what matters is I was able to 
conduct a trial in an utterly fair fashion. Did I like it? NO! It was deeply 
stressful! (Oakland County Circuit Judge Jessica Cooper, May 17, 1996).
Judge Cooper here gave voice to a commonly experienced (but seldom
expressed) challenge that they must meet. As neutral and impartial arbiters, judges
have to hide their true feelings, even (or especially) if they at some point act upon
them. As I shall later argue Judge Cooper was to so act when sentencing Kevorkian
110 Judge Cooper, by her staff, declined to grant interviews on a pending matter likely to be 
proceeding to rise through the appellate courts. This is consistent with the requirement for transparent 
judges in the United States, as described by Vicki C. Jackson, “U.S. judges are ethically required to 
avoid discussion of pending cases with outsiders, an isolation . . .” 119 Harvard Law Review 109 at 
118(2005).
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in 1999 (Ferguson 2007: 35). The judges were required to present -  and they 
presented — the public face of a neutral and impartial arbiter at trial, sitting behind a 
raised platform, costumed in a black robe (or in more informal chambers meetings, a 
suit or professional attire; in either event, differently and with status identifying 
clothing, compare, Katz 1999: 6, regarding different treatment based upon medical 
garb/surgical attire), with a stenographer, bailiff, court officers, and an entire 
courtroom to manage and control procedurally during the trial, while making 
substantive and procedural decisions of law along the way up until the time came for 
the jury to withdraw and to deliberate and return a verdict (Rock 1993).
During the period of study, I had an opportunity to meet with three judges who 
presided over six of the Kevorkian trials (two of the trials were for two different 
patients each, and one in Ionia was a mistrial). These were instructive as to their 
expectations and their aspirations, as well as to their credentials. Particularly, they 
were a glimpse of the two worlds of the judges -  their formal and their informal 
worlds (Rock 1992, p. 183).
Because there were a number of cases, and a number of times that similar 
parties (or the same parties as to the defendant) and judges were involved, I shall offer 
a brief introduction to the judges involved, to allow for me to distinguish between 
them. Jack Kevorkian was the defendant tried in each case.111
A. Who and Where the Kevorkian Judges Were
Oakland Circuit Court Judge Jessica Cooper presided over the first of the 
“double” trials in March 1996, in which Kevorkian was acquitted after a trial that
111 The first trial in 1996 was for the assisted suicides of Merian Frederick and Dr. Ali Khalili (though 
the times and places of the deaths were at different times), which were bundled together. The second 
trial in 1996 was for the 1991 Wantz/Miller side-by-side deaths (through different methods) prior to the 
assisted suicide enactments.
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went on for approximately two weeks. Additionally, she presided over the final and 
four day long trial, the 60 Minutes euthanasia murder prosecution of Kevorkian when
119he was convicted of homicide and drug delivery charges in 1999. Cooper, the only
11^one of the judges to be a woman, was a petite formerly married woman who self­
identified as Jewish.114
Judge Cooper was a youthful, 50 years old, had been a judge for 17 years.
Prior to ascending the bench, she had gone to a local college and law school, then 
embarked on a legal career first as a civil rights lawyer and appellate defender. She 
described her ascent to the bench as virtually on a fluke, having been asked to run 
against a seated judge., .In a visual context, Judge Cooper appeared to be a woman 
with a judicial robe trimmed with a white Peter Pan collar, surrounded by a sea of 
men in suits. The lawyers, who were prominent and powerful (and in Fieger’s case in 
1996, loud) were silenced by her with what I believe was the most powerful technique 
I have ever observed a trial judge deploy. The louder they got, the quieter she got.
The phrase “gentlemen, gentlemen” was a quiet code to precede the possibility of her 
walking off the bench and leaving them to be loud in a silent space. The underlying 
message was that they were not behaving in compliance of the custom and the 
etiquette of their profession (compare Rock: 1993, p. 153).
In print, one does not experience the full impact of the visual 
experience,.something with which I found myself wrestling to express. Shortly after 
the viva, I found the expression in the experience of the 2009 Broadway production of
112 The conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal, as I shall discuss in greater detail in the course 
of the following field chapters.
1131 am grateful to Bob McGreevy, Esq. for questioning me as to the importance of this, and for 
making me explain my thoughts in detail, which led me to articulating that which had been an intuitive, 
albeit obvious, leap..
114 While I conclude that Judge Cooper’s religious affiliation was not a factor in any of her rulings in 
1996 and 1999, nor in her 1999 sentencing, I note that one of the members of the 1999 jury pool, 
identified his “Jewish faith” as a possible impediment in sitting on the Kevorkian jury, as I shall 
discuss in the next chapter.
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Friedrich Schiller’s 1800 play, Mary Stuart. The accompanying Playbill had an 
article by Ruth Leon, entitled ‘Queen to Queen,” in which costume designer Anthony 
Ward engaged in the “risky idea to have the two queens in period dress while the men 
who surround them wear business suits. This sets them off as iconic, in a different 
world ... isolated by a fate nobody else shares.” (Leon/Playbill 2009:,. p. 10). So too 
was Judge Cooper isolated -  the only one of the Kevorkian trial judges to be a petite 
woman in what was an otherwise gendered legal workgroup in the Kevorkian cases 
(Robinson 2005).
My interview of Judge Cooper was on May 17, 1996 took place approximately 
two months after her trial was concluded, and a few days after the acquittal of 
Kevorkian by a jury in the courtroom of Judge Cooper’s brother judge, Judge David 
Breck, whom I also interviewed during that trip. Judge Cooper’s staff advised me that 
she could not give any interviews after the 1999 trial, citing that the matter would 
travel up on appeal. However, her sentencing minutes and related trial and bail 
minutes were available and they were also instructive.
Judge David Breck, a gentlemanly115 judge of many years, presided over the 
second double trial in 1996, which lasted a substantial 6 weeks. He granted me an 
interview the day after the acquittal verdict, on May 15, 1996. He was a self-described 
“liberal,” whose wife had died of cancer at the Palliative Care Unit of Harper 
Hospital. Breck’s family experiences were profound and also professional. Breck 
was a founding member of Cranbrook Hospice, and stated that one of his goals was 
“to make hospice big in this country.” Judge Breck had a daughter who was a nurse 
in Alabama, and another daughter had Master’s degree in bioethics and was married 
to someone who was pursuing a Ph.D. in bioethics.
115 My use of this phrase relates to Judge Cooper’s comments that the law and judging were gracious 
and “gentlemanly” professions.
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Judge Charles Miel of tiny Ionia County (population 5,000) had been a judge 
for approximately 6 months prior to the trial of Kevorkian in June 1997, and he was 
interviewed within 48 hours of the mistrial of June 12, 1997. He was a young judge 
in both senses of the word, recently seated on the bench and approximately 35/36 
years of age at the time of interview. Prior to being elected on a non-partisan ticket to 
the Circuit Court of Ionia, he had worked as an assistant prosecutor and for legal aid, 
as well as engaged in general practice with his father.
Each was read a lengthy consent colloquy I had prepared consistent with, and 
approved by and in accordance with, an Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
requirement by the University of Minnesota, where I was on a fellowship during that 
year (and consistent with London School of Economics human subject research ethics 
later developed and implemented). Each interview was instructive about the 
perceptions of the judge as to the trial before him or her.
In reviewing the tapes and notes, certain thematic patterns emerged, areas of 
interest or concern or comment or surprise,. These themes might not have seemed as 
prominent in any one interview, but in a group of interviews, had a cumulative effect 
(i.e., presented an indicative finding, which was itself a finding). The judges had, in a 
sense, learned from watching the experiences of one another over time. In a sua 
sponte observation, Judge Breck explicitly commented on lessons he had learned from 
watching portions of the Kevorkian trial Judge Cooper conducted approximately two 
months prior to his, and as to how to handle the media. While it is likely the two of 
them discussed their respective trials at length, and as colleagues, I did not ask this 
specific question, which I now view as a slight methodological limitation imposed by 
my own concern for being respectful of the bench and the jurists occupying it. The 
judicial learning (and perhaps mentoring) curve also provided a certain stream of
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patterns regarding how to try these notorious cases (as exemplified by Judge Breck’s 
media management after Judge Cooper’s trial).116 In fact, as I alluded to earlier, 
Judge Cooper’s 1999 Kevorkian trial was conducted in a far more tightly controlled 
way, which I believe demonstrated lessons she herself learned from her 1996 
Kevorkian trial.
The three prime areas I shall discuss are the judges’ reported perceptions of 
the media and the judges’ commentary pertaining to the reporting of the Kevorkian 
trials, the judges’ sentencing philosophies (and changes in that regard in the case of 
Judge Cooper), and their perceptions of their respective juries. The last of these 
which I shall also discuss, from the juror perspective, is in the next chapter.
B. Judicial Reporting and Comments on the Media
First, was the impact of the media presence, which Judge Miel likened to “the 
Ionia Free Fair, with 100,000 people coming,” to the county seat of Ionia, with its tiny 
two judge courthouse, in front of which the media members were “camped out” under 
tents in the sun on the courthouse lawn. Judge Cooper was likewise confronted by 
television reporters, still photographers and press writers from the print news, along 
with their equipment, their cameras and camera men (as distinguished from still 
photographers). Her description of this was not unlike Rock’s (1998, pp.81-82)
116 During Cooper’s 1996 trial, members of the print and television media lined the walls of the court 
from the elevator to the closet at the back of the hall -  in other words, the entire length of the hall; 
photographers and reporters went in and out of the courtroom at will, and with a certain collegial 
amount of interaction, alternating with efforts to get party or witness statements. In contrast and in 
stated response, Breck issued a Media Order banning media presence or activity outside the courtroom, 
and providing for a media room (which Judge Breck told me was the old closet at the end of the hall, 
cleaned out for the purpose of use of media equipment and personalities), and a posted order that 
anyone arriving after proceedings began had to observe from the media room and anyone leaving the 
proceedings would not be allowed back in. There were enforced strictly, and more than once I sat in 
the media room to watch, while on one occasion, I was allowed back in because Kevorkian himself was 
entering, and he graciously embraced several people outside the door and told the court officers “we 
are a family, we all go in together.” Kevorkian was one of the few allowed absolute ingress and egress, 
along with paralegals and lawyers on the case (i.e., not lawyers who were observing as academics or 
lobbyists or simply court watching).
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description of what confronted the bereaved family of homicide victims: “[tjhrust, as 
many of them were, into the public space of the courthouse ... with voyeurs, the 
tourist, the casual spectator, the press and the defendant’s ‘supporters’ and family.” 
This observation held, although Judge Cooper was seated in a separate private space 
in the public court).
While her judicial role placed Judge Cooper in the court, it did not necessarily 
prepare her for the onslaught of media who might arguably be described as 
professional voyeurs. During Cooper’s 1996 trial, there was an entire wall outside 
her large suburban courtroom constantly and visibly set up by and with media. It is 
almost impossible to describe the visceral impact that I (a non witness or party, and a 
mere observer) first felt (other than to say it felt like an anvil, as I lost my breath and 
nearly my footing), rounding the comer from the elevator banks and phone booths to 
see the entire hallway corridor banked with reporters, television cameras, 
photographers and their equipment, running the length of not only Judge Cooper’s 
courtroom, but extending to the hall comers on both sides; it was a literal gauntlet 
(and occasionally on both sides of the hall, with shots being set up for photographers). 
In addition to this, there were media trucks outside the Oakland County Courthouse,
117with reporters and photographers constantly coming into and out of her courtroom. 
This occurred so constantly during her 1996 Kevorkian trial that when Judge Breck 
started his own Kevorkian trial less than one month later, in April 1996, he posted an 
order on his door banning entry once proceedings started, and relegated the press to a 
“media room” at the end of a corridor, permitting only a set number of television and
117 While it is reasonable to conclude that Judge Cooper was at a loss as to how to deal with this in 
1996, Judge Breck handled the media quite differently in the months and trial that followed, and Judge 
Cooper herself learned the difficult lessons of this experience as shown by the 1999 trial, in which she 
allowed only three camera and videos in the courtroom, along with a similar number of reporters, and 
no press milling about in the exterior hallway.
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press personnel in on any given day. This was, he told me, a lesson he had learned 
by coming into Judge Cooper’s court during the earlier 1996 Kevorkian trial.118
All three judges appeared to relish the unusual opportunity to comment upon 
the press. They were able to reverse roles with the reporters who had been reporting 
about them and their Kevorkian trials. At the time of the interviews, the three judges 
were fresh from their experiences within two days (as with Judges Breck and Miel) or 
two months (as with Judge Cooper, who was able to engage in a comparative 
commentary as to her trial and Judge Breck’s). Judge Cooper, the first of the three 
judges in the Kevorkian trials in time, said (Cooper Interview: May 17, 1996):
... two high profile sides [were] speaking, misleading, I knew there 
would be so much press that... I wanted to make sure I would be gracious,
[that the court would be run with] formal order. If you have to raise your 
voice, you lost, so I had to take breaks. That’s how I controlled the 
courtroom. I couldn’t talk to the media and had a gag order on both sides. I 
can’t talk to the media or give interviews about pending matters. (Cooper 
Interview: May 17, 2006).
Judge Breck’s Kevorkian trial began in April 1996, shortly after the March 
1996 verdict in Judge Cooper’s first Kevorkian trial. He had learned a great deal from 
his colleague’s experiences during which he noted that “they [the media even] 
followed Kevorkian to the bathrooms during the Cooper trial” (Breck Interview: May 
15, 1996). Indeed, the gentlemanly judge found that that he was “forced to take 
extraordinary measures because of [the media]. I used to think having the media 
would have an impact on witnesses we haven’t seen [and] we had to keep the jurors 
away and have deputies escort them to cars... [and get] a media room, I tried to find a 
room [myself for the press]” (Breck Interview: May 15, 1996).
118 Ironically, as I discussed more fully earlier, I was a beneficiary of the media room, as I would go to 
watch the proceedings there if I had to leave the courtroom and would hence be unable to return to my 
seat before the next break in proceedings, of which there were many in the six week trial, almost hourly 
to actual trial time.
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In contrast, Judge Miel found the “media fine, nothing objectionable to me at 
all. I met with them several times... there was nothing offensive about the media at 
all. We gave them press space [outside the court building] and they [the press outlets] 
split the cost of the tent” (Miel Interview: June 13, 1996). One might be skeptical 
about how long the good behaviour of the media would have lasted in a long trial -  
the Ionia trial. Thjs, we shall nevr know, since the case was literally over before it 
began, as soon as the prosecutors obtained from Judge Miel a ruling that there had 
been a mistrial (based upon misconduct during defense counsel’s opening, and before 
the first witness was ever sworn).
C. Kevorkian Judges and Kevorkian Sentence
Two of the three judges interviewed went on the record to state that they would 
not have incarcerated Jack Kevorkian, whether for assisted suicide or euthanasia 
murder. The third judge whom I interviewed in the mid-1990s alluded to the 
likelihood of continued liberty had there not been an acquittal. Noteworthy is that the 
judges were in different jurisdictions in Michigan. They were jurists in locales 
suburban and rural, with constituencies on opposite ends of the economics spectrum.
A clear change of circumstance took place by the end of the decade. Judge 
Cooper’s presided over a double assisted suicide trial in 1996, and over a euthanasia 
murder case in 1999, but this was not the central reason for difference in sentencing 
approach, nor was the 1999 jury verdict of guilt per se. Support for this can be 
evidenced by the hearing regarding bail pending sentence; Cooper allowed 
Kevorkian liberty on recognizance after the jury returned a guilty verdict. 
Furthermore, and on the record, she literally and explicitly begged Kevorkian not to 
engage in further assistance of death while he awaited sentencing.
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The only explanation for the change of circumstances was occasioned by 
comments by Kevorkian while he was at liberty during the pre-sentence period. He 
told probation authorities during his interview that he could not “be stopped,” after 
which his lawyer (Morgenroth) arrived and ended the interview. Kevorkian’s 
flagrantly contumacious words to probation authorities during his presentencing 
statement, rather than his actual conduct of ending Tom Youk’s life, were thus the 
likely prompt for the incarceratory sentence. This argument holds although the 
sentence imposed in 1999 by Judge Cooper followed state sentencing guidelines. I 
draw this conclusion based in part upon my interviews of the jurists in the mid-1990s, 
which I shall expand upon. I further support my conclusion with references to 
transcripts of Kevorkian’s post-trial bail hearing,.when Judge Cooper permitted the 
liberty that she revoked in the subsequent incarceratory sentencing proceeding.
As I shall now argue, there was also a pattern in Kevorkian’s reactions to judicial 
proceedings over time and in the public space of the court. For example, at a press 
conference on August 17, 1993, following the Wayne County (Detroit) indictment 
and arraignment regarding the August 4, 1993 suicide of Thomas Hyde, Kevorkian 
announced, “I will continue helping suffering patients no matter w hat.... It isn’t 
Kevorkian on trial. It isn’t assisted suicide on trial. You know what’s on trial? It’s 
your civilization and your society.” This language all but parroted that of the Oscar 
winning screenplay written by Abby Mann for the 1961 classic film, Judgment at 
Nuremberg and Kevorkian delivered the lines with equally dramatic effect.
Three years later, Judge Cooper made the following prescient comment in my
1996 interview, some three years before her second Kevorkian trial):
Just as you have zealots on one side, you have zealots on the other. As a 
judge, I can’t comment, take a position, but it’s [assisted suicide and 
euthanasia] highly controversial and they’re zealots. I  think [Kevorkian is] a 
zealot, in every social movement you have zealots, people in your face, nobody
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likes people in your face and that hurt Dr. Kevorkian ...[but] then along came 
change in social relationships. (Cooper Interview: May 17, 1996)(emphasis 
added).
Judge Breck, on May 15, 1996 (48 hours before my interview with Judge Cooper)
also commented on zealotry, but extended it to sentencing issues. When I asked him
what he thought of Kevorkian, he made seemingly contradictory comments in rapid
succession -  that Kevorkian was “tough to handle” and that it:
would have been tough to fashion a sentence, I’d give a year of probation, 
suspended, no penalty whatsoever ... but his disdain for the courts, made me 
wonder a little bit if I’d follow through (Breck Interview: May 15, 1996).
Here, the charges were those of common law homicide (or open murder)119 related 
to Kevorkian’s participation in the 1991 deaths of two women, and the sentence 
Judge Breck contemplated for the “tough to handle” Kevorkian was more in accord 
with misdemeanour shoplifting than open murder. Thus, I conclude that Judge Breck 
would have been basing his potential sentencing structure for Kevorkian upon how he 
viewed the right to die debate or assisted suicide movement, rather than upon the 
defendant. This view of Kevorkian regarded the issue, not the charges before him or
190the defendant’s conduct, and certainly not any sentencing guidelines. If anything, 
this underscores that while Judge Cooper sentenced Kevorkian within the guidelines 
in 1999, she implicitly indicated a probationary sentence in the post-verdict bail 
hearing in March. Many Kevorkian insiders, including Kevorkian’s jury consultant 
and friend Ruth Holmes, were shocked that an incarceratory sentence was imposed.
An example of the judicial reaction to this defendant’s conduct before Judge 
Breck and during the trial -  in fact, during Kevorkian’s testimony, during the evening
119 The common law murder cases involving the Wantz/Miller deaths predated the first physician- 
assisted suicide statue enacted in Michigan, PA 270 in 1993 (also known as HB 4501), and hence were 
brought under a different theory of the case.
120 In fact, I shall respectfully expand upon this, to the extent of saying that stronger sentence would 
ordinarily be imposed where there was a defendant who continued to engage in the conduct for which 
he was on trial and indeed during trial.
156
between direct and cross-examination — is that Kevorkian assisted in the suicide of 
Canadian assisted suicide advocate Austin Bastable, a 53 year old man who suffered 
from multiple sclerosis. The courtroom was abuzz with talk of the events, and their
191timing during trial and testimony. Breck was philosophical, “I was concerned 
about the Bastable timing ... shows also absolute disregard for the law, zealot, no 
doubt” (Breck Interview: May 15, 1996).
I have two comments in this regard. First, the judge might well have revoked bail 
at liberty in light of the defendant’s demonstration that he was engaging in the same 
or similar conduct for which he was on trial as a violation of the conditions of bail. 
This was something akin to Judge Cooper’s reaction to Kevorkian in April 1999.
Also, the question arises that if the conduct was against the law, if a defendant 
engaged in sort of flouting the law while on bail status during his own trial shows
199show a colorable -indeed explicit threat to society. This was notwithstanding a 
judge who was sympathetic to the issue for which the defendant is on trial.
Second, as a purely judicial matter, Kevorkian’s assistance in the death of 
Bastable and its timing -  literally, during the night between days of testimony on the 
stand -- were literally contumacious. Kevorkian’s timing was evocative of the 
cultural disdain of acting like a thief in the night, and on its face disrespectful to the 
trial, the court and to the culture of the criminal justice system. Nevertheless and 
somewhat surprisingly, Judge Miel, one year and many assisted suicides later, also 
stated that he did not know if he would have imposed a jail sentence on Kevorkian, in
121 The timing of events, by Kevorkian in response to legislation, by the legislature in response to 
Kevorkian, and by the judiciary and Kevorkian in response to each other, is a source of fascination to 
me, and while the thesis is microscopic in focus upon interviewees, the kaleidoscopic nature of three 
dimensional time is one that I would like to explore further at a later date. While “timing is 
everything” is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the list was long on both sides of the ocean as to 
whose conduct precipitated whose conduct and when, and I shall expand that into a writing at a later 
date.
122 One factor in receiving bail is that the defendant should not be deemed to be a threat to society. By 
arguing that this might be a “colorable” threat, I am engaging in a cultural legal politeness, since actual 
conduct goes beyond a potential threat to society and is an actualized occurrence.
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light of “no prior criminal convictions” on Kevorkian’s record (Miel Interview: June 
13, 1997).
Two years later, on March 25, 1999, when the jury had returned from its 
deliberations of the Kevorkian/Youk euthanasia with a verdict of guilty of murder and 
drug delivery charges, some 14 court officers were present in the courtroom. This 
which struck me as a visually clear first indication of a guilty verdict, as it more than 
quadrupled the officer presence in the court from the rest of the proceedings, with 
police presence at every door, both to public and private areas.
Notwithstanding the guilty verdict, Judge Cooper engaged Kevorkian in the
following extraordinary colloquy during the bail hearing pertaining to liberty between
conviction and sentencing:
THE COURT: Dr. Kevorkian? I understand we have a difference of opinion 
on this particular subject [of assisted suicide], the law and you. Right?
DR. KEVORKIAN: Yes.
THE COURT: You are pending a sentence by this Court. Can I have your 
word that there will be no activity during this period of today’s date and your 
sentence?
DR. KEVORKIAN: No illegal activity -  no unlawful activity. Yes.
THE COURT: Unlawful in my definition -  
DR. KEVORKIAN: Yes.
THE COURT: — not necessarily yours, sir.
DR. KEVORKIAN: Well, I mean unlawful in general.
1 9 1THE COURT: No assisted suicide. No injection (sic). No anything.
DR. KEVORKIAN: No. No. I kept my word up until now and I’ll keep it.
THE COURT: And you understand the consequences would be severe should 
there be anything -  if you break your bond to me?
1231 believe that the court stenographer made an error in this line, the actual quote I heard and noted 
was “No assisted suicide, no IV push, no anything.” This quote actually became a culturally noted one 
in the legal community in which I was involved and was frequently compared to other homicides.
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DR. KEVORKIAN: Yes.
THE COURT: And that is your word, sir?
DR. KEVORKIAN: My word.124
THE COURT: I’ll take your word, sir. (Kevorkian Transcript, March 25,
1999, Volume IV pp. ll-12)(emphasis added).
However, Kevorkian did not promise not to publicly declare his aims and plans
for the future. Indeed, Kevorkian vigorously stated his agenda again in 1999 in his
pre-sentencing interview with the Probation Department, although he was interrupted
by the arrival of his counsel (Mayer Morgenroth) who had him stop speaking. The
results were devastating, as can be noted by the sentencing hearing, where a very stem
Judge Cooper had a very different tone than at the bail hearing post-conviction.
While a sentence, even within the appropriate guidelines, may not be an easy
calculation to make, Cooper showed that she would not “be overcome by the torment
revealed in a courtroom ... and y e t... convey some knowledge of that torment to
embody communal satisfaction over the sentence delivered” (Ferguson 2007, p.38).
That is to say that she would acknowledge the controversy of both the conviction and
the defendant, and formulate her own sentence considering the relevant factors. Her
words spoke for themselves:
THE COURT: This is a court of law, and you said that you invited yourself 
here to take a final stand, but this (1999) trial was not an opportunity for a 
referendum. The law prohibiting euthanasia was specifically reviewed and 
clarified by the Michigan Supreme Court several years ago in a decision 
involving your very own cases, sir. ... (Kevorkian Sentencing, April 13, 1999: 
35).
But we are not talking about assisted suicide here. When you 
purposefully inject another human being with what you know to be a lethal 
dosage of poison, that sir, is murder and the jury so found.
124 As I shall argue further in Part II of Chapter 6, Kevorkian considered his word or his vow to be a 
matter of honor, to be kept and upheld in the absolute. I would argue that this went far beyond the 
cultural construction of a gentleman’s word, and that anyone familiar with Kevorkian would be aware 
of such, as with his absolutism about telling the truth, even to his own detriment.
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No one is unmindful of the controversy and emotion that exists over 
end of life issues and pain control. And I assume that the debate will continue 
in a calm and reasoned forum long after this trial and your activities have 
faded from public memory. But this trial is not about that controversy. The 
trial is about you, sir. It was about you and the legal system, and you have 
ignored and challenged the Legislature and the Supreme Court.
And moreover, you’ve defied your own profession -  the medical 
profession. You stood before this jury and spoke of your duty as a physician. 
You repeatedly speak of treating patients to relieve their pain and their 
suffering, but you don’t have a license to practice medicine. The State of 
Michigan told you eight years ago that you may not practice medicine. You 
may not treat patients.125 You may not possess, let alone administer or inject 
drugs into another human being. (Kevorkian Sentencing, April 13, 1999: 
35-36).
There are several valid considerations in sentencing, and one of them is 
rehabilitation. But based upon the fact that you’ve publicly and repeatedly 
announced your intentions to disregard the laws of this state, I question 
whether you will ever cease and desist. The fact that your attorney in the pre­
sentence investigation says that you’re out of business from this point forward 
doesn’t negate your past statements.
Now another consideration, and perhaps a stronger factor in 
sentencing, is deterrence. This trial was not about the political or moral 
correctness of euthanasia, it was all about you, sir. It was about lawlessness. It 
was about disrespect for a society that exists and flourishes because of the 
strength of its legal system. No one, sir, is above the law -  no one.
So let’s talk just a little bit more about you specifically. You were on 
bond to another judge when you committed this offense. You were not 
licensed to practice medicine when you committed this offense, and you 
haven’t been licensed for eight years. And you have the audacity to go on 
national television,126 show the world what you did, and dared the legal system 
to stop you. Well, sir, consider yourself stopped. (Kevorkian Sentencing,
April 13,1999: 37-38).
In this pronouncement of sentence proceeding, Judge Cooper marshaled the
evidence of a decade of Kevorkian’s conduct in Michigan. This was evidenced by the
reference to his mid-1990s challenge to the Supreme Court, as well his defiance and
escalation of conduct after legislative enactments. Given her prior rulings about
Kevorkian’s liberty, I conclude that she was also sentencing him for his contempt and
125 While Kevorkian raised awareness of, and was widely considered to be the poster child for, 
physician-assisted suicide, he in fact was no longer a licensed doctor as of 1991.
261 shall discuss this at length in Chapter 6.
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continued statements of future intent. Albeit that her pronouncement was within the 
sentencing guidelines, there was significant speculation that she would grant a 
sentence of probation. This was particularly so since she had allowed Kevorkian to 
be at liberty after the jury convicted him, and pleaded with him to cease his practice 
Cooper, at sentencing, became one with the class of judges that Pakes (2004, p. 97) 
identified when he commented that “the rule of law dictates that judges be 
independent.” This was even more dramatic given that Judge Cooper’s prior 
statements and actions during the 1990s, as well as the 1999 trial, had indicated that 
she had leaned against incarcerating Kevorkian,
Trial prosecutor John Skrzynski was then more persuasive in seeking bail
denial:
Dr. Kevorkian has at least a 10-year history of open defiance of the law, of a 
guarantee to break the law on several occasions.127 He broke the law when the 
initial ban against assisted suicide was passed, he challenged and broke the law 
when the latest assisted suicide ban was passed. He was on bond to the Court in 
Royal Oak when he killed Thomas Youk. And he said in his pre-sentence report 
to the probation officer that he intended to go about relieving pain and suffering 
no matter what it (sic) results on him. And then when his [new] lawyer arrived and 
his lawyer had a conference with the probation officer with Dr. Kevorkian, he 
suddenly amended his statement to say oh, what I meant was that I’ll be glad to 
stump for a change in the law.
Dr. Kevorkian has been packaged and marketed by eloquent and clever 
lawyers for the last ten years, but when he gets a chance to say what he really 
means, what he really means is that he intends to break the law at every chance he 
gets. He’s demonstrated that before, he’s said it, and he said it in this case. The 
man is a danger to other people when the men (sic) does not respect nor obey the 
law. (Kevorkian Sentencing, April 13, 1999: 42-43).
This time, Judge Cooper denied bail pending Kevorkian’s (unsuccessful) 
appeal, and Kevorkian, began his period of incarceration, pursuant to the 
indeterminate sentence of 10-25 years for murder, concurrent with 7 years for drug 
delivery.
127 This actually understated the case, as Kevorkian has publicly acknowledged engaging in over 130 
assisted suicides.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I had an opportunity to explore prosecutorial discretion and 
judicial demeanour. I did so using interviews with the perspectives of the chief 
prosecuting attorneys and post-trial interviews with the judges reflecting on various 
aspects of these (usually unexplored) factors in the criminal justice system. 
Kevorkian’s demeanour was largely outcome determinative by the time that Chief 
Prosecuting Attorney Gorcyca prosecuted him in 1998.. Certainly, this was so by the 
time Cooper sentenced him in 1999, in what appeared to be more a state of pique at 
his contumacious pre-sentencing comments that he “could not be stopped,” than based 
upon the verdict, which initially did not lead to a revocation of liberty. Thus, 
Kevorkian’s “bad” demeanour in a criminal justice interview by probation officers 
related to, but not actually in, the courtroom appeared to have had the greatest impact 
upon Judge Cooper’s sentencing application (Goffman 1967, pp.78-79). I conclude 
from this that the perceived (and sometimes precarious) legitimacy of the law 
enforcement officials in the courtroom work group had as much a role as the 
defendant’s own (Goffman 1967, p.58, Werthman and Pillavin 1967, pp.74-75).
While some jurists may feel bound by sentencing guidelines, Judge Cooper was 
lauded by line prosecutor John Szkrzynski for her “courage,” in imposing the 1999 
prison sentence. This sharp departure from the original perception that she would not 
impose a sentence other than probation may have been courageous, but I conclude 
that it was a reassertion of the state’s legitimate authority, by application of 
procedural guidelines which Kevorkian had seemingly escaped.
Prosecutors are supposed to be disinterested representatives of the state, 
furthering justice (and not simply a “win,” Robinson: 2005), yet the old guard
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prosecutions may originally have been inspired by debate as much as by Kevorkian’s 
conduct. Thus, in initiating charges against Kevorkian, the question arose whether, 
for example, the issue was a general public health issue, as in the 1973 Roe v. Wade 
Supreme Court abortion case. Certainly, Judge Cooper was correct in saying that 
there were zealots on both sides of the Kevorkian courtroom aisle, long before matters 
got into the courtroom.
That said, electoral politics proved to be a neutralizing factor in providing for 
a “disinterested prosecutor” who would, at least in theory, engage in prosecutorial 
discretion as a reflection of the Oakland County constituency. This argument is self- 
proving, given Gorcyca’s campaign promises, which he kept, insofar as dismissing 
pending Kevorkian cases once he was ousted Thompson, Ironically, some of those 
favorable, or at least purportedly neutral, to the debate were involved in Kevorkian’s 
ultimate downfall,. This is true of Gorcyca, who was opposed to the litigation, yet 
drawn inexorably into it. Equally rich in irony is that Richard Thompson finally saw 
a conviction of Kevorkian for euthanasia, but only after he lost his office to Gorcyca. 
To top it off, a central plank of the Gorcyca campaign had been to cease Kevorkian 
prosecutions and to thus save taxpayer expenditures, which had become a mid-1990s 
economic liability and losing proposition.
In this chapter, I have also questioned some of the factors that might have had 
an influence on the court proceedings. Race and gender could not be explored in 
terms of the white male chiefs (a finding in and of itself). However, questions arose 
as to whether these were matters that had an impact upon those appearing in, or 
reporting on, trial courts seated by a male or female jurist.. As discussed, there were 
times in 1996 that Judge Jessica Cooper was entreating the “gentlemen” in court to 
behave properly. The use of the word “gentlemen” was a clear rebuke from a petite,
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ladylike and particularly “well-demeaned” female jurist with a white Peter Pan collar 
on her robe (Goffman 1967, p.77). My perception and conclusion was that her 
brother jurist, Judge Breck never seemed to have to engage in pleas for manners. By 
1999, Judge Cooper seemed to underscore her judicial demeanour by becoming 
solely the “judge” in tight control of those who appeared in her court (Goffman 1959, 
p. 211) demanding deference and punishing antics (Goffman 1967, pp.78, 93).
I am reluctant to say that gender affected the conduct of the judges (though I 
believe this an impact on proceedings, in terms of style, although not substance). 
Instead, I would conclude that Judge Cooper showed the weight of her prior 
Kevorkian 1996 trial experience by 1999, and was stricter in court because of it. A 
mirror image finding was made in an essay in 1996 by Elaine Martin, “ Women 
within the Judicial System: Changing Roles,” (in Duke’s Women in Politics: 
Outsiders Insiders 1996, pp.215-227). Martin commented upon two studies of 
federal judges done in the 1980s that did not find differences between the behaviour 
of male and female judges, although women might (in theory) bring a different 
perspective or employ different reasoning (Martin 1996, pp.218-219). Likewise, in a 
sense, the weight of experience (and years) showed in Judge Breck’s more relaxed 
approach to enforcing decorum in his courtroom in 1996, while in 1997, the newly 
seated Judge Miel had difficulty with that very aspect. This was predicted by Chief 
Prosecutor and trial attorney Ray Voet, now a judge himself,.
In this chapter, I have also shown how elites who have elevated status within 
their profession had an impact upon, and were influenced by, emerging issues in the 
criminal law and by their attendant social forces. The media, which I shall devote an 
entire chapter to, was one such social force. One might reasonably observe that this 
“bleeding” might actually increase with age and experience, such as with regard to the
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dying trajectory of O’Hair’s father (regarding personal asset depletion) and Breck’s 
wife (regarding service provided by hospice). In the next chapter, I shall consider 
those who are not elite, but who are rather “peers” (juries) and, in the chapter 
thereafter, families and their roles as factors and actors in this series, before finally 
turning to the chapter regarding social and legal constructions of the media in the 
Kevorkian cases.
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Chapter Four: Juries in the Kevorkian Trials
Introduction
In the last chapter, I examined how the elites of the legal community created 
and adjudicated the Kevorkian cases. I also considered what the actors had in 
common (or not) as factors in the cases. I had interviewed Chief Prosecuting 
Attorneys prior to trial (with the exception of Ray Voet of Ionia County, who was 
both Chief Prosecutor and line or trial prosecutor), and I interviewed each of the 
judges within either days (Judge Breck in 1996 and Judge Miel in 1997) or weeks 
(Judge Cooper in 1996 although I had, no 1999 interview granted, presumably 
pending appeal).
In considering juries as a factor and specific jurors as actors, a similar division 
occurred in the course of research, which came to light in the course of writing.
Jurors are drawn from the ordinary citizenry, and presumably are not elite in the legal 
profession and also not expert on the matters at issue in trial128 As in the last chapter, 
my examination here has a “before” and “after” element of trial matters and fieldwork 
relating to the juries and its members. First, and before the trial, is the voir dire 
transcript of jury selection in Kevorkian 1999 (which resulted in conviction). Second, 
and after the trials, are materials from press conferences and in depth interviews after 
the first 1996 trial in Judge Cooper’s court, the second 1996 Kevorkian trial in 
Judge Breck’s court, and the 1997 Kevorkian mistrial in Ionia County in Judge Miel’s 
court. Because the 1999 jury declined to be interviewed by the press or others after 
the 1999 Kevorkian conviction, material is limited to the court transcript of jury 
selection.
128 While lawyers and judges are not technically barred from jury service in many jurisdictions, there is 
a cultural preference against having legal trained people on any particular jury, as I myself experienced 
in 2007.
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A comment as to the scope (or more correctly, that which is beyond the scope) 
of this chapter is best made at the outset. During the fieldwork, my focus was on 
legal elements of the cases, the parties, the trial process; it was not on juries other than 
as to the simple fact of their verdict or guilty or not guilty. The jurors themselves, as 
with the family members of the next chapter, were beyond my original scope of 
review in the cases. This rich area emerged in analysing data and in finding new ways 
of reviewing legal material through a socio-legal lens. These foci will open up new 
questions and avenues of the roles of “ordinary people” and the actual ordinary people 
involved in the criminal trials.
That said, this chapter offered an exciting opportunity to consider that most 
mysterious and secretive of trial factors -  the jury -  from three different perspectives. 
First, was jury selection and elimination process. Second were judicial views of the 
jury and its members. Third were the post-verdict observations and interviews of jury 
members who sat through deliberations. These are all the more important given the 
same presence of the same defendant in all cases, and of the same judge in two of the 
cases, and the related matters and parties. It was a front row seat in Rashomonesque 
production, which yielded much about methods of trying Kevorkian in particular and 
how to try assisted suicide and euthanasia in general.
Part I: People v. Kevorkian (1999) Voir Dire Study and 1994-1996 Jury 
Nullifications
A. Introduction
The final Kevorkian trial (in which he was convicted of the euthanasia murder 
of Tom Youk and related drug delivery charges) presented a rare opportunity -  that of 
a court certified transcript, including jury selection, to analyse. First, jury selection 
(known as voir dire, literally translated from French as “to see to say” with regard to
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potential jurors) is generally not available for review. The reason for this is simple, 
and practical -  in cases of acquittal, transcripts and court records are sealed after trial, 
and minutes are not transcribed. Second, although I was travelling to Michigan to 
attend the trial at the time the voir dire was conducted (in less than one day); the 
transcript provided a full record of what had transpired. Given the adage that a case 
may be won or lost before the first witness is sworn, and given the dearth of such 
opportunities in prior Kevorkian prosecutions, the opportunity to find these “new 
facts”129 (or pre-existing facts in a new form) was one I was loath to forego.
Accordingly, and using the methodology of an appellate lawyer, I compiled a
“digest” (or an annotated index) of the voir dire minutes dated Monday, March 23,
1999, the day the jury was selected and sworn. In effect, a digest is an index of
events, page-by-page or event-by-event. In legal practice, it is common to use this
method to catalogue the salient facts of the case and/or trial errors (meaning
objectionable conduct of counsel, the judge or court, and procedural law and legal
matters). In American appellate practice, it used to be highly uncommon for voir dire
minutes to be transcribed, in large part due to the expense incurred, especially for
indigent defendants. However, this changed after the 1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky
476 U.S. 79 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
prosecutor’s use of peremptory (permissive) challenges (excuses or exclusions) to
exclude blacks from a jury trying a black defendant. The Supreme Court held that
this was grounds for an equal protection claim of purposeful discrimination by the
prosecutor. The practice of transcribing voir dire along with hearing, trial and
sentencing minutes then became common. Rock (1993, pp. 101-102) noted in the
anonymised case of “Grey” a similar concern regarding the presence or absence of a
1291 use this phrase as homage to a standard generally employed in appellate review, where the finding 
of new facts upon a pre-existing record is a way of examining evidence or testimony that the jury 
overlooked or misapprehended as a matter of law.
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black juror onto the panel. This was not in issue in the 1999 Kevorkian trial, but other
matters emerged as being noteworthy.
In short, the jury selection in a state criminal trial in the United States is
conducted in a basic way, though there are variations of the process. Jeffrey
Abramson, in We the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal o f Democracy, noted that
“[tjhere is a famous lawyer’s quip about the difference between trials in England and
trials in the United States: in England, the trial starts when jury selection is over: in
the United States, the trial is already over” (1994, p. 143). Pakes (2004, p.05), in the
cross-cultural study included in Comparative Criminal Justice, noted:
a system for the random selection of jurors from election lists was adopted [in 
the United States] in 1970. Nevertheless, both parties have extensive powers 
to exclude potential jurors. Because of that, the actual composition of the jury 
often turns into a battleground, as if it were a trial before the actual trial itself. 
Many US lawyers believe that selection of the right 12 persons is paramount 
to victory or defeat at trial (Simon, p. 1977).
Bloomstein (1972, p.66-67) observed that “methods vary in the several 
states, but as a fairly representative system, let us assume that thirty names of 
prospective jurors are picked out of a revolving drum and form the panel for the 
particular trial, out of which twelve will be selected to be the actual jurors.” The 
panel may be larger for a case involving a notorious crime or an infamous defendant, 
as Abramson observed in regard to the 1970s case of the Harrisburg Seven, where the 
trial commenced with a voir dire of some 450 potential jurors in the case considering 
seven members of the Catholic Resistance in the Vietnam War. The Harrisburg 
Seven, went on trial in 1972 for conspiring to raid draft boards, destroy draft records, 
blow up heating tunnels in the nation’s capital, and kidnap the American National 
Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger (1994, pp. 155-156).
A common practice, noted by Bloomstein (1972, p.66), is for 12 cards to be 
randomly chosen from the total cards on the panel. In parallel form, the jury cards
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containing minimal information such as name and address of the juror will be slotted 
into two rows of six (or, for those courts who seat alternate jurors at the same time, a 
common practice, two rows of seven). I have also seen on occasion judges question 
the entire panel at once (though this happened only once during my time practicing, 
both prosecution and defence lawyers - 1 was defence — were startled and alarmed by 
this seeming chaos, which was calmed when the judge had to adjourn the case, and 
give it to another judge, for reasons that I was not privy to).
Voir dire is, as a general matter, within the province of a judge’s questioning 
in voir dire as was the situation in the 1999 Kevorkian case, as decided by Judge 
Cooper (Hearing, December 22, 1998 5) or (more typically) the judge and lawyers 
(as in the 1996 Kevorkian cases). It is common to ask jurors about their lives, their 
views, their possible attributes that may make them more (or less) sympathetic to the 
defendant on trial in what may be an extensive “Q & A” (question and answer). In 
this process, the potential jurors may be asked about their families, their work, their 
health, their friends and colleagues, their education and association, and (as happened 
in the 1999 Kevorkian voir dire) their faith. Abramson (a former prosecutor) listed as 
areas traditionally within the jury selection ambit, “ethnic, religious, sexual, and 
occupational stereotypes” (1994, p. 147). Indeed, the number of questions a judge or 
lawyers might ask is limitless. This is because the standard jury inquiry may lead to 
fruitful areas of questioning that may determine whether a juror is fit or suitable to sit 
on the case, and whether they can do so in an impartial manner. In some of the 
Kevorkian cases, potential jurors also filled out written questionnaires, which served 
as a platform from which to launch voir dire.
Information is also transmitted in ways other than the formal questions and 
answers,. How jurors looked, dressed, walked to and from the jury box for
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questioning, and acted with or without attention, were all on display during the 
selection process. This sort of examination is evocative of Goffman’s comment 
(albeit in a different context), “he must have a supply of appropriate clean clothing if 
he is to make the sort of appearance that is expected of a well demeaned person” 
(1967, p. 92). This went beyond mere attire and gait. Ruth Holmes, who worked as a 
volunteer jury consultant throughout the Kevorkian trials, told me in personal 
communication that she also looked at the potential juror’s handwriting for clues as to 
their personalities.
Bloomstein noted that the voir dire “is actually a preliminary examination of 
the prospective juror to determine his qualifications, any reason for disqualification or 
any bias he may have that would render him unfit for this particular jury [but that] 
possibly the most important reason for the voir dire is to size up the prospective juror. 
Here is the opportunity for the lawyers to question this stranger, obtaining as much 
from the way he answers as from the answers themselves” (1968/1972, p.66).
While much of the voir dire is ostensibly spent asking jurors if their various 
relationships and life experiences would prevent them from being fair and impartial, it 
is axiomatic that neither party truly wants a fair and impartial jury -  the parties want a 
jury that will deliver the party’s desired verdict (or be more fair to their side). Where 
lawyers conduct voir dire, it is traditionally viewed as the chance to educate the jury 
pool regarding their theory, or perspective, of the case. Lawyers also want open- 
minded jurors whom they can persuade to see their respective points of view -  as to 
the facts they are supposed to be introducing and as to the legal principles that are the 
judge’s province to instruct the jury to apply to the facts of the case.
In seeking to divine this, lawyers have three formal categories by which they 
can challenge the jury or individual jurors, and seek to have them dismissed from the
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potential jury. The first category regards challenges to the array (that the pool does 
not represent the general society racially, socio-economically, or otherwise). Second, 
there are challenges for cause (circumstances involving a particular juror that render 
that potential juror unfit to sit on the case). The third category pertains to peremptory 
challenges (the “hunch” challenge) as Bloomstein said (1972, pp. 68-72).
It is in this last set of challenges, the peremptory, that a lawyer’s “gut” instinct 
is and where art must meet technique. This is where cognitive ability and speed to 
recognise become vitally important. Lawyers may tend to think in patterns in this 
way, and to recognize symptoms of a problematic (such as belligerent or 
unsympathetic) potential juror, project the hypothetical consequences, rule each one 
out and reach a decision. The lawyer has to make a determination as to whether a 
juror is going to be helpful (to their side) in considering the case, and the attorney 
must do so in the time of the voir dire instantly and semiconsciously assimilating the 
relevant data, and comparing it with past cases and jurors and come to a decision 
whether to retain or excuse the juror -  if this does not happen speedily and 
successfully, there is a risk that the case will be lost. I shall discuss this further (in 
particular with regard to Bishop Donald Ott, the foreman of the first 1996 jury), and 
consider why jury profiling does not always succeed.
My review of the March 22,1999 voir dire was not intended to be all- 
encompassing, but rather focused on a particular group of selected social attributes. 
While inspired by the Batson case, race was not a factor that I considered to be an 
issue of purposeful discrimination by either the prosecution or by Kevorkian. I also 
note that the jury array was not challenged on appeal, 248 Mich. App. 373 (2001). 
There was no question that the jurors were not representative of the community at 
large (which was one of two general questions posed by Baldwin and McConville in
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1979, the other as relating to socio-economic status) (1979, p. 90). The one potential 
juror who was, like Kevorkian, Armenian by descent, was excused by the prosecutor. 
The more likely factor was not nationality or ethnicity, but that her two brothers were 
doctors (70-81, 134). Conversely, one potential juror (#7) who testified at voir dire 
that she primarily spoke Spanish primarily, and did not know what the word 
“euthanasia” meant (157), and could understand perhaps “60% of English” she heard 
(159) was excused for cause, as agreed by both Kevorkian and the prosecutor, 
because Judge Cooper said it “will be disruptive for juror translation” (165). 
Bloomstein (1972, p.75) noted what seemed the obvious necessity of “understanding 
English,” which I take one step further to note that nuance and idiomatic expressions 
are necessary tools beyond a dictionary vocabulary What was interesting to me that 
the colloquy with this juror continued, as she went on to relay that her sister had died 
of cancer after two years in Lima, Peru (160), and that her daughter was a prosecutor 
(163),. Either of these might have been cause for challenge in the prosecution of 
Kevorkian for terminating the life of Tom Youk.
Attributes that I chose to focus on related to four areas. First were questions 
or information raised with regard to members or those with a relationship to the 
medical profession. Second, I considered how potential jurors relayed their religion 
and related opinions regarding euthanasia and assisted suicide. Third, I examined 
personal or family issues with regard to long-term chronic or terminal illness;. Last, I 
regarded how exposure to media representations regarding Kevorkian’s involvement 
in the death of Tom Youk. This was nationally broadcast and widely reported on, yet 
astonishingly, only two of the members of the jury pool reported having seen it (27).
Judge Cooper, the Presiding Judge of the 1999 Kevorkian trial (as well as the 
first 1996 trial) had 80 potential jurors initially brought in for possible jury selection
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(13). In addition, Judge Cooper decided to conduct the 1999 voir dire herself, rather 
than to invite or to allow the prosecutor and pro se defendant to question and probe 
the potential jurors (13-14). This meant, by definition, that there were constrictions 
on, and limitations to, what information the prosecutor and Kevorkian gained from 
face-to-face interaction with the jury pool before members were either seated or 
excused.
Further to my notes of the voir dire, of approximately 50 potential jurors, 46 
potential jurors were questioned before the 12-member jury was selected and sworn. 
Also sworn were two “alternate” jurors who also sit on the panel to hear evidence, 
and who were required to be prepared to step permanently into the chair of a juror 
who potentially had to be dismissed from the jury mid-trial (this “alternate” juror 
system would be the necessity of a mistrial for lack of a full jury, in the event that a 
juror was immediately involved in a birth, a death, a hospitalization, or something of 
an equally dramatic nature or in the event of juror misconduct). The number of 50 
potential jurors in this notorious case involving an infamous defendant might have 
seemed surprisingly small for a voir dire. Jury selection proceeded surprisingly 
quickly and completed in less than one day of court, (or just under five hours, by 3:17 
PM, including time out for a midday break). Given the seriousness of the crimes 
charged and the widespread media attention, it would have been reasonable to expect 
more awareness and less speed. In a sense, it foretold of a different sort of trial and 
speed than the lengthy trials, sometimes lasting several weeks, of “the issue trials” of 
the mid-1990s -  and indeed, the 1999 (which I call the “elements”) trial began on 
Monday and was concluded by the same Friday, with a day out for the judge’s weekly 
calendar (or general motion) day.
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The concept of a jury of one’s peers is one of “symbolic, ideological and 
instrumental significance of juries in the criminal process” related to public opinion, 
according to Lacey, Wells and Quick (2003, p.94). The purpose of a jury is to 
“legitimate the criminal process by allowing a say to non-professionals (peers) of the 
defendant who have no vested interest either in the system itself or in any particular 
outcome of the case” (Lacy, Wells and Quick 2003, p.94). That said, something that 
captured my interest was how people involved in different aspects of the medical 
profession -  doctor/dentist, nurses, lower level health care administrators and staff, 
and a writer of mental health books -  were viewed, and that medical information (but 
not necessarily employment in a medical arena) seemed all but a per se exclusion 
from jury service on this case, as some of the colloquies established. None of these 
individuals had any expertise in pathology (which I suggest would have made them 
better equipped to understand the “duelling doctors” as I shall discuss in Chapter 6), 
the area of medicine under consideration, despite general medical knowledge or 
specialist knowledge unrelated to that of the defendant Kevorkian or the medical 
examiner Dragovic. Some potential (and final) jurors did, however, work in nursing 
homes or health care facilities, which seemed to point to a different sort of medical 
knowledge -  that of day-to-day lives in end-of-life patients. As I shall now argue, 
these individuals had too much knowledge beyond that of common sense 
appreciation, yet too little to actually have comprehended the esoteric erudition of 
Kevorkian and Dragovic.
B. Medical Professionals (doctors and nurses) and medical workers 
(administrators/technologists)
The voir dire transcript, cited by page numbers contained in one volume dated 
March 22, 1999, (and further cited by revolving potential jurors along with page
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numbers, in some instances) yielded much information. The transcript showed that 
there were 17 references to members of the juror pool either being themselves 
members of the medical profession or of friends/family who were in the medical 
profession. Of the 46 jury pool members questioned, one (who was very vigorous in 
his voir dire colloquy, as I shall illustrate in detail) was a cardiologist, three were 
nurses, one was a dentist, one was a medical student, and one was a respiratory 
technician, one a surgical technician. In a rare moment of humour, the judge quipped 
that the surgical technician had missed meeting the previously excused cardiologist 
(103). Three potential jurors had other medically-related jobs, and three had friends 
or relations in the medical field.
Almost all were excluded from serving on the actual jury, with excuses for 
cause (mandate) issued by the judge in some cases, challenges for cause by both sides, 
and peremptory (permissive) challenges by both sides. The two who were not 
excused seemed to have had lower level jobs (the surgical technician and someone 
who “worked in a long term skilled nursing home run by Dominican nuns.” Possible 
challenges for the latter were for medical-related profession, religious opinions, 
family members who had been ill and/or exposure to the 60 Minutes “Death by 
Doctor” segment that was the central piece of evidence; nonetheless, the minutes 
indicated that this person remained on the final jury panel.
The medical professionals I chose to focus upon were the cardiologist and the 
three nurses. The cardiologist (#9, 28-66) indicated that his religion as a member of 
the Jewish faith and his status as a physician (in that order) would raise issues for him 
in deciding the Kevorkian case. While he noted that his mother had osteoporosis and
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Alzheimer’s disease, he told the judge that he had “Jewish opposition130” (49) but 
would follow the law as provided by the judge to apply to the facts of the case. The 
judge herself excused the doctor for cause.
At first blush the cardiologist was the most vigorous and outspoken.
However, in reviewing my the digest and the voir dire minutes, the ultimate finding of 
interest was the three nurses (all excused from the jury -  one by the prosecutor for 
cause, one by Kevorkian as a peremptory challenge, and the third by the court for 
cause -  in a curious symmetry of parties and court). Their statements, while not of a 
large survey, were significant in this small study, which may be considered indicative, 
though not necessarily numerically conclusive (Pappas 1993, p. 348 n. 6, Smith, 
Blagg and Derricourt 1988, p. 378).
A conclusion that I draw here is that the attorneys actually intend for the social 
construction of a jury in a criminal trial -  for both sides of the case -  to result in a 
jury favourable to finding for their side (be it conviction or acquittal). Baldwin and 
McConville, in their 1979 book Jury Trials, about the English jury experience, which 
is designed to be less schematic and provide less information for far fewer attorney
130 Because I am limited to the transcribed minutes of the voir dire proceedings, I cannot ascertain with 
certitude what the cardiologist meant by the phrase “Jewish opposition,” which was his linguistic 
choice of phrase. Thus, I am assuming that the cardiologist intended to communicate that assisted 
suicide and euthanasia were in opposition and subordinate to his religious beliefs, which appears 
consistent with a plain reading of the transcript. However, among other matters in the Jewish tradition, 
as a general matter, people who commit suicide cannot receive a religious funeral or be buried on 
hallowed ground. For a fuller discussion of some of the issues that may emanate from the Jewish faith, 
Professor Steven H. Resnicoff of De Paul University College of Law published a paper in 1998 
entitled, “Physician Assisted Suicide Under Jewish Law,” which is available on www.jlaw.com. A 
later version of this paper was published in an article entitled, “Jewish Law Perspectives on Suicide and 
Physician-Assisted Dying,” 13 Journal o f Law and Religion 289 (1998-1999). Professor Resnicoff 
identified five central areas in which assisted suicide is in contradiction of Jewish law:
1. The rules against murder and suicide - and the duty to rescue and to preserve life;
2. A person's lack of a proprietary interest in his life;
3. The general permissibility of medical intervention;
4. The special status of a goses (someone expected to die within 72 hours); and
5. The prohibition against giving someone improper advice and enabling someone to violate
Jewish law.
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challenges, expressed some dismay in this regard. They wrote that “the notion that 
trial lawyers subscribe to, that the composition of a particular jury is likely to have an 
important bearing on the verdict it returns might be taken to represent a serious 
criticism of the institution [of the jury trial]” (1979, p.88). Paul Rock, in personal 
communication to me, wrote that this was “not [his] experience in research -  counsel 
said that they could not, and would not, attempt to read jury’s minds” (Rock edit e- 
mail: August 27, 2007). It is equally fair to conclude that with both sides jockeying 
for the better or more sympathetic or more persuadable jurors, there is a gamble that is 
equally beneficial or detrimental (as I later argue with regard to the inclusion of 
Bishop Ott on the first Kevorkian 1996 trial, which proved disastrous for the 
prosecution).
Nurse #1 (who had been one potential juror #1) told the court that she had 
“very strong opinions” [about euthanasia] and had “been a nurse for 12 years” which 
led to the result that “I’ve just seen too much,” and that “it would be very difficult to 
be fair and impartial” (107). An interesting question, unasked by the judge during 
voir dire, was whether what she had seen led to opinions relating to strong religious 
belief and sanctity of human life and suffering, or whether she had become in favour 
of withdrawing treatment or even administering euthanasia to those in terminal 
suffering. These quotes suggested opinion informed by her observations in her 
professional nursing life, rather than the likelihood of deeming herself to be a medical 
expert. The language, if anything, implied (to me) that the juror would use her 
common sense as informed by her day-to-day experiences, rather than expertise. 
Nonetheless, given that it was the prosecutor successfully challenged this potential 
member of the jury for cause, the conclusion to be drawn appears to be that the 
courtroom workgroup itself concluded that in the years she had been a nurse, she had
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seen declines in health and that this made her sympathetic to issues of termination of 
life. This seems to fly in the face of what Glaser and Strauss noted in Awareness o f 
Dying, that “nurses may derive genuine gratification from ‘working with’ a patient 
who allows them to participate in his (sic) confrontation of death” (2005, p. 104).
Since the prosecution, rather than the defence, challenged Nurse #1, my conclusion 
(because of the challenging party) is that this nurse did not have a pro-life inclination 
and did not fall within the ambit articulated by Glaser and Strauss.
Nurse #2 (who had been a potential juror #5) spoke more to the medical issues 
at hand. She told the court during her voir dire colloquy that she was an RN 
(registered nurse) who “dealt with terminal patients [including] ALS and muscular 
dystrophy” (214). This specialized experience was all the more pertinent, given that 
Tom Youk, to whom Kevorkian administered euthanasia, had end-stage ALS. Nurse 
#2 also told the court that she “[did not] want to disregard [her] medical knowledge” 
(218-219) in considering the evidence adduced and determining the facts of the case, 
regardless of the law the judge instructed. In this instance, defendant Kevorkian 
issued a peremptory (permissive) challenge. While peremptory challenges are not 
required to be explained, I concluded that Kevorkian wanted to supply any medical 
information himself or be in control of how it was developed in testimony of the 
Medical Examiner, as a medically trained professional and to do so without anyone 
else superimposing their medical expertise.
Nurse #3 (potential juror #7) had been a neo-natal intensive care nurse for 11 
years, and in addition, took care of her mother when she had cancer. Nurse #3 said 
that she had “very strong opinions” and had engaged in “heated debates” about end- 
of-life terminations (150). More troublesome to the court, which ultimately excused 
her for cause, was the statement that “there are colleagues I will not practice with ...
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no, I cannot be fair and impartial”(150-151). Indeed Nurse #3 said that she could not 
apply the law if it was “against her firm belief’ (151). Resolving any ambiguity, the 
nurse testified that “[she] could make a factual determination [but she did] not believe 
that [she] could apply the law as [the judge gave it] to [her] if it was against her firm 
belief’ (151).
Thus, this juror invoked her faith as a reason for being unable to follow the 
law, although there was no discussion about her religious views per se. My 
conclusion as to Nurse #3, who issued the equivalent of a “conscience clause” which 
allows an opt out for those who object to performing or assisting in abortions, was 
that she was devoutly pro-life. I do note that it is also possible that she was in fact 
voicing an intention to engage in acquittal via jury nullification (which in the United 
Kingdom is more commonly referred to as a “perverse verdict”), regardless of the 
facts adduced at trial. The voir dire transcript is clear that Nurse #3 did not make 
medical statements relating to professional expertise. Rather she made personal moral 
statements that resulted in her being excused from the jury. In either event, the judge 
excused her, after soliciting possible objections from both the prosecutor and 
Kevorkian (who both agreed to excuse the potential juror).
Ultimately, there was nearly wholesale rejection of members of the medical 
profession. In this I include doctors and dentists, as well as nurses, who, similarly to 
doctors have to go through a systematized technical training along with licensure 
maintenance and state supervision. Perhaps by these rejections, he presiding judge, 
prosecution attorney and defendant former physician, all tacitly participated in what 
Ashworth and Mitchell (2000, p. 17) referred to as the jury in its “normative” role, the 
standards of ordinary decent people. This presented an implied contrast with juror 
anonymity and abstraction in the United Kingdom, who also are considered to idealise
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and represent the ordinary man/woman. In other words, nobody seemed to want to 
seat a juror who knew too much about medicine, although some with medically 
related experience seemed to pass muster as ordinary citizens for purpose of the jury. 
These apparently allowed for service of potential juror #3 (who worked in a long-term 
skilled nursing home run by Dominican nuns) and potential juror #6 (the surgical 
technician who scrubbed for open heart surgeries). Excluded from service a potential 
juror #9 (who wrote marketing books on mental health and for mental health 
professionals), as well as the cardiologist who was a potential juror #9, who was the 
cardiologist.
Hence, it seemed that knowledge of the medical profession as an attribute that 
was peripheral was not in issue, but those with anything that went to the heart of the 
case (professional doctors and nurses, those with a close connection to issues 
pertaining to ALS or to mental health, or expressed a strong belief as a result of what 
they had seen or heard or experienced in the medical field) were excluded. Ironically 
and as a side matter, Judge Cooper also excluded evidence at trial with regard to Tom 
Youk’s pain and suffering as one with end-stage ALS there was a possible 
consequence that general everyday experiences of medical pain and suffering that 
might have tended toward an inclination to acquit, may have been excluded from the 
jury room, as well as the evidence Kevorkian sought from potential testimony of the
i l l
Youks Of particular note was that each of the nurses expressed either an 
unwillingness or inability to subordinate their experience and beliefs to the 
instructions of law and of the judge. This was in contrast to the cardiologist (who also 
expressed strong Jewish faith and anti-assisted death sentiments) and the dentist,
131 While I will be addressing matters arising from Kevorkian families in the next chapter, I think it 
necessary to comment here that the Youk family did testify -  in Dr. Kevorkian’s behalf -  at the time of 
sentencing on April 13, 1999, where they objected to not being able to do so at trial.
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neither of whom expressed lack of willingness to follow judicial instructions and 
neither of whom expressed inability to be socialized into the jury.
Perhaps another way of looking at this is that doctors are trained to be 
analytical in nature and to be problem solvers, while nurses are trained to follow mles 
in the absolute.132 Alternatively, doctors may not feel the same level of hopelessness 
or helplessness with the terminally/chronically ill, since they are with the patient for 
short periods of time (Katz 1999),. This generally offers an element of clinical 
detachment, whereas nurses are involved in one-on-one day in and day out care may 
experience patient illness differently (Glaser and Strauss 1970, p.20-32). In addition, 
nurses go into a “caring” profession, while doctors go into a “curing” profession. 
Physicians and their more intellectualised form of medical practice are thus further 
distinguished from nurses, who watch and keep vigil over those in pain and suffering. 
Last, where nurses testified on voir dire to strong religious and personal belief, one 
might conclude that this belief sustains them throughout the dying process, whereas a 
more secular nurse might become angry at the pain and suffering in the degenerative 
dying process. This secular possibility might be viewed as a contrapositive to what 
Goffman wrote about mental patients, “we can learn about ceremony by studying a 
contemporary secular situation, that of the individual who has declined to employ the 
ceremonial idiom of his group in an acceptable manner and has been hospitalized” 
(1967, p.93). In any event, and in an unanticipated finding, the doctor and dentist 
seemed more willing to consider analytical evidence, the facts and the law and to 
apply the law to the facts, whereas the nurses each expressed views of a strength and 
character to defy the judge and her legal authority in instructing the jury as to the law 
they must follow. (Perhaps the surprise was that nurses are “subordinate” to doctors,
1321 am grateful to Dr. Linda Wasserman, who pointed out this cultural distinction.
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and the seeming converse of attitudes toward legal and judicial authority, so 
powerfully stated, stunned the lawyer in me.) One might wonder what the 
consequences might have been had certain bodies of experience and competence not 
systematically been excluded from the stock of knowledge available to the jurors, in 
what doubtless was a universally well-intentioned effort to contain the jury to 
members of ordinary good common sense.
C. Jurors Who Self-Reported Strong Religious Belief or Opinion During the 1999 
Voir Dire
Since two of the nurses cited their firm beliefs (as opposed to the one who 
cited not wanting to disregard her medical knowledge), there was a natural segue to 
another topic -  that of religion and beliefs. In the transcribed voir dire minutes, there 
were eight people making references to religious belief (as a factor regarding views 
brought to a euthanasia murder trial) and 13 references to strong opinions/beliefs. In 
a jury pool of approximately 50, this seemed to be a large proportion of people who 
were suggesting that religion or firm beliefs would have an impact upon the case at 
hand.
Ordinarily viewed as a topic as positively demonstrating strong social roots in 
the community by religion and/or church participation, in this case religion seemed to 
create a negative impact on the perception about a potential juror’s fitness in the eyes 
of the courtroom workgroup collectively and individually. This was powerfully 
exemplified by the cardiologist and the nurses, and led me to review the transcript as 
touching upon other members of the jury pool. My argument in this regard is simple 
-  with the exception of issues pertaining to personal or family/friends’ illnesses and 
end-of-life issues, references to religion and belief seemed to be the strongest 
indicator of fitness or acceptance of jurors in the 1999 Kevorkian trial. This inference
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is based solely on the numbers and the information available in the transcript of the 
1999 Kevorkian voir dire. The jury in the 1999 case declined to give press or other 
interviews after its verdict of guilty was pronounced (at 4:59 PM on Friday, March 
26, 1999), and so further information is unavailable about this matter. While this is 
now a methodological limitation, it is imposed on information that was not part of the 
original research objective, and I include it as a limitation in the tradition of Baldwin 
and McConville (1979, pp.28-36).
This argument is, however, neither supported nor refuted by interview 
comments of the Kevorkian prosecutors in the mid-1990s. I conducted in-depth 
interviews of prosecutor John Skrzynski shortly after the first Kevorkian 1996 
acquittal (Skrzynski Interview: March 14, 1996) prosecutor Ray Voet shortly after 
the Kevorkian 1997 mistrial (Voet Interview: June 13,1997) and former prosecutor 
Mike Modelski (who later served as second chair on a volunteer basis for Voet during 
the Kevorkian 1997 case) shortly after the second 1996 Kevorkian acquittal 
(Modelski Interview: May 17, 1996). The issue of strong religious affiliation or 
personal belief of potential or ultimately seated jurors was one that I neither asked 
about nor was offered in the course of interviews in which I focused upon legalistic 
matters. Thus, while those interviews were rich in other matters, this is material that 
was not developed at the time. This may be because I had not been present at the voir 
dire proceedings in those trials, and my questions often developed from what I had 
seen or heard or noted down in court during the trials, supplemented by areas that the 
interviewees offered). This was a constructive espirit d ’lescalier in that the ideas 
would come out of observations before or during meetings, on the way onto the 
staircase, rather than leaving it -  but came with the downside that many questions 
emerged for me years after the original fieldwork had been done and the stairwell left
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behind. In the absence of a field finding, I note that Abramson wrote briefly of 
religion as a demographic factor in the Harrisburg Seven case, but in terms of what he 
called “scientific jury selection” or what juror consultants might look for (1994, 
p. 156). Abramson’s commentary about religion was to educate, and pertained to, 
social scientists who provided profiles of “good jurors” and “bad jurors” to the 
defence team of the Harrisburg Seven case (1994, p. 156). One woman (the “second”) 
was chosen for “her demography ... especially her lack of religious affiliation,” while 
the fourth was selected because she was Catholic; not only did the [jury consultant] 
survey show that Catholics would make better defence jurors than Protestants, it was 
also believed that the jury needed a Catholic to inhibit expression of anti-Catholic 
sentiments” (1994, p. 157). The social scientists team considered their final jury well 
chosen in the Harrisburg Seven case. After some 60 hours of jury deliberations, it 
hung on major conspiracy charges by a vote of 10 to 2 in favour of acquittal, 
convicting on minor charges only (1994, p. 157).
Indeed, of the 37 members of the jury pool who were stricken for either cause 
or peremptorily, there were 13 transcribed potential juror references to belief 
systems/strong opinions about euthanasia/assisted suicide, and 9 comments by 
potential jurors to religion as a factor that would impede potential jurors from acting 
impartially on the Kevorkian jury. I shall amplify this matter below. Since strikes 
were simply stated either as for cause (eight by the court, one by the prosecutor and 
three by Kevorkian) or as peremptory (none by the court, 10 by the prosecutor and 17 
by Kevorkian) and there were some overlapping issues (such as medical 
practice/experience, personal/family health issues, media exposure). One can only 
hypothesize as to the reason for these permissive peremptory challenges. However, 
the sheer numbers suggest that experience of church or temple was taken to be
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grounds for challenge as to fitness to serve on the jury in this case. This was echoed 
by some of the specific juror voir dire colloquies, and begs the question as to whether 
this aspect of selection favoured juror apathy over the ignorance and indifference 
implied by Judge Cooper in her discussions with the prosecutor and the defendant.
Of the eight jurors specifically citing religion as an issue regarding their 
inability to be impartial jurors, two gave their religion as Catholic. One potential 
juror (#3) cited the fact that she was Catholic and had strong opinions about 
euthanasia (82) and she was subsequently excused peremptorily by Kevorkian (89). 
Another potential juror (#1), who was questioned later in the day, announced that she 
was a Catholic and a “very strong Christian” with “very strong beliefs” and was 
summarily excused (198) in less than two pages of transcript of colloquy in total, 
toward the end of the voir dire process. This brevity stood in contrast to the more 
extensive colloquy of the cardiologist, who was potential juror #9.
Other potential jurors alluded to “strong religious beliefs” (# 4: 114), or were 
religious and “had opinions that would prevent impartiality -  a lot of them” (#4: 128) 
or stated that they “couldn’t be impartial” (#1: 132) or could not be fair and impartial 
(#7: 150). Not all strong opinions were necessarily based on religion. Some were 
phrased in secular medical terms such as one potential juror #3, the nursing home 
worker who stated that euthanasia and assisted suicide represented “a very strong 
issue in our nursing home” (94-96). This statement reflected a common 
consciousness of the issue in a non-acute care service environment. One possible 
conclusion that these various statements led to was that people were decided on the 
issue of euthanasia or assisted suicide with a zeal that would prevent calm discourse. 
They stated this in much the same way that the potential jurors who expressed strong 
religious or moral or secular beliefs claimed that they could not be impartial. This
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conclusion, while perhaps obvious and natural, seemed particularly compelling in the
rarefied atmosphere of a courtroom voir dire. The information in this regard is derived
from the transcript of the voir dire, and “no person, other than a member of the jury
can state what the reasoning was in a particular case” (Baldwin and McConville 1979,
p.32), Because of this, and since the jurors who expressed strong religious beliefs
were largely excluded from the jury that convicted, the effects of religion and faith
seemed most clearly demonstrated in their exclusion from the jury, rather than by any
effect upon the jury and its members’ action.
The jury selection in the 1999 Kevorkian trial seemed reminiscent of the voir
dire that failed to exclude Bishop Donald Ott, of the United Methodist Church who
was the foreman of the jury in the first 1996 assisted suicide trial. That trial
regarded two distinct allegations. These were Kevorkian’s 1993 (post-legislation
assisted suicide ban) aid in the carbon monoxide inhalation suicides of 72-year-old
homemaker/ALS patient Merian Frederick and that of 61- year- old Chicago
physician/bone cancer patient, Dr. Ali Khalili. Bishop Ott was widely credited as the
primary mover of acquitting Kevorkian of assisted suicide in March 1996, and was
specifically named to me in Judge Jessica Cooper’s 1996 in-depth interview. Bishop
Ott was ultimately a. failed  juror choice on the part of the prosecution. This is
because the prosecutors knew of his religious affiliation, but seemingly did not
discover that he had written a pro-assisted suicide article in 1993, believed to be
around the time of the death of his family member. Writing for The New York Times
on March 9, 1996 in an article entitled, “Kevorkian Again Not Guilty of Aiding
Suicide,” journalist and Kevorkian insider, Jack Lessenbery observed:
Mr. Ott, the jury foreman, said he viewed the issues in the case as important 
for society. Prosecutors and defence lawyers were startled to learn today that 
he wrote an article defending assisted suicide in 1993. "Choosing a time of 
one's death in a terminal condition can be an expression of faithful living," Mr.
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Ott wrote in a church publication.
Ruth Holmes, president of Pentek, a handwriting analysis firm that helped the 
defence pick the jury, said Dr. Kevorkian's lawyers had nearly sought to have 
Mr. Ott excused because of fears that he might oppose their client on religious 
grounds. (March 9, 1996, p.7)(emphasis added).
Bishop Ott aside, the continuing trend of the general public, from which
juror pools are culled (most frequently from voter registration roles or drivers/vehicle
registration, both of which are address specific), showed that religious belief was most
likely to be inversely related to favouring assisted suicide, euthanasia or withdrawal
of life support. Indeed, according to an AP-Ipsos poll published May 29, 2007 on
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18923323/ (just days before Kevorkian was due to be
released from prison on parole):
The AP-Ipsos poll showed that religious faith is a significant factor in views 
on the subject. Only 34 percent of those who attend religious services at least 
once a week think it should be legal for doctors to help terminally ill patients 
end their own lives. In contrast, 70 percent of those who never attend religious 
services thought the practice should be legal. Just 23 percent of those who 
attend religious services at least weekly would consider ending their own lives 
if terminally ill, compared to 49 percent of those who never attend religious 
services. (AP May 29, 2007).
That this survey was conducted nearly a decade after Kevorkian 
administered euthanasia to Tom Youk seemed to indicate that a defence-favourable 
jury would continue to have been unlikely to include people with strong religious 
roots in the community. However, that statement must be tempered. Evidence about 
jurors such as Bishop Ott (as well as family clergy such as Unitarian Minister 
Reverend Ken Phifer, who attended Merian Frederick’s assisted suicide) are a caution 
that religious affiliation and strong belief may not necessarily be definitive as a juror 
predictor. Ultimately, a question for further research may be to conduct a study of 
jurors in the past Kevorkian trials to learn whether religious beliefs of the actors in the 
trial may have existed and had an impact upon the jury members, but this was not 
information that was available at the time of trial or interviews.
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D. Potential Jurors With Personal Illness or Disability and Illnesses o f Family and 
Friends
The next set of attributes I considered was the impact of illnesses and end-of- 
life related experiences of potential jurors, their families and their friends. As 
discussed in the chapter regarding chief prosecuting attorneys and judges, these 
profound experiences can shape the personal and professional perceptions and actions 
of those who are legal elites, an argument I shall shortly extend to jurors. Among 
other examples was Prosecuting Attorney John O’Hair (after his parent’s decline to 
death), and of the second 1996 Kevorkian trial Judge David Breck (whose wife had a 
lengthy decline from cancer in the Palliative Care Unit of Harper Hospital)(Breck 
Interview: May 15, 1996).
In the 1999 voir dire minutes of Kevorkian, I counted 18 potential jurors who 
made references to illnesses or (in two cases) disabilities borne by the jurors 
personally, or by family or friends, totalling 25 instances of personal experience. Of 
the attributes I examined, this was the single most frequently and prominently 
mentioned. In this regard, I segregated the eight references to religion from the 13 
references to strong opinions, some of which might also have been secular in nature. 
Indeed, this pervasive element seemed in keeping with concerns about lengthy 
declines from degenerative illness to death as a part of life in the 20th century, and of 
the medicalization of the dying process.
In an earlier article I wrote during the mid-1990s about what were then “recent 
historical perspectives about euthanasia and physician assisted suicide” (Pappas 
1996), I noted that degenerative illness has become the way by which we die in a
133 This trend continued in the 21st century, as noted by Bloomberg Staff Piece, “Alzheimer’s could 
quadruple by 2050,” in Metro New York. June 11, 2007 (p..8).
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society that has drugs to cure most acute illnesses (with the result that we live longer, 
and to an age where degenerative illnesses most commonly take our lives rather than 
opportunistic infections). I found that I adopted the views of jurors who had personal 
or “family illness” or who were heavily involved in the day to day care in illnesses of 
friends, perhaps because of my own family experiences of Huntington’s Disease. In 
any event, I felt compelled to consider this attribute, and did so from the somewhat 
safe distance of a transcribed voir dire and in the third person. Perhaps because I had 
been a criminal lawyer at another time, the explanation for this was best expressed in 
a criminological article about third party (i.e. family and friends) victims of homicide, 
authored by Rock and Howarth. They wrote that “members of the family would 
become defined by a crime they had not themselves committed and they would share 
the opprobrium which is heaped upon the offence and the offender” (Rock and 
Howarth 2000, p.69). If one were to substitute the words “illness” or “disability” for 
“crime, and substitute these words again for “offence” and “offender,” this could 
reach an emotional truth of those who have been ill or cared for the ill -  in other 
words, members of a jury pool. In the next chapter, I shall be discussing family 
members of those Kevorkian hastened to death, but I note this here, with the comment 
that jurors have families, and that illness was a huge issue in voir dire.
For the most part, the revelations of the potential jurors regarded family 
members, rather than themselves. However, in terms of personal illness and ability, 
two potential jurors had survived cancer, only to be dismissed from the jury 
peremptorily, one each by the prosecutor (203) and Kevorkian (171). This said, the 
prosecutor might also have excused the 12-year cancer survivor peremptorily because 
she was a writer of marketing books on mental health and for mental health 
professionals (205).
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Of the potential jurors, only one was currently disabled, though not specifying 
in what way (#3: 93). In retrospect, I realise that this may -  or may not -  have been 
readily observable were I not working from a transcript on printed page. This could 
have led to either juror empathy for Youk seeking assisted suicide or to juror 
antipathy toward Kevorkian’s assisted suicide crusade turned euthanasia for the 
profoundly disabled Youk. Diane Coleman, President of Not Dead Yet, a lawyer 
who is herself disabled, “[i]n recent years, the disability community’s opposition to 
legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia has become increasingly visible”
(2002, p.213). The disabled potential juror was ultimately dismissed, for complicated 
reasons far more likely to have been relating to the criminal justice system rather than 
to disability. I shall return to this juror below.
Of the remaining references, 10 had family members who currently had or 
had died from cancer; one had a close friend with the illness, one had a family 
member with MS, four had relatives with ALS„ one family member had died from 
emphysema, one had a family member who had Alzheimer’s (though a number of 
those in the medical fields were also exposed to Alzheimer’s on a regular basis), and 
four family members had “other” or non-named illnesses of degenerative decline. In 
charting the personal, family and friend illnesses, an unanticipated finding was that 
not one potential juror from the metro-Detroit area had cited a close relationship with 
anyone with HIV/AIDS decline; part of this was surprising because of the 
urban/suburban late 1990s jury pool.
In terms of illness, the first noteworthy matter was that the sole potential 
member of the jury who reported a disability (potential juror #3: 90) and who was on 
social security for disability was dismissed from the jury (93). However, that was by 
the judge for cause because he was a prior felony offender with a conviction for
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felony assault with a knife (92-93). The criminal record aside, this potential juror was 
the only member of the jury pool who reported himself to be currently disabled or 
handicapped, which in a case involving prosecution for euthanasia murder of a man 
with end-stage ALS, seemed to exclude from the jury an entire relevant class of the 
population -  the disabled. The only juror remaining who expressed a relationship to 
matters of disability (# 10: 207-209, who remained on the jury) had a wife whom he 
described as “handicapped” by chronic fibromyalgia that caused pain every day (this 
juror also had an aunt with dementia and an uncle with cancer who required 24 hour 
care
The issue of potential juror #3’s disability seemingly shunted aside (although 
more likely for the Prior Felony Offender status), a surprising number of potential 
jurors had personal or familial experiences with cancer (historically the paradigmatic 
referent for adult voluntary euthanasia in the 20th century). There was a surprising 
number of potential jurors who had direct involvement with close family and friends 
with ALS, Alzheimer’s, cancer and other degenerative illnesses, from which one 
might draw the conclusion that terminal and degenerative illness have become very 
widespread. Some, such as #2, whose grandmother had had Alzheimer’s Disease, but 
who had not been involved in day-to-day care were seated on the ultimate jury. More 
often they were excused, such as potential juror #4 (the dentist), whose father-in-law 
had died 12 years earlier, after a nine-year observable decline, of ALS/Lou Gehrig’s 
Disease and whom Kevorkian excused by peremptory challenge.
Of the 14 potential jurors who cited personal/family illnesses, the court 
excused five for cause, the prosecutor excused one for cause and two peremptorily, 
and Kevorkian excused two for cause and four peremptorily. Since this represented 
approximately one-quarter of the 46 jurors who gave information by testimony during
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the voir dire, this seems to be a very strong statement that how the question of we die 
has permeated the daily lives of ordinary people, lending support for the debate about 
end-of-life issues generally, and physician assisted suicide and euthanasia 
particularly, during the 1990s. With the exception of the man whose uncle had cancer, 
stricken from the final jury was each of the potential jurors who had either had cancer 
or had a close family member with cancer or who had participated in day to day care 
of a family member or friend with cancer.
With respect to some potential jurors, such as a 12 year cancer survivor (writer 
of mental health books), or disabled person (prior felony offender), or a person who 
took care of a mother with cancer (cardiologist, the third nurse), there were often 
other overlapping relevant attributes that may have had an impact on either their 
fitness to serve or undermined confidence in their partiality as jurors; this is to say 
that I did not examine attributes as mutually exclusive of one another. That said, the 
matter of personal illness and end-of-life issues of family and friends was the single 
most overriding theme developed during the juror questioning in the voir dire 
minutes, one which did not necessarily result in juror disqualification for cause or 
peremptory challenge. If nothing else, this underscores why end-of-life issues, 
including termination of life for adults with terminal illnesses, has become so 
important and pervasive in contemporary Anglo-American society.
Part II The Post-Trial Analysis o f the Juries o f the 1990s Nullification Acquittals and 
Mistrial
A. Introduction
The 1999 jury convicted Kevorkian of murder and drug delivery charges, 
making this the first time in the course of over 130 acknowledged medically-aided 
deaths by Kevorkian in which he was legally (to use the trial judge’s word) “stopped”
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(April 13, 1999, sentencing proceedings). The convicting jury pointedly declined to 
be interviewed by media or academics after the trial, In fact, Judge Cooper instructed 
the media and civilians in the gallery not to impede or question individual jurors, who 
chose not to be interviewed and were escorted from the courthouse. This action 
appeared to be consistent with her ongoing “protection” of jurors from the media, 
although she did offer the jury an opportunity to speak to the press, stating “and for 
those who are curious, I wish to speak with the jury and I will let them know that you 
are obviously very curious and perhaps we can make an orderly arrangement for those 
people who wish to speak to you” (March 26, 1999, 12-13). This 1999 jury refusal 
of post-trial interviews, similarly to the fact of the conviction, was a departure from 
prior cases. Thus, the verdict (and only the verdict) spoke for the convicting jury of 
1999.
The voir dire study regarded the 1999 trial of the Youk euthanasia murder 
Considerations of post-trial jury analysis and commentary pertain to trials in 1994- 
1997. Specifically, I shall now consider matters relating to the juries of the first trial 
in Detroit (Wayne County) in 1994, the two trials in Pontiac (Oakland County) in 
1996 (tried by Judge Cooper and Judge Breck, respectively) and the 1997 mistrial in 
Ionia County (presided over by Judge Miel). I attended most of each of these trials. I 
travelled during, and arrived effectively after voir dire. This is because a jury 
selection signified that a trial would actually take place This was a financial travel 
decision relating to a student budget); the exception to this is the 1994 trial, which I 
was unable to attend. These trials (and the 1997 mistrial) all took place earlier in time 
than the 1999 case in which the voir dire minutes were available for study. However, 
the timing of my access to post-verdict matters such as in-depth interviews with the 
presiding judges, jury press conferences, and in-depth juror interviewing was after the
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end of the cases.. From a thematic approach, this pointed to placing this section after 
the voir dire study of the 1999 trial, notwithstanding the fact that the latter trial 
occurred earlier in time.
So as to include the 1994 Detroit trial of Kevorkian for the assisted suicide of 
Tom Hyde (Kevorkian’s 17th assisted suicide, and the first to go to trial), I cite the 
1994 document and article based book by Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury 
System and the Ideal o f Democracy. Abramson cited the Kevorkian 1994 jury verdict 
of acquittal as part of an opening on the history of jury nullification (where a jury 
acquits a defendant despite sufficient evidence to prove the elements charged, also 
known as a “perverse” verdict). Law Professor Paul Butler, in his 1995 Yale Law 
Journal essay, observed, that “jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a 
defendant who it believes is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. In finding 
the defendant not guilty, the jury ignores the facts of the case and/or the judge’s 
instructions regarding the law. Instead the jury votes its conscience” (Butler 1995, 
pp.677, 700). Introducing the Kevorkian 1994 verdict, Abramson (a former assistant 
prosecutor in Massachusetts turned college professor) wrote that this was “an 
illustration of the subterranean life that jury nullification continues to live today” 
(1994, p.65). While it is possible to disagree with the contention that the Kevorkian 
juries were in some way “subterranean,” I do not disagree with Abramson’s general 
factual rendition, which he culled from newspaper articles:
In 1994, a Detroit jury acquitted Dr. Jack Kevorkian of 
violating a Michigan law that made it illegal to assist persons to 
commit suicide. In the few years prior to trial, the infamous “suicide 
doctor” had by his own count helped twenty persons [the number 
changes and jumps sharply depending upon the year, and sometimes 
even month, of any given writing, including my own, as can be seen by 
Pappas 1996 a and Pappas 1996 b]to end their lives, but this was the 
first time Dr. Kevorkian had come to trial.
The law that Dr. Kevorkian was accused of breaking contained 
an exemption for acts that were done with the intent of relieving pain
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and suffering, even if the person performing the acts knew they would 
hasten death. In interviews after trial, several jurors indicated that they 
believed Dr.Kevorkian acted only to relieve the person’s suffering, but 
this was hard to believe in light of the fact that Dr. Kevorkian had 
placed a mask over the person’s face and released carbon monoxide 
into his lungs for twenty minutes. The more likely explanation for the 
jury verdict is that they nullified the law insofar as it prohibited a 
physician from assisting in suicide. (David Margolick, “Jurors Acquit 
Dr. Kevorkian in Suicide Case,” May 3, 1994, New York Times p. A l; 
Jack Lessenberry, “Michigan Jury Acquits Kevorkian,” Boston Globe. 
May 3, 1994 p. A l; Richard Knox, “Verdict Touches Off 
Deliberations,” Boston Globe. May 3, 1994) Abramson (1994, pp.65, 
268).
Abramson’s description of the jury perception of the case recollects Chief 
Prosecutor John O’Hair’s comments previously discussed in the previous chapter. 
O’Hair expressed concerns and made commentary regarding the potential for jury 
nullification as early as our interview in August 1993. The case in 1994 appeared to 
have been proven element by element and should legally have been won, yet was lost 
once in the hands of the jury. In what might have been a peer review commentary 
from lawyer to lawyer, line prosecutor John Skrzynski told me in our interview, “Tim 
Kenney [the line prosecutor who tried the case that Chief Prosecuting Attorney John 
O’Hair initiated in 1993, that resulted in the 1994 acquittal of charges relating to the 
assisted suicide of Tom Hyde] tried a nice case.” A “nice” case is a colloquial 
expression for a job well done, notwithstanding the fact that the jury acquitted 
Kevorkian after Tim Kenney’s “nice case” was presented to the jury. While 
Skrzynski did not use the phrase “jury nullification,” that is what his comment 
implied about the Detroit trial. My fieldwork did not include this 1994 trial nor 
interviews of any of its participants. However, media accounts and press, as 
discussed in the Abramson passage, suggested that jury nullification was a serious 
possibility.
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B. Judges Judging the Juries
Jury nullification was generally accepted as the outcome of the 1996 trials. 
These trials were lengthy lasting up to five weeks. These trials resulted in what I 
would describe as “issue acquittals” regarding the assisted suicide and medical 
euthanasia debate in Michigan, as much as jury nullifications of the crimes of which 
Kevorkian was tried. This Michigander use of “jury nullification,” as a colloquial 
term of art, was so commonly accepted and taken as a given that lay people bandied it 
about. One such example was at the sentencing proceeding on April 13, 1999, when 
Melody Youk was protesting being excluded by the judge from testifying on 
Kevorkian’s behalf
Of course, I wish I had been able to speak at the trial, feeling that that 
would have given the jury an opportunity to receive a balanced view of the 
facts, but understood the prosecution’s concern for a jury nullification based 
on Tom’s situation of being near death. However, not being able to speak also 
did not allow us an opportunity to address the questions improperly raised as 
to [Tom’s] lack of adequate medical care or to correct inaccuracies as 
mentioned above or to lay to rest misrepresentations such as the suggestion 
that the tape [of the Kevorkian/Youk euthanasia] was somehow staged or 
produced for any reason other than to show, again, my husband’s consent and 
that no one but the doctor was present at the procedure (Sentencing 
Proceeding, April 13, 1999 at 13).
By use of the phrase “issue acquittal,” I am embracing different 
characterizations enumerated by Robert F. Schopp in his 1998 book, Justification: 
Defenses and Just Convictions. A jury has the ultimate power to decide the facts, as 
well as the application of the law to the facts in a criminal trial, but it could also 
engage in a process through which jurors take a judicial and or legislative role (1998, 
p. 156). This is what I conclude took place with the two 1996 juries, I shall address. 
Schopp noted that jury nullification is not a power to invalidate a statute, nor is it to 
overturn the law as unconstitutional, nor is it to create a new law or as precedent 
(1998, pp.156-157). In other words, it is a case-by-case, jury-by-jury event, where a
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jury “wrongly” acquits a criminal. Commentators have argued nullification (or a 
perverse verdict of acquittal) may occur on a rare occasion [Zander 1974a, as cited by 
Baldwin and McConville (1979, p. 10)] or as frequently as in one in eight acquittals by 
a jury, as being “contrary to the law and evidence,” [McCabe and Purves 1972, as 
cited by Baldwin and McConville (1979, p. 9)]. As I shall develop, the evidence 
tends to support a theory of jury nullification in the 1997 Kevorkian trials, which were 
a unique set of political, as well as legal trials.
If we assume that there was no jury nullification in the mid-1990s Kevorkian 
trials, Kevorkian’s acquittals may have as their social roots the English case 
prosecuting Dr. John Bodkin Adams. He was acquitted of a medical murder in the 
1950s, and whose trial is considered to be the first in which the jury received a charge 
(or instruction) from the judge regarding “double effect.” Bodkin Adams was 
acquitted of the alleged murder by morphine of a woman, after less than an hour of 
deliberations and notwithstanding similar conduct with other patients.
The critical feature in the Bodkin Adams case was believed to be Lord 
Devlin’s jury instruction originating the legal concept of “double intent.” This 
doctrine states that if a doctor’s intent was to alleviate pain, but there was a secondary 
effect of shortening life, an acquittal must result. While Lord Devlin had not been in 
the jury room deliberating, he had been in the position of having been the trial judge 
and hearing the evidence, as well as observing the jury he had instructed on the law to 
be applied in the case. Devlin’s 1985 book, Easing the Passing: The Trial o f Dr.
John Bodkin Adams, went so far as to state that “[t]he trial process is designed to put 
you, the jury, in the position of the big decision makers, which is what for this case 
you are” (1985, p.57). Devlin noted that there were, as with Kevorkian, other related 
alleged murders committed by Bodkin Adams in the 1950s (1985, p.58), presumably
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for economic gain. This was rather than Kevorkian’s quest for assisted suicide and 
fame related thereto, a theory that was first relayed to me during my 1993 interview 
with Chief Prosecutor Richard Thomspon, as discussed in the previous chapter and 
consistent with the arguments advance by Rojeck in Celebrity (2001, p. 143-181).
The judges also offered judicial reflections regarding the juries post-verdict in 
the Kevorkian cases. While the focus of the judicial interviews was not specifically 
upon the jury (and indeed, my focus in questioning regarded issues pertaining to order 
in the court and to judicial views of end-of-life prosecutions), each of the three judges 
interviewed offered unique commentary regarding the juries they had observed.
They, in a sense, made comments judging the jury that they had participated in 
selecting. Thematically, these referred primarily to matters of jury 
protection/management and to the jury’s application of the law to the facts of the 
case,
Lord Devlin commented on the need to keep the jury, composed of members 
of the general public, segregated from press,134 information and innuendo regarding 
his famous euthanasia case. This applies to any famous case, and indeed to juries 
generally. What Devlin stated was that “[t]he only safe course, it is felt is to keep a 
jury in the sort of ignorance which guarded the virtue of Victorian maidens” (1985, 
pp.58). This approach transports otherwise competent adult members of the jury into 
a familial setting with the judge as parent, and renders the jurors as children who must 
be directed and protected. Thus, while jurors must only consider only testimony and 
exhibits as evidence and as instructed by the judge, the jurors actually become 
infantilised in a more general way as the children being introduced to, and protected
134 During the 1990s Kevorkian trials, this was phrased in terms of “protecting” the jury from the media 
and from excessive or disorderly questions, by Judge Cooper in our interview in 1996, as well as by the 
jurors themselves in the course of their Press Conference (Cooper Jury Press Conference, as cited 
during Cooper Interview: May 17, 1996).
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by, court process. The underlying reason for this is that the minds of the jurors should
not be contaminated by any untested and extraneous material.
Paternalistic protection was something that the jurors noted in their press
conference after the first 1996 trial. In my interview of Judge Cooper, I asked about
the jury thanking her profusely during their post-acquittal press conference in March,
although that “protection” regarded the media. This protection was from the wall of
the media, discussed previously. As to her perception of the media, Cooper stated
during our interview, “I have a very good relationship with the press, what bothers me
is being manipulated by both sides because [the prosecution and defence] didn’t
bother to read.” In other words, one concern expressed was not so much that the jury
might have known legal matters or been exposed to Kevorkian, but rather that the
press might intrude on to the jurors’ lives and deliberations.
During the 1999 Kevorkian trial, over which Judge Cooper also presided, she
was pointed in her protection:
Members of the jury, you’re wondering what you’re doing in this crowded 
courtroom and you’re wondering perhaps about the space invaders [referring 
to the media trucks and vans parked at the courthouse] on the front lawn, and 
you might also be wondering about a lot of things.... I do want you to know 
that cameras are turned off for purposes of jury selection and I do want you to 
know that the law in Michigan says that jurors are not photographed, and so 
you can all heave a sigh of relief (voir dire transcript, March 22, 1999: 27).
This introduction for the jurors was only one of a number of media restrictions
imposed during the 1999 Kevorkian trial (including keeping the hallways clear of
media). It also reflected a desire to protect the integrity of the proceedings and the
sanctity, as well as the comfort, of the jury and its potential members. That said, and
in a nod by Judge Cooper at the voir dire to the level of media interest in the
Kevorkian cases, rather than ask the traditional question of whether any of the jurors
knew Kevorkian, her question was “is there anybody on this jury panel who has not
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heard or [sic] Dr. Kevorkian?” (Kevorkian 1999, 27).. Indeed, during a pre-trial 
conference and hearing with the parties on March 19, 1999, Judge Cooper told the 
prosecutor and Kevorkian’s advisors, “You never know. I mean we could get 14 
jurors who say they never heard of him. I doubt that. We did -  what was interesting 
the last time [i.e., 1996] there were jurors who - 1 think we discussed this in 
Chambers -  are out of the loop. I don’t know that you necessarily want those people 
on your jury, but there are those people who are without any opinions whatsoever in 
their whole lives about any subject whatsoever and who don’t watch the news and 
who don’t read the media (sic) and we don’t know what they do with their free time. 
You never know.” (Hearing March 19, 1999, 25-26).
Judge Cooper’s “protection” came with parental limitations, as well. Jurors 
were not permitted to take notes, in contrast in Judge Breck’s Kevorkian case a month 
later (Personal Observations, March-May 1996; Breck interview: May 17, 1996). 
Judge Breck expressed a concern that “three weeks [after hearing testimony or 
reviewing evidence] jurors would not remember.” Judge Breck in interview prided 
himself on being “one of the first” judges in Michigan who had allowed jurors to take 
and use written notes, which he deemed “helpful.” It could be argued135 that juror 
note-taking could distract the juror’s attention, or could result in conflict between 
juror notes and the actual court proceedings (either by recollection or by a re-reading 
“read-back” of the actual court minutes), possibly usurping the court’s role in 
supervising evidence and because jurors could rely more on their notes than upon 
actual evidence adduced and transcribed by the official court reporter. Bloomstein 
(1972. p. 94) argued that “the industrious juror does not take full notes of all the 
evidence and, the human mind being what it is, he will tend to stress the points during
1351 actually did once argue this successfully on appeal.
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deliberation that he wrote down, to the detriment of equally important facts that he 
failed to note because they did not penetrate his awareness at the time or even because 
his nose itched at just that moment [so] in general, note taking is not allowed.” I 
observed that neither Judge Cooper (1996, 1999) nor Judge Miel (1997) allowed 
jurors to take notes. This invites the conclusion that they would have required jurors 
to rely upon court records, physical evidence and minutes read-backs, rather than 
upon juror notes that could have been subjective or incorrect.
In the Kevorkian cases, one questionable matter regarding juror notes and
note-taking in the trial supervised in 1996 by Judge Breck is that the jurors “wanted to
keep the notes” and have the parties and judge “autograph” them” at a “Saturday night
out to dinner” for the jury sponsored by the Kevorkian defence team, after the jury’s
May 14, 1996 acquittal (Breck Interview: May 15, 1996). Such a memento was
arguably unseemly as disturbing the role of the jury as sitting in judgment (famous
parties and lawyers aside), and suggests cause for concern where a famous or
infamous defendant is tried by a jury of the general public (Rojeck 2001). I suggest
1 ^ 6that the potential for a spatter effect of fame seemed possible in what Judge Breck 
in our interview called “a trial of the century because of the importance of the issues” 
pertaining to end-of-life matters generally, and assisted suicide/euthanasia 
specifically.
In another difference between jury management styles expressed by the judges 
in supervising or “protecting” jurors, Judge Breck allowed jurors to question 
witnesses via notes to the court (trial observations April -  May 1996, Breck 
Interview: May 15, 1996), while Judge Cooper did not permit jurors to ask questions 
of the witnesses (Cooper Interview: May 17, 1996). Judge Cooper, who during our
136 The spatter effect is literally a reference to the effect that paint has when it spills or spatter.
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1996 interview was very focused upon preserving the integrity of the proceedings, 
stated that jurors were “not allowed because it could make an unruly court [and it] 
puts the juror in the position of being an advocate if they can ask questions.” Though 
I am mindful of the legal adage that reasonable minds may differ, I conclude that 
Cooper and Miel had the more correct approach in this regard.
To members of the jury, perhaps the most “unruly” aspect of the proceedings 
was that introduced by the defendant Kevorkian and members of his legal team. 
During the juror press conference held after Judge Breck’s jury acquitted Kevorkian 
of the simultaneous Wantz/Miller homicides, more than one commented to the effect 
that while in Judge Breck’s courtroom, they found Kevorkian “entertaining” (Breck 
Jury Press Conference: May 14, 1996). This unusual characterization of a murder 
defendant by a jury is mirrored in opposite by a comment made in interview after the 
Kevorkian mistrial by Judge Miel in June 1997, regarding Kevorkian’s absence from 
the abbreviated proceedings prior to the post-opening mistrial -  Miel said in interview 
that he thought the proceedings and tried would be “smoother” if Kevorkian were not 
there [in court during the assisted suicide trial of Loretta Peabody]” (Pappas trial 
notes: June 12, 1997, Miel Interview: June 13, 1997). I shall comment further on 
Kevorkian and his celebrity status in Chapter 6.
In Ionia, the judge took an approach that was perhaps preferable to having 
Kevorkian the defendant present for trial, and engaging in antics such as those in the 
1996 trials. One such antic was when Kevorkian assisted in a suicide during the night 
between his direct examination and cross-examination. Comments in the second 1996 
jury press conference post-acquittal, to the effect that some four of the 12 deliberating 
jurors knew of the Bastable assisted suicide and Kevorkian’s attendance thereto, could 
not have been other than distracting, notwithstanding the fact that the jurors claimed
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that they did not take this into account during deliberations (Breck Jury Press 
Conference: May 14, 1996).
The jury in fact did not seem to take Kevorkian’s mid-testimony involvement 
at the Austin Barnstable assisted suicide (during the Wantz/Miller trial before Judge 
Breck) into account. This may be inferred by the following: had the jury considered 
this evidence of seemingly unregenerate and recidivist conduct, they would have been 
more likely to convict the defendant than less likely to convict him. Further, the mid­
trial assisted suicide attendance of 53 year-old Austin Bastable on May 7, 1996137 
flew in the face of the fundamental principles of bail and liberty pendente lite in that 
this posed a similar threat to the community (similar conduct was noted in a different 
context and most negatively by Judge Cooper in her sentencing on April 13, 1999). 
Finally, this mid-trial (indeed, mid-testimony) conduct flouted the authority of the 
court generally. One inference that can be drawn is that Kevorkian was a serial killer 
in search of fame (Rojek2001). Taken together with another, more seemingly 
benign event during the same trial, that was nearly certitude. In the latter event, at a 
group lunch during jury deliberations, Kevorkian lost his temper over a bad cup of 
coffee, complaining of its 35 cent cost -  a micromanaging detail that was unseemly to 
a criminal defendant on trial for homicide). While the first of these events was 
technically not before the jury, and the latter was in the courthouse cafeteria while the 
jury toiled at its task separately upstairs, to someone aware of both events, it was 
surprising that the jury sitting on the case acquitted Kevorkian. Under no instruction 
as to the former, and without awareness of the latter, it was for courthouse speculators 
to juxtapose these events and draw their own conclusions.
137 For a full discussion of the post-direct and pre-cross examination evening of assisted suicide of 
Austin Bastable, news accounts are available, such as the staff article on May 8, 1996, in Section A, p. 
20 of The New York Times, entitled “Despite Trial, Kevorkian Is At a Suicide.”
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C. Juror Perceptions of the Kevorkian Trials (1996 and 1997)
The jurors’ perceptions ranged from their involvement in trial as an 
institutional matter to their involvement in Kevorkian’s trial as a personal and social 
matter. One juxtaposition that I made regarded the jury’s role as the judges of facts. 
This harkened to a comment by Lord Devlin in his book about the Bodkin Adams 
euthanasia trial, “[w]hat they [i.e., jurors] resent is not the work nor the sacrifice of 
time but the tedium of hanging about with nothing to do” (1985, p.27). While Lord 
Devlin was referring to the “downtime” of a trial (time in which neither evidence nor 
legal argument or instructions are being presented to the jury), Judge Miel of Ionia 
County voiced a similar sentiment 40 years after the Bodkin Adams trial, regarding 
the Kevorkian mistrial (1997).
As explained in Chapter 3, the 1997 mistrial was the rare post-opening statement 
mistrial -  prompted by then-Kevorkian lawyer Geoffrey Fieger’s opening statement. I 
was present at this opening statement, made in front of the all-white, rural and 
conservative jury, uttered quite possibly in the hopes of a mistrial in place of a trial 
before a potentially unfriendly jury that would be likely convict Kevorkian. This was 
underscored by Ionia County Prosecutor Ray Voet in our June 13, 1997 interview in 
which he told me that he “came out of jury selection feeling pretty good, [so] Fieger 
had to commit jury arson” (Voet Interview: June 13,1997). Had the 1997 jury in 
Ionia heard the evidence and deliberated to verdict, I wonder what they would have 
made of the death certificate that stated “death by IV injection” (Death Certificate of 
Loretta Peabody: September 3, 1996). This, which Voet referred to in our interview 
as “the needle mark”, was a conclusion to be drawn from the 1996 death certificate of 
Loretta Peabody. The form had a box for “how injury occurred,” in which the cause
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was listed as “physician assisted suicide,” though in fact the inference is actually 
medical euthanasia.
A rhetorical question loomed before me a decade later, writing after the 
Kevorkian 1999 conviction of euthanasia murder relating to the 1998 Tom Youk 
hastened death. What would the jury have decided to do with the information? An 
inference to be drawn -  10 years after that jury was dismissed upon mistrial -  is that 
in actuality, Ionia County had a viable case for common law homicide, but chose only 
to bring a statutory assisted suicide trial after the 1996 Oakland County acquittals, 
with the hopes of securing a guilty verdict. Following the 1997 mistrial, it seemed to 
invite Kevorkian to more openly engage in euthanasia (such as that of Tom Youk on 
September 17, 1998, which was sent to 60 Minutes). That is, in fact, what he was 
tried for in 1999 -  only after statutory assisted suicide charges brought simultaneously 
were dropped further to a pre-trial motion.
The 1997 mistrial in Ionia led to the inevitable result that the jury did not hear 
the case (or evidence at all, given that the mistrial was immediately after opening 
statements were concluded). Judge Miel’s comment in our interview was, “I am sorry 
for the people on the jury -  they spent a long time for nothing to happen. They gave 
up their time. I’d have had them come in at 1:00 PM instead of 9:00 AM. They’re 
disappointed” (Miel Interview: June 12, 1997). During our interview, Cameron 
Beedle, who had been a juror in the second 1996 trial, gave the vehement and 
prescient comment that “we [jurors] all said if we were alternates, we would be very 
upset -  not to be there for the final decision” (Beedle Interview: May 19,1996).
For the 1996 juries that did sit on Kevorkian trials to conclusion the result was 
acquittal in both trials (each of which actually represented two cases). As I have 
already discussed, the acquittals were widely viewed as having been by jury
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1nullification in both cases. Involving prosecutorial theories of the case or legal 
presentations of the facts and the law, this was a particularly stunning development. 
The March 1996 trial presided over by Judge Cooper, regarding Merian Frederick and 
Dr. Ali Khalili, was tried under the 1993 statute banning assisted suicide. The 
April/May1996 trial presided over by Judge Breck regarding Sherry Miller and 
Marjorie Wantz was charged and tried under a theory of common law, pre-dating the 
first statutory assisted suicide ban. Both resulted in acquittal. Each of the 1996 juries 
held press conferences in the courthouse after they rendered their verdict (in contrast 
to the 1999 jury that convicted Kevorkian and exited the courthouse forthwith).
Nearly a decade later in May 2007,1 reviewed a tape I had made of one of these, on 
May 14, 1996 (after a not guilty verdict in Judge Breck’s courtroom), as well as an in- 
depth interview I conducted with deliberating juror Cameron Beedle on May 19,
1996.
If the jurors in the Kevorkian 1997 mistrial felt disappointment at not hearing 
the evidence and not going to a verdict, the Pontiac (Oakland County) trial presided 
over by Judge Breck was a five week period described by a male juror during the 
press conference as “five weeks -  we have been hostage since April 1” (Breck Jury
138 Laurie Asseo, of the Associated Press, wrote, “some believe it happened when Michigan juries 
repeatedly acquitted Dr. Kevorkian of assisted suicide charges. Laurie Asseo, “Free Speech or Jury 
Tampering? Group Telling Jurors The Can Nullify the Law Fights Courthouse Ban,” July 22, 1996, 
The Daily Record, July 22, 1996, p. 13. While Kalven and Zeisel (1966) found in a pioneering study 
of the American jury system that juries acquitted in cases that judges would have convicted occurred 
in 19 % of cases, and of those 21% of acquittals were attributable to jury nullification (a statistic that 
Kevorkian easily surpassed), my information from judges came just short of commenting on 
nullification. Judges preferred to instead to comment in ways such as that of Judge Breck to the effect 
that had the jury convicted Kevorkian, “it would have been tough to fashion a sentence. I’d give a 
year of probation ... no penalty whatsoever.”(Breck Interview: May 15, 1996). In other words, even 
though Judge Breck knew that Kevorkian had repeatedly been tried, and had, in fact assisted in a 
suicide during Judge Breck’s trial (which Judge Breck, in our interview, interpreted as Kevorkian 
showing “his disdain for courts,” so as to make probation sentence that he might not comply with the 
conditions of,” he expressed himself politically, rather than legally. In addition to this, 
notwithstanding the jury conviction of Kevorkian in 1999, the bail hearing made clear that Judge 
Cooper was not originally going to sentence him to jail, a sentence she imposed only after Kevorkian 
told the Probation Department in his pre-sentencing statement that the courts could not stop him as 
long as he was out of prison.
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Conference: May 14, 1999). During those weeks, the jurors felt “a lot of stress” 
(Cameron Beedle, Breck Jury Conference: May 14, 1996. Furthermore, one male 
juror, during the second part of the press conference (which was moved from a press 
room to a hallway), told that watching the interviews of the decedents was “gut 
wrenching,” adding to an already high stress level in which he “would go home, be in 
tears, was emotionally strung out, and would just lie on the couch and recover.”
(Breck Jury Press Conference: May 14, 1996). Cameron Beedle, commented in 
interview that during deliberations, “we were burnt out, and talked about Yatzee game 
and Monopoly game, that kept us going” (Beedle Interview: May 19, 1996). The 
stress level in these multi-week Kevorkian cases seemed to be almost universal 
(except, perhaps, for Kevorkian himself, as noted above), and Judge Cooper candidly 
commented in our interview “it was deeply stressful [for her, as a judge, and that she 
was] constantly in [her] office researching on the weekend” (Cooper Interview: May 
17, 1996).
During the 1996 Beedle interview, a matter came up that did not, until review 
of the 1999 voir dire minutes, register with me completely. Cameron Beedle’s “father 
was epileptic, tried to commit suicide a number of times [but] they [Judge Breck, 
prosecutor Larry Bunting and defence attorney Fieger] didn’t ask me [about suicidal 
matters injury selection], [although] they did ask about her brother who had died of 
muscular dystrophy, with the prosecutor Larry Bunting asking one or two questions 
and Fieger asking a lot of questions” (Beedle Interview: May 19, 1996). This 
comment highlights another difference between the mid-1990’s jury selection and that 
of the 1999 jury, to which I alluded earlier. Lawyers vigorously participated in 
questioning jurors in voir dire during the mid-1990s. In the final Kevorkian trial in 
1999, Judge Cooper solely conducted voir dire question and answer, and then offered
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the prosecutor and Kevorkian an opportunity to challenge for cause of peremptorily 
challenge potential jurors.
My review of the Breck jury press conference was intended to focus upon how 
the jury decided the case. Overwhelmingly, the jurors indicated that their decision to 
acquit was because the 1994 case of Hobbins/Kevorkian seemed to retroactively 
criminalize Kevorkian’s 1991 assisted deaths of the two non-terminally ill women, 
Marjorie Wantz (who had chronic pelvic pain) and Sherry Miller (who had multiple 
sclerosis). However, when I listened to the press conference again during 2007, one 
voice in questions was overwhelmingly present. That voice belonged to Ruth 
Holmes, who had volunteered her services as a Kevorkian jury consultant throughout 
the decade. In later years Holmes, along with her daughter, was among the five 
people escorting Kevorkian from prison on June 1, 2007 when he was paroled (ABC 
Eyewitness News, viewed June 1, 2007). I did not realize this at the time of the 
original press conference, because I did not yet recognise her voice (or the voices of a 
number of participants in the cases). However, hearing her pepper the jury with 
questions about how they came to their conclusions pointed to later voir dire focal 
points (which she did not disclose to me), which is something I wish I had had an 
additional opportunity to probe.
Facts that the members of the jury did divulge after Judge Breck’s Kevorkian 
trial included that their deliberations were for a total of 12.5 hours (which seems 
short for a five week trial), and that there were three votes, according to juror 
“Vince.” The first and immediate vote was 7 Not Guilty, 4 Guilty, 1 Undecided. The 
second vote was 9 Not Guilty, 2 Guilty and 1 Undecided. The final unanimous 
verdict was Not Guilty (Breck Jury Press Conference: May 14, 1996). The jurors 
pointedly, repeatedly and variously stated that what had swayed their opinion. First
209
was the lack of a definition of the “common law” regarding euthanasia and assisted 
suicide. Second, the cases for which Kevorkian was being tried happened in 1991, 
with the Supreme Court (of Michigan) issuing a definition for criminal conduct of 
assisted suicide in 1994; the jury was clearly offended by what it viewed as an ex 
post facto  law that had no explanatory back-story. One juror, “Jennifer,” enumerated 
it simply as “1. the prosecutor didn’t make an attempt to explain the common law and 
2. how should a decision in 1994 affect Dr. Kevorkian in 1991?” (Breck Jury Press 
Conference: May 14, 1996).
Thus, the jury did not seem to accept that while they were the judges of the 
facts, the judge was required to provide instructions regarding the law, but not 
required to provide a “written law” that was in effect when the Wantz/Miller assisted 
suicides took place in 1991. What the jurors apparently wanted was black letter law, 
literally in the printed form in front of them. The law was not provided because the 
case was tried under a theory of common law of homicide (as upheld and required by 
the combined cases of People v. Kevorkian/Hobbins v. State, 447 MichApp. 436,482- 
495 (1994). That case reversed and remanded an earlier dismissal by Judge Breck for 
Kevorkian to be tried), as predating the first statutory ban on assisted suicide in 
Michigan. The statutory ban was passed in 1993, and the jury perceived the case as 
an assisted suicide “common law” passed in 1993 reaching back to 1991. Indeed, it 
also seemed that the jury imposed a burden on the prosecution to provide and explain 
the law, while it would have been reversible prosecutorial and fair trial error tot usurp 
the judge’s province, had the prosecutor so done. Because, as the jurors stated in their 
press conference, “of course” they knew about Dr. Kevorkian before his trial, and it 
would appear that the jury, in effect, deputized him as an expert witness, as well as a 
defendant. Since the jury felt Kevorkian did actually make an affirmative showing
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during his testimony in the second 1996 case, they acquitted him (Breck Jury Press 
Conference: May 14, 1996). This stood in stark contrast to the 1999 Kevorkian trial, 
where he acted as his own counsel, opened and closed the case, but did not testify.
The other factor, while not identified by the jury until the end of their press 
conference, was that what really touched them and had an impact upon their decision 
making process was the testimony of the families of the decedents who had been 
served by Dr. Kevorkian -  Sherry Miller’s mother and her best friend, and Marjorie 
Wantz’ husband. This, along with the videotapes of the women, the jurors found 
compelling. Indeed, they were so compelling that during deliberations, one male 
juror “Vince” asked Cameron Beedle to “please turn around those pictures of those 
dead women” (Beedle Interview: May 19, 1996).
Thus, for the acquitting jury in the second Kevorkian trial in 1996,, the factors 
that were most prominent were first, a lack of clarity on a non-statutory “common” 
law. Second was the appearance of a judicial or prosecutorial vendetta by 
criminalization of the conduct after the fact. Third was the impact of the families and 
friends of the women who had died, despite their non-terminal illnesses. However, 
this acquittal occurred less than two months after the acquittal in the Frederick/Khalili 
assisted suicides (by carbon monoxide inhalation) that took place in 1993, when the 
temporary statutory ban (now permanent) was in place. Thus, the prosecutor’s office 
was faced with two separate jury verdicts acquitting Kevorkian. First was the 
acquittal of statutory assisted suicide (Judge Copper’s 1996 Kevorkian trial, regarding 
two statutory 1993 cases under the first assisted suicide ban, based on a successful 
defence theory of double effect of alleviating suffering by use of the carbon monoxide 
inhalation. Second was the acquittal under a theory of common law murder (Judge 
Breck’s Kevorkian trial, regarding two 1991 cases common law murder cases that
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occurred and were first prosecuted prior to the statutory scheme. These seemed to 
have been lessons learned by the prosecutor’s offices by 1999. This argument is 
supported by the fact that Kevorkian was charged with both the assisted suicide and 
euthanasia murder of Tom Youk only after a new law permanently banning assisted 
suicide was passed, and the vigorous and successful opposition to Kevorkian being 
allowed to call Tom Youk’s wife Melody and brother Terry to testify to Yom Youk’s 
pain and suffering.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown how the jury was a select -  and selected -  
audience in the theatre that staged the Kevorkian trials of the 1990s, demonstrating 
how a criminal trial may effectively be won or lost in the United States by the time 
the jury is selected and swom. However, the audiences of these plays became 
characters in the theatre of the legal arena and the political forces in the assisted 
suicide and euthanasia debate in the 1990s. Individual members of the juries 
variously ignored the media, embraced the media, and shunned the media over time 
and at different times. Viewed from the relative distance of a decade later, perhaps it 
was no surprise that the juries in the debate-focused “issues trials” of statutory 
assisted suicide (March 1996) and common law murder (April-May 1996) held press 
conferences and gave statements to the media. These were politicised trials that tried 
the issue (of assisted death), rather than the man (Dr. Death). Recollected from nearly 
the same distance in time and space, perhaps the surprise in the 1999 “elements” and 
“just the facts” trial (convicting) jury was that its members and body specifically did 
not want to hold interviews or press conferences. This seemed nearly unthinkable at 
the time of the trial that the members of the jury would speak only by their verdict of
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guilty as to both euthanasia murder and drug delivery charges. Both of these are 
consistent with Pakes (2004. p.l 15), who said, “juries normally do not explain their 
decision.”
In this chapter, I have had an opportunity to analyse the voir dire minutes of 
the Kevorkian 1999 convicting jury. While the last chapter examined how elites came 
to the Kevorkian proceedings, the voir dire minutes offered an opportunity to glean 
how ordinary people were drawn in and went from being actors to being a factor in 
the case via lay participation. In that jury selection exercise, jurors who were 
previously not involved in the cases were initiated and educated by a ritualistic 
process. Some jurors in the trial passed through this process successfully, others 
either did not do so or chose not to do so. A number of social attributes (such as 
medical education, knowledge and exposure; personal and family illnesses involving 
end-of-life care; and strength of opinion or belief) contributing to the jury 
arrangements were examined fully. Others, such as the impact religion actually had 
upon subsequent deliberation of selected jurors in the 1999 trial, could not be so 
completely analysed, due to methodological limitations imposed by a lack of jury 
selection transcript of a jury deliberation information. In any event, studying the voir 
dire was a rare opportunity to take a pure construction of law, and assess it in 
actuality, rather than simply hypothesize it in the potential application and vacuum of 
a mock trial or jury consultation, assess it in actuality
Unlike earlier Kevorkian cases, where the lawyers and judge all issued 
questions to potential jurors, solely the judge conducted question and answer during 
the 1999 voir dire. The jury’s verdict of conviction spoke for the jury, whose 
members declined to do so, in what is a methodological limitation on direct evidence 
of deliberation. The potential jurors in the mid-1990s were more actively interrogated
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by judge and lawyers, which created a participatory atmosphere in the eyes of some 
jurors. This was enhanced in the second 1996 trial in which jurors were permitted to 
take notes and issue questions of witnesses, so that the jurors were closer to actors on 
stage. Jurors who were previously not legal activists found themselves politicising 
their jury. One example of this politicalization was developed during the Breck jury 
conference in which jurors cited the after-the-fact criminalization and trial of 
Kevorkian’s 1991 conduct as a significant factor in their decision to acquit.
I conclude that the mid-1990s Kevorkian prosecutions resulted injury 
nullification. This conclusion may be supported by the first 1996 verdict of acquittal, 
which was in accord with a defence that inhalation of carbon monoxide was actually 
done with the intention of alleviating pain and suffering, although causing death. I 
also draw the conclusion that the jury in the second trial in 1996 nullified, based upon 
its objection to the Michigan legislature’s responses to prior conduct. Thus the 
verdict of not guilty reflected a decision to set aside murky and arguably retroactive 
law, rather than the facts of the case.
In addition, the fieldwork supports a finding that the 1997 jury in Ionia was 
viewed with such trepidation by the defence ideologically that the lawyer had to 
devise an elaborate opening statement strategy to provoke a mistrial. Jurors and juries 
showed a commitment to the rigors of hearing and deliberating, and the citizenry of 
the Ionia jury took offence to the fact of a mistrial more than they might have to the 
facts of the case.
Ultimately, having access to various aspects of jury selection, jury dynamics 
and jury deliberation allowed for development of new facts about this thesis project 
and dissertation, employing a unique comparative approach spanning different trials 
of the same defendant, over different years. This important feature advanced the
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study of the Kevorkian trials, and of criminal trial juries and their members -  ordinary 
people drawn into an extraordinary piece of theatre -  and who became like a family.
If the jurors became a family (as they indicated in their press conferences) and 
the jury became a factor, the next step of consideration is how the family member 
witnesses were actors and factors in the Kevorkian cases and the politics of medically 
hastened death in Michigan. In the next chapter, I shall consider how this other 
section of ordinary people -  family members -  became legally, politically and 
ideologically active in the course of, and as a result of, the Kevorkian cases.
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Chapter Five: Families of the Kevorkian Trial Cases
Introduction
In the last chapter, I examined how “ordinary people” were chosen for the 
Kevorkian (1999) jury. I also compared the juries and their members from the 
perspective of individuals with nothing initially or obviously in common other than 
their jury summons dates in Kevorkian 1994, 1996, 1997 and 1999. I also examined 
the roles and perspectives of “ordinary people” who were chosen as jurors in various 
Kevorkian trials, by examining how and why potential jurors got excluded. In this 
chapter, I shall examine the roles of the family members of the decedents for whose 
deaths Kevorkian was on trial. These were in the Kevorkian first 1996 assisted 
suicide acquittal and the second 1996 open murder acquittal. I shall compare these to 
the roles of the Youk family in the Kevorkian 1999 euthanasia murder conviction and 
sentence. Further,I shall give several families’ perspectives on the consensual, if not 
legal, hastening of death of several competent and terminally ill patients.
Families (or lack thereof) affect a person’s interactions when they become 
actors in the social world of the criminal justice system, particularly families of the 
victim (Rock 2004, Doak,2008, Rock forthcoming 2009) and, albeit differently, the 
families of the defendant (Condry 2007). This is a universal regardless of whether 
the family members are drawn from the ordinary citizenry or from the elites of 
society.
Families of the decedents (whether due to euthanasia, assisted suicide, 
homicide, or manslaughter) do not generally “enjoy” (or possess or share) the same 
privileged status as jurors, however. Generally, I am using the legal wording 
“decedent” here (alternating occasionally with the word “client”), rather than the
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politically charged “victim” or “patient” to avoid siding with prosecution or defence 
or taking a certain (any certain) political stand. In this regard, I hold to the neutrality 
of legal language (albeit of probate, rather than of criminal, law. My use of the word 
“decedent” is intended to be read with neither positive nor negative connotation of the 
decedent, or imputing a pejorative nature to the relationship between the decedent and 
Kevorkian. Additionally, I am using “decedent,” as a reference to person or noun, 
whereas “deceased” might be used as either a noun or a verb; this perhaps reflects a 
political nature insofar as the Youk euthanasia goes, in which Youk was acted upon 
by Kevorkian as the actor (unlike assisted suicides, in which the decedent is 
presumably the final actor, rather than a doctor).
Paul Rock observed in his 1998 book, After Homicide: Practical and Political 
Responses to Bereavement,
[i]n law, it should be remembered, there are defendants, witnesses and, until 
conviction, alleged victims, but there are no secondary victims, indirect 
victims or survivors: those are roles which are still contested [at the end of the 
20th century, contemporaneously with the Kevorkian prosecutions and 
conviction] on the outer fringes of the criminal justice system. Secondary 
victims of homicide are not a legal entity, they have no rights of audience, and 
disputes about their legitimacy [were] made a part of [the After Homicide] 
book (Rock 1998, p. 26).
The focus of this chapter is upon the secondary victims (family and close 
friends), who I shall argue were also subject to secondary victimisation (or 
revictimisation) during the criminal trials. I note that subsequent to the Kevorkian 
cases, a federal Crime Victims Act was passed in April 2004, to “guarantee” crime 
victims of federal (i.e., not state, such as the Kevorkian matters were) crimes 
substantial rights to observe and participate in portions of the trials of those accused 
of victimizing them. However, these victims’ “rights” did not come with a guarantee 
to testify at trial (a central issue in the 1999 Kevorkian (case, regarding the Youk
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family efforts to be permitted to testify fo r  the defendant). (See, for example, David 
Fontana, “The New Crime Victims’ Rights Act: Empowering Victims without 
Harming Defendants’ Rights, findlaw.com, Thursday, May 20, 2004).
The federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 (a)(3) and 
(a)(4), provides for the “right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the 
district court involving release, pleas, sentencing or any parole proceeding,” but does 
not specify trial participation. Applying the principle of “expressio unis, exclusio 
alturis” or that which is not expressly included is otherwise excluded; trial testimony 
was not within the ambit of any such victim or victim “survivor’s” rights. I note that 
legislative intent of the 2004 federal enactment was to allow families of crime victims 
to have a voice and to confer with prosecutors, rather than to address the situations 
considered by this dissertation. In the Kevorkian, family members and friends 
commented in trial testimony (and the Youks in sentencing statements) that their 
decedents and they, themselves, were not victims. Further, they repeatedly stated that 
their sympathies were overwhelmingly aligned with defence, not prosecution -  hardly 
the scenario envisaged by legislators.
In this chapter, I shall train the lens upon the family surviving the Kevorkian 
decedents. My focus in Part I is on the Youk family, and Part II is focused upon 
interviews of surviving family members in the mid-1990s trials, an organizational 
structure similar to the Chapter 4. This is because Mike Wallace’s interview of Tom 
Youk’s family was included in the 60 Minutes ’’Death by Doctor” segment in the 
November 1998 broadcast, with the family as Kevorkian supporters, but excised from 
the prosecutor’s cuts of the video presented at trial; likewise, the prosecutor 
successfully moved to exclude from evidence any potential testimony by the Youk 
family, who then later spoke on behalf of Kevorkian at his April 13, 1999 sentencing.
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Tom Youk’s wife, Melody, Youk and his brother, Terry, were present and prepared to 
testify on behalf of defendant Kevorkian at trial as to Youk’s pain and suffering, but 
were prohibited from doing so during the Kevorkian (1999) trial by Judge Cooper; 
this evidentiary exclusion was upheld on appeal in People v. Kevorkian, 248 
MichApp. 373,439-443 (2001). As with the preceding chapter, I had the opportunity 
to engage in in-depth interviews. Family members of two of Kevorkian’s assisted 
death clients -  the daughter of Merian Frederick (Carol Poenisch), and the parents of 
Sherry Miller -  from the first 1996 trial for statutory assisted suicide, and second 
1996 trial for open common law murder trials, respectively granted me interviews in 
1996. Because the Youk family declined to be interviewed immediately after the 
Kevorkian 1999 conviction, I am relying on the CBS broadcast of the original 60 
Minutes programme and the sentencing minutes.139
During my fieldwork, my focus was upon legal elements of cases, substantive 
law, procedural law and application by (and to) the parties. Since the family and the 
bereaved of the decedents are not parties to the case, my original focus was not on 
families as a factor. Civilian friends and some family members were viewed as 
witnesses in court, to be compelled and controlled by the lawyers, and ultimately, the 
judges. This bias almost certainly derived from the fact that I was a criminal lawyer 
by origin, and I inadvertently took as fundamental the very premise that Rock (1998:
139 This is not to say that the Youks never spoke of the matter of Tom Youk’s death ever again, and in 
fact wife Melody and I had breakfast in the Pancake House outside Detroit within two weeks after the 
verdict and we also went to the movies in New York that same summer. However, she made a request 
not to make additional statements for the record, which I am herewith honoring. Reasons for this 
request may have included the potential implications of a reversal on appeal, in which case the Youk 
family may have been able to testify on retrial; alternatively, the Youks may have decided to rest on 
their prior statements. While this at first blush is a methodological limitation, I note that the Youk 
family did not give additional statements to CBS and to Mike Wallace for 60 Minutes for the June 3, 
2007 broadcast 48 hours after Kevorkian was released on parole -  this said, and in what I considered to 
be rather misleading, in the June 3, 2007 broadcast of updated versions of what Wallace called “My 
Favorite Stories,” the Youk family statements -  from 1998 -  were included, without contextualization 
that the statements were from nearly a decade earlier, and a pre-trial, rather than post-parole, 
commentary.
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26) quite rightly was critical of (and which was echoed by wife Melody Youk and
brother Terry Youk in their statements to the sentencing court on April 13, 1999).
Rock articulated it thusly:
In law, is should be remembered, there are defendants, witnesses and, until 
conviction, alleged victims, but there are no secondary victims, indirect 
victims, or survivors: those are roles which are being contested on the outer 
fringes of the criminal justice system. Secondary victims of homicide are not 
a legal entity, they have no rights of audience and disputes about their 
legitimacy are part of the theme of this book [entitled, After Homicide: 
Practical and Political Responses to Bereavement] (Rock 1998. p.26).
Since this rich area regarding the families in the Kevorkian trials emerged in
data analysis and in seeking new mechanisms by which to examine the trials in a
social and legal context, the emerging information was a find in both senses of the
word. Nearly a decade later, I had the methodological limitation of working from
information and interviews previously developed and of not being able to go back and
gather further material. This invites further research in the future, and an opportunity
to develop a new vein.
This was a sense of spirit d'lescalier for me. If in the last chapter, I attempted
to be a wordsmith by saying that what I saw or heard in court or in the literal halls of
justice or even in the course of an interview had me climbing up the stairs on the spot,
in this chapter, I continuously experienced the desire to turn back to the stairway and
ask questions that had previously not revealed themselves to me. I now offer a few
such examples. First, had their feelings about Kevorkian changed as a result of their
(or subsequent) trials and, is so, how? Second, how do they now feel, 10 years later,
about assisted suicide, and separately, about medical euthanasia? Third, would they
describe themselves as pro-choice, pro-life, and had this view changed?
Fourth, although I did have an opportunity to interview Rev. Ken Phifer
(Merian Frederick’s minister), I generally made it a point not to ask about religion,
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because I wanted family members to feel comfortable in interviews. I now wish that I 
could ask about religious affiliation and participation, because one of the conclusions 
I drew ultimately was that those who sought and received assisted suicide (and I 
extend this to Tom Youk’s euthanasia) were not typical of the profile of Durkheim’s 
suicidants (Durkheim 1951). Although I shall spend much of this chapter aging this, 
at this time I do want to say that on the whole, the profile of those who were 
decedents in the Kevorkian trials were in strong family settings and had social roots in 
the community. One reflection I wish to make is that I considered it somehow 
politically incorrect or rude to ask about religion, as being deeply personal (like 
money or wealth), yet so many people involved in the Kevorkian cases in so many 
ways had become habituated to openly discussing illness and death. As I reflect back, 
this was a finding of itself, that within the culture of the courtroom and of the 
lunchroom (as well as information volunteered in interviews of a nature that I would 
not have dared to ask) everyone had a story. People wanted to talk, they needed to 
talk (Merian Frederick’s daughter and minister went on the lecture circuit). They 
became enraged when they could not talk (like the Youks) or were curtailed in 
testimony (like the mid-1990s cases). This became widespread, as can be seen by 
Judge Breck’s comments in Chapter 3 and juror Cameron Beedle’s comments in 
Chapter 4, and as shall be seen in this chapter and Chapter 6. And so, while people 
spoke of intimate issues of death and dying, I now regret not inquiring further about 
religion, which pales in personal nature to what people freely, indeed eagerly 
discussed.
Fifth, while I was focused upon how interviewees perceived the criminal 
justice system and the Kevorkian cases, I think an additional area of inquiry would 
have been further inquiry regarding the medical profession. I shall raise this further
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with regard to Rev. Phifer seeking assistance from other doctors, prior to Kevorkian.
I shall also touch upon this with regard to the Youks, but I note that after the 
Kevorkian trial, Terry Youk took training in hospice. This begs the question of how 
family members may have changed their opinions of doctors, nurses and health care 
(in this last regard, the Youks spoke compellingly at the 1999 Kevorkian sentencing).
I have chosen to refer to the family members by their first names in this 
chapter. This is for two reasons. The first of these is to look at the so-called “other” 
instead as another human being, a neighbour, a friend, the person who might work 
next to you, or live down the road. In other words, I sought to destigmatise the 
“other” in contrast to the families of offenders, studied and interviewed by Condry 
(2007, p. 92, citing Goffman 1963, p. 164). I wanted to put a human face on the 
universal themes of these people whose private family experiences were placed in a 
public world of court. This might be juxtaposed with the family members who 
survived (factually non-consensual) homicide considered by Rock (1998, p.278-279) 
who felt that:
Only those who had passed through the same experience could have 
any conception of the devastation inflicted by homicide, and they became 
experts faute de mieux, the only ones who ‘know what murder is really like’ 
(footnote omitted).
Second, I also noted that in the course of multi-week trials and proceedings, 
the courtroom gallery became a small town and a social world unto itself, where 
everyone became a neighbour and first names were (or quickly and naturally evolved 
into) the custom among people with different purposes for being in court. In a sense, 
it was the mirror image to the formal proceedings on the other side of the rail, where 
the actual trial was unfolding before the jury. Even with formal taped interviews 
(which invariably took place after the trials) with formal consent colloquies consistent 
with Institutional Review Board procedures, first names were used (or invited by
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interviewees) in interviews more likely to take place in interviewees’ homes or a 
nearby restaurant as would be a formal office or coffee/meal meeting for elites who 
gave interviews. A reasonable conclusion might be that these relaxed settings eased 
conversation, or at the very least a free flow of information in an unfettered way with 
regard to experiences and decisions.
People have free will to make their own decisions, but I also acknowledge that 
there are forces that shape their options in making those decisions. This is consistent 
with Karl Marx’s 1853 “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” Marx argued, 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past” (www.marxists.org/archive/maxwork/1852/18th- 
braumair ch.Ol). This Cook’s tour may show that families and their members may be 
subject to recipe knowledge within the courthouse, but the actors may themselves 
change the recipe on the way to, and after departing from, the halls of justice. I shall 
argue that for them, the experience was inconsistent with the Thomas theorem that if 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences. In large measure, 
members of what I sometimes call “the Kevorkian families,” felt that their situations 
were being redefined by the criminal justice system, in ways and with consequences 
that they eschewed, as I shall amplify. The manner in which the family members 
viewed events was an example of the ability of people to consider and distance 
themselves from what might be regarded as constraints, a reflexivity that could be 
applied to the social world of the judicial system or of the medical system.
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Part I  Social and Legal Representations o f the Family in a Euthanasia Trial and 
Sentencing Proceeding in People v. Kevorkian 1999
In the previous chapter, I commented at length on the unique opportunity to 
analyse a certified court transcript that included jury selection. For this chapter, I also 
had a transcribed court proceeding of ordinary people (as opposed to elites) who 
became involved in the Kevorkian trial and conviction. In particular was the 
transcript of the sentencing statements by the bereaved relatives of the decedent of the 
Kevorkian 1999 euthanasia murder case (i.e., Tom Youk’s widow and brother). 
Labelling those on the receiving end of Kevorkian administered-euthanasia or assisted 
suicide has presented me with the ongoing question of whether they were patients 
(medical/defence), clients (business/civil), decedents (clinical) or victims 
(prosecutorial). Each possible role comes with different implications -  a client may 
be a consumer, a victim may be a subjugated other, a decedent may be a distant 
abstraction, and a patient may be a combination of these (or not). This sense of 
dissonance was also present when I considered describing the bereaved families and 
friends of Kevorkian decedents (in both mid-1990s cases of acquittal and the 1999 
conviction), who had shifting roles, as I shall discuss in this chapter.
Judge Cooper granted a motion by the prosecutor, that summarily deprived 
members of the Youk family of the opportunity to testify in Kevorkian’s defence at 
trial. Thus, the Youk family perspective was not a factor injury deliberations. A 
synopsis of this unusual exclusion of the “victim’s” family as willing defence 
witnesses may be found in People v. Kevorkian, 248 Mich. App. 373,438-443 (2001). 
Excluded by judicial fiat from offering testimony of pain and suffering, as well as 
competency to consent (a technically mitigating factor used by Kevorkian juries to 
nullify), the Youks were thus totally shunted aside at the trial. However, statements
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by Youk’s widow and brother were compelling at Kevorkian’s sentencing, iconic in 
this historical case.
These survivors were bereaved in the dictionary sense of the word bereft,140 
but did not necessarily appear to be acutely or chronically bereaved in the senses of 
the family and friends of homicide victims described by Rock (1998, p. 27-30). 
Warranted is a brief disclaimer that I ultimately found myself talking about the 
“Kevorkian Families” to avoid assigning a label to family members and friends who 
may have presented themselves to court and in interviews differently than “bereft” or 
“victims.” I found myself in the company of Rock (1998, p.x), in this regard, insofar 
as bereaved and their self-descriptions and labels as to social identity went. By this, I 
do not in any way seek to diminish the profound losses of the Kevorkian families. 
Instead, I am seeking to be consistent with how family members and friends defined 
and identified themselves in court and in interviews.
The Youks at the 1999 sentencing and June Miller in our 1996 in-depth 
interview took particular offence to either themselves or their Kevorkian decedent as 
being described by the criminal justice system as victims, as quotes in Part I (Youks) 
and Part II (Millers) will show. This was but one paradox distinguishing the 
Kevorkian Families from some of those studied by Rock (1998, p.279) who 
considered themselves “survivors who had endured and victims who were oppressed.” 
To use the term “survivors” would imply that would-be assisted suicide Kevorkian 
patients or clients either changed their mind or did not achieve the death they sought, 
although “survivor” is also sometimes taken to refer to the bereaved and the 
Kevorkian Families support group chose to call itself “Survivors.” I have sought and
140 The definition of “bereft” contained in The American Heritage College dic-tion-ary (sic) 4th ed. is 
“deprived of something” or “lacking something needed or expected,” with a second definition of 
“suffering the death of one bereaved,” which in turn is defined as “to leave desolate or alone, esp. by 
death” (2002/2004, p.133).
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adopted words to be consistent with the narratives and statements of the original 
family members I interviewed.
The Youk family had no opportunity to testify during the trial, and since they 
were judicially banned by Judge Cooper from being called as witnesses by the 
defence (Kevorkian 1999 trial and sentencing: Pappas observations of court and 
sentencing proceedings). This was a departure from the prior 1990s cases, in which 
family members were called as witnesses in unsuccessful prosecutions. The mid- 
1990s Kevorkian cases that resulted in acquittal or mistrial were sealed after trial. 
Accordingly, transcripts were not available to me. Since the Youk family members 
were not allowed to testify at trial in 1999, they were thus excised from participating 
in the murder trial.141 Prosecutor John Skrzynski underscored this by arguing that,
“[tjhis court (i.e., Judge Cooper) ruled that the evidence of [Tom 
Youk’s] pain and suffering, Tom Youk’s medical condition, his activities of 
daily living and his quality of life were not relevant to the murder count. The 
court did say they were relevant to the assisted suicide count. So we came to 
the Court on Friday and we dismissed the assisted suicide count” (Hearing, 
Tuesday, March 16,1999: 6).
Judge Cooper finally permitted wife Melody and brother Terry to make 
statements at the April 13, 1999 sentencing. The Youks did not give the usual, and 
ordinarily prosecutorial victim impact statement (Doak 2009, pp. 150-152; Rock 
2004, pp. 173-194), but rather argued in favour of mitigating any sentencing that 
would deprive Kevorkian of complete liberty. These statements had the “hallmarks of 
credibility”142 traditionally associated with witness testimony in terms of demeanour
141 An explanation in this regard was provided by Pam Bellock, in an article in The New York Times on 
March 27, 1999 in “Dr. Kevorkian Is a Murderer, The Jury Finds,” retrieved from nytimes.com on July 
30, 2007. Although the Oakland County prosecutor originally charged both murder and assisted 
suicide, the prosecutor’s office dropped the assisted suicide charges specifically in order to prevent 
Melody and Terry Youk from testifying about pain and suffering. Trial prosecutor John Skrzynski 
identified keeping the Youks from testifying as the pivotal factor in so doing, after Judge Cooper ruled 
that evidence of pain and suffering could be introduced by the defense regarding the assisted suicide, 
but not euthanasia murder, charges.
142 Hallmarks o f credibility is a commonly used phrase in hearing and trial practice in the United 
States, referring to a way of saying that within testimony, there are many signs of truthfulness and
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and consistency, and ultimately, veracity. Although the Youks considered their 
sentencing statements to be testimony (as was noted in one of Terry’s comments), 
because the Youks were not required to take an oath or swear or affirm prior to their 
statements, I am pointedly not calling it testimony. However, this is a technical 
parsing of legal terms as compared to the social experience of the Youks at the 
sentencing proceeding. Indeed, I would argue that a fair reading of the transcribed 
minutes suggests that it would be reasonable to conclude that the Youks in fact 
believed that their statements were testimony to the court. Melody and Terry Youk 
may well have believed that it was relevant to the truth-finding work of the court, 
whereas courts in the Anglo-American tradition are as occupied by procedural 
fairness as substantive truth-finding.
As with Chapter 4 ,1 had the opportunity to work from a court transcript.
These were the sentencing minutes dated April 13, 1999, the day that Kevorkian was 
sentenced in the concluding portion of the conviction relating to the Youk euthanasia 
murder and related drug delivery charges. My attendance at the sentencing offered a 
supplement to the “cold bare record” of transcript.143 For a reader who is not from the 
United States or who is not familiar with criminal trials and sentencing processes, 
something that may be taken as a given by an American criminal lawyer should be
reliability, pointing to a witnesses’ veracity or lack thereof. State v. Pedro S., 87 ConnApp. 183 
(Conn. App. 2005).
143 This is evocative of the case of People v. Norton, 164 A.D. 2d  563 (1st Dept. 1990), in which Justice 
John Carro, writing for the majority, opined, “It is said that a reviewing court, facing a cold, bare record 
cannot see, hear or have a real feel for the witness, but can only read the words typed on the pages of the 
record. However, this reviewing court was not without benefit of examining the demeanor of the victim 
Roldos. We have listened to his tape recorded recantation, and find Roldos to have sounded calm, and fairly 
articulate, not fearful or confused” (emphasis in original). As a matter of disclosure, I was the judicial clerk 
for Justice Carro at that time, and this portion of the writing was inspired by earlier years of appellate 
advocacy and transcription analysis. Subsequent to the fieldwork considered in this thesis, but in a related 
matter to be discussed in the Chapter 6 ,1 engaged in a Faculty Innovation Grant, which was entitled, “Uses 
of Demeanor as a Socio-Legal Research Tool and Instructional Device,” funded by the Teaching and 
Learning Technology Center at Seton Hall during Spring 2006, in which both the Kevorkian 60 Minutes 
(Youk) tape and the Norton case were considered in the course of a grant study on demeanour and 
juxtaposed for different aspects of tapes, videos, trial/hearing transcripts and appellate decisions/opinions, 
with a focus upon credibility and demeanour of witnesses, defendants, attorneys and judiciary.
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spelled out. The Kevorkian sentencing proceeding took place approximately two and 
one-half weeks after the original trial to a guilty verdict rendered March 26, 1999. I 
further note that March 26,1999 was a Friday, and that the jury came back at nearly 
5PM (i.e., at the literal end of the week). In American criminal law, it is commonplace 
for a break between trial and sentencing for the probation service to gather 
information from which to prepare a pre-sentencing recommendation for the court, 
and that occurred in this case (although pre-sentence reports are not generally 
considered as part of, or released along with, the transcribed sentencing minutes).144
The time between the jury’s verdict of guilty and the sentencing proceeding 
was a time which was put to use by the legal team Kevorkian allowed to represent 
him after the summations of the 1999 trial. Tom Youk’s wife, Melody, and his 
younger brother, Terry, made detailed and eloquent statements at the sentencing 
(Sentencing Minutes April 13, 1999: 8-17, and 17-27, respectively).
It is crucial to note that, in two ways, these oral remarks were not viewed as 
victim impact statements (cf. Doak 2009, Rock 2004). First, victim impact statements 
made to the probation department are generally reduced to a written synopsis 
available only to the court (with the parties permitted to view at sentencing). Second, 
the Youks were offering testimonials in favour of Kevorkian, rather than issuing 
statements in which they perceived themselves to be victims of criminal conduct by
144 Ashworth (2005, pp.348-349) offered a somewhat different comment as to English pre-sentence 
procedures, “[i]n some cases a court may adjourn the case before sentence to allow for the preparation 
of a pre-sentence report, for example where the defendant had pleaded guilty and no pre-sentence 
report had been prepared. The principle is that, if  the court adjourns the case specifically in order to 
have the offender’s suitability for a certain sentence assessed, and the report confirms suitability, it is 
wrong for the court to impose a custodial sentence.... The principle applies wherever a sentencer’s 
remarks present a reasonable expectation of a non-custodial sentence, even if  only over a lunchtime 
adjournment. If the court appears to go back on what it has stated, the ensuing case of injustice will 
lead to the quashing of the subsequent custodial sentence.” One must wonder (rhetorically) whether 
Judge Cooper’s comments during the March 26,1999 bail proceeding would invoke the specter 
Ashworth describes; however, Kevorkian’s intervening comments to the Probation Department, which 
Judge Cooper focused upon at the sentencing, would appear to support the departure from likely non­
custodial sentence to that of 10-25 years.
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Kevorkian. While the Youks’ oral statements may perhaps have been prepared, or at 
least outlined, in advance,145 the demeanour of the Youks during the sentencing 
proceeding was respectfully conversational in their narrative to the court, even when 
chiding the judge. As I shall discuss, the Youks were critical of the judge and of the 
criminal justice system, yet treated the office of the judiciary and the public space of 
court with due respect. These dignified, respectful objections stood in sharp contrast 
to the antics of both Fieger and Kevorkian in previous trial. I conclude that these 
literal outsiders (an homage to Becker’s classic 1966 book) actually gave more proper 
critique of the flaws in the criminal justice system than did Fieger and Kevorkian (the 
first of whom was a litigation insider, and the second of whom became so during the 
course of the 1990s cases).
In several ways, Melody and Terry Youk’s statements contain more than their 
mere words. At first blush, the statements are important as the first formal family 
statements on the record in a conviction of Kevorkian, rather than a trial to acquittal. 
Second, this was the first American conviction of a doctor, after trial, regarding
145 On the whole, both wife Melody Youk and brother Terry Youk spoke passionately and seemingly 
from the heart. This said, there were passages in both their statements that were remarkably similar -  
not about Tom Youk, but rather about how Youk “initiated contact” with Kevorkian (Melody: 11; 
Terrence: 23), about the Medical Examiner’s statements at the February 22, 1999 Michigan Law 
School/Michigan Journalism Fellows Conference regarding “Covering Assisted Death: the Press, the 
Law and Public Policy” (Melody: 15, Terrence: 24). I note from both attendance at the trial and trial 
transcript review that a central contested issue before the jury was whether Youk was pressured, and a 
central legal issue -  which was explored on cross-examination, but not on Kevorkian’s summation -  
was a colorable causation issue, in which the Medical Examiner, a long-time Kevorkian adversary, was 
the central witness ( I now refer the reader to the next chapter for amplification of these). These 
portions of the Melody and Terry Youk statements had the sense of what in Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure law is called “ritualistic incantation” or tailored testimony; that said, both wife and brother 
spoke with individualized passion about their decedent family member, and perhaps the former and 
relatively brief portions were “canned” or prepared by or with counsel. This may be underscored by 
the fact that Morgenroth (Kevorkian’s lawyer at sentencing and on appeal) introduced and called both 
Melody Youk (April 13, 1999: 8) and Terrence Youk (April 13,1999: 17), whereas it might be more 
common for the court or bailiff to invite family members to testify at a post-conviction sentencing 
proceeding. These observations do not undermine the statements the Youks made about either 
decedent Tom Youk, or their view of medical care, or their experience of the criminal justice system. 
Noteworthy as having had shape to certain issues of a legal nature unlikely to be had from non-legal 
professionals or from witnesses generally at a court proceeding, this later would be prominent in this 
case on appeal. That is to say, both their personal statements and the statements of potential benefit to 
Kevorkian for mitigation of sentence or for appeal were made and preserved for the official record.
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euthanasia, so that Youk family statements will stand as a historic case of first 
impression.146 Last, both wife Melody and brother Terrence (or Terry, as he is 
known) made comments that I shall examine in three thematic areas.
The first area touched on the family and Tom Youk’s life, illness and 
decisions. The second theme was critical of the courtroom processes that had 
excluded the Youks from testifying at trial. The third target for the Youks’ comments 
was the medical profession and its failures in the treatment of Youk (as contrasted by 
the Youks with Kevorkian’s care). The Youks did not believe the medical profession 
had failed to care for Tom Youk in the course of his efforts to fight and manage the 
path of his biological deterioration, but was rather had a belief that the medical 
profession could not offer end of life (or ending life) options. Strikingly absent were 
statements about bereavement or grief after Tom’s death during statements that 
instead celebrated Tom Youk’s life and lifetime.
I shall now juxtapose this with another jurisdiction, the Netherlands — where 
there was a sufficient number of openly conducted medical euthanasias to allow 
Swarte, van der Lee, van der Bom, van den Bout and Heintz to produce a quantitative 
study published in 2003. This study was of 189 bereaved families and close friends of 
terminally-ill cancer patients who died by euthanasia versus 316 bereaved family 
members and friends of comparable cancer patients who died a “natural death” 
between 1992 and 1999 in the Netherlands (Swarte et al. 2003, p. 189).147 The study 
concluded that, among other things, “the grief experienced by family members in 
suicide cases differs from grief after euthanasia, mainly because relatives have had the
146 Traditionally, a case of first impression refers to a case in which either a novel (or new) legal issue 
is presented, or in which a factual scenario requires a new application of an existing common law or 
statutory scheme, or in which a new statute is being applied to a case or challenged.
147 An e-version of this article downloaded from BMJ.com is 7 pages in length, but not paginated. 
Hence, references to this article will either refer to the text or, in a style similar to American law review 
citation, as footnotes and accompanying text where applicable.
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opportunity to say goodbye, which is seldom the case in suicides [and it posited that] 
physician assisted suicide should be expected to resemble euthanasia on this point, 
because it will also usually be announced” (Swarte et al. 2003, p. 189 n.4 and 
accompanying text).148 The question regarding families of those who were assisted in 
suicide will be amplified in Part II of this chapter, but it is interesting that the Dutch 
chose not to include assisted suicide cases in their parameters. This invites questions 
for further research and development in jurisdictions where assisting in a suicide is 
lawful. Such research is not limited to the Netherlands, but includes Oregon and 
Washington State, which in 2009 became the second of the United States to allow for 
limited physician-assisted suicide. One matter of note is that assisted suicides do not 
generally regard suicidants such as those examined by Durkheim, but on the whole 
regard terminally ill patients with social support systems.
This 2003 conclusion regarding families of Dutch euthanasia decedents 
implicitly invited two questions about the various Kevorkian cases. First, as to the 
1998 Youk euthanasia, what can be gleaned from the statements of the Youk family at 
the 1999 sentencing, and how do they compare to the findings of Swarte et a l l  
Second, as to Kevorkian’s physician-assisted suicide trials in the mid-1990s how did 
the family members/close friends shed light on the hypothesis of Swarte et a l l
A. The Family’s Social Construction o f Tom Youk’s Euthanasia Event
Turning to the first question, the Youks had lengthy opportunities not only to
say goodbye to Tom Youk, but also were present during the ongoing decision-making
process as his health declined for two-and-one-half years following his ALS
diagnosis. Brother Terry Youk told the court that he “witnessed Tom’s decision and
148 The question regarding families of those who were assisted in suicide will be amplified in Part II of 
this chapter, but it is interesting that the Dutch chose not to include assisted suicide cases in their 
parameters. This invites questions for further research and development.
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was in dialogue with him throughout the entire process [and] can testify that he made 
his choice from a stable, well-informed point of strength” (Sentencing Proceeding, 
April 13, 1999: Terrence Youk 23). Wife Melody likened Tom’s decision to have 
euthanasia administered as consistent with his general analytical approach in life, 
noting that “he approached his illness as he approached everything else in his life— 
with curiosity, determination, and a problem-solving response” (Sentencing 
Proceeding, April 13, 1999: Melody Youk 9-10).149
These matters were consistent with other characteristics and social attributes 
she had described lovingly with regard to her husband -  he was hardworking from 
childhood onwards, with a paper route as a child, later he was variously a chefs 
assistant, a hospital orderly, an Air Force serviceman with a high security clearance, 
and a college educated accountant who later formed his own auto restoration business 
as an extension of a lifelong passion that had included racing cars well into his illness 
(4-9). Terry Youk (who later trained as a hospice volunteer and has since made 
several documentaries regarding end-of-life care and hospice treatment), and who had 
remained favourable to Kevorkian.150 Terry added that Tom had been eight years 
older, and had effectively raised him as a “father, mentor, and playmate who gave 
playful, loving attention” while their parents worked (19). He also reaffirmed that his 
brother was “diligent, methodical, accountable” (19). Terry further noted that he was 
with his brother when he first went to meet with Kevorkian (24) and that it was Tom’s 
own choice to have euthanasia, rather than assisted suicide (25),151 echoing Melody’s
149 As a short form, citations to statements made at the Sentencing Proceeding shall hereinafter simply 
be designated by page numbers (xx).
150 This was noted in the Staff Article, “Kevorkian Release Stirs Grief, Gratitude: Famous Pathologist To Be 
Freed From Prison This Week After Serving 8 Years for Second-Degree Murder,” May 31, 2007, visited on 
cbsnews.com (August 3, 2007).
151 In Chapter 6 ,1 shall argue that Kevorkian’s own rendition included a statement -  by Kevorkian -  
that Youk had some ambivalence about euthanasia and had actually wanted assistance in suicide, rather 
than to have euthanasia administered.
232
comment that Tom chose “to bring a peaceful transition” (13), although his decision 
left her “heartbroken” before his death (10), and “grateful” afterward (11).
B. Social Constructions and Criticisms o f the Criminal Justice System by the Youk 
Family
In phrasing strikingly similar to that by Glaser and Strauss in Time For Dying 
(1968: 179), regarding a patient’s “own calculus based on a different weighing of 
values, such as worthwhile living time versus worthless living time,” Terry Youk 
described to the sentencing judge Tom’s choice to die as one that was consistent with 
Tom’s own “equation for life, with work through the limitations [of Tom’s illness],” 
(22) and steep decline from ALS. After describing the diligence and accountability of 
his brother, Terry Youk pointedly stated “it therefore rankles me to have endured this 
disingenuous characterization by the prosecution about [Tom’s] fortitude and 
projected mental inability throughout the course of this trial with no forum available 
to address the inaccuracies and the misconceptions” (20).
In effect, physician-assisted death can be viewed from different standpoints -  
legal, medical, familial, from the standpoint of the sick person -  that is contested and 
the Kevorkian cases constituted an arena in a court where only one version of this 
could be given a voice and make an impact. To quote what Goffman wrote in The 
Presentation o f Self in Everyday Life, “criminal trials have institutionalized [a] kind of 
open discord” (Goffman 1959:, p. 11). The difference between Goffman’s writing and 
the confrontation the Youks had in court at the sentencing was that Goffman was 
discussing a “murder mystery” in which the defendant was confronted at the end -  
here, it was the judge and the one version wrought by the criminal justice system that 
the Youks were confronting and critiquing.
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This first open critique of the judicial proceedings by Terry Youk, to the 
officiating judge herself, would be quite unthinkable to a lawyer in practice, and
1 S9would approach contempt of court. Ironically, the open narrative of a sentencing 
proceeding afforded both wife and brother freedom to speak to topics they would 
have been prohibited from addressing at trial, under the traditional structure of direct 
and cross-examination. This is because at the sentencing proceeding, they were not 
constrained by the direct examination of a lawyer seeking to elicit favourable 
information (or curtail any unfavourable facts in testimony), or by cross-examination 
seeking to impeach factual testimony or witness credibility and what they said was 
not material in front of the jury for deliberation in its decision to convict. Indeed, in 
practice, there is no purpose for cross-examination of family members (or friends or 
clergy) addressing the court after a conviction, but before the sentence is imposed in 
cases where the judge imposes sentence.
In this, they were unfettered in comparison to witnesses, who Rock argued 
“had laced themselves, their relations, and their narratives together in ways that made 
the public and personal one, staked valued identities and reputations; engaged in what 
Goffman once called aggressive [f]ace-work; launched images of self and action 
against one another in a clash of vituperation and disbelief that elicited pain, 
bewilderment, and anger; and became, in consequence, like the inhabitants of Babel 
who could no longer ‘understand one another’s speech’ (Genesis 11:7)” Rock (1993, 
p. 92, footnotes omitted). Even as they protested their systematic exclusion from 
testifying at trial, the Youks were able to step out of the ritualistically stylised role of 
witnesses, and into the role of ordinary plainspoken people who were exempt from
152 While the family members of a victim or decedent are generally given latitude in issuing pre­
sentence statements in court on the day of a sentencing, these are usually pro-prosecution and in 
castigation of a defendant. That on sentencing day the Youks were chastising the court and prosecutor, 
while extolling the virtues of Kevorkian, was yet another example of the unusual nature of the 
Kevorkian proceedings.
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some of the dramaturgical limitations of trial. Thus, they were allowed to introduce
the personal narrative in the public space of court, because they were not witnesses.
Both Melody and Terry Youk had much to say in their criticisms of the court,
the criminal justice system and its participants and what they said is instructive. Both
were critical of Tom Youk being listed as the complainant -  Melody pointedly
commented that Tom was “not a victim,” (11) and she referred to her husband as a
1 ^“client” of Dr. Kevorkian (8). As discussed earlier (and as I shall discuss as to the 
families of Kevorkian clients Merian Frederick and Sherry Miller in Part II of this 
chapter), this is a significant point of family self-identification and of labelling of their 
decedents. Both commented positively to the effect that Youk had initiated contact 
with Kevorkian (Melody: 11; Terry: 23) via Kevorkian’s “address on the internet” 
(Melody: 11). Terry, who was then a documentary film producer living in Vermont, 
stated, with regard to the legal status of Tom as a “victim” and the role of the Youk 
family:
One can’t ignore that the statement I am about to present on behalf of 
my brother, Tom Youk, and my family is unique among criminal cases. How 
unusual is it that the so-called victim and family members unflinchingly 
supports (sic) the alleged perpetrator of the purported crime. ... As I have 
witnessed the unfolding of this trial and the surrounding hyper media glitz, it 
is clear to me that the most important story and facts pertinent to this case are 
simply absent. It mystifies me to consider that the complainant/victim and his 
story have been systematically excluded from consideration in this trial (Terry: 
17-18).
Thus, once again, there was a theme of contestation about the meaning and 
framing of the event and its principals, a contestation that was doomed in the eyes of 
the legal tribunal (cf. Goffman 1959, p.211). In a sense, Terry was describing the
153 The Youk family depictions, like those of the Kevorkian Families I shall discuss in Part II of this 
chapter, were remarkably different in their use of linguistic self-identifying language than families in 
SAMM (Support After Murder and Manslaughter) considered by Rock in the 1990s; Rock noted the 32 
June 1995 letter of Frank Green, to a member of SAMM who had resigned in protest of its use of the 
word ‘victim’ instead of ‘survivor.’ “I fully understand the concept of establishing the survivor in the 
client, but I believe we can be victims too” (Rock 1998. p. 279).
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criminal trial of Kevorkian as a reverse example of the Thomas theorem that “if men 
define situations as real, they are real in their consequences,” by adamantly holding to 
that the definition of the situation was unreal and that the consequences being 
imposed by the conviction and potential sentence were surreal.
Melody described Kevorkian’s demeanour with them in the days preceding the 
euthanasia of Tom Youk, as “quiet, calm, interested, understanding ... thorough, 
warm, extremely compassionate, caring towards [her] husband” (11). In sharp 
contrast, the Youks commented negatively on the prosecution and its witnesses — 
particularly Medical Examiner Dragovic. Both Melody (15) and Terry (24) were 
critical of Dragovic’s medico-legal taxonomy of “only three categories as relates to 
death cause: natural, by your own hand, and homicide.” Melody went on to argue 
that “[c]learly, there needs to be another category as in Tom’s situation” (Melody:
15).
Thus, the Youks did not view themselves as homicide survivors with the 
traditional array of issues described by Thompson (2007, pp. 109-123) or Rock 
(1998). In this way, the Youks more were similar to the families of the Kevorkian 
acquittals that I shall discuss later in this chapter. The Youks were critical of the 
Medical Examiner, but neither of them specifically raised the possibility that Tom 
Youk had died of his underlying illness. This had actually been raised by Dragovic’s 
own autopsy which listed “end-stage ALS” as a second possible cause of death, a 
matter to which Kevorkian devoted much of his cross-examination. This last may 
legally have assisted Kevorkian more (at least on appeal), than the judicial decision of 
Judge Cooper to prohibit the Youks from testifying in Kevorkian’s defence as to 
Tom’s pain and suffering. However, theoretical law was not the concern of the 
family; the family was emotionally invested in testifying as to a husband, a brother, a
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decision to end his pain and suffering from a fatal illness in a steep trajectory, and the 
implementation of that decision by a doctor (notwithstanding the fact that Kevorkian 
had been administratively stripped of his licenses), whom they experienced as a 
medical provider, rather than a murderer. Their efforts to seek mitigation of sentence 
were, as the record showed, unavailing. That the Youk family statements were 
consistently in harmonious accord with Kevorkian’s position may be compared to 
Glaser and Strauss’ (1968, p. 176) argument regarding terminally ill patients in 
hospitals in A Time for Dying that “family members sometimes have a major share in 
shaping the last phase of the patient’s trajectory.... Occasionally there may be a 
conflict between the physician and the family over the family’s desire to shorten the 
ordeal.”
Legal categorization of medical death was but one of the issues the Youks had 
with the criminal justice system and its proceedings in the Kevorkian (1999) case.
A particular focus for both Youks was that, as Terry told the court during the 
sentencing proceeding, “my wish is to convey the deep disappointment my family 
feels at having been prevented from testifying to the real facts and the intentions of 
my brother and Dr. Kevorkian” (18). Their frustration implicitly had as much to do 
with the socialization process of lawyers and to the way legal facts are edited and 
elicited at a hearing or trial (Vago 2006, pp.398-401) and how the police and 
prosecution authorities edit the facts necessary to secure a conviction, rather than to 
engage with the full facts of a case (McConville et a l 1991, pp. 11-13, 36, 65-75).154 
In fact, the prosecutor and trial judge excluded testimony by the family members
154 One popular film version that may be used as a vehicle explaining this to lay people is the 1992 
movie of Aaron Sorkin’s acclaimed play, A Few Good Men. The fact-based drama of a military court 
martial for the accidental homicide of a young recruit who was being hazed has an exchange between 
two co-counsel in which one asks the primary legal character, Lt. Kaffee, if he believes the story of 
their clients; the answer to this was “it doesn’t matter what I believe, it only matters what I can prove.”
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specifically because their testimony as to pain and suffering was at best immaterial to, 
and at worst nullifying, Kevorkian’s legal guilt. Melody Youk went further still:
Of course, I wish I had been able to speak at the trial, feeling that that 
would have given the jury an opportunity to receive a balanced view of the 
facts, but understood the prosecution’s concern for a jury nullification based 
on Tom’s situation of being near death. However, not being able to speak also 
did not allow us an opportunity to address the questions improperly raised as 
to his lack of adequate medical care or to correct inaccuracies as mentioned 
above or to lay to rest misrepresentations such as the suggestion that the tape 
[of the Kevorkian/Youk euthanasia] was somehow staged or produced for any 
reason other than to show, again, my husband’s consent and that no one but 
the doctor was present at the procedure (Melody: 13).
In this short passage, Tom Youk’s wife covered a good deal of legal territory.
Examination on direct and cross-examination would have been ritualistically elicited,
rather than providing for an open, spoken narrative. Thus, for the Youks, being
banned from testifying at all was worse than having to provide evidence and
information in the form and under the constraints of what Rock called “recipe
knowledge” (1993), although this also provided the Youks with the opportunity for an
unfettered open narrative of wide range at sentencing. Melody also publicly and
directly, although briefly, attacked the prosecutor’s reaction to prior jury
nullifications, citing that as a reason that the prosecution objected to the Youks
testifying.
The Youks knew at the sentencing that their statements to the court would be 
historically important. Terry Youk pointedly stated that his “intent [was] to provide 
the court and the world watching with a portrait of [his] brother from those who knew 
him most intimately—his family. In so doing, it [was his] most sincere desire to 
appeal to the courts (sic) and the world’s wisdom, common sense and mercy in the 
sentencing today in this most unusual of trials” (17-18).
He thus invoked both the family status and the unique trial proceedings 
resulting in this first conviction of Kevorkian, after some 130+ hastened deaths. In
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short, the Youks knew they would be in a defining moment in legal history of 
euthanasia and one that would be literally published to the world.
I conclude that this was what the Youks surely did when they were 
interviewed for the original 60 Minutes programme “Death by Doctor” segment in 
November 1998. Terry Youk explicitly acknowledged this and said that “the doctor 
[Kevorkian] has videotaped most of the procedures he has performed, the intent of 
which is to protect the family members from being criminally culpable.155 Further,
Dr. Kevorkian consulted with us previous to the release of the videotape to 60 
minutes (sic) and sought our permission before its release, which we gave” (26-27).
A rhetorical question emerged as to whether Terry Youk, a documentary 
producer, in fact appreciated in advance matters that other families may not have. 
While the Youks correctly questioned why, as family they were not charged (indicted 
and/or tried) as co-conspirators (Terry: 26), they were not unaware of their 
prominence and importance in this first Kevorkian trial and conviction for euthanasia. 
I support this conclusion with Melody’s comment that she “assured [Tom Youk], 
prior to his death [by euthanasia] that he was just casting his absentee ballot on 
Proposition B [the 1998 ballot initiative originating with Merian’s Friends, to allow 
assisted suicide, though not medical euthanasia] early” (Melody: 13).156
As a transition from the Youks’ various criticisms of the legal process, 
proceedings and criminal justice system, to their comments about how the medical 
system treats (in both senses) the terminally ill, the iconic nature of their statements
155 This rendition by Terry Youk and the question of family culpability and presence is one that I shall 
return to in Part II of this chapter, when I consider the “kitchen table” interviews I conducted with other 
families from the Kevorkian cases. While Kevorkian may have been asserting control as much as 
seeking to protect the family members from culpability (if not more so), the fact remains that this was 
what Terry Youk was told by Kevorkian and what the Youks believed.
156 The Youk euthanasia was September 17, 1998, the ballot vote defeating Proposition B was on 
Election Day held the first Tuesday of November 1998, the Youk euthanasia was broadcast by CBS 
later that month, the Ann Arbor conference regarding assisted suicide, the press and public policy was 
in February 1999, the Kevorkian trial was in March 1999, and the sentencing was in April 1999. This 
was an extraordinarily fast set of events in legal time.
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1 ^7should be underscored here, as well. As recently as 2007, Howarth, in Death and 
Dying: A Sociological Introduction, observed that “many research studies have 
demonstrated that dying people frequently consider ways to end their suffering, and 
that some terminally ill people and their families would welcome euthanasia” (2007, 
p.151).
The situation Howarth described in her argument, and which I am examining 
here is exactly that which affected such families -  after the fact of assisted death. I 
note that in researching medical sociology, such families were not included. 
Considered in medical sociology instead was the decade long and highly litigated 
Schiavo family feud. This famed post-millennium American version of Dickens’ 
Jamdyce v. Jamdyce had, on one side, a husband who sought to discontinue the use 
of a feeding tube in the treatment of his persistently vegetative (and thus non- 
competent and non-consenting) wife, Terri, (now deceased). On the other side were 
Terri’s parents, who opposed the withdrawal of nutrition and medical care of their 
daughter, who had been in a persistent vegetative state for over 10 years (Weiss and 
Lonnquist 2006, p. 341).
In stark contrast, the Youks offered a paradigmatic portrait of unity and the 
consenting American family after the fact of voluntary and consensual active 
euthanasia.158 I underscore that I am considering this as the social unit of the family
157 Deliberately omitted as beyond the scope of this discussion are non-Kevorkian cases, whether 
preceding the period of study, regarding withdrawal of life support with family agreement, as in 
Quinlan (1973) and Cruzan (1991), or with family disagreement and litigation, as in 2005 with 
Schiavo. The reason for this decision is that I am herewith examining patient and family participation 
contemporaneous to the life shortening measures (i.e., competent patients), rather than those of patients 
whose families’ judgment is substituted for that of the patient, in hopes of being in the patient’s best 
interests. Stated differently, I am examining criminal cases with family and patient consent, 
notwithstanding the fact that one cannot consent to one’s own homicide as a matter of Anglo-American 
law; and I am further restricting myself to a particular geographical jurisdiction over a particular period 
of time. Hence, the earlier cases would be excluded as non-binding jurisdictionally, and the later case 
as inapposite.
158 Consent to euthanasia is not allowed under Anglo-American law as either a justification to, or 
mitigation of, homicide (Fletcher 2000,. p. 236).
240
and its interaction with the criminal justice system. If anything, the Youks felt they 
were experiencing secondary victimization not as a result of the medical community 
or as a consequence of any of Kevorkian’s actions, but rather of their exclusion as 
witnesses during trial by the prosecutor and the court. The prosecutor dismissed 
assisted suicide charges relating to Tom Youk’s death specifically to prevent the 
Youks from testifying as to his pain and suffering and to excise the family’s story.159 
Terry Youk summarised the family reaction to this with the claim that the family 
“endured the disingenuous characterization by the prosecution about [Tom’s] 
fortitude and projected mental instability throughout the course of this trial with no 
forum available to address the inaccuracies and the misconceptions” (20).
C. Family Perceptions o f the Medical Profession and Medical Care o f Tom Youk
Seemingly incongruously, it was in the arena of the criminal justice system 
that the Youks had the opportunity to be complimentary about the health care that the 
terminally ill, “end-stage”160 ALS patient Tom Youk received prior to this change of 
status to Kevorkian client and “victim.” Melody made these comments almost 
immediately in her statements at sentencing, following on her loving description of 
her husband and his lifelong activities and achievements. Indeed, her transition to this 
topic was via her comment that Tom was of an analytical frame of mind in college 
and as an accountant, and “he approached his illness as he approached everything else 
in life -  with curiosity, determination, and a problem-solving response” (9).
As to Tom’s care, Melody gave a litany of positive comments about the 
medical care that he had received from the U.S. health system, and clearly
159 One reason for this was that in this criminal trial, the prosecution was required to prove the intent of 
the defendant, and not the decedent.
160 End-stage is a phrase taken from the autopsy and the Medical Examiner’s testimony, and arguably 
pointed to a reasonable doubt as to cause of death; this phrase was hence a time factor suggesting 
imminence and used a term o f art in a more specific way than the generic phrase “terminally ill.”
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communicated that she did not feel that he was marginalized by his progressive illness 
and disability. She directly told Judge Cooper, the courtroom, and the media 
reporting on the sentencing:
There exists for your review volumes of verifiable information to show 
that he was, in fact, well cared for, from the day of diagnosis of Lou Gehrig’s 
disease (sic) [the alternate name for ALS in the US] in June of ’96 and 
throughout his illness, by the esteemed University of Michigan Neurology 
Clinic and had been under the care of the Angela Hospice prior to his passing. 
Additionally, he met every challenge of his illness with the same analytical, 
determined approach he used throughout his life by seeking alternative 
treatments, researching new information, as well as participating in the 
experimental drug therapies through the University (Melody: 9-10).
Thus, Tom Youk’s widow described outstanding access to health care,
excellent treatment by traditional and alternative medicine. She simultaneously
described her husband as a patient with a positive outlook and diligent effort in
availing himself of all the medical system had to offer, including research and
development opportunities. It was a portrait of the best of the medical system with a
patient who was a sophisticated consumer of health care and its products, as compared
to some patients unaware of their terminal status and options, depicted by Glaser and
Strauss in Awareness o f Dying (2007, pp. 122-126).
As Melody explained at the sentencing proceeding, this was ultimately not
enough:
However, as [Tom] had come to the situation where in addition to 
being able to control only his thumb and first two forefingers of his right hand, 
he was losing his ability to speak, and in spite of receiving specific 
medications for problems of swallowing and choking. He’d had a food tube 
inserted directly into his stomach wall in August [i.e. approximately one 
month prior to his euthanasia], but was not metabolising food as his bodily 
functions were apparently shutting down. We discovered at that time that his 
lung capacity had dropped to 25 percent of normal.
But Tom had long ago determined for himself that he did not wish to 
be on a ventilator nor completely dependent on others in a totally paralyzed 
body. I was heartbroken to realize that in spite of our efforts we had come to 
the end. I was crushed and I resisted, but came to understand that it was 
selfish for me not to support him in his decision.
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For these reasons and more to follow, I wish to submit to you that my 
husband had come to the end of his life as he chose to live it. He was not 
depressed, he was not a victim (Melody 10-11).161
Widow Melody thus described in detail the process and progression from what 
Charmaz would call disability as an interruption to an intrusion to an immersion for 
Tom Youk (Weitz 2007, pp. 168-169, citing Charmaz 1991, pp.l 1-40,41-72, 73- 
104). However, Youk’s social relationship with his family did not wither during this 
time; if anything, the family unit became stronger and was continuously unified and 
positive in its dealings with the medical system. Additionally, his internet contacts 
kept him connected to a community of people dealing with the same illness. This 
mitigated Youk’s potential social isolation, in ways that were perhaps unimaginable 
in 1968, when Glaser and Strauss wrote in Time for Dying of “a patient’s increasing 
isolation, whether or not he perceives it” (1968, pp. 168-169). I conclude that his 
family was concerned not with social death, but with biological death and the 
physiological death process of Tom, whom the hospice and Medical Examiner had 
characterized as “end-stage ALS” and whom Kevorkian described as “terrified of 
choking” in the November 1998 60 Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment.162
Terry Youk underscored Melody’s statements regarding medical science at the 
Kevorkian sentencing. This seemed also to be part of an effort by the family to 
educate Judge Cooper prior to sentencing, since they were not permitted to offer this
1611 conclude that the portion of the Youks’ statements attesting that Tom Youk was not a victim 
hearken of Holstein and Miller (1990, pp. 103-122), and that the statement that he was not depressed 
would be contested by the arguments Stan Cohen made in States o f Denial: Knowing about Atrocities 
and Suffering (2001: 54-57, making the point as to AIDS, but equally reasonable as to MS, ALS, and 
Huntington’s Disease) that unless one is “psychotically cut off from reality”(54) so as to be completely 
in denial, a deadly degenerative illness inevitably leads to a reality of depression. Whereas Cohen 
argues convincingly that depressives are actually accepting reality (2001, pp. 57), I would conclude 
that the Youks were essentially making the argument that Tom Youk was not unduly depressed, in a 
political choice of wording. I suggest that in an updated version of Mirrors and Masks: The Search for  
Identity, Strauss (1959) would likely have made an argument that the language of both testimony and 
narrative would need to be revised, so as to include “the open-ended, tentative, exploratory, 
hypothetical, problematical, devious, changeable and only partly-unified character of human courses of 
action” (1959, p.91).
1621 shall discuss this more fully in the next chapter/
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information to the jury to consider during its verdict deliberations. The brother 
observed:
Tom learned of his illness in early 1996 and continued on with 
hopefulness to live as best he could within the limitations presented to him. 
ALS is a terminal disease. There is no treatment. Very little is understood 
about its mechanisms. There is ultimately no escape. What is ALS? 
Simplified, in a healthy body the brain sends a signal to the neurons which 
then activate the muscles. In ALS, the neurons fail to deliver the message and 
the muscles slowly atrophy, leaving you a prisoner in your own body.
This, of course, doesn’t really give you a glimpse of what the actual 
experience is like. It started slowly for him, affecting first his left leg until he 
needed a brace, then the right leg, and soon another brace, then with canes to 
aid in walking. Soon he was confined to a wheelchair, but he responded with 
characteristic acceptance and inquisitiveness, like scoring (sic) various 
options, both medical and mechanical. He began injection treatment with the 
experimental drug, Mytrophin, he purchased a handicap equipped van to 
increase his mobility, as well as investing, toward the end of his life, in a 
specially designed race car he could operate without the use of his legs (Terry: 
20-21).
The conclusion was that Tom Youk did not simply take on a sick role, but 
rather initially viewed the sickness as an interruption of his normal life that became an 
intrusion in his ability to live normally. Terry Youk continued, effectively presenting 
to the judge how the intrusion became an immersion in the experience of illness, 
notwithstanding excellent care and social support:
Unfortunately, [Tom’s] symptoms continued to accelerate and soon his 
arms were weakened and succumbed and became all but useless. Even then 
he embraced and adapted his limitations. He used his computer to reach out 
and research his condition. He engaged in dialogue with a community of 
courageous human beings afflicted with ALS. He had a stomach tube inserted 
to aid in the taking of medication. Whatever he tried, the disease always 
seemed to be two steps ahead.
Soon, a mere two and one half years after his diagnosis, Tom was 
confronted with having no control over his body and was quickly losing his 
ability to communicate. He was in great discomfort and needed to be moved 
via (sic) sling, a complicated and unpleasant procedure, every 10 to 15 
minutes or so. He was experiencing intermittent pain that would come in 
flashes and with great intensity, pain that even morphine could not touch.
His body was shutting down and was not metabolising food, and the 
little food that did digest became an ordeal to eliminate. He had a catheter 
inserted and there it remained for the last three weeks of his life. His lung 
capacity dwindled to a miniscule 25 percent. He would, with increasing 
frequency; experience spasms of choking on his own saliva, despite the
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medication he was using designed to alleviate this condition. He was caught 
in hell, a hell with accelerating conditions, off the charts and on a dead run to 
one eventuality (22).
Ironically, some of the information relayed in this narrative, and its description 
of Youk’s progression to “the certainty stage of dying” (Glaser and Strauss 2007, 
p.230) would probably not have been developed in the question and answer format of 
witness examination -  either on direct examination (had Kevorkian prevailed in his 
effort to call the Youks as witnesses) or on cross-examination, which is constructed to 
be limiting, rather than expansive, in nature. This bird’s eye of the medical and 
social world of Tom Youk hence was important. He continued:
Everyone has his or her own equation for life -  everyone, with no 
exceptions. When our equation is not being fulfilled in the positive, we 
mobilize, we take action, we improve our lives, and we evaluate and transform 
to balance our equation. Tom fought the courageous and inspired fight to the 
very end of his life and embraced with dignity and grit each choice along the 
way in an attempt to balance his equation. It wasn’t easy, and it wasn’t always 
pleasant, as he struggled with accepting new challenges.
Yet, through it all, he always chose to work with the limitations. 
Ultimately, he chose to be released from his needless suffering. Tom arrived 
at this realization on his own terms...
Why then, suddenly at the end of our lives as we arrive at one of the 
most important and sacred moments of our entire human experience, does our 
right to self-determination end abruptly? (Terry: 22-23).
Although consent is not a justification or excuse for euthanasia in American
law, Terry Youk, noted, “only Melody and myself can really testify to Tom’s intent,
not the prosecution” (24). He argued vigorously that euthanasia as a medical matter
at the end of life was his brother’s choice, and actually a common everyday
occurrence in the shadows of the medical profession, as shown by the following pair
163 It is impossible to say with any certainty what, if  any, cross-examination of Melody and Terry Youk 
would have been conducted by the trial prosecutor, since he was successful in his motion to exclude 
their testimony at trial. Notwithstanding this limitation, I would posit that one possible forensic 
purpose might have been to show that Youk and his family had actually been contemplating physician 
assisted suicide, rather than euthanasia. As I shall show in Part II of Chapter 6, this was something of 
moment both in the original 60 Minute programme and in trial evidence (as well as opening and closing 
arguments of Kevorkian and the prosecutor).
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of Terry’s quotes. What these quotes offer is an educated layperson’s commentary on 
the medical profession, and on the criminal justice system’s interaction with members 
of the medical profession, to the extent that it affects patients and families 
simultaneously, Terry Youk sought to mitigate any incarceratory sentence that might 
have been (and, in fact, ultimately was) imposed upon Kevorkian (whom he believed 
should not have been convicted, let alone punished):
Tom not only made this decision to be released from his suffering, but 
he initiated contact with Dr. Kevorkian. He wilfully, and as a willing 
participant, sought out a release from his suffering. He knew full well that he, 
alone, would receive the benefit o f the procedure he initiated—to be relieved 
from his abject suffering.
I witnessed Tom’s decision and was in dialogue with him throughout 
the entire process. I can testify that he made his choice from a stable, well- 
informed point of strength....
The first time we met with Dr. Kevorkian, I was quite astonished to 
discover a radically different man from what the media portrayed. The doctor 
was extremely thorough and questioned Tom extensively concerning his 
condition. We had provided the doctor with all of Tom’s medical records 
upon his [i.e., Kevorkian’s] request. He explained the various options 
available to Tom and stressed repeatedly that there was no rush and in fact 
suggested we wait for Tom to reconsider his decision.
After consideration o f the various options, including assisted suicide 
and euthanasia, Tom made his own choice o f euthanasia, based on wanting to 
have more control in the actual mechanics o f his death. Throughout, the 
doctor’s manner was kind, direct and compassionate (Terry: 23-24, emphasis 
added).
Terry said of the medical profession generally (and without detracting from 
the health care Tom had received from the time of diagnosis until his death):
There are thousands of doctors performing these procedures for 
terminally ill patients every day in this country illegally. They don’t dare 
disclose their actions for fear of losing their license (sic) or risking 
prosecution. There is only one man that I know about in America who has the 
moral conviction and fortitude to defy those inadequate, unjust laws (Terry: 
24).
I conclude that family members were frustrated by hidden medical practices in 
the US (or in the UK, as the family response to the English Cox case showed). The 
study of Swarte et al. (2003) suggests that an open practice could well be helpful to
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the family in terms of saying goodbye in advance of death, and recovering from 
bereavement thereafter. That can occur only where there are decriminalized or 
legalized protocols.
I am not herewith suggesting that euthanasia should be permitted as a 
decriminalized course of conduct. However, one might reasonably conclude that 
“good” doctors have long been operating within the shadows of the law to hasten 
death (other than in Oregon, and there only as to assisted suicide by pills). Although 
not cited by the Youks at the sentencing, this argument was supported by a 1998 
article appearing in The New England Journal o f Medicine, entitled “National Survey 
of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States.” This article came 
up with the astonishing findings and admissions (under guaranteed anonymity) that 
11% of 1902 physicians surveyed said that under then-current (1998) circumstances, 
there would still be circumstances in which they would be willing to hasten a patient’s 
death by prescription drugs, and a whopping 7% said that they would provide a lethal 
injection to a patient; numbers jumped to 36% and 24% if the practices were legal 
(Meier et al. 1998, p. 1193). One-third of Michigan doctors surveyed in a 1996 study, 
also published in The New England Journal o f Medicine, responded favourably to the 
less risky question, in terms of criminal culpability and civil liability, as to whether 
“they might participate in assisted suicide if the practice were legalized” (Bachman et 
a l 1996, p.303).
The corollary is that “good” families are experiencing a dissonance with a 
technologically (as well as legally) sophisticated medical profession. I conclude that 
not only are voices competing to more or less effectively give public definition to the 
events at the core of this thesis (and thus to reject having the Thomas theorem thrust 
upon them), but also that a range of more covert or voiceless practices which shape
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the reality of death (Howarth 2007) or the definition and role of “victims” generally
(cf. Zedner 2002) in certain circumstances. Also of moment with regard to Terry
Youk’s critique of the medical profession and its restraints on doctors is the
observation that the prosecution of Kevorkian was after the fact,164 and not in the
category of civil cases and declarations sought in advance in the Quinlan (1973),
Cruzan (1991) [and, in the UK, Bland (1993)] cases.
Terry Youk asked a rhetorical question at the sentencing proceeding that
applied to the family experience, the criminal justice system, and the social world of
medicine. “Can we not find a way as individuals, as a nation, to embrace
compassionate support for those choosing to live as well as compassion and mercy for
those who choose to be released from life in dignity?” (23). I note that Terry went on
to study and to be trained in hospice after Kevorkian administered euthanasia to his
brother Tom, and after he spoke on behalf of Kevorkian at the sentencing proceeding
on April 13, 1999 (cf. Putnam 2002).Were one to set aside the answer Terry Youk
seemingly required and went on to academically and technically explore by his own
further education, this question hearkened back to Parsons and Lidz (1967: 170).
They wrote in a footnote to an article entitled, “Death in American Society:”
[s]ome recent studies have demonstrated much ‘denial’ of death to exist in at 
least one social situation, namely the relation of medical personnel to 
terminally ill patients in readying themselves and their personal relationships 
for debility and death, and a tendency for doctors to continue ‘treating’ their 
patients in ways that involve great discomfort and cost for both patients and 
their families, well after there can be any realistic hope for significant 
recovery of faculties (Parsons and Lidz 1967. p. 170)
I note that Parsons and Lidz were writing in 1967, some 30 years prior to the
events studied in this thesis. Thus, what appeared to be a significant minority who
fell outside the Parsons and Lidz paradigm, the reality is that medical practice,
1641 would, and indeed do in the Chapter 6, make the argument that Kevorkian was actually prosecuted 
months later, and only subsequent to the broadcast of the Youk euthanasia on the original 60 Minutes 
programme.
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technology, and indeed the entire debate had shifted during these decades. Whether 
one answers Terry Youk’s question in the affirmative or the negative, the next part of 
this chapter will consider families who sought “release” in two cases of which 
Kevorkian was acquitted in the mid-1990s
Part II Social and Legal Consequences o f Two Families in thel996 Kevorkian 
Acquittals
This portion of my argument regards people who were actually forced to 
testify as witnesses in the 1996 trials. Mechanisms for this included prosecutorial 
immunity and mandated testimony as a result. However, these mutated and became 
favourable factors in a larger context supportive of Kevorkian and the patients. I shall 
return to Swarte et al. (2003) to consider the second question begged by the Dutch 
study regarding families of euthanasia patients in the Netherlands. A question 
revealed itself to me. Did the Kevorkian family members and close friends shed light 
-  years in advance of the Dutch study -- on the hypothesis of Swarte et al.l
Interviews with members of two families allowed me to explore whether “the 
grief experienced by family members in suicide cases differs from grief after 
euthanasia, mainly because relatives have had the opportunity to say goodbye, which 
is seldom the case in suicides [and posited that] physician assisted suicide should be 
expected to resemble euthanasia on this point, because it will also usually be 
announced.” (Swarte et al. 2003:, p. 189). I did this in order to take up an argument 
advanced by Glaser and Strauss, in Time for Dying (1968, p. 152), in which they 
considered the (non-hastened) dying trajectory in the hospital setting, noting that an 
“unexpected death can cause the family to act drastically .... [whereas i]f a family is 
to be prepared for a patient’s death, it must be forewarned.”
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I shall now explain seeming incongruity as to my in-depth 1996 American 
interviews and the 2003 Dutch article. I had the opportunity to interview members of 
families immediately after the two 1996 cases -  the parents of Sherry Miller (Ron and 
June Miller Interview: May 15, 1996) and the youngest daughter of Merian Frederick 
(Carol Poenisch Interview: March 15,1996). Parents and adult “child” offered 
different perspectives on. and of, family experiences. Both interviews took place 
within one week subsequent to the respective trials to acquittal regarding Kevorkian’s 
assisted death of their respective family member. Additionally, both involved cases in 
which transcripts were not available due to acquittal, and in which prosecutors 
asserted that there was no daily copy (day by day minutes of trial) (Skrzynski 
Interview: March 14, 1996; Richard Browne Interview: May 16, 1996). Moreover, 
both the Millers and Poenisch were the primary caregivers for their family member 
prior to Kevorkian’s intercession. Similarly to the Youks, the patient resided with 
family caregivers during their lengthy declines -  Miller from multiple sclerosis 
(“MS”) and Frederick from ALS (the same illness as Tom Youk).
There are differences between the family experiences of the various Kevorkian 
matters as demonstrated by the Millers and Poenisch, as well as the Youks. These 
experiences may not be as publicly and indelibly etched as were the 1998 Youk 60 
Minutes experience and 1999 sentencing statements. This may be exemplified by the 
fact that when Kevorkian was released on June 1, 2007, and CBS had a 60 Minutes 
segment on his parole on June 3, 2007, the Youks’ original 1998 statements were used 
in the piece). Nonetheless, the 1996 interviews do offer perspective on matters of 
differences in time, and on public versus private space that are worthy of exploration. 
Whereas Tom Youk was the last Kevorkian hastened death in 1998, Sherry Miller 
was a very early Kevorkian case (client #3 with death by carbon monoxide inhalation,
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on October 23, 1991) before any assisted suicide laws had been enacted in Michigan). 
Kevorkian assisted in Merian Frederick’s suicide (client #19, October 22, 1993)165 
after a “temporary” assisted suicide ban was passed by the Michigan legislature in 
1993. Thus, these decedents and their families reflected different methodologies 
employed by Kevorkian, who was tried under different legal theories or statutory 
schemes, during the 1990s.
In this part of the chapter, I shall again focus on the families’ relationship with 
the decedent, and their comments on the criminal justice system as they flowed from 
their experience of the case. The Kevorkian/Frederick assisted suicide case was the 
first trial in March 1996, and tried along with the Kevorkian/Khalili case, though 
they were different events on different days. The Miller/Kevorkian homicide case, 
although occurring first in time (1991) was the second tried, in April/May 1996, along 
with the Marjorie Wantz case, that took place contemporaneously. I shall amplify 
further the distinctions between assisted suicide and homicide in some cases, and also 
amplify how some cases that might medically fall more suitably within one or another 
legal category were actually tried differently for reasons of political expediency.166
Both the Millers and Poenisch spoke less about the medical system than did 
the Youks. That said, it is worth reciting a quote from Merian Frederick’s minister, 
Rev. Kenneth Phifer, who was in the room with Frederick as she died, holding her 
son’s hand. My original intention when seeking to interview Phifer, who was a 
witness at the 1996 (1) Kevorkian trial, was to learn about the social aspects of 
religion in assisted suicide cases. While Phifer did make comments relating to 
religion, such as with regard to Michigan Right to Life, “I’m as right to life as they
165 A full list o f Kevorkian’s known patients/clients/victims may be found, with date and number of 
death, easily, as I did on August 9, 2007, at http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/jk.htm.
166 One such example, which I discussed in Chapter 3 was the case of Loretta Peabody that Ionia’s 
Chief (and trial) Prosecuting Attorney, Ray Voet prosecuted under an anti-assisted suicide law, 
although the “needle mark” indicated euthanasia murder.
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are [we just have] different meanings,” (Phifer Interview: March 11, 1996), and 
making some observations regarding juror and foreman Bishop Ott, the heart of 
Phifer’s interview was guided by him toward Merian Frederick, and his experiences 
of the criminal justice system, which issued an “order of immunity” (from prosecution 
for his attendance and possible role) so that the prosecution could call him as a 
witness. The Unitarian minister represented himself as a friend as well as a minister, 
and told me in our in-depth interview that he had told her, ’’whatever your choice ... I 
will be with you. I am your minister, I will be with you. (Phifer Interview: March 11, 
1996).
Commenting about the availability of medical options, Phifer told me for the 
very first time in interview, only after the trial and acquittal:
I went to doctors Merian Frederick knew and asked “would you help 
her? I’m coming on her behalf.” Doctors said “we wish her well, wouldn’t 
want her to suffer, but can’t help her.” One doctor said he could hospitalize 
her and give her a morphine drip, but she didn’t want to be hospitalized.... 
Jack was 14 of the 20 options, One to 13 were worthless -  she wouldn’t have 
chosen him [Kevorkian]. She knew him only through the media, inflections 
(sic), and there would be publication of her death (Phifer Interview: March 
11, 1996).
According to Phifer, Frederick was very clear that “she chose as she chose 
because she felt the hospital wouldn’t honor her wish. [She had a] healthy suspicion 
of the medical profession.” This was to the point because she told Phifer “I will never 
allow them to take me to a hospital” (Phifer Interview: March 11, 1996, emphasis in 
original interview). Similarly to Terry Youk’s commentary about his brother, 
Frederick’s statement reflected a need to break from the traditional medical system 
seems to have been predicted by Parsons and Lidz (1967: 170). The latter suggested 
“that the element of denial is evidence of a well localized, if severe, structural strain 
regarding the boundaries between the orientation toward controlling the adventitious 
aspects of death and the orientation toward the inevitable aspects of death, as they are
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specified to the norms of medical practice” (Parsons and Lidz 1956, p. 170). In the 
language of litigation 30 years later penned by 9th Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, in 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 800 (1996), patients who were 
terminally ill with an inevitable death had an interest in choosing the “time and
167manner of one’s death.” The conclusion to be drawn seems to be that some who 
cannot control the fact of their impending biological death turn to controlling the 
surrounding circumstances of time, process, and decision as a way of managing the 
medically unmanageable -  whether or not that option lies within the ambit of the law. 
A reasonable inference is that this legal debate was anticipated by Glaser and Strauss 
in Awareness in Dying (2007, p.21), who discussed discussing the hospital nursing 
staff and the distinction between physical cues, and temporal cues, in the dying 
trajectory. As I shall now argue, the Kevorkian families showed an almost thematic 
approach to the temporal, as a medically manageable, aspect of the death process for 
themselves, and for the patients.
A. The Families: Parents o f Sherry Miller, (Adult) Child o f Merian Frederick
Ultimately, when Frederick went to Kevorkian for her assisted suicide, it was 
with her son and his wife, along with Phifer, but not with Carol the caregiver. Phifer 
posited, “she wanted Carol to have a pure memory” with which to recall her mother 
(Phifer Interview: March 11, 1996). As with Carol Poenisch, Ron and June Miller 
were not in attendance at the death of their daughter, which occurred on what June 
Miller called “the longest day of my life, when we hadn’t eaten all day, there were 
five or seven of us ... it was 7:30 or so in the evening when we got the call -  - they 
[Kevorkian] called us before they called the police” (June Miller Interview: May 15,
167 The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed the case in 1997; however, the language 
correctly reflects the spirit of the debate, and the legal system’s continuing struggle during the 1990s.
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1996).168 One might conclude that this is consistent with the arguments of Swarte et 
al. (2003) that a family will have less regret when they are given notice and an 
opportunity to say goodbye to family members who have euthanasia or assisted 
suicide. This might arguably be the family equivalent or patient controlled 
mechanism of temporal cues of what Glaser and Strauss described as a nurses’ “death 
watch” (2007/1965: 246-258), as much as what they described as “the division of 
labour in American hospitals [which] allows close kin to carry out routine comfort 
care while the nursing staff gives the more difficult or professionalized care” (Glaser 
and Strauss 1968, p. 157).
Moving on, I now wish to address three areas. First is the family experience 
of the patient illness and decision to obtain assisted suicide that was illegal. Second, I 
shall examine support systems assisting the Kevorkian Families. Third I shall 
consider the families’ experience of the criminal justice system.
For each of these, I must emphasise that the two literal kitchen table 
interviews were of dissimilar people, in their own space and time, rather than in a 
courtroom subject to the rituals of another social organization. The Millers were 
intensely private, Poenisch an activist who went on to speak at national 
conferences.169 Poenisch also became one of the co-founders of a group (that also
168 Ron and June Miller graciously gave me an in-depth interview together, in their kitchen, on May 15, 
1996, the day after the verdict acquitting Kevorkian of the Wantz/Miller cases. For most of the 
interview, both were present, but at one point Ron excused himself to the ladies, after which June and I 
continued. Looking at this, and other, interviews from a safe distance of a decade, it amazes me that so 
many people so graciously took time out of busy lives and trying times to interview with me in the 
weeks after the various trials. In reviewing the tape of the Millers’ interview, I noted that they said that 
the night after the acquittal, they did not celebrate, they “just relaxed that it was all settled up” (Millers 
Interview: May 15, 1996). One possible conclusion regarding the generosity of interviewees, some of 
whom, like the Millers were previously very private -  in Mrs. Miller’s case, until a Frontline interview 
the night after the verdict -  is that the retelling of narrative, especially an open narrative unrestricted by 
direct or cross examination, provided closure without requiring a ritualistic incantation of evidentiary 
testimony.
169 One such example, a talk given at a conference “Families on the Frontier of Dying,” held in May 
1998 under the auspices of the Center for Bioethics of the Pennsylvania Health Systems, was published 
on October 1, 1998 in The New England Journal o f Medicine, under the title, “Merian Frederick’s 
Story” (Poenisch 1998, p. 996). This was published approximately one month before Proposition B
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included Wayne County Chief Prosecutor John O’Hair), Merian’s Friends. This 
group unsuccessfully sought the decriminalisation of assisted suicide by a voter 
initiative, which was defeated in November 1998). While both the Millers and 
Poenisch were caregivers, the experience of parents was historically different from 
that of a daughter. This seemingly obvious fact nevertheless repeatedly revealed itself 
in the interviews, and provided insights for juxtaposition of family perspectives.
The Millers spent a good deal of time introducing me to Sherry and her 
attributes, and a review of the taped in-depth interview170 demonstrated that they were 
parents who were loving, involved with, and proud of their deceased daughter -  as 
reflected by their affectionate tone and quiet demeanour, as well as by their words. 
Sherry Miller was a daughter, a sister (with an older and younger brother, and a 
younger sister), a mother of two, an ex-wife (divorced shortly after her multiple 
sclerosis was diagnosed, though June Miller was unsure if that was the reason for the 
end of the marriage), and a Lutheran. Her parents described her as athletic, with a 
mind of her own since she was little, a woman who liked nice clothes and earned 
enough money to buy a [Ford] Mustang when she was in high school (a teenager), a 
graduate of high school (if not a good student), and “the greatest Chinese checker 
player there ever was” (Millers Interview: May 15,1996).
Five years after the MS diagnosis, and after her divorce, Sherry moved in with 
her parents (June Miller Interview: May 15,1996). The move was intended to be
was defeated on the ballot and less than two months before the Youk euthanasia was broadcast on 
national television. As to the latter, on May 29, 2007, three days before Kevorkian’s parole, Poenisch 
told L.L.Brasser of the Detroit Free Press, “I think definitely [the Youk euthanasia] went too far ... I 
don’t believe the physician should be injecting the patient.”
170 Interviews were taped with consent, and in March 1996,1 underwent an IRB review at the 
University of Minnesota prior to commencing the interview portions of my fieldwork. During that 
process, I developed a specific consent form, which was deployed effective March 1996 and thereafter. 
Interviews conducted prior to 1996 were done under the sole auspices of the London School of 
Economics, which did not have such a requirement for research subject interviews at that time; those 
earlier interviews, solely of elites, was deemed by the University of Minnesota to be retroactively 
approved.
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temporary, until she “got her own place,” but her deterioration put an end to that plan. 
She, like Tom Youk, continued to drive after her illness, but she stopped driving after 
she crashed her car into the garage by accident. The Millers held onto that car until 
September 1995, although Sherry died in 1991 (June Miller Interview: May 15, 
1996).
The Millers were the primary caregivers, with a succession of part-time home 
health workers who were unsatisfactory and “did not take an interest in Sherry, they 
came, hurried and left,” until a woman named Diane came twice a week, and cared so 
greatly for Sherry that she would call on her days off. June Miller told me in our in- 
depth interview that she “never heard from [Diane] from the time Sherry died.” 
(Millers Interview: May 15, 1996) While this seems surprising at first blush, given 
that the parents saw that Diane obviously was affectionate to her patient, a possible 
conclusion, along the same lines as which I argued in the last chapter regarding the 
potential jurors who were nurses, was that Diane had strong feelings or religious 
belief as to what transpired.
For parents who were, at their youngest, in late middle age, caring for a 
progressively more disabled daughter was difficult. (For example, June told me that 
Sherry was “a tiny little girl -  4’ 10” 90 lbs, but became dead weight for her dad to 
pick up”). Nonetheless, the Millers described a daughter who had pluck and 
perseverance, who would say “I’ll never use ...” whether it was a cane, wheelchair or 
otherwise; the parents would get these items and just set them in a place where she 
could see them, “then first thing, you know, she’s using it all the time” (Millers 
Interview: May 15, 1996).
Sherry first told her parents about her wish for assisted suicide in 1989. “We 
told her we were against this -  we went to [visit] our [other] daughter in Texas and
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she sprung this on us” (Millers Interview: May 15, 1996). Sherry’s seeminingly 
gentle, yet difficult to hear, disclosure of an already harsh disclosure (cf. Glaser and 
Strauss 1965, pp 148-153) was her way of making the family “aware, rather than 
unaware of her planned suicide. The Millers told me that they had told her “no one 
can do this” (Millers Interview: May 15, 1996). Sherry spent a good deal of time 
seeking to persuade her parents, showing them an article Kevorkian had written for 
the Sunday papers about his suicide machine, writing to Kevorkian and asking her 
mother to mail the letter. She expressed upset to her parents that Kevorkian would 
not let her be his first case because he felt “[Sherry did not] need it [yet], Janet Adkins 
need[ed] it more”171 (Millers Interview: May 15, 1996). Sherry went to court to 
testify at a preliminary hearing in support of Kevorkian, at then counsel Geoffrey 
Fieger’s request, and expressed her intentions to the court and to the public months 
before her death in 1991, in an effort to support him in return.
Carol Poenisch, Merian Frederick’s youngest child, also spoke compellingly 
of her mother’s character and how her illness, ALS, had affected her. Merian was 
diagnosed with a “terrible disease” in 1992, for which “we were always looking for 
cures” (Poenisch Interview: March 15, 1996). When Frederick told her friends, and 
not her daughter, of her decision to seek assisted suicide, Poenisch “took it 
[Kevorkian] personally - 1 wanted her to have a future, and [Merian] said “why are 
you trying to problem-solve when I am trying to stop problem-solving” (Poenisch 
Interview: March 15, 1996). Carol said she “wanted to have my mother as much as 
possible,” yet they were in court a month later, and “she would have loved it [had she
171 Taking this statement as accurate and at face value, one might reasonably conclude that it was 
predictive of both Kevorkian’s arguments regarding doctors providing for better medical control and 
trial prosecutor John Skrzynski’s 1999 arguments that Kevorkian, rather than patients, was the focus of 
control. Both conclusions are reasonable, and not necessarily mutually exclusive (although I am not 
attributing a deliberate line of thought or of planning in this way to either Kevorkian or the trial 
prosecutor).
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still been alive]” (Poenisch Interview: March 15, 1996). She told me there was “no 
doubt she wanted to die ... [it was] also an indication of the point to which her disease 
had progressed and that it was time” (Poenisch Interview: March 15, 1996).
The reaction of Carol Poenisch after her mother’s death was at the other end of 
the spectrum from the private response of the Millers. Carol told me that since her 
mother’s death in 1993, she was “totally ... involved in the cause and would continue 
volunteer work with Michigan at the Hemlock board” to promote assisted suicide and 
gave speeches nationally (Poenisch Interview: March 15, 1996).
Carol went even further, saying that she could give instruction about 
interaction and “hoarding meds -  do you have any seconal? Phenobarbital? When I 
go to the dentist, I’ll ask for three -  Have you heard this before?” (Poenisch 
Interview: March 15, 1996). Such pill hoarding and stockpiling received such open 
treatment as a post-mortem investigatory matter in a suicide in the case of a terminally 
ill woman in Glaser and Strauss’ Anguish (1970, pp.62-65). However, I had not heard 
this before with such candour, other than an initially off the record conversation 
during my in-depth interview in August 1993 with Janet Good, who later and 
repeatedly went on the record. Indeed Good who was the President of Hemlock at 
the time I interviewed her, later became a named a co-defendant of Kevorkian’s in the 
June 1997 Ionia Loretta Peabody case. The case against Good was dropped in view 
of her failing health due to fatal pancreatic cancer. The 73-year-old Good went on to 
become the 57th of Kevorkian’s assisted suicides on August 26, 1997; this was her 
final act of activism,
Regarding Carol and her involvement with Good,, she commented in the May 
1996 interview that “living with someone who is going to die is very private, you try 
to share their feelings and I’m getting close to Janet Good” (Poenisch Interview:
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March 15, 1996). From this comment was sown the seed for the next section, 
regarding how family members of decedents developed social support. However, as a 
parenthetical (that I currently have no way of confirming or refuting), it appears that 
there was a widespread underground movement to obtain and use medications to 
hasten death. One such example is an article by Abigail Goldman, in the May 22, 
2009 Las Vegas Sun, “Las Vegas Man Allegedly Brought Assisted Suicide Drugs into 
The U.S.” According to the article, the man (a non-physician), Jeff Osfteld brought 
depressants back from a trip to Mexico to assist a friend, in a case treated thus far 
moird as a border patrol drug case, rather than as a potential murder or assisted suicide 
of the 32-year-old decedent.
This said, I shall now proceed with the next aspect of the interviews regarding 
social support structures for families, though I note that the interviews were 
conversational in nature, rather than necessarily divided into neat sections.
B. Family Support Systems
The interviews with the Millers and Poenisch showed a glimpse of support 
systems that were developed for (and furthered by) the Kevorkian Families. This may 
be compared to other family groups (such as those studied by Rock 1998; Rock and 
Howarth 2000; Condry 2007). There was a support group, called “Survivors” 
(Poenisch Interview: March 15, 1996). Neither family (nor other members of the 
support group) viewed their loved ones or themselves as crime victims, and by the 
time of the assisted suicides, they were favourable to the Kevorkian procedures. 
(Kevorkian in fact wanted family support and unity to be given to the patients before 
he assisted in the suicides). Poenisch pointedly commented that the support group, 
organized by Sharon Welsh (a childhood family friend of Sherry Miller) and Sheryl
259
Gale (wife of Hugh Gale, who was the 13th of Kevorkian’s assisted suicides on 
February 15, 1993), contacted her only after her mother’s death, which I conclude 
could be the result either of ensuring commitment to the act or of socializing the 
surviving family members to a new set of roles:
Both [Welsh and Gale] were involved in court cases. They contact 
families after a suicide is done. I got a letter after her death inviting me to the 
next social function. I  needed it before [my mother’s death] (Poenisch 
Interview: March 15, 1996, emphasis in original).
Indeed, this statement opens a new potential vein of research beyond the work 
of Swarte et. al (2003). That is, what advance support is there for Dutch euthanasia 
patients and their families and does it make a difference to the experience of 
bereavement after euthanasia? This could not be introduced in the United States at 
this time (only Oregon, and, as of 2009, Washington State, allow for limited assisted 
suicide, and no state allows for euthanasia). June Miller, who knew Sharon Welsh 
most of her life, commented that there were events and get-togethers, though she was 
matter of fact and welcoming about this, in contrast to the criticism by Carol Poenisch 
that pre-assisted death support was needed. June Miller told me:
I see Sharon quite a lot. [Also,] there was a picnic with Fieger, 
Kevorkian and the families. A support group. We didn’t go the first year, but 
we went to a few other things -  a memorial at a church on the West Side, a 
dinner and Margo [referring to Margo Janus, Kevorkian’s sister and his 
assistant until her death] would see us (June Miller Interview: May 15, 1996).
Mrs. Miller took particular comfort in events with “Margo [Janus, Kevorkian’s sister 
and assistant until her death] and the girls. We’d go out and just get dinner, just us 
girls and Margo” (June Miller Interview: May 15, 1996).
There was another aspect of the Kevorkian families and their support that was 
revealed in the course of the Millers’ interview -  Fieger would call families and tell 
them “it looks good [at Kevorkian’s trials] if family and friends are there. It shows
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the families are really interested” (June Miller Interview: May 15, 1996). This may 
be analogised to Finch’s argument and examples in “Displaying Families,” where she 
noted that:
[t]he ways in which interaction worked directly between participants is an 
important source of pride. By their collective engagement in family-like 
activities, the participants confirm to each other that they are indeed a ‘family 
which works’ however eccentrically composed to an external observer (Finch: 
2007, p.75).
For some of the Kevorkian families, attending the trials was a show of support 
as one would give a family member, albeit that this was constructed by Fieger.
During one such phone call from Fieger to families, the Millers told him they could 
not attend court. They were on their way to see their surviving children in Texas, and 
June Miller told me that Fieger’s response was “you’re not going to Texas” (Miller 
Interview: May 15, 1996). In other words, Fieger was instructing the Millers to 
cancel their trip, since they were to come to show moral support for Kevorkian in 
court.
From my own observations during the mid-1990s trials, the presence of the 
Kevorkian Families in court was impressive in the gallery. Although the judges and 
prosecutors did not comment in court upon this support, I conclude that the daily 
presence of family members was at least a subtle communication to the jury that these 
families were there to benefit and support Kevorkian, the defendant. Carol Poenisch 
would come and at verdict, would do so with balloons (representing the release of the 
ill by assisted suicide),172 and Heidi Fernandez (the fiance of Tom Hyde, Kevorkian’s 
17th assisted suicide and first trial in 1994) was often in court. Others did not attend
172 My recollection is that the first time Poenisch did so, she was directed by court officers to wait 
outside the door to the courtroom with the balloons; however, the gallery was fraught with activity at 
the time that the verdicts were delivered, so this recollection as to whether she actually stepped inside 
the courtroom with the balloons might equally relate to courtroom chatter at the time. Whether on the 
cusp of the courtroom door or inside of it, her gesture (which was repeated) stands in its intention to 
bring balloons to symbolize the freedom from, and release of, the decedents.
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court -  for example, the Millers did not attend the Frederick/Khalili trial that was held 
in March (a few weeks) before the Wantz/Miller trial. Although she watched the trial 
on television, Mrs. Miller said that the family “should have gone to support Dr. 
Kevorkian” (Millers Interview: May 15, 1996) She also observed in our May 15, 
1996 interview that, during the Wantz/Miller Kevorkian trial 1996 (2), “Mr. Wantz 
couldn’t come a lot. He lives on the West Side and has a four-hour drive. They 
couldn’t stay at a motel. I told them they could stay here one night, but I didn’t really 
know them. I got to know Bill [Wantz]. He said he’d love to come visit us.”
Thus, an interesting finding was that support of Kevorkian Families fell into 
two categories -  support o f a family post-death, and support by the families of 
Kevorkian in court. This leads me to the next section of this part -  how the 
Kevorkian Families in the mid-1990s perceived the criminal justice system.
C. Social and Legal Consequences o f the Kevorkian Families in Court in the Mid- 
1990s
A number of family members testified at the mid-1990s Kevorkian trials, 
unlike the Youks’ experience of exclusion from the trial process in 1999. Indeed, 
during the mid-1990s, some family members were granted immunity by the 
prosecutor and compelled to testify for the prosecution (since there is no Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination once immunity is granted). The 
Millers testified in the second 1996 trial. They told me that Fieger had talked to them 
(before their testimony), but “didn’t prepare [them, rather he simply] just told [them] 
to tell the truth, tell what [they] knew” which was fine, since they had not been at the 
time and place of their daughter’s assisted suicide (Ron and June Miller Interview: 
May 15, 1996). The Millers contrasted this with their experience of the prosecutor’s
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office, which was then under the direction of Chief Prosecuting Attorney Richard 
Thompson. This was after the case was revived further to the 1994 Kevorkian 
appellate decision People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 435,482-497(1994). That case, 
reinstated the open murder charges and remanded to Judge Breck, who sat on the case 
that Thompson brought to trial in 1996. June told me during our in-depth interview:
The Prosecutor’s office writes me that I am a victim of a murder and if 
we need help counselling ... all we have to do is call the prosecutor’s office 
and they will help us in any way they can, they will counsel us.. We got a 
letter from the prosecutor two or three months before April [1996, before the 
Kevorkian trial for the 1991 assisted suicide of Miller]. They said to notify 
them if we want seats. I never bothered calling back. (June Miller Interview: 
May 15,1996).
One might reasonably come to a number of conclusions from this. One 
possible conclusion was that the prosecutors were seeking to establish family 
presence on their own side, although they had reason to know that the Millers would 
be supportive of Kevorkian. Based upon our interview, I conclude that June Miller 
perceived this latter day attempt of the prosecutors to seek the family as an ally in 
1996 to be an affront to the preceding years since Sherry’s 1991 death. A second 
possible conclusion might be that the prosecutors were trying to elicit information, 
and possible family witnesses for the prosecution. A third possibility was to test the 
waters of the defence case and strength. A fourth possibility is that the prosecutors 
were engaged in an effort to change the Miller family self-.identification to that of 
victim (a word and social role change of status that June Miller found objectionable in 
the prosecutor’s letter, particularly since it was nearly five years after the death of her 
daughter Sherry). This would have fit into the 1990 model of Holstein and Miller, 
“the group most frequently engaged in victimization -  that is, assignment o f victim 
status -  are in one way or another, interested in social control. (1990: 103-122 
internet version non-paginated, emphasis added). I note that all of these might be
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true, and none of these possible conclusions are mutually inconsistent. However, with 
the exception of the third possibility I have just enumerated, it is arguable that almost 
any interpretation would involve status forcing (see Rock 1998: 278-279; Condry 
2007: 174). Equally, members of the Kevorkian Families at trial eschewed the 
forcible and paternalistic protective cloak of the criminal justice system, perhaps 
because they instinctively “recognize[ed] the tremendous complexity of interaction” 
(Strauss 1959, p.54) that taking on such a title or label would impose.173
Testifying at the second Kevorkian in 1996 was apparently the first time the 
Millers were seen and heard in public discussing their daughter and her death. This 
was unlike the Youks 1998 television interviews for the original 60 Minutes 
programme, which I shall discuss at length in the next chapter. Ron Miller told me 
that “even when Sherry was doing interviews [about her wishes and reasons for 
assisted suicide before her actual death], [he] didn’t want to say anything” (Ron 
Miller Interview: May 15, 1996). June concurred, and said:
I didn’t give interviews. I hid. I didn’t want any... nothing.. I got mad 
at “Pete”. I didn’t want to talk to anyone ... taking pictures. Well a trial 
gives a different perspective. Everyone knows everything. ... well, it’s all an 
open book, now (June Miller Interview: May 15, 1996).
The Millers had been intensely private, although Sherry Miller had done many
interviews in advance of her death, had explained her plans, and repeatedly
communicated with Kevorkian and Fieger. Indeed, the latter had her testify at a
hearing on Kevorkian’s behalf in June 1990. Sherry had literally announced her
decision in a public space and in the international media. Once the trial began, the
Millers were no longer able to be private. One reason is that they “sat there [in the
hall outside the courtroom] waiting to be called [as witnesses]. He [Fieger] wants to
173 Holstein and Miller (1990), in “Rethinking Victimization: An Interactional Approach to 
Victimology,” quite fairly noted that this is essentially the mirror image of Becker (1963) consideration 
of how persons are given the label of deviant.
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have somebody there to not be caught short without witnesses” (June Miller 
Interview: May 15, 1996). I have an alternate conclusion and hypothesis about this -  
by having the Millers sitting outside the courtroom, and being in the public space of 
the halls, ladies and men’s rooms, phone booths, and eating areas, Fieger had an 
opportunity to implicitly introduce them to the press and others, and to get them 
comfortable in the public space of the courthouse. I conclude that this would have 
been important to Fieger both for his client and for the trial as portrayed in the media 
-  the same media the Millers had assiduously avoided having contact with for 
interviews and photographs (June Miller Interview: May 15, 1996).
Similarly to the Millers, Merian Frederick’s family was a presence -- on behalf 
of the defence, even when called by the prosecution to testify. Family members thus 
testified in the first Kevorkian 1996 assisted suicide trial on behalf of the defence and 
Kevorkian, as well as attended in the gallery. The Rev. Ken Phifer commented that 
Fieger “didn’t set up their seating in the court,” but that the seating in the gallery 
showed “the [Kevorkian] supporters were front and center” (Phifer Interview: March 
11, 1996). This was in accord with my own recollections of the mid-1990s trials, 
which was evocative of Howarth’s description (1996: 180) of the deliberately 
orchestrated seating by funeral directors, “[l]eading the bereaved from home, the 
funeral director was aware that, like the flowers, he must rank them according to their 
relationship to the deceased; next of kin and immediate family seated in the first 
mourning car, more distant relatives positioned behind, those with the most remote 
ties relegated to the rear of the procession”. As to his own attendance of the trial, 
Phifer said that:
I wanted to say by my presence that I supported this man [Kevorkian],
I wanted the jury to know that he’s not a killer roaming and looking for 
people. I wanted it known that this man was performing a public service 
(Phifer Interview: March 11, 1996).
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In other words, it was not only by Fieger’s dramaturgical construction that friends and 
family were in the court gallery (Goffman 1959, p.211).
I interviewed Carol Poenisch on March 15, 1996, one week after Kevorkian’s 
acquittal of the Merian Frederick and Ali Khalili assisted suicides. The central 
defence claim on that occasion was that Kevorkian was seeking to relieve suffering. 
The jury acquitted in this Kevorkian trial (which lasted from February 12, 1996 -  
March 6, 1996, approximately the second half of which I attended). The jurors found 
him not guilty, accepting the defence’s claim of a statutory exemption in the original 
1993 assisted suicide law for doctors using medications to relieve pain as its basis for 
acquittal. In essence, the jury embraced Fieger’s assertion that Kevorkian was only 
relieving suffering, not trying to cause death, by having Merian Frederick inhale 
carbon monoxide (although I continue to offer the conclusion that this was in fact 
nullification by a distorted application of the double effect clause, given that carbon 
monoxide is not a painkiller in the medical sense).
A week after the trial regarding her mother’s and Ali Khalili’s assisted 
suicides, Carol Poenisch had harsh words to say about both the lawyers representing 
the prosecution and defence, who might have been called extreme adversaries in the 
criminal justice system. Carol told me that “Skrzynski examined [her] first, then 
cross-examination by Fieger” (Poenisch Interview: March 16, 1996). Specifically, in 
response to a general question about the lawyers, she said that “there was evil in 
[Skrzynski’s] eyes.” Almost immediately thereafter, she told me that “I don’t like 
[Fieger’s] whininess, although it’s effective and wins cases -  it’s theatrical. I like 
someone calm and collected, he didn’t get my mother’s name right and he got the 
name of Khalili’s illness wrong with extra syllables” (Poensich Interview: March 15, 
1996).
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As to Judge Cooper, Poenisch remarked that she “felt so sorry for her, because 
she stood up two years ago and said [the statute banning assisted suicide] was 
unconstitutional174 ... she’s trying to be impartial and keep her job ... walk a thin 
wire and did it well” (Poenisch Interview: March 15,1996). One reasonable 
conclusion is that she reacted favourably to Judge Cooper herself, or to a judge as a 
neutral and impartial arbiter, and unfavourably to adversaries whom Carol perhaps 
perceived as taking on the persona of their positions in court. Ultimately, her take on 
the matter in 1996 was “whether it should be in court, legislature or medical 
profession, it’s three circuses at the same time” (Poenisch Interview: March 15, 
1996).
Carol’s 1996 comments during our in-depth interview were prophetic in two 
ways. First, they anticipated the sort of balancing act that Judge Cooper would have 
to engage in three years later -  demonstrated most prominently when sentencing 
Kevorkian to prison, rather than continuing Kevorkian’s liberty, as implied at length 
in the bail hearing on March 26,1999. I shall discuss the options under sentencing 
guidelines in Chapter 6, and Judge Cooper’s preliminary decision to depart from 
them, which she subsequently altered, to the extent of adhering to the guidelines; 
matter which I also touched upon this in Chapter 3.
Second, Carol’s comments served to foretell her own involvement in the 
Proposition B assisted suicide ballot initiative. That legislative effort was officially 
begun in 1997 by a group that called itself “Merian’s Friends” in honour of her 
mother, and was defeated in 1998 by a 3-1 margin shortly after the Tom Youk
174 This appears to be a veiled reference to the 1994 Hobbins/Kevorkian decision.
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euthanasia (although prior to its broadcast into the collective awareness in November 
1998).175
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown how some of the Kevorkian Families 
experienced the medically hastened death of their family member. I have also 
examined family and friends’ reactions to the criminal justice system and to the state 
that brought Kevorkian to trial relating to their family member decedent. In addition,
I have explored their perceptions of the medical system and care provided to their 
family member. The family units, such a factor in the patients’ lives, were socialized 
into ritualistic roles in court -  even where those roles departed from the normal court 
experience. Acquittals were secured in cases where there was testimony regarding 
consent and family approval, while conviction was the result in the case where 
evidence of consent and family testimony was judicially barred. These seemed to be 
implicit approval where there was consent and family approval in the assisted suicide 
and homicide trials of 1996, and disapproval of the defendant legally standing alone 
in the euthanasia trial of 1999 (as e evidenced by the conviction). Individual family 
members were treated as bit actors in the trials, and some, like the Youks, found their 
role left on the cutting room floor during the production that was the criminal trial and 
the sentencing that followed a few short weeks later.
The Kevorkian decedents, and their survivors, were the mirror image of those 
considered by Rock (1998). Rock noted, “having been willed and intentional,
175 A study of Merian’s Friends and the beginning through end of the efforts to pass Proposition B, 
officially known as the Merian's Friends Physician Assisted Suicide Initiative, could itself become a 
full length work, taking as its point of departure the intersection of Rock’s 1998 book, After Homicide: 
Practical and Political Reponses to Bereavement and the Dutch study of considering families after 
euthanasia, published in the British Medical Journal by Swarte et al. (2003); however, that is beyond 
the scope of the current chapter.
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homicide could have been otherwise, and the existential reality of the survivor is 
certainly bound up with pressing questions about how it could have been permitted, 
whether it could have been prevented and what it signifies about the workings of the 
moral and social order” (Rock 1998, p.54, footnotes omitted). These particular 
families were involved in units where their beloved family members made decisions 
over time, and included the families in the decision making process, though not the 
ultimate decisions. As something of an irony, rather than perceiving the grief 
associated with loss as overpowering, their experience with the criminal justice 
system would fill in the blank for the “it” signifying “grief’ where Rock wrote “it is a 
confusing experience for which there are only meagre scripts, an experience which 
swamps the etiquette of everyday life and social estrangement can follow” (Rock 
1998, p.54).
A further irony is that the Dutch experience has yielded quantitative data 
suggesting that families were emotionally better prepared and their grief was either 
lessened, or there was less incidence of what Swarte et al. referred to as clinical 
traumatic grief,176 in cases where cancer patients availed themselves of euthanasia 
rather than experiencing a “natural” death (Swate et al. 2003). Moreover, I conclude 
that the Glaser and Strauss trilogy on death and dying predicted this as early as the 
1960s. While I do not anticipate that each family of each person whom Kevorkian 
hastened (or assisted hastening) would feel this way,177 the Youks, the Millers and the
176 Swarte et al. cite Jacobs et a l ,  “Diagnostic Criteria for Traumatic Grief,” in Death Studies 2000:24. 
pp.185-199.
77 For example, a staff article by ctv.ca, “Smiling Jack Kevorkian released from prison,” updated 
Friday June 1, 2007, on the occasion of Kevorkian’s release from prison, quoted Tina Allerillie, sister 
of ms patient Karen Allerellie, who was found dead in a Michigan hotel room in August 1997, after 
contacting Kevorkian for assistance; “Allerellie told CTV’s Canada AM that it’s been 10 years since 
her sister’s death, but hearing of Kevorkian’s release opened up old wounds .... She blames Kevorkian 
for her sister’s death. Tina Allerellie said that if  Karen wouldn’t have learned about him through 
newspapers, she may have worked to manage her illness instead of looking for a way out.” While the 
Allerellie case was not prosecuted during the Gorcyca era (the new Chief Prosecuting Attorney 
declined to prosecute Kevorkian for assisted suicides, consistent with his election platform that it
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relatives and friends of Merian Frederick clearly had structural support for themselves 
and their family members.
One surprising finding was that some of this structural support may have 
actually emanated from Fieger, acting and directing on Kevorkian’s behalf, and was 
beneficial to both sides of the equation i.e., both the families and the defendant were 
supported. Families benefited from social support, but as Carol observed, this was 
only after the death occurred. I conclude that some of this support was organized for 
Kevorkian’s benefit, as June Miller’s interview comments suggest. It was implicit in 
the interviews and statements that Kevorkian dealt with families before a death, while 
Fieger and Kevorkian’s assistants (including his sister Margo) mobilised them 
afterward. This seemed to be so until the final trial of Kevorkian for the Youk 
euthanasia, when Kevorkian sought to mobilise the Youks for court and the 
prosecutor mobilised the judge to exclude the family from testifying.
Some Kevorkian Family members expressed a clear wish that the support 
systems had been there in advance of the deaths -  for them, for the families, not just 
to look good for the media or the courts after the death has already been hastened. 
While this gap may have been part of what sparked Carol Poenisch as a physician 
assisted suicide advocate, it is interesting to note that her efforts went toward 
establishing a (failed) voter initiative to allow for assisted suicide. Another
wasted resources to prosecute someone seemingly unconvictable), a mid-1990s juxtaposition is that 
Robert Mattner, one of Marjorie Wantz’ two sons testified on April 19, 1996 that he regretted writing a 
letter saying that he approved of his mother’s intention to commit suicide, which he said that he did 
only because his mother told him Kevorkian would not perform the assisted suicide without being 
released from civil liability. An article published on April 20, 1996 by the Chicago Tribune, “Coroner: 
Kevorkian Pulled the ‘Trigger’,” compiled by David Eisner did not focus on the legal liability issue, 
but rather on the family issue, quoting Wantz’s son as saying, “I just wish there was a way she was here 
to see her grandchildren.” Conversely to the Kevorkian consent forms and releases from civil liability 
is the case of Dr. Anna M. Pou, a New Orleans doctor whom a grand jury declined to indict regarding 
four alleged euthanasias by lethal injection of elderly patients in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 
2005; Dr. Pou is, however, facing civil liability suits by three of their families. Adam Nossiter,
“Grand Jury Won’t Indict Doctor in Hurricane Deaths,” The New York Times, July 25, 2007, p. A10 c. 
5-6.
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unanticipated conclusion is that for these families, the advances in medical technology 
had not progressed enough to save their loved ones. These (although not necessarily 
all of Kevorkian’s) families and patients expressed this as frustration with 
degeneration of failing bodies, not marginalisation by the medical system. In a sense, 
these families had the opportunity during the lives of the patients to seek to prevent 
the deaths. Once that was not possible, then the next recourse was to manage the 
deaths with a “professional” and to control the temporal aspect of the dying trajectory.
Perhaps their sense of the workings of moral and social order was undermined 
most by the workings of the criminal justice system, though as I shall argue in the 
next chapter, the media had a role as well. Perhaps the underlying issue is as much in 
the struggle over constructing the framework and assigning roles in criminal court 
sphere pertaining to cases of medically hastened death. As I shall underscore in the 
next chapter (pertaining to the media in the Kevorkian cases), perhaps a preliminary 
conclusion is that the vocabulary is imprecise as to whether hastening death is a 
medical intervention, or a crime, or by a curious turn of the law, both simultaneously. 
Family members may be victims (in a prosecutorial stance) or supporters (as with the 
Millers, Youks and Frederick/Poenisch families) or both, with the differentiation 
being one of linguistic construction or professional labelling. In the next chapter, I 
shall delve further into how the criminal court dealt with such decisions, and how the 
law and the facts of the cases were conceived, as further framed by the media.
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Chapter Six: Media and the Kevorkian Case
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall turn my attention to the very factor that focused local, 
national and international attention on Kevorkian in the first place -  the media. I 
began this doctoral study and fieldwork under the assumption that the media reported 
the news. By the end of the fieldwork, that assumption had been challenged and
178refuted with respect to this issue generally, and Kevorkian specifically. A 
conclusion emerged that the media in fact precipitated and sometimes created the 
news of Kevorkian, and with it, the politics of euthanasia and assisted suicide. This 
harkened to Daniel J. Boorstin’s essay in The Image or What Happened to the 
American Dream, entitled, “From News Gathering to News Making: A Flood of 
Pseudo Events,” (1962, p.7-45). Boorstin argued that a “pseudo-event... is a 
happening that possesses [four] characteristics,” which in short are that “it is not 
spontaneous,” that “it is planted primarily (not always exclusively) for the immediate 
purpose of being reported or reproduced,” that “its relation to the underlying reality of 
the situation is ambiguous,” and that “usually, it is intended to be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy” (1962, pp. 11-12).
I shall argue that the media reached beyond the frequently -  and correctly -  
held belief that Kevorkian used and manipulated the press. In this chapter, symbiotic 
relationships between Kevorkian and members of the media during a short period of
178 In this regard, I note the comment and experience of Villanova Assistant Professor Matthew Robert 
Kerbel, a former television news writer, who in his book Edited fo r  Television: CNN, ABC and the 
1992 Presidential Campaign, wrote of a personal experience in which he was invited by random lot to 
a White House event reception (in which 2,000 members of the general public -  which was his role at 
this event -- were issued invitations after they sent in postcards for lottery drawing) and of the related 
press coverage (where he was on the other side of the camera), “The impact of television is such that it 
has grown beyond simply covering the story, beyond shaping the story, to the point where it is the 
story” (Kerbel 1994, p. xiv)(emphasis in original). I would argue that Kerrbel’s commentary, while 
unrelated to the coverage of assisted suicide, shows that the sort of assumption challenge I experienced 
may also surprise media members.
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time, between November 1998 and March 1999 are my focus, as I shall amplify. For 
purposes of this thesis and unless otherwise specified, “media” will collectively refer 
in general to radio, television and newspapers. Some of these will be utilized as 
sources, and also critically examined (particularly the 1998 60 Minutes segment, 
“Death by Doctor”, in varying formats).
In some interviews, transcripts, tapes (such as talks given by speakers at the 
February 22 1999 University of Michigan Law School/Journalism Fellows Ann Arbor 
conference) people have used the phrases to refer to “the media,” or collectively to 
“the press,” but actually refer to a specific medium. Interviewees sometimes also did 
so. I am deliberately keeping the colloquial language of such statements and 
interviewees intact. This is so as to reflect their statements with as much accuracy as 
possible, rather than to superimpose my own interpretation or to alter the reader’s 
interpretation (although in some areas, I am using footnotes as a vehicle to offer my 
analytical commentary as a parallel text without interrupting the flow of the speaker).
One factor in my decision to do this was that many interviewees over the 
course of the project -  from family members to judges -  pointedly told me that the 
media either misquoted them or misrepresented their quotes, as was discussed in other 
fieldwork-based chapters. Thus, I chose to let the actors’ own words speak 
unfettered One such ongoing thematic example was the actual words spoken in court 
during the 1999 Kevorkian/Youk euthanasia trial. The actual words spoken in court 
and played on videotape are bounded in by the transcribed minutes of the court 
proceedings. However, the jury found facts by way of its verdict, whereas the media 
and the appellate court interpreted “facts” elicited. Because there are some 
discrepancies, which I am pointing to in an analytical and political way, I think this is 
an important effort. In addition, in some places, I shall use lengthy quotes -
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particularly as to arguments of the prosecutor and Kevorkian relating to their 
interpretations of the evidence that present opportunities for contextual analysis.
By way of an explanation of the latter point, it is best to state at the outset that
170Part I will focus on how the original 60 Minutes programme segment, “Death by
Doctor” was created, along with statements and new facts regarding key actors in that
process of development. First, there was a taped segment broadcast nationally in the
United States by the CBS television network on November 22, 1998, which I am
calling “the original 60 Minutes programme.” Second, and the focus of Part II of this
chapter, there was a redacted (as to the pain and suffering of Tom Youk, and as to the
family support of Kevorkian) version of the tape introduced at the 1999 trial by the
prosecution, which I am calling “the prosecution’s clips of the 60 Minutes”
180programme or transcript, as appropriate. I shall juxtapose the prosecutor’s clips, 
along with the prosecutor’s and Kevorkian’s constructions of these during their 
opening and closing arguments, so as to show the character of the kaleidoscope 
presented to the jury. Thus, the focus of this chapter is on the social and legal 
constructions of one specific media event, which literally proved to be a critical factor 
at the Kevorkian (1999) trial, as the statements of crucial actors indicated.
179 On network television programmes, there are standard intermittent breaks for commercials from 
sponsors who pay for the time, and in effect, the programme production costs. In 60 Minutes, which is 
a one hour (60 minute) long show, there are generally three segments of 17-18 minutes each, 
surrounded or separated by commercials (advertisements), as well as a brief programme introduction, 
conclusion, and occasional editorial spot of four to five minutes. These add up to 60 minutes (time, not 
title) and in general parlance, the portions of network programmes between commercial breaks are 
called “segments.” I would note that in a cable television show, there is generally uninterrupted 
broadcast (because the consumer or viewer pays a premium each month for access to these shows), and 
when there is a shortfall of time between programmes, the cable stations generally advertise their own 
upcoming shows, rather than other commercial products such as soda, cleaning products, bath products, 
store sales, and the like. Indeed, in selling the “Death by Doctor” tape, CBS sells only the segment 
(and charges additionally for each segment broadcast during the same hour), although the commercials 
are not included in the for-sale tapes. I would also note that in creating programme clips or clips for 
my Faculty Innovation Grant in 2005-2006, the instructional technologist referred to “clips,” rather 
than segments -  however, some of the clips were portions of shows or movies, rather than unique 
whole segments or entire programmes. As a further note, my “Death by Doctor” and “Choosing Life 
(A.L.S.)” clips I posted for my students did include the entire segments as sold to me by CBS in 2006.
180 The prosecutor used both edited clips of the videotapes and a transcribed version of the edited clips, 
as I shall discuss and amplify in Part II.
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Part I: Media Constructions o f the 1998 60 Minutes Kevorkian/Youk “Death by 
Doctor” Segment181
In his book After Homicide: Practical and Political Responses to
Bereavement, Paul Rock (1998, p.225) argued:
Crime is central to the project of the mass media, and its stories about 
violence and killings that are at its very core. Murder and manslaughter are 
assumed to be objects of abiding public interest. They have a pathos, 
immediacy, urgency, and horror that lend themselves to ready dramatisation, 
and they are continuously being translated into news, entertainment and 
‘human interest’ stories for public edification. They are, moreover, thought to 
exemplify truths about the condition of society, and the exceptional homicide 
will be pored over incessantly for the moral, personal and political lessons it is 
thought to impart about the way we live (Rock 1998, p.225, footnotes 
omitted).
I conclude that the Kevorkian/Youk euthanasia fell squarely within this 
ambit, which I shall amend to the extent of adding to Rock’s statement that the 
Kevorkian/Y ouk case has been offered as an opportunity to pore over the way we live 
and the way we die. Indeed, the process began immediately after the 60 Minutes 
broadcast. It also spurred a conference, Michigan Journalism Fellows/University of 
Michigan Law School182 conference on “Covering Assisted Death: the Press, the Law 
and Public Policy,” on February 22,1999, which I attended.183 In my 1999 
conference report, I observed that:
1811 delivered a related paper, “Representing Reality? The Socio-Legal Implications of 60 Minutes of 
‘Dr. Death’,” at the annual conference of the British Society of Criminology, London, England (2007).
182 My visual styling of this co-sponsored conference is two-fold. First and with regard to the styling of 
punctuation, the use of “/” is to show that the Michigan Journalism Fellows and the University of 
Michigan Law School were two entities within the University sponsoring the conference (rather than 
use of “-“which would place one in a subordinate position to the other. Second, I chose this as a visual 
representation of separateness of the Journalism Fellows and the Law School (I shall discuss visual 
representations and the work o f Hulme later in this chapter, regarding visual representations of 
transcripts and videotapes), to signify separateness of the professions.
183 In addition, I prepared a conference report for publication, “Covering Assisted Death, The Press,
The Law and Public Policy,” University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) (1999); in 4(3) Mortality, pp.334- 
335 (1999). Also related to some of the discussion in this section was "Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide: Is 'All the News That's Fit to Print' Really?” Social Contexts of Death, Dying and Disposal, 
Sussex University (1995).
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Paradoxically, this conference examining and calling the media to 
account might well not have been held if Charles Eisendrath, the erudite 
Director of the Michigan Journalism Fellows Program, had not acted as the 
conduit by which Kevorkian delivered the Youk tape (via Kevorkian friend 
and former New York Times contributor Jack Lessenberry) to the American 
programme, CBS News magazine “60 Minutes.” Eisendrath was thereafter 
prompted to create this extraordinary and balanced conference exploring 
whether the media “offers fresh solutions.” Experts of various disciplines and 
views regarding euthanasia and assisted suicide had a unique opportunity to 
comment upon the quality and quantity of media reporting, and precipitation, 
of the assisted death cases and controversy (Pappas 1999, pp. 334-225).
What I did not note in the brief conference review, but which I shall examine
in this chapter, is the role played factor in the process by two actors in the
Kevokian/Youk media foray -  the roles of Michigan Fellows benefactor and CBS
moderator Mike Wallace and former Michigan Fellow and journalist Jack
Lessenberry, as highlighted in the conference and the 1999 trial.
A. The Ann Arbor Conference Regarding Media Coverage o f Assisted Death
The Ann Arbor conference was held a bare three months after the original 
November 1998 60 Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment was aired, and the 
conference preceded the Kevorkian (1999) trial by a month almost to the day.184 The 
keynote speaker was Professor Arthur Caplan, Director of Bioethics at the University 
of Pennsylvania, though his remarks were given as a critique of the failure to address 
the bioethical aspects of the Youk euthanasia case by the media and a missed 
opportunity to distinguish between physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and end of 
life care. Timing is everything here. Caplan said that he had conducted a content 
analysis of 1400 “stories” between the airing of the original 60 Minutes programme in 
November 1998 and February 1999 (including print and television, but not including
1841 have also reviewed portions of a tape of the conference subsequent to attending the conference.
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1 RSradio), subsequent to the airing of “Death by Doctor. He argued persuasively that
“Kevorkian hijacked the media with his own agenda” and particularly by Kevorkian’s
claim that “we have to help people to die or they suffer and remain in pain” (Arthur
Caplan, Ann Arbor Conference: February 22, 1999). Caplan held that “framing the
issue[‘s] presentation as a crime story overlooked the pros and cons of the issues and
merits of the case” from a medical ethics standpoint, with very little discussion of end
1of life issues, or the difference between active and passive euthanasia safeguards in 
jurisdictions allowing physician-assisted suicide (such as Oregon) and pain control 
issues (Arthur Caplan, Ann Arbor Conference: February 22,1999). Although there 
may have been other ways to phrase the various issues and problems, Caplan and his
185 When Caplan, along with co-authors Joseph Turow and John S. Bracken, wrote up their findings, as 
assisted by some eight graduate students, in “Domestic ‘zealotry’ and press discourse: Kevorkian’s 
euthanasia incident,” in 1 (2) Journalism 197-216 (2000), they focused their examination on print 
media coverage (197) and expanded their study to 1756 “pieces” or articles (202). Turow, Caplan and 
Bracken, identified their methodology as follows:
We investigated whether and how Jack Kevorkian’s 22 November 1998 appearance 
on 60 Minutes affected mainstream US newspapers’ discussion of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide. We examined newspaper coverage of these topics from 15 October 1998 through 14 
January 1999. To take into account any disclosure of the tape’s contents to the press before 22 
November, we considered that the month of the broadcast began on 15 November. (As it 
turned out, there was no such prior disclosure.) For article sampling purposes, we divided our 
time span into three months -  15 October -  14 November; 15 November -  14 December; 15 
December -1 4  January.
Using the Lexis-Nexis full text database of large and medium circulation US 
newspapers, we retrieved all articles that mentioned euthanasia or assisted suicide in the 
headline or body during that period; the number totaled 1756 in 129 papers. Because we 
noted that most of the articles clustered around the period of the broadcast, we were concerned 
that choosing a random sample directly from the population of 1756 pieces would not yield 
enough from the four weeks before and after that time. Consequently, we decided to 
randomly choose the same number of articles -200  -  from each of the four weeks. In the end, 
14 had to be discarded and we exceeded our sample for the second period by 10 articles. In 
total 586 randomly selected articles comprised our sample (Turow, Caplan and Bracken
(pp.201-202).
As an aside, in the article, the authors noted that “the research was funded through a grant from the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation,” (214), though at the conference, Caplan identified Pew as the 
source of research funding.
186 In terms of this dissertation, active euthanasia is considered as including affirmative causation such 
as in the Kevorkian/Y ouk intravenous lethal injection, whereas passive euthanasia is considered to 
involve cases of omission or of withdrawal of life support with the subsequent natural death of a 
patient.
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colleagues developed their findings for Caplan’s talk and the subsequent article in this 
way.
However, I would argue that Caplan’s studied remarks actually proved 
Rock’s 1998 argument. Caplan’s criticisms about the original “Death by Doctor” 
broadcast and the subsequent content analysis may be true, but a logical conclusion is 
that the 1,400 stories targeted an audience. This conclusion is reasonable whether the 
media are reporting or precipitating the news, and whether the target audience is 
reading newspapers or watching television stories.187 Kevorkian was seen as a 
“personality,” so the crime story eclipsed those of medical ethics, religion, and 
disability rights (Turow, Caplan and Bracken 2000, pp.204, 206, 211-212). I note 
here that this was despite the fact that a personality and crime story could also have 
been used to exemplify medical ethics issues and there was no apparent reason why 
the media did not do so.
At the Ann Arbor conference, Caplan remarked at length about “w/*o” the 
media chose to talk to -  the CBS executive producer (also at the Ann Arbor 
conference), prosecuting and defence attorneys (40%), law professors (20%), and he 
observed that Kevorkian himself “had a lot to say,” all with “less than 5% of 
comments from bioethicists, religious [leaders], disability groups [or anyone else].” 
(Arthur Caplan, Ann Arbor Conference: February 22, 1999). Although Youk had been 
under hospice care, hospice (as well as spiritual, financial burdens, and abandonment 
in psychological and social support) was included in a category that Caplan contended 
was “widely overlooked,” as was pain control. Notwithstanding the fact the 
Kevorkian had been a doctor (albeit stripped of his licenses), the subject of trust in 
doctors and caregivers received little attention in the stories Caplan reviewed, a
187 In a post-millennium environment, this could extend to Internet broadcasts and podcasts, and to 
online news, although these were not available at the time of the Kevorkian/Y ouk euthanasia reporting.
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finding Caplan commented was repeated in the lack of discussion of the possible
1 fifislippery slope after the original 60 Minutes programme.
However, the Ann Arbor conference provided a number of insights as to the
1 RQrole the media play in creating the news. Chief among these were remarks made by 
Mike Wallace and by Jack Lessenberry. Lessenberry’s involvement in the Kevorkian 
cases began with working as a “stringer” for The New York Times when he lived in 
Tennessee and increased substantially over time, with him sometimes seated at 
counsel table with Fieger’s team and Kevorkian during the mid-1990s trials, and 
attending private meals and meetings with them. I interviewed Lessenberry on March 
15, 1996 (after Kevorkian’s first 1996 trial), and he told me that he “focused on 
Kevorkian’s quirks and Fieger’s flamboyance” (Lessenberry Interview: March 15, 
1996). As an initial matter, the focus was on personality and dramatization and 
during the time that “Fieger control [led] access to Kevorkian,” and that Lessenberry 
“cultivated Kevorkian and Fieger, you bet you.” (Lessenberry Interview: March 15, 
1996). That early access worked both ways, according to Lessenberry, “if not for 
Geoff Fieger, no one would have heard of Kevorkian, he’d just be some crazy guy 
who killed 9 (sic) women” (Lessenberry Interview: March 15,1996).
Wallace, who was (and remains) a benefactor of the University of Michigan 
Journalism Fellows190 and Wallace House,191 stated, “our business is to cover news, to
188 Ironically, and later at the same conference, journalist and Wallace/Kevorkian intermediary Jack 
Lessenberry commented in his remarks that Kevorkian had tried to raise this issue. I shall discuss 
Lessenberry’s progressively escalating involvement in the Kevorkian cases more fully in the course of 
this chapter.
189 This seemingly colloquial usage, embraced by members of the press and numerous interviewees, 
seemed to treat any single medium as plural, as a grammatical, but not colloquial, anomaly. As I 
mentioned earlier, and in keeping with the speakers and writers, I am doing so as well, although with 
the acknowledgment that it is not grammatically proper.
190 Mike Wallace and his wife, Mary, a former CBS producer, fund the Knight-Wallace Journalism 
Fellowship and they have also donated “Wallace House,” to the programme for working dinners, 
colloquia, and study. Wallace is a graduate of the University of Michigan, where he earned his first
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stimulate and to stir debate ... we try to put flesh and blood into these issues.” (Mike 
Wallace, Ann Arbor Conference: February 22, 1999). Wallace said:
Let me tell you how the program about Jack Kevorkian was generated 
... I [Wallace] had not met Jack Kevorkian ... [I had a call] from Charles 
Eisendrath [Director of the University of Michigan Knight-Wallace 
Journalism Fellows].... [He told me] there was a first rate former Michigan 
Journalism Fellow, Jack Lessenberry, sitting there, who wants to talk to 
[Wallace]. Jack Lessenberry told [Wallace] on the phone that Dr. Kevorkian 
wanted to speak to me on the phone about a video he had, please give me the 
number where I will call [Kevorkian], and [Wallace] did.
I said, ‘Dr. Kevorkian would you kindly send me a copy of the tape’.... 
[T]he next morning, it was on my desk.
I was stunned. It was immediately apparent - it  was a very big news 
story, which was our business (Mike Wallace: Ann Arbor Conference: 
February 22, 1999)(emphasis added).
Wallace briefly outlined the protocols he began to follow in considering 
whether and how to broadcast:
I showed [the Kevorkian tape] to a few people in the [CBS] office first, 
and it was virtually unanimous that it was the kind o f piece America should 
see. Why?
Assisted suicide was in the forefront of the national agenda for the past 
decade, especially.192 [But the] subject of euthanasia was less on the forefront 
of the American people,193 and it seemed to me to put flesh and blood on this
degree. The programme invites 12 American journalists and four to six international journalists for a 
one-year cycle annually.
191 Wallace has also openly talked about his battles with clinical depression and a failed suicide attempt 
of his own, in which he took an overdose of pills.
192 At first instance, this sounds like “pack journalism” it fits within the ambit of “mass pursuit by 
reporters of a story illuminated and given authority by their own activities,” cf., Paul Rock, in 
Reconstructing a Women’s Prison: The Holloway Redevelopment Project, 1968-1988 (1996. p.29, n. 
146 and accompanying text) in which Rock cites, R. Ericson, et a l, Representing Order: Crime, Law  
and Justice in the News Media (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). However, in November 
1998 the day before Kevorkian called Lessenberry to put out the tape, and three weeks prior to the 
original 60 Minutes programme of the Kevorkian/Y ouk euthanasia, Michigan saw a (failed) ballot 
initiative to legalize physician assisted suicide. On a national level, the United States Supreme Court 
had contemplated assisted suicide in 1997 in the paired New York (Quill) and Washington 
(Glucksberg) civil cases (discussed earlier in this dissertation). During this same period of time, and 
thereafter, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (which had been voted into law by ballot initiative 
Measure 16 in 1994, and survived a 1997 ballot measure seeking its repeal) was implemented by the 
state and challenged by the federal government (where it ultimately reached the United States Supreme 
Court in 2005 and upheld on procedural grounds on January 2006 in Gonzalez v. Oregon, 2006 U.S. 
LEXIS 767), with the result that Oregon remained the only one of the United States to allow for legal 
physician assisted suicide and exempted state-licensed physicians from civil or criminal liability, 
where they complied with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act procedural safeguards, and dispensed or 
prescribed a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally ill patient.
93 This statement, while technically correct and accurate, is nevertheless incomplete due to a material 
omission taken as axiomatic by Michiganders, and implicit during trial. As I will discuss further in the 
next section of this part, Kevorkian called Lessenberry to promote the Youk euthanasia on election
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whole discussion, the whole debate (Mike Wallace, Ann Arbor Conference: 
February 2 2 ,1999)(emphasis added).
This description dovetailed with the argument of Rock (1973, p.74) that 
journalists “are governed by an interpretative faculty called ‘news sense,’ which 
cannot be communicated or taught (footnote omitted)... [and that] the critical task of 
capturing news is entrusted to an indescribable skill whose workings are uncertain.” It 
was also in keeping with what Howarth (2007, p.l 10) argued -  “what makes news is 
determined by what the media consider to be newsworthy and by the way they 
investigate and construct their accounts.” In addition, it would in time anticipate and 
underscore her observation that “the proliferation of news media around death events 
challenges the view that death has been banished from public discourse” (Howarth 
2007, p.l 10, citing also Walter 1991, 2004; Giddens, 1991; Mellor and Shilling,
1993).
Wallace told the 1999 conference body that Bob Anderson, the producer, flew 
to Michigan and then Wallace went in early November 1998.194 Wallace and
night, when Proposition B, the “Terminally 111 Patient’s Right to End Unbearable Pain or Suffering” 
ballot initiative proposed by Merian’s Friends, seeking to legalize assisted suicide, was defeated. Thus, 
Wallace was not faced with a simple and consensual medical euthanasia, but a complicated local legal 
and political issue, as will be expanded upon throughout this chapter by use of evidence and argument 
at trial, as well as background events leading to the Youk euthanasia and its subsequent publicity.
194 This was the same teaming for the June 3, 2007 post-parole Kevorkian segment in Wallace’s “My 
Favorite Stories” years later. I would further note and argue that this 2007 post-parole segment met the 
criteria of Rock (1973, p.76) enumerating, albeit for newspapers, a showing that “demonstrates that 
significant change has occurred during the time interval that elapsed between editions.” Among the 
events that took place between the original 60 Minutes programme in 1998 and the post-parole 
interview and broadcast in 2007 were Kevorkian’s trial and conviction, Kevorkian’s incarceration, and 
the segment was produced on the occasion of Kevorkian’s parole, with Wallace again as interviewer. 
One of the interesting aspects in this 2007 segment was that there was a very brief cut of Judge Cooper 
at the April 13, 1999 sentencing, saying to Kevorkian “You have been stopped.” This quote as used in 
the new 2007 edit created an impression that undercuts Judge Cooper’s previous favorable treatment of 
Kevorkian -  which included allowing him to remain at liberty following the jury verdict and pending 
sentencing, and only became what seemed harshly punitive in sentencing after Kevorkian told 
probation officials at a pre-sentencing interview that they “could not stop” him. Hence, the 2007 cut 
failed to show that Judge Cooper was actually being responsive to Kevorkian’s unregenerate and 
remorseless statement effectively promising recidivism if allowed to be sentenced to probation. 
Kevorkian apparently learned the lesson of this (which was further discussed in Chapter 3), and as 
Wallace and Kevorkian drove away from the prison on parole day, Kevorkian told Wallace he “[did 
not] feel like a free man. Parole is a virtual tether. ... can’t promote or practice assisted suicide ... talk 
in detail about the procedure, can’t advise, counsel anybody, can’t be present at a suicide or
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Anderson met with Kevorkian, and also met with the Youk family members. The 
family included Tom Youk’s mother, widow and two brothers, and formed what 
Wallace called a “very private family” in terms of the “business of publicity,” in 
airing this material, since “we knew that it would cause a stir” (Mike Wallace, Ann 
Arbor Conference: February 22, 1999). In this instance, as I discussed previously in 
the chapter regarding Kevorkian families, one might reasonably conclude that this 
was a bas relief to Howarth’s (2007, p. 100, citing also Walter et al. 1995) arguments 
concerning the contemporary trend in the ‘psychologicalization’ of grief and 
individualization of mourning styles -  that is, that the Youk family was a vehicle for 
teaching the American public a style of loss, grief and mourning styles in euthanasia 
or assisted suicide cases.195 The decision of CBS to include the Youks, who appeared 
quietly dignified in the “Death by Doctor” segment of the original 60 Minutes 
programme, would seem to be a continuing theme from the last chapter on families, 
and the preceding chapter on juries. That is, those popular and/or cultural attitudes to 
medically-hastened death (in the Youk case, by euthanasia) are continually emerging 
in discourse and in protocol.
In Ann Arbor, Wallace also engaged in a public re-examination of CBS and 
the decision to air the Kevorkian tape, as it was edited and narrated to create the 
original 60 Minutes programme broadcast approximately three weeks later. 
Specifically, Wallace reflected that he “agree[d] with Dr. Caplan that the media failed
euthanasia” (Kevorkian Interview on 60 Minutes, “My Favorite Stories,” June 3, 2007). When 
Wallace asked in 2007 what he would do if someone came to him to ask him for assistance in dying, 
Kevorkian answered “it would be painful for me, but I would have to refuse it, because I gave my word 
that I won’t do it again.” In my observations during the bail proceeding on March 26, 1999, Kevorkian 
gave his word that he would not assist in suicide or euthanasia pending sentencing using similar 
language of promise, a promise he honored in 1999 while awaiting sentencing, notwithstanding his 
statements. It is my conclusion that to say he is giving his word is the height of language of promise 
and intention for Kevorkian, a very earnest vow. This said, I would argue that it is an open question as 
to what Kevorkian would and will do in the days after his parole is concluded — which Kevorkian 
(who is a master of language parsing, in my observations) made no promises about.
195 In a way, this seemed to me to be evocative of Swarte et a l  and their study of Dutch families post­
euthanasia, as discussed in the chapter regarding families.
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to discuss the background of euthanasia and assisted suicide [and] we failed too at 60 
Minutes and particularly noted that the team had not sufficiently examined the Youk 
family background, and what Tom Youk’s medical condition had been, as well as the 
hospice care he received (Mike Wallace, Ann Arbor Conference: Wallace February 
22, 1999). The solution to this, in Wallace’s analysis, was that he “can see 
demanding, though it’s hard to demand, more time” (emphasis in original) (Mike 
Wallace, Ann Arbor Conference: February 22, 1999). Nobody (including me) 
questioned what this meant; I took it as implicit that he meant more time to develop 
and produce the segment. Wallace may have meant that they needed more time to 
decide whether to air the tape, but the more likely interpretation was that he meant 
that they needed more time to construct a segment in a balanced way.
Assuming that the latter was the case is consistent with another statement 
Wallace made. As a remedial effort, Wallace observed that “we have now gone back 
and talked to people with ALS196 around America, talked to people in hospice,” for a 
piece that was broadcast on February 28,1999 (which was within one week of the 
conference, and less than one month prior to the Kevorkian euthanasia murder 
trial).197 Wallace’s recitation (which almost sounded like an allocution and restorative 
effort) points to the possible conclusion that he had some regret about his role in a
196 As a brief reminder, ALS is, according to www.als.org, a short name for amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis, often referred to as "Lou Gehrig's disease," which is a progressive neurodegenerative disease 
that affects nerve cells in the brain and the spinal cord. Motor neurons reach from the brain to the spinal 
cord and from the spinal cord to the muscles throughout the body. The progressive degeneration of the 
motor neurons in ALS eventually leads to their death. When the motor neurons die, the ability of the 
brain to initiate and control muscle movement is lost. With voluntary muscle action progressively 
affected, patients in the later stages of the disease may become totally paralyzed. There is, as of the 
time of this writing, no cure or treatment that reverses ALS, and patients experience a decline until they 
die either of the illness or of another cause (such as opportunistic infection, accident, or as in Tom 
Youk’s case, a hastened death by euthanasia).
197 The title of the piece, “Choosing Life (A.L.S.)” was not named by Wallace at the Ann Arbor 
conference, but a date “will be broadcast in the next two to three weeks” was (Mike Wallace, Ann 
Arbor Conference: February 22, 1999). One might ask whether this was a previous scheduling, or 
whether the date was advanced. The segment was not pro-life per se, but it was about people choosing 
to live with, rather than to die because of, ALS (the same illness Youk had). In a sense, it was a reply 
to “Death by Doctor” in which hope and options were the focus, rather than the hastening of death.
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Boorstin style “pseudo-event” and his seeming descent into the fray of Ericson’s 
“pack journalism.” Wallace, as both CBS broadcast editor and Kevorkian 
interviewer, may have structured and sculpted the landmark narrative telecast segment 
of the original 60 Minutes programme; however, the media event was created with 
clay supplied by Kevorkian and Michigan newspaperman Jack Lessenberry. It is this 
latter that I shall now discuss and analyse.
B. The Role o f Reporter Jack Lessenberry in the Kevorkian Cases and 60 Minutes 
Programme
Some of the speed (of the production of the Kevorkian programme by CBS) 
was explained by reporter and Kevorkian go-between, Jack Lessenberry, who 
announced at the February 22, 1999 conference that he “thought he’d start out by 
revealing for the first time what really happened -  how the tape got to Mike Wallace”:
Kevorkian called me on election night when his former attorney, Geoff 
Fieger failed to be elected governor [on the same day that Proposition B, the 
‘Terminally 111 Patient’s Right to End Unbearable Pain or Suffering” ballot 
initiative proposed by Merian’s Friends, seeking to legalize assisted suicide, 
was also defeated]. I said, I feel fine (laughter). I met him the next day and he 
said, “I’ve done a euthanasia. I want to talk to you in your professor/media 
ethics role. I want as much attention as possible -  what do you recommend I 
do?
Lessenberry advised Kevorkian that “50 Minutes is the highest rated, most 
successful news show in the country,”198 to which Kevorkian reportedly said, “I like 
Barbara Walters” (an ABC senior moderator and news producer). (Jack Lessenberry, 
Ann Arbor Conference: February 22, 1999). Lessenberry then told Kevorkian that 
he thought, “Mike Wallace has an interest in this issue,” at which point Lessenberry
198 The prominence of 60 Minutes was certainly no secret. Indeed, in the 1999 fact based popular film 
entitled, The Insider, starring Al Pacino (as a 60 Minutes producer) and Russell Crowe (as a big 
tobacco whistleblower) and Christopher Plummer (as Mike Wallace, whose role in the film was that of 
a supporting player), within the first five minutes and in the second film scene sequence, Al Pacino has 
lines to the effect that “60 Minutes is the highest rated, most respected news show in America,” a line 
echoed later in the film by Christopher Plummer.
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quipped that Kevorkian replied, “I think Barbara Walters is really cute.” Lessenberry 
related anecdotally that Kevorkian asked if Lessenberry “suppose[d] Mike Wallace is 
closer to this issue than Barbara Walters?” Lessenberry told the conference that 
Wallace was 10 years older,199 “and that’s how history was made.” (Jack 
Lessenberry, Ann Arbor Conference: February 22,1999).
First, the proposition that Kevorkian was “shopping”200 around the tape of the 
Youk euthanasia was plausible,201 and Kevorkian reputedly had unsuccessfully 
approached Barbara Walters (a senior female counterpart to the senior Mike Wallace 
at another network) about showing an assisted suicide on television. Lessenberry’s 
connections to the Michigan Journalism Fellows and, in turn, to Wallace and CBS
199 The inference seems to be that Walters, who was then in her late 60s was further from death than the 
octogenarian Wallace, though both were seemingly in good health and alive (and working in television, 
though Wallace is semi-retired) as of the time of this writing.
200 1 use this word deliberately -  Kevorkian was not paid (or asking for money) for the tape, nor was he 
seeking to neither sell nor peddle the tape for money, and I note that to “shop” an item is a colloquial 
expression for an effort to distribute or disseminate, as was the case here. It is also a colloquial 
extension of the legal phrase to “forum shop” or to seek a friendly venue for a case.
201 Indeed, this would be an extension of the practice of forum or “judge shopping,” a practice that 
Kevorkian’s former lawyer, Geoffrey Fieger, had engaged in -  in 1996, “seeking to stop prosecution of 
Kevorkian, he filed thirteen separate suits and then, after each was assigned, withdrew twelve so that he 
could effectively avoid the random draw [of judges] and get the judge he wanted” (Betzold 1997: 2). 
Fieger was in fact officially sanctioned and received a fine of over $8,000.00 and an official 
professional “reprimand” for this. In the Matter of: Geoffrey N. Fieger, Michael A. Schwartz, and the 
Law Firm of Fieger, Fieger and Schwartz, No. 97-1359, 191 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1999). 
Kevorkian and Fieger had also engaged in prior video shopping efforts, as the New York Times 
confirmed in an article by James Barron with Alex Kuczynski, entitled, “Public Lives,” on November 
25, 1998 (the week after the “Death by Doctor” segment was broadcast by CBS on 60 Minutes), that 
Ms. Walters said no to Kevorkian. “Ellen Murphy, a spokeswoman for ABC News, said that a lawyer 
for Dr. Kevorkian had contacted Ms. Walters last year. But Ms. Murphy said that Ms. Walters and her 
bosses decided not to do a Kevorkian segment on ‘20/20,’ which had shown parts of a Dutch 
documentary on assisted suicide in 1994. ‘We made the decision at that time that we would not include 
the moment of death,’ she said, ’’out of respect for the audience or the privacy of the person who died.' 
The conversations with the lawyer for Dr. Kevorkian, Geoffrey Fieger, ‘never went that far along,’ Ms. 
Murphy said. ‘What they wanted Barbara to do was witness a death and presumably film it. Her 
immediate reaction was that was not something she was interested in doing.’ Of course, this would 
stand in contrast with the decision of Mike Wallace and CBS, which did broadcast the moment of Tom 
Youk’s death on a Sunday evening.
Later, it would be Walters who would be turned down -  by the prison, where she sought to 
interview Kevorkian with his permission. The prison invoked a rule not permitting media to film, other 
than stock footage. The resulting litigation was unsuccessful and the interview did not take place. 
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., a/k/a ABC  v. Michigan Department o f Corrections et a l ,  No 
228757, 2001 WL 63361 (Mich. App.), 29 Media L. Rep.20022 (Mich. App. 2001)(Not Reported). In 
this instance, “Not Reported” is a legal designation that the case is not reported officially and therefore 
may not be cited as precedent, but rather is solely decided in a way that is limited to the case at hand 
before the Court.
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showed the change in his role in the Kevorkian cases and how far entrenched he had 
become since the early coverage he relayed to me in our March 15, 1996 interview.
In effect, he had sought out Kevorkian and Fieger originally as a “stringer”
(occasional reporter) for The New York Times. (Lessenberry Interview: March 15, 
1996). By the time of the Youk euthanasia, Fieger was no longer representing 
Kevorkian and it would be reasonable to conclude that Lessenberry was effectively an 
agent of Kevorkian (and I would argue that he was effectively an unindicted co­
conspirator). However, at the Ann Arbor conference (at which Lessenberry correctly 
predicted that Kevorkian would be convicted in the Youk euthanasia), Lessenberry 
expressed himself as follows:
In the interest of full disclosure, while I vehemently deny that I am 
some sort of “apologist” [a reference and reply to the 1997 New Republic 
article by Michael Betzold, which criticized Lessenberry for ethics in his 
reporting on the Kevorkian cases and Lessenberry’s relationships with 
Kevorkian and Fieger] for Kevorkian, I do feel that people ought to have a 
right to choose to end their life, and in certain circumstances, to be able to 
receive medical assistance in doing so.
Turning back to our prime topic, the media has [sic] covered this -  
Kevorkian’s effect on the issue has been a two edged scalpel. Certainly on 
June 4, 1990 [before Lessenberry knew him, based upon our March 15, 1996 
interview], with his first in-your-face assisted suicide, Kevorkian has made 
this an issue in the public mind. Tim Quill202 didn’t do that. Derek Humphrey 
generally didn’t do that, all (sic) the Hemlock meetings and debates in the 
world never could have done that.
Kevorkian did. (Jack Lessenberry, Ann Arbor Conference: February 
22,1999).
I argue that it was actually Lessenberry, along with Kevorkian, who was 
constructing the narrative that would be attached to Kevorkian’s activities, and that 
Lesssenberry’s fellow reporters discerned this prior to the Youk case. Interesting
202 This is a reference to Dr. Timothy Quill, the hospice physician who invited prosecution in 1991 with 
his New England Journal o f Medicine essay on providing a lethal prescription to a cancer patient, and 
who subsequently sued New York State in federal court in what was to become the United States 
Supreme Court case of Vacco v. Quill 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997), as one of a pair of companion cases 
(along with Washington v. Glucksberg 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997), which challenged the Washington State 
ban on assisting in suicide) in which the Court held that there was no due process or equal protection 
right to assisted suicide as a matter of constitutional law.
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counterpoints to Lessenberry’s statement emerged from earlier (1997) statements of 
two Michigan reporters who were not on the panel at the February 22, 1999 
University of Michigan Journalism Fellows/University of Michigan Law School 
Conference, “Covering Assisted Death: the Press, the Law and Public Policy” in Ann 
Arbor. These two reporters were Michelle Kelly, working for The Ionia Sentinel 
newspaper during the June 1997 mistrial in Ionia County (whom I interviewed on 
June 17, 1997) and Michael Betzold. The latter was a former Detroit Free Press 
reporter who authored the 1993 book, Appointment with Doctor Death, and later 
wrote an excoriating criticism of Kevorkian, Fieger and Lessenberry for The New 
Republic, released on May 26, 1997 (shortly before the Ionia mistrial). I now add to 
my earlier argument that everyone has a story to tell or a vested interest that come into 
play in the Kevorkian cases. Betzold, in his 1997 New Republic article, noted that his 
1993 book “was based on [his] work as a reporter for The Detroit Free Press [and 
that] as [he] was starting the book, [his] cousin, Martha Ruwart, arranged to die with 
Kevorkian’s help rather than battle cancer to the end, [and] learned about this after 
she died.” While this may, at first blush, appear to be a more personal connection 
than some of the other interviewees, a common theme has emerged to the effect that 
judges, lawyers, jurors, legislators and task force members have often had some sort 
of private experience in the arena of end-of-life issues and cases.
Kelly and Betzold were, respectively, small town (in Ionia, there was 
generally a 5,000 person readership, according to the Kelly Interview: June 17, 1997) 
and big city established reporters. Both had harsh words about Lessenberry (for 
Betzold’s, I draw from the 1997 New Republic article; and I note that some of these 
were replied to by Lessenberry in 1999 at the Ann Arbor conference). If the Ann 
Arbor conference was an opportunity for the presentation of medical ethics and
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journalistic commentary on the media, Kelly and Betzold provided a “press on 
press”203 construction of the media, and pointedly on Lessenberry.
For example, Betzold wrote:
Journalists legitimize Kevorkian’s activities as medical practice by 
calling him a doctor, 04 without mentioning that his Michigan medical license 
was revoked in 1991, and that the only remedies he ‘prescribes’ are poisons. 
They call his customers patients, though people come to him to be put away, 
not cured. They call the deaths ‘assisted suicides,’ though no one really 
knows how his customers die (Betzold 1997, p.2).205
He continued (1997, p.5):
Normally, journalists are cautious in characterizing suspicious deaths, 
and those involved in them. But on the Kevorkian story, it is the norm for the 
press to report as fact whatever Fieger [Kevorkian’s lawyer in all the 
Kevorkian trials, except the 1999 Youk euthanasia murder trial] says.
Someone has died with Jack Kevorkian at the bedside. The coroner has ruled 
the death a homicide. In any other circumstance, the death would be treated in 
the press as such. But in this case, the headline reads, “assisted suicide.” Why 
are the media so willing to suspend disbelief and accept the view of the man 
accused of participating in the homicide. The answer, ultimately, is about the 
biases that journalists bring to their jobs, and a prime example is the work of 
one of the most influential reporters on the Kevorkian beat, the man who 
covers Dr. Death for The New York Times, Jack Lessenberry. Lessenberry, a 
Detroit freelancer who is the Times ’s principal writer on Kevorkian, pretends 
objectivity in his Times pieces. But in an op-ed column he regularly writes for 
[Detroit] Metro Times, a Detroit weekly, Lessenberry betrays his views, 
describing Fieger as “a brilliant lawyer” who seems to be on the brink of 
changing history. Kevorkian as a compassionate doctor who “has standards” 
and the police who pursue Kevorkian as “Keystone Cops” (Ibid. 5)...
There is much more to the relationship. Lessenberry admits he edited 
an article Fieger wrote for Penthouse, and that he passed on to The New York 
Times, via his own computer, an op-ed piece Fieger wrote and the Times 
published. Last summer [referring to 1996, after the two 1996 trials to 
acquittal], Lessenberry threw a party with Kevorkian and Fieger as the guests 
of honor. Fieger recommended that ‘Frontline” producers hire Lessenberry as 
a reporter for a 1994 documentary, “The Kevorkian File”; they did so. Last 
September (1996), in the Times, Lessenberry broke the story of Fieger’s
203 All three -  Betzold, Kelly and Lessenberry -  wrote for newspapers and/or newsmagazines, thus this 
phrase.
041 now note that in reviewing portions of the 1999 trial transcript of testimony, opening and closing 
arguments, the court reporter identified Jack Kevorkian as “Dr. Kevorkian,” as were many references 
on the record. I would argue that a rhetorical question emerged -  ought one to conclude that the 
criminal justice system in some way still legitimized him from this?
205 An online version of Betzold’s New Republic article is referenced with page numbers 1-9; however, 
the original 6544-word article was printed in hard copy of the May 26, 1997 issue starting on page 22, 
under the headline, “The Selling of Doctor Death.”
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revelation that Kevorkian had aided in unreported deaths of Michigan 
residents.... Lessenberry denies any bias in his New York Times stories. 
Although he hopes one day to write the authorized biography of Kevorkian 
(Ibid. 5).206
Less than one month later, and in the days after the Ionia County prosecution 
of the Loretta Peabody assisted suicide case ended in a mistrial (immediately
0(Y7following Fieger’s inflammatory opening), Michelle Kelly was also critical of 
Lessenberry’s multiple roles. Kelly told me, “if you write opinion columns, you don’t 
report on actual events” (Kelly Interview: June 17, 1997). One possible conclusion 
for such a general practice is because the role of an independent reporter is different 
from that of an editorial or opinion piece writer. Lessenberry answered this (though 
not specifically her) at the Ann Arbor conference celebrating,208 as well as criticizing, 
the original 60 Minutes programme he had actually had a major role in orchestrating:
I have won awards for my work on [Kevorkian] and I’ve come under 
intense fire for it. -  partly because I’ve written point of view columns about 
all of this at the same time I have done my more conventional reportage (Jack 
Lessenberry, Ann Arbor Conference: February 22, 1999).
At first blush, Lessenberry may have been addressing a difference in style or
of opinion. However, given his active role in the Youk case, and his symbiotic
relationship with Kevorkian, it might be closer to say that Lessenberry’s conduct
approached of co-conspirator rather than independent reporter. First, it is reasonable
to conclude that he had more severe conflicts of interest than even Betzold and Kelly
206 Ultimately, the author of the authorized biography, Between the Dying and the Dead: Dr. Jack 
Kevorkian’s Life and the Battle to Legalize Euthanasia, by friend and former Kevorkian assistant Neal 
Nicol, former Kevorkian neighbor Harry Wulie, and Cheeri Rao and with contribution by Kevorkian, 
was published in June 2006, with an acknowledgment to, but not authorship by, Lessenberry.
207 1 discussed this earlier in Chapter 3, with the support of interviews of the Ionia prosecutor and
i“dge-
For example, Faye Girsh, then Executive Director of the Hemlock Society, which advocated what 
she called “physician aid in dying” said she “[thought] 60 Minutes was brave and important,” after 
which she argued for “greater and more sophisticated use of double effect and terminal sedation.” (Ann 
Arbor conference: Girsh February 22, 1999). Since the principle of double effect, as discussed in the 
Bodkin Adams case, regards a primary intention of pain relief and/or comfort care, with an unintended 
secondary effect of hastening death, one possible conclusion was that Girsh was actually arguing for 
euthanasia by a more euphemistic phrase, and likewise as to terminal sedation.
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suggested, given that Kevorkian called Lessenberry in 1999 for advice on promoting 
and delivering the Kevorkian/Youk euthanasia tape, and given Lessenberry’s actual 
role in so doing with CBS.
Second, I conclude that Lessenberry was far more of an active participant in 
the Kevorkian events than an “apologist” or even taking favouring a position or even 
advocating one, by inserting himself into the actual process precipitating investigation 
and prosecution. Third, I argue that by actually being seated at defence counsel’s 
table during the mid-1990s trials (Pappas observations), Lessenberry’s mere presence 
constituted a compromise of attomey-client privilege. I conclude that this reached 
beyond Rock’s argument that “journalists religiously read their own and others’ 
newspapers, they consult one another209 and look for continuities in the emerging 
world which their reporting has constructed” Rock (1973, p.77, footnotes omitted).
Ultimately, the Ann Arbor conference showed that the original 60 Minutes
programme first, reflected the political ideology of members of the “press,” as the
media collectively were referred to in the conference title, and second, met all of the
elements of “newsworthiness” enumerated by Reiner (2007, p.324, drawing upon
Chinball and Jewkes). The Youk euthanasia broadcast was marked by immediacy,
dramatization, titillation and novelty. Third, structural determinants of news making
were displayed (Reiner 2007: 324; Rock 1973: 76-79). However, the media event and
original landmark narrative of the 1998 “Death by Doctor” segment of the original 60
Minutes programme was in the mainstream of homicide news. I find support for this
argument particularly as constructed and analysed by Caplan in his conference
remarks and by Turow, Caplan and Bracken (2000). I further argue that the politics
of death and hospice care for the dying was an afterthought. I find as the proof of
209 1 would point to a case in point here -  that Michelle Kelly told me she spoke with Mike Betzold 
shortly before the Ionia (1997) Kevorkian trial (mistrial) for assisted suicide of Loretta Peabody (Kelly 
Interview: June 17, 1997).
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this the announcement of Mike Wallace in Ann Arbor and the subsequent February 
28, 1999 broadcast of the 60 Minutes segment “Choosing Life (A.L.S.)” segment. 
This was less than three months after the landmark narrative broadcast and was one 
month before the Kevorkian (1999) euthanasia murder trial.
This part of the chapter discussed the constructions created by the media and 
the original 60 Minutes programme. As the original research shows, the media 
actually created the news in a relationship with Kevorkian so symbiotic as to 
approach conspiratorial (at least as to Lessenberry, if not others). Members of the 
media effectuated this by determining what was newsworthy and shaping the debate 
about euthanasia in Michigan -  and across America with a national audience. For this 
argument, I draw support from the fact that Kevorkian created the Youk euthanasia 
tape, but that it only became newsworthy after Lessenberry and Wallace became 
involved. Furthermore, the Youk euthanasia became prosecutable210 only after 
Wallace and CBS broadcast the “Death by Doctor” segment and Kevorkian interview 
some two months after Youk’s death.
In the next part of this chapter, I shall consider legal constructions of two 
tapes. These were the Kevorkian 1998 tape (i.e., the tape that Kevorkian and 
Lessenberrry arranged to be delivered to CBS) and the prosecutor’s clips of the 60 
Minutes programme segment “Death by Doctor.” For that argument, the words of 
those in court at trial and the legal construction of the prosecutor’s clips will be 
juxtaposed in an innovative methodological analysis -  that of parallel text by use of 
footnotes.
210 By this, I mean a prosecutorial policy and decision to prosecute -  rather than the culpable conduct 
of the defendant.
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Part II. Legal Constructions o f the September 1998 Kevorkian Tape and the 
Prosecutor’s Clips o f the November 1998 Original 60 Minutes Programme as 
Employed During the 1999 Trial
As I have already discussed and developed in Part I, CBS came to the decision 
to use the Kevorkian tape from September 1998 and then went on to create the 
November 1998 “Death by Doctor” segment. “Death by Doctor” included first, 
portions of Kevorkian’s September 1998 tape of his interactions (question and 
answer, as well as the purported consent colloquy) with Tom Youk, as well as the 
actual euthanasia. Second, the original 60 Minutes programme included narration and 
commentary regarding the September 1998 tape by both Kevorkian and Wallace 
during the course of Wallace’s interview of Kevorkian for the original 60 Minutes 
programme. Third, the “Death by Doctor” broadcast contained commentary by 
family members and experts.
The prosecutor in the final Kevorkian (1999) trial claimed that he had 
deliberately focused solely upon whether or not there was intentional criminal 
conduct that led to the death of Tom Youk, rather than upon the debate about 
euthanasia. However, as the trial went on, the politics of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide were referenced and argued by both sides. The former was set at the 
beginning of trial, and I argue that the latter developed in the course of this trial, brief 
though it was. My argument, presented through juxtaposition of relevant transcript 
quotes, is that this fitted what Livingstone, Allen and Reiner (2001, p. 182) called a 
“revisionist” aspect of oral history. As with Goffman (1959, p.211), I take as 
axiomatic that a trial inevitably is a literal oral history in an official legal proceeding 
and social construction of an alleged criminal event, circumscribed by lawyers 
presenting witnesses and evidence. Livingstone et al. noted:
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[0]ral history itself is caught between two opposing arguments. On 
the one hand, the construction of a history “from below” attempts to counter, 
or complement, the “harder” history based on documentary evidence (Dayles, 
1992). But such a history risks naive realism. On the other hand, oral history 
data is [sic] revisionist, for people tell stories about the past from the 
standpoint of the present and for the purposes of the present (Samuel & 
Thompson, 1990). Thus oral history interviews offer a persuasive rhetoric as 
well as a descriptive account, and the two may be epistemologically 
indistinguishable (Livingstone, Allen and Reiner 2001, p. 182).
In the 1999 Kevorkian trial, not only was there inevitable interpretation
during the oral court proceedings, but there was also a transcript.2111 suggest that this
transcript may be understood by the construction of Livingstone, Allen and Reiner of
919a hard history alteration, in that the prosecutor’s 9 minutes of video clips of the 
approximately 18-minute long “Death by Doctor” segment. The 18-minute version 
was broadcast as the original 60 Minutes programme and was pruned to a 9-minute 
version to match the elements of the crimes charged213 (and not any defences or 
excuses).
At this point in the chapter, I offer the reader an explanatory note in terms of 
how the words spoken (or video clips shown) at trial were reduced to the written word 
of the transcript. I further offer a contemplation of the impact upon presentation in 
this chapter for interpretation by a potential reader. Notwithstanding the fact that a 
trial is a formal proceeding, it is also an oral one, replete with spoken word, cadence, 
tone and overall demeanour. These words are taken verbatim from the transcript
211 This official record did not always match what transpired in the courtroom, such as during the post­
conviction bail hearing pending sentencing, where Judge Cooper referred in court to an “IV push” 
which has a different and more familiar construction than the more common phrase of “IV injection,” 
which the court reporter transcribed. Previously, I offered both of these in discussion of judges, but 
note it here as a reminder. Further, how the appellate court constructed the official transcript did not 
always match what was transcribed (in the less benign example of including in its appellate decision 
that the jury saw the original 60 Minutes programme, rather than carefully selected clips of 
approximately one half the tape, and omitting material at the discretion of the prosecutor); this 
subsequent appellate decision, as will be discussed later in this part, became an official legal 
construction of the trial in a way that neither occurred at the trial (which I was present at) nor in the 
official transcript, and regarded the fundamental piece of evidence.
212 Although the standard grammatical rule is to use written words for “one” through “nine” and 
numbers for 10 and on, I deliberately chose this numeric representation as a visual representation here.
213 By this, I make a social comment, not a legal criticism, as to Skrzynski’s choice as to how he 
created the prosecutor’s clips.
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(with citations to date, page, speaker details). Thus, this formal recorded written 
version of the words spoken includes fragments of colloquial sentences, word 
contractions (and in some places, contradictions) and other matters many a 
grammarian would likely shudder at seeing in an academic document or legal 
document or any publication. These spoken words by doctors, lawyers, and judicial 
officials, have been left intact so as to show the speaker’s flow. In turn, this afforded 
me here an opportunity to show cadence at the trial in a novel way; for this, I shall 
inevitably be compromising my analysis on grammatical matters, but have used 
original words, as transcribed and captioned by the court reporter at the 1999 
Kevorkian trial. In a sense, I hope I shall offer the reader an opportunity to see what 
the court reporter heard.214 One caution I issue however, is that tone, cadence and 
demeanour are (perhaps by definition) less obvious in a written rendition of an oral 
process.
In this regard, I draw some support from what would otherwise be an obscure 
source -  Keri Hulme’s 1983 novel, The Bone People, which won the Pegasus Prize 
for Literature. Hulme’s novel was originally a work created in an academic setting, 
and she wrote in her preface to the first edition,, “Standards in a non standard Book” 
{sic, reprinted in the Penguin edition published in 1986):
The editor should have ensured a uniformity (sic)? Well, I was lucky 
with my editors, who respected how I feel about... oddities. For instance, I 
think the shape of words brings a response from the reader -  a tiny, 
subconscious, unacknowledged, but definite response. “OK” studs a sentence. 
“Okay” is a more mellow flowing word when read silently. “Blue green is a 
meld, conveying a colour neither blue nor green but both: “blue green” is a
214 In one particular way, there will also be a transcribed version of what the court reporter saw, in that 
there are transcribed representations of a video that the prosecutor created and vigorously used in clips 
of the original 60 Minutes program, which in itself contained excerpts of Kevorkian’s September 1998 
tape of his interactions with Tom Youk. This material will be analyzed later in this chapter, and 
include what at first glance appears to be erroneous shifts in the line by line labeling, which in fact is 
directly quoted from the transcript as the visual representation of the court reporter’s visual and 
auditory perception of the tape.
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two-colour mix (Hulme 1983/1986, non-paginated reproduction of Preface to
the First Edition)(emphasis in original).
Hulme’s effort to create a method of written visualisation of an auditory 
experience was intriguing to me, and challenged me to seek to do likewise. Whether 
Hulme included this as an effort to offer an additional visual cue for the reader, or 
whether she included it as an effort to explain a freshman work containing an 
unorthodox practice that might be mistaken for illiteracy, I did not know. I did -  and 
still — believe that the disclaimer might be read in both of these ways. In using this 
passage, I have attributed both of these as important for two reasons of interpretation I 
shall now offer the reader of this dissertation. First, in my prior professional life, I 
experienced trial work both as a young trial lawyer seeing and hearing in the 
courtroom, and then as an appellate lawyer and legal academic by way of transcript 
review and reading. Since I was at the trial, I can rely upon my experience of seeing 
or hearing or may choose to rely upon reading of the transcript, with a visual/auditory 
recall along with the written rendition of the trial proceedings; a reader does not have 
this option.215
My intention in offering the reader any given passage as visually transcribed 
(i.e., how it literally appears on the page of the court record) is two-fold. First, as a 
former appellate lawyer, the transcript was the supreme source of what occurred at 
trial, and I wanted to afford readers an opportunity to come along with me to see the 
flow of the proceedings and the arguments depicted by the transcript.
215 In theory, a reader who attended the trial is in a position to do as I do; however, as a practical 
matter, even this would have been subject to varying factors of who was in or out of the courtroom at 
any given time, or their/my place in the courtroom -  for example, spectators at trial would surely have 
had a different experience than the parties or the lawyers or the judge, or even the jurors, the last of 
whom had observations of only that part of trial that was evidence or argument to the jury and whom 
did not experience of any prior Kevorkian trial. Similarly, members of the media would have been 
subject to not only similar varying factors, but to searching for their news story of the day/week (and 
thus, would not have had the transcript). Lastly, and upon my further deliberation of this, even were 
one to watch a tape of the trial now, the tapes did not have full courtroom vision -  one such example 
was the jury, another the entrance/exits that were so compelling to watch during verdict return.
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Second, I wanted to take the reader on the journey of how the material was
used and developed at trial, and offer my own interpretations as a parallel text.
However, I do want to point to a further matter which emerged for future exploration
in another study at another time -  the court reporters themselves engaged in the
01 (\process Hulme described above in rendering the transcript. Here, I shall simply use 
the Kevorkian transcript, with the grammar, quotation, and citation styles as depicted 
in the original, although the inevitable result is what would otherwise appear to be a 
lack of uniformity or a lack of grammar at times.
Introducing the case, prosecutor John Skrzynski argued on opening:
Now this is not an assisted suicide case . Tom Youk didn’t kill 
himself with Jack Kevorkian’s help. Jack Kevorkian killed Tom Youk by 
injecting him with drugs. And this case is not about the right to die. That’s a 
topic that’s to be discussed by all the people of this state and to be decided in a 
difference place. That’s not what this case is about.
This case is about Jack Kevorkian’s right to kill. (Kevorkian Trial 
Transcript March 22, 1999: 249-250).
You know, we wouldn’t even know that Jack Kevorkian killed Tom 
Youk at all except for the fact that Jack Kevorkian videotaped the killing. He 
videotaped the killing and then he took it to the CBS network and he gave it to 
them, and they aired it on their program 60 Minutes, in November to 
million(s) (sic) of people all over the country. You’ll get to see that tape that 
he gave to 60 Minutes,218 you’ll see that tomorrow. And what that tape shows 
is Jack Kevorkian killing Tom Youk injecting him with drugs.
You’ll also see excerpts of the actual 60 Minutes program and in those 
excerpts a statement that Jack Kevorkian makes to Mike Wallace about why 
he did what he did, and it gives insight to why he did what he did and into why 
we’re here. Dr. Kevorkian told Mike Wallace, I’ve got to force them to act.
He means the prosecutor. “They must charge me. He tells him, “Either they 
go” -  meaning the prosecutor -- or I go. If I’m acquitted they go because they 
know they’ll never convict me.” And then he goes on to tell Mike Wallace,
216 It would be interesting to pursue a line of research on this use and (literally) visual depiction of 
language heard in typed transcription, rather than to have an axiomatic use and bedrock source (this is 
not to say that I view the transcript as incorrect, other than where -in  rare instance -  particularly noted).
217 Although Kevorkian was also charged with assisting in a suicide, the prosecutor dismissed this, 
although Kevorkian moved to reinstate (Motion Hearing, March 16, 1999: 43-45).
218 While I highlight 60 Minutes, the court reporter generally simply typed 60 Minutes (sic) without 
quotes.
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“One of the two is gonna go and that’s why I did this. The issue has got to be 
raised to the level where it’s finally decided” (emphasis added).
And the issue that he’s talking about is his right to kill. Jack 
Kevorkain used the death of Tom Youk to publicize his own political agenda 
which is the legalization of euthanasia — that’s killing — and he did it in such a 
way that there will be no debate on this issue by all the people of this state. 
There won’t be any vote on a ballot by all the people of this state about this 
important issue. He did it in such a way that he forced the Oakland County 
Prosecutor to charge him with murder by having a murder broadcast all over 
the country, and that’s exactly what the Oakland County Prosecutor did. 
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 22, 1999: 252-253)(emphasis added).
Hence, at the 1999 trial, the prosecutor initially outlined to the jury a theory 
of the euthanasia murder case (his proposed legal construction of what and how a 
crime happened). The prosecution was thus circumscribed in its legal construction of 
Kevorkian’s conduct relating to the September 1998 euthanasia death of Tom Youk, 
rather than a social construction of the politics of assisted suicide or euthanasia.219 
While that was, and had to be, the prosecutor’s job, it was a contrast from the trials 
earlier in the 1990s.
This was the beginning of a short trial of less than one week, with 60 Minutes 
the key in a trial that had a swift and certain verdict by week’s end.
A. The Prosecutor’s Clips o f the Original 60 Minutes Programme as a Jury Media 
Loop220
Now, I shall examine what portions of the initial Kevorkian tape and the 
original 60 Minutes programme were used in the trial -  and what were excluded -  and 
how these may have affected the structure and the outcome of the trial. Kevorkian’s
219 As I shall argue later in this chapter, both the prosecutor and Kevorkian nonetheless moved on to 
make repeated references to the politics of euthanasia and assisted suicide during their closing 
summations.
220 I delivered a related paper, “Socio-Legal Constructions of Demeanor in the Criminal Law: A 
Spoken Past, A Taped Present, and A Digitized Future,” at the Midwestern Criminal Justice 
Association, Chicago (2005).
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acts, and his invitation to, and interview with, CBS, taken together, met Reiner’s 
(2007, p.316-318) requirements for the “logically necessary preconditions” of a crime 
-  “labelling, motive, means, opportunity and the absence of those controls.” This 
said, at trial, the jury did not see the originally broadcast landmark narrative 18- 
minute segment whole, but rather in carefully extracted parts (equalling less than the 
sum, and creating an entirely different whole, as I shall argue).
The original 60 Minutes programme was constructed by the media to show 
“Death by Doctor” upon the repeated, recorded request and purported consent of Tom 
Youk and with family approval. This may be as compared with homicide cases 
generally (Rock 1998, p.83). The representation was shown to the jury at trial by use 
of the prosecutor’s clips, which he repeatedly cited as the 60 Minutes tape. By doing 
so, rather than as excerpts, I would argue this progressively inculcating the jury with 
an interpretation of the clips as a different whole than the sum). Moreover, the 
prosecutor’s clips pointedly excluded details related to Youk’s pain and suffering due 
to illness and also excluded information and statements of the Youk family support of, 
and gratitude to, Kevorkian.
Further, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that this, similarly to the 
exclusion of any trial testimony of Melody and Terry Youk, was expressly “to prevent 
a jury nullification argument,” 248 MichApp. 373,438 (2001). This entailed a return 
to the Michigan folk culture of jury nullification in the Kevorkian cases, one that that 
might be raised by tugging on the sympathy of the jury for Youk by Kevorkian and to 
forestall the possibility of an acquittal like those of the mid-1990s.
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As I shall show, the results were not done justice (in the colloquial sense of the
991phrase) by transcribed pages of the cold hard record. In his opening, the prosecutor
hinted at this:
When you look at the evidence of this case -  and I want you to look at 
the evidence, especially the videotapes -  it will be difficult for you not to 
focus on Tom Youk when you first see this. But I urge you -  you’ll be able to 
take those videotapes into the jury room -  look at those videotapes over and 
over. Don’t focus on Tom Youk, begin to focus on what Jack Kevorkian does 
and what Jack Kevorkian says, and when you do that what you ’re going to see 
is a man who is breaking the law. Jack Kevorkian killed Tom Youk and Jack 
Kevorkian does not have the right to kill (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 
22,1999: Skrzynski Opening p. 260)(emphasis added).
Moreover, the appellate court, in its decision affirming Kevorkian’s conviction
and sentence, concluded “by noting that the jury, no doubt influenced by the gritty
realism of the videotapes defendant made as well as his flat statement of culpability in
the 60 Minutes interview, convicted [Kevorkian] of second-degree murder as well as
delivery of a controlled substance.” 248 MichApp. 373,405 (2001). Notwithstanding
the fact that I had seen the original 60 Minutes programme in the comfort and privacy
of a friend’s dwelling, I think it important to comment that watching clips played
221 On a number of occasions during my time as an appellate lawyer, the thorny question arose as to 
what a witness might have meant by intonation, or whether his demeanour reflected credibility. When
I became a judicial law clerk to an appellate judge, I was very sensitive to this issue, and took
opportunities to explore the question of witness demeanour, and (in a move that was considered highly
unusual), would seek to requisition tapes where available to consider the demeanour o f witnesses
beyond the typed pages, and to comment, as in the case of People v. Norton, 164 A.D. 2d 343 (1st Dept.
1990). In that case, Justice Carro (for whom I drafted decisions) wrote, “It is said that a reviewing court,
facing a cold, bare record cannot see, hear or have a real feel for the witness, but can only read the words
typed on the pages of the record. However, this reviewing court was not without benefit of examining the
demeanor (sic) of the victim Roldos. We have listened to his tape recorded recantation, and find Roldos to
have sounded calm, and fairly articulate, not fearful or confused. Roldos acknowledged talking to defendant
before going to see defense counsel but unequivocally stated that he had not been coerced or threatened in
any way.” My contemplations of demeanour carried on into this doctoral project and on into a subsequent
Faculty Innovation Grant in 2005-2006. In the case of the former, one of my explorations, shared by those at
the Kevorkian trial in 1999, was Kevorkian’s demeanour in the September 1998 Kevorkian tape, and the
prosecutor’s clips of the original 60 Minutes program; in the case of the latter (and a subsequent advanced
class I developed in “Crime, Law and Society”, I had students examine the CBS tape of the November 1998
program available for purchase, and read them the relevant portions of the trial transcript for discussion.
Further discussion of these is deemed beyond the scope of this writing, though I shall at some point develop
an article relating thereto.
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repeatedly in the court for the jury over a few days was emotionally.222 The 
prosecutor, during his closing statements (his initial summation and his rebuttal to 
Kevorkian’s summation), repeatedly referred to detail in the tapes, as well, to 
highlight this:
It’s a small thing, but you would think that he would close Tom’s 
mouth before he started taking the tubes out. Just tells you where his focus is. 
It’s not Tom Youk.
That wasn’t a movie, that was a real human. That was a man just 
killed before your eyes. And then again on national TV. Dr. Kevorkian took 
the tape, took this tape to CBS, a major network and CBS broadcast the most -  
one of the most intimate moments that a human being can have, the moment 
of their death. Broadcast to millions and millions and millions and millions of 
people. Why? Death with dignity. Why do this? (Kevorkian Trial 
Transcript, March 25, 1999; Skrzynski Closing at 41).
Thus, the film of the Youk euthanasia provided evidence and also provided 
avenues by which the prosecutor was able to argue intent. This may stand as a 
parallel to an argument made by Robert A. Ferguson in his 2007 book, The Trial in 
American Life. Discussing television viewers of court cases, Ferguson argued:
Advances in the electronic tools of observation have improved access 
to the extent that seeing on a screen can be more intimate than an experience 
in court.... An electronically fed image culture is complicating previous 
distinctions between private and public knowledge, observation and 
participation, reception as opposed to actual perception. Comprehension of a 
public trial now comes through video projection with recognition dictated by 
voice overs, sound bites, pictorial bombardment, action sequencing, reaction 
shooting, zoom camera movement, and constant but very selective repetition. 
Broadcasting reaches a huge but impersonal audience, one in which the sender 
cannot know the receiver or what has been understood in reception. From the 
other side, an individual viewer must cope in isolation with a regime of
222 The prosecutor implicitly acknowledged this in his summation rebuttal, when he argued: 
“[Kevorkian] said this is the final solution for Tom -  a final solution. You know, maybe there’s not so 
much outrage because of Tom Youk’s condition. [Kevorkian] said that we didn’t show much 
sympathy for Tom Youk. I didn’t broadcast Tom Youk’s death to millions of people all over the 
country. I didn’t do that. I didn’t videotape this man in his death throes. I didn’t do that, [Kevorkian] 
did. This. Didn’t even bother to close that man’s mouth [referring to Youk].” (Kevorkian Trial 
Transcript, March 25,1999: Skrzynski Rebuttal at 64). I conclude that by this, the prosecutor was 
arguing that Kevorkian did not show dignity for Youk while he passed away and died, which while not 
an element of the crime charged per se, pointed to a culpable level of criminal intent as opposed to a 
professional rendering of a medical service.
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seemingly authoritative appearances but without the benefit of full sensory
perception or context. (Ferguson 2007, p.268).
The Kevorkian/Youk euthanasia tape, with its original small screen intimacy 
designed for an at-home television audience, was brought into the courtroom on large 
screen view for the jury in the 1999 trial, whose jury members were compelled by 
legal duty to repeatedly watch and study. The jury was repeatedly, if not relentlessly, 
fed the large-scale life-sized223 electronically-fed images of the Kevorkian tape and 
the prosecutor’s clips of the original 60 Minutes programme. In fact, the in-court trial 
viewing time was approximately one-half of the original 60 Minutes programme, and 
the “constant but very selective” sections, were re-imaged to reach a small, but very 
personal, audience of the jury. The prosecutor as courtroom “sender” repeatedly 
played, editorialised and compellingly constructed the video clips for the members of 
the jury.
I argue that the 1999 Kevorkian jury was thus confronted by the actual 
authoritative appearances and arguments of the prosecuting attorney. However, 
unlike the home audience imagined by Ferguson, the Kevorkian jury was without the 
benefit of the full sensory perception or context of facts sympathetic to the defence 
that the original 60 Minutes programme would have provided in its 18 minute “Death 
by Doctor” segment. The repetitive playing and transcript reading of the abridged 
portions of both the tapes made by Kevorkian and the prosecutor’s clips of the 
original 60 Minutes programme and transcripts went palpably beyond the “gritty 
realism” the appellate court commented upon, and became the in-court equivalent of a 
media loop carefully excluding the original, wider media construction of CBS and
223 1 use the phrase “life sized” based upon my physical observations at the trial, which predated the 
proliferation of large screen television for home use, and thus would have been an unusual viewing 
construction. I argue that this is all the more so given that the original 60 Minutes programme was 
designed for at home-viewing and hence, by expansion was by definition and colloquial construction, 
the small screen of television.
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Mike Wallace.224 This was a departure from the “context” given during the issues 
trials of the mid-1990s, although it was legally correct.
Moreover, immediately when court commenced on the first day following jury 
selection and opening statements, the morning of March 23, 1999, the prosecution 
promptly introduced exhibits and distributed transcripts of its excerpts of the two 
1998 tapes, called “the Kevorkian tape” and “the 60 Minutes tape.” As soon as this 
task was completed, the prosecution played the two tapes for the jury. These were 
the excerpts of the September 1998 Kevorkian tape (from 8:40 AM to 9:16 AM, 
Kevorkian transcript March 23, 1999: 9-23) and the prosecution’s clips of the 
original 60 Minutes programme (from 9:17 to 9:26AM, Kevorkian transcript March 
23, 1999: 23-31). Two reasonable conclusions readily became apparent.
First, as a social observation, the first thing the jury experienced together as a 
jury was that on their first morning of service, before 10:00 AM, they were required 
to watch these two tapes, including the euthanasia of Tom Youk. Furthermore, that 
they saw excluded the purported balancing information included by Wallace in the 
original 60 Minutes programme (regarding the family, and Youk’s pain and 
suffering). This material, that Wallace implied at the Ann Arbor conference was 
insufficient, had nonetheless softened what had, in its original state, been advertised 
as “disturbing” material. Being literally and legally compelled to watch these 
seemingly private matters, including the moment of death, in a public space (in which 
the jurors themselves and the jury as a collective were being observed by anyone and
224 At the end of trial, this was underscored when the prosecutor played and read excerpts during his 
summation and further encouraged the jury to replay and to reread transcribed versions in deliberations.
225 I am constructing the presentation as playing the tapes to and for the jury, although the judge, 
spectators, lawyers and Kevorkian himself were all present for this video presentation; the reason for 
this is that evidence is introduced for the jury’s consideration, and that in this regard the target audience 
was of its member jurors.
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everyone in the court), would have made for an unhappy shared experience for group 
bonding (Goffman 1959, p.211).
In addition, and with tacit consent by both sides, “everyone did see the 
videotape, over and over, repeatedly” (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999: 
Kevorkian Closing at 57). I argue that while it is possible (indeed, even likely) that 
members of the jury had seen the original 60 Minutes programme in November 1998 
and before the March 1999 trial, the transcript does not have any specific evidence in 
this regard, though it does have a colloquy of the judge asking prospective jurors if 
they had heard of Kevorkian (with an assumption that they had, as discussed in the 
Juries chapter). Thus, I am making the necessary assumption on the basis of the trial 
record that the jury was exposed solely to the clips at trial, rather than to the 
programme segment in toto.
Whether one views the matter as a glimpse of the awesomeness of death (to 
recollect the Rev. Phifer’s interview) or embraces the prosecution’s theory of the case 
as a revelation of the monstrosity of murder, at best it had to be difficult for the jury 
members repeatedly to watch such matters in court without being able to take a break 
or to walk away226 or to change the channel or to have the opportunity of a discussion 
and debriefing. Given that the trial was of such a short duration (under one week
226 This phrasing is deliberate. On the evening of the original 60 Minutes broadcast, Adam Heilman, 
Esq., a high school friend of some 20 years invited me to come to his apartment for supper and to 
watch the much-anticipated programme. The friend, who was legally trained and who knew of my 
work and field work in the mid-1990’s, had a fair idea of what might transpire, but walked out of the 
room in the middle of the national broadcast, saying he could not watch anymore.
227 Students of mine who watched a “for sale” version of the original 60 Minutes programme in Spring 
2006, had the opportunity for both an immediate classroom debriefing discussion and also an electronic 
blackboard debriefing. I note here that they were repeatedly told prior to the April 2006 viewing that it 
could be difficult to watch, and that anyone who wished to absent him/herself from the class in Crime 
and Civil Liberties that day, or who wished to leave the room at any point for any reason or no reason, 
could do so. That viewing, which was conducted consistent with a grant study, also had benefit of a 
senior colleague, who had seen the original 60 Minutes programme in 1998 when the broadcast was on. 
This colleague and I commented on edited excerpts and then had a lengthy conversation about matters 
in each of our own families that related to the assisted suicide and euthanasia debate. Although not 
deliberately constructed as such, he and I effectively had our own mini-debriefing, in which we
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from jury selection to verdict, minus one day for the judge’s calendar day), I conclude 
that perhaps the jury’s deliberations period served as the discussion and debriefing 
opportunity, As the prosecutor noted in his opening, the jurors ultimately were first 
allowed to discuss the tapes “with 11 people that [they do not] know and ... with the 
whole world watching” (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 22,1999: Skrzynski 
Opening at 254). One might also wonder whether the jury convicted Kevorkian for 
his conduct and/or for his intentions based upon the bare facts of the case, or for his
audacity in sending the tape to the media and inviting both interviews and
228prosecution.
Second, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the prosecutor’s clips, 
composing his excerpted version of the original 60 Minutes programme was 
approximately half as long as the actual programme broadcast nationally in November 
1998. The prosecution’s excerpted version was tailored to excise any and all 
discussion of Tom Youk’s pain and suffering, in a specific effort to prevent any 
possibility of jury nullification230 in the Kevorkian case (248 Mich.App. at 438). 
Likewise231 removed by the prosecutor was the 1998 Youk family interview by
commented on the tape, our family matters, and the students’ immediate perceptions and comments in 
class after the viewing.
228 As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, the convicting jury declined to hold a press conference after the 
verdict and its members chose not to speak to members of the media, opting instead for an exit escorted 
by court officers. Hence, I would argue that the question remains open as of the time of this writing.
229 My choice to write that the prosecutor’s clips “composing” is phrasing to show, as with a musical 
piece of orchestration, a deliberate (indeed, literally creative) process; this to me is a more active word 
as to the prosecution role than to say the clips “formed,” which seems a more passive activity than what 
occurred.
230 Indeed, this was part of a sustained effort on the part of the prosecutor. For example, the appellate 
court noted that, “[b]efore trial, the prosecutor moved to preclude defendant from asserting the defenses of 
consent and euthanasia and from introducing any irrelevant testimony regarding Youk's medical condition, 
pain and suffering, and quality of life, and to prevent a jury nullification argument” 248 MichApp. at 438. 
This shorthand, with which even casual observers became aufait, referred generally to Kevorkian’s success 
in obtaining acquittals in earlier cases in the mid-1990s. I have given this aspect of the case further in-depth 
treatment in Chapter 4.
231 Although at first blush this seems to violate the axiom that a prosecutor is a disinterested officer of 
the court whose job it is to offer a balanced and unemotional account and evidentiary introduction of 
the underlying facts pertaining to the charge, the prosecutor in the 1999 Kevorkian trial was actually 
seeking to legally and correctly offer the jury the facts relating to the charges of murder and drug 
delivery for which Kevorkian was on trial. This is yet another way in which the Kevorkian prosecution
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Wallace, and the family members’ comments praising and thanking Kevorkian. What 
was left was no more than a Kevorkian narrated version of the Youk requests and 
purported consent, and of the Kevorkian euthanasia of Tom Youk by lethal injection.
Kevorkian’s statement in his summation to the jury may have exacerbated, 
rather than mitigated, the prosecutorial slant when Kevorkian argued at one point that, 
“I staged the whole thing. Really. I’m not much of a producer or a director in movie 
(sic)” (Kevorkian Trial Transcript March 25, 1999: Kevorkian Closing at 53).
These may initially seem to be contradictory statements. That said, I argue that the 
first is entirely consistent (and the second not inconsistent) with the general practice 
of videotaping surgical and medical procedures. This is a routine protocol for use as a 
tool in defending against medical malpractice cases, rather than purportedly 
consensual euthanasia and not for a mass audience. However, it would seem that 
Kevorkian also removed both his tape and the prosecutor’s version of the 60 Minutes 
“Death by Doctor” segment from the realm of Howarth’s argument (2007: 109) in 
terms of media and the debate on euthanasia, and “documentaries devoted to debates 
on moral imperatives and the ethical implications of birth, life and death.” At the 
same time, Kevorkian placed the tape of the Youk euthanasia and the prosecutor’s 
clips of the 60 Minutes programme squarely within Rock’s 1998 construction of crime 
(particularly murder) and the mass media (1998, p. 225), as an “exceptional 
homicide” to be repeatedly reviewed for lessons in the political and legal arenas, as 
well as the personal and moral arenas.
Perhaps it is ironic (or not) that Tom Youk’s brother Terry, who gave a 
lengthy oral statement on Kevorkian’s behalf at the April 1999 sentencing
was unusual, even as the prosecutor sought to confine the case to the elements and the limits of the law. 
I argue that the paradox here is that the prosecutor was actually seeking to be a disinterested officer of 
the court, by keeping emotional family matters (which Kevorkian sought to introduce on his own 
behalf) beyond the scope of the trial, a family reality which the history of the Kevorkian cases 
suggested would have trumped the legal theory.
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proceeding,232 was in fact a documentary-maker who had knowingly participated with 
CBS in the original 60 Minutes programme,233 although he was not present at the 
euthanasia of his brother. Terry Youk, as well as brother Rob, mother Betty and 
Tom’s widow Melody, gave CBS an interview for the original programme, that was 
again excerpted and played in the 2007 updated segment of Mike Wallace’s “Favorite 
Stories” on the occasion of Kevorkian’s parole.234 During the 1998 CBS interview in 
the original 60 Minutes programme (replayed in the 2007 post-parole segment), Terry 
agreed with Mike Wallace that it was “socially useful to have [Tom Youk’s death] 
broadcast.” Melody’s 1998 comment to Wallace was that she was “so grateful, I 
don’t consider it murder, I consider it humane.” While this had no legal force, I 
conclude that the expectation was for her statements of Kevorkian support to be 
played for the jury, which would have been consistent with prior trial inclusion of the 
families at trial. I note that this was replayed to a national audience again in June 
2007 on the occasion of Kevorkian’s parole, though excluded from the prosecutor’s 
clips at the Kevorkian trial.
The prosecutor’s clips at the 1999 trial showed Kevorkian struggling with the 
intravenous injection and Youk crying out “ow” in pain.235 They further showed
232 This was given in-depth treatment in the earlier chapter regarding families.
233 As an aside, I note that the Youk family was cited in the June 3, 2007 post-parole 60 Minutes 
segment of Mike Wallace’s “favorite stories,” but that images and words were taken from the Youk 
family in 1998 -  not contemporaneously with the 2007 parole, although the CBS edit lends a 
misleading appearance of immediacy and recency to the family clips in the 2007 production. That 
there was not a new statement in and of itself was not misleading, but the application of the 1998 
statements in conjunction with the 2007 release, taken together, created a different and almost 
inevitable interpretation for a television viewer who either has not seen the earlier programme or sat in 
the trial. When I first saw the 2007 broadcast, I took as an obvious given that the family member 
statements were from 10 years ago; however, colleagues I spoke with in the following days thought the 
Youk statements were imminently recent, which drew attention to this as a possible media 
manipulation of prior statements as present in nature.
234 This begs the currently unanswered question of why no new updated interview or supporting 
statements from the Youks were included in the 2007 segment, which might appear to invite a 
presumption of family ambivalence or reluctance.
35 There was a similar description of one of the mid-1990s cases by Michael Betzold the Detroit 
reporter who originally wrote Appointment with Doctor Death in 1993. The lengthy follow up article 
“The Selling of Doctor Death,” for The New Republic (May 26, 1997) argued that Kevorkian
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Kevorkian straddling Youk’s wheelchair. They also showed the moment of death 
with interview narration by Kevorkian. Each of these was carefully pruned from the 
June 3, 2007 version of Mike Wallace’s “Favorite Stories.” In other words, while the 
prosecutor’s clips were designed to show a homicide that was unmitigated by either 
the decedent’s purported consent or by the family’s support, CBS in its revised 
version sought to emphasise the debate about euthanasia and to portray Kevorkian 
more sympathetically (Howarth 2007, p. 109). I argue that taken together in 
juxtaposition, the two versions (the prosecutor’s 1999 clips and the CBS 2007 
“remix” of the original 60 Minutes program) also constituted compelling evidence (in 
the colloquial sense of the word). This pointed to Ferguson’s argument that “the 
greater the controversy in a high-profile trial, the stronger the public desire for a 
subsuming narrative with victory for one side or the other, [and] the greater the 
likelihood of serious competition between legal and nonlegal narratives” (Ferguson 
2007: 268).
If, as Caplan suggested at the Ann Arbor conference, Kevorkian hijacked the 
press, then I argue that the prosecution was able to hijack the original 60 Minutes 
narrative at the trial in his clips of the November 1998 “Death by Doctor” segment, 
supplemented by the Kevorkian tape made in September 1998. This coup became 
evident by reviewing the trial transcript, and observing that tried citations of the tapes
repeatedly placed a gas mask on emphysema patient Hugh Gale, even after two entreaties to “take it 
off.” The February 15,1993 Gale assisted suicide, which preceded the 1998 Kevorkian/Youk 
euthanasia by several years, was described by Betzold as “the most disturbing possibility of duplicity.” 
In specific in the latter piece, Betzold argued:
“Kevorkian’s original written report on Gales’ death certificate said that, after the 
procedure was resumed, Gale made a second request to ‘take it o f f  but fell into 
unconsciousness. The mask was then left in place.” Later, Kevorkian, using white-out and a 
manual typewriter, deleted references to any second request to “take it o f f ’ and “substituted a 
sanitized version of what had happened. Fieger says the original writing that Kevorkian 
excised was “a typo” -  a typo four lines long. The discovery of the altered memo nearly got 
Kevorkian prosecuted for murder, but the witnesses to Gale’s death closed ranks. In 
depositions, Gales’ widow, Cheryl, and Neal Nichol, who attended the death, both swore that 
Gale had made no second request to “take if  off.” At his trials, eyewitnesses have parroted the 
defense that Kevorkian’s actions were not meant to cause death.”
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fell into three categories. These three were references to the prosecutor’s cut of the 
“Death by Doctor” segment of 60 Minutes, references to the Kevorkian tape from 
September 1998 (the tape that Kevorkian and Jack Lessenberry arranged to have sent 
to CBS and Mike Wallace), and references of what might appear to be a mixed (i.e., 
unspecified) nature to either the tape or the video.236 In this last regard, it is fair to 
conclude that the prosecutor and Kevorkian were working in shorthand (as, in fact, 
were a number of the people in the gallery who, like myself, had been present 
listening and observing at previous trials). They were dealing with material that they 
had come to know very well over a period of time beyond that of the materials 
relating to the Youk euthanasia, and with adversaries who were well known to one 
another (Skrzynski had been the trial prosecutor in the first 1996 Kevorkian trial, at 
which Judge Cooper had also been the Presiding Judge, although the 1999 trial did 
not include former Kevorkian counsel Geoffrey Fieger). However, to a juror or 
spectator seeing or hearing these matters for the first time, the material offered at trial 
was linear, rather than contextual or cyclical.237 This was legally immaterial that this 
was contextual or cyclical
In the next section, I shall discuss how the prosecutor’s clips were used and 
argued by the prosecutor in building the case for the jury and by Kevorkian in 
defending against that case.
236 As an aside, it took me the better part of a day to unravel these citations, and I created a chart in the 
traditional “digesting” method that I was taught as an appellate lawyer (I used quotes and transcript 
page numbers, which I then listed in three categories for analysis).
37 This reminded me of my interview with Judge Breck after the 1996 (2) trial, in which he expressed 
awe at Geoffrey Fieger’s summation. In and of itself, it was spectacular, but to those who had sat in 
the 1996 (1) trial presided over by Judge Cooper, it was clear that it was a “canned” summation (a form 
with the parties and new facts filled in to a previously written, albeit compelling, script), which 
diminished its effect. For jurors who may have seen the original 60 Minutes programme, they may have 
experienced a similar deja vu (although with enhanced effect, in view of the prosecutor’s clips and 
exclusions), but for members of the jury who had not seen the 1998 programme, the prosecutor’s clips 
and the Kevorkian tape would likely have been similar to an anvil in impact. I argue that only those 
who had comparative of longitudinal experiences of these -  whether the 60 Minutes or the trials -  
would have been able to consider this analytical perspective. Of course, jurors were required to 
consider only the evidence that had seen and heard at trial, but I would suggest that an interesting 
question emerged in this regard, one that will never be answered.
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B. Construction o f the Elements o f the Crimes Using the Kevorkian and 60 Minutes 
Clips
As the prosecutor noted in his opening, “the crime of murder, like all crimes in 
[Michigan] is composed of ingredients or what we call the elements” (Kevorkian Trial 
Transcript, March 22, 1999, Skrzynski Opening p. 250). In a brief reminder to the 
reader, the prosecution must satisfy (or meet) the burden of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt as to each element before a person may be convicted of a crime. These are 
generally the actus reus, which is the external physical act (or conduct) and the mens 
rea or guilty mind, which is the minimum requirement of culpability (or intent). I 
note that the question of whether the identity of the defendant was the same as that of 
the alleged perpetrator was not in issue here. Neither was the question of whether the 
Oakland County criminal justice system had jurisdiction over the case.239
Professor George P. Fletcher, in his 2002 updated version of Rethinking 
Criminal Law, wrote of two general “modes of thinking about homicide” (Fletcher 
2002, p.238). Fletcher, who spent 1971 as a Deputy Assistant Attorney in 
California’s LA County, set forth that:
For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to these modes of thinking 
about homicide, respectively, as the “harm-oriented” and the “act-oriented” 
approaches. Each of these modes requires some clarification.
The essence of the harm-oriented analysis of homicide is expressed in 
Blackstone’s influential rule of thumb: killing another human being amounts 
to murder except where “justified ... excused on the ground of accident or self 
preservation; or alleviated into manslaughter....” [... The defendant/s and/or 
counsel] concede the wrongdoing of killing and interpose new matter on 
grounds for acquittal or mitigation.
The act-oriented approach to liability takes intentional or negligent 
killing as a necessary component of the prima facie (sic) case. Most issues of 
justification and excuse are not affected by this shift, but the claims of mistake
238 Gardner and Anderson discuss these generally in chapter 3 (33-57) of their 2006 book, Criminal 
Law (9th ed. Instructor’s Edition).
239 Jurisdiction, though unusual in a criminal trial, was brought into issue in the 1994 Wayne County 
prosecution and trial of Kevorkian for the assisted suicide of Tom Hyde, with the question of whether 
the death occurred on Belle Isle in Wayne County or in Royal Oak or another location in Oakland 
County; this question was raised by Fieger on summation in his closing remarks.
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and accident cease to function as excuses and become instead denials of the 
prima facie (sic) case (Fletcher 2002, p.238)(emphasis in original; footnotes 
omitted).
I shall show that the evidence and arguments of the prosecutor were act- 
oriented (until his closing statement and rebuttal statement to Kevorkian’s closing). I 
shall further show that the evidence and arguments of Kevorkian were harm-oriented, 
with focus variously placed on both justification (acting within his professional 
duties) and excuse (by saying to Mike Wallace that it “could be manslaughter”). In 
constructing the elements of causation and intention, a good deal of information was 
used from the Kevorkian tape and the prosecutor’s clips of 60 Minutes (rather than the 
full original 60 Minutes programme and the full content of the “Death by Doctor” 
segment). I shall now examine how both the prosecutor and Kevorkian developed 
material during the course of the trial, and I shall offer through analysis how this 
likely (if not inevitably) led to the verdict of guilty as the outcome of the trial.
1. Causation and the Case o f the Duelling Doctors240
One aspect of the 1999 Kevorkian trial was that there were competing 
contentions as to the cause of the death of Tom Youk in September 1998. At first 
blush, this may sound absurd, given Kevorkian’s tape and the 60 Minutes programme 
interview with Mike Wallace, during which Kevorkian narrated and provided 
commentary (in both the original programme and the prosecutor’s clips) as he injected 
Youk with a lethal cocktail.241 However, there was a possible (albeit seemingly far
240 I delivered a related paper, “Theories and Realities of Criminal Causation in Euthanasia and 
Physician Assisted Suicide Prosecutions,”at the Canadian Society of Criminology Conference, 
Toronto, Canada (2005).
241 The protocol Kevorkian used in his lethal injection was remarkably similar to the lethal injection 
protocol developed by Utah’s Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Jay Chapman in 1977; Chapman, like 
Kevorkian, was a pathologist and his “execution method mimicked the induction of general 
anesthesia,” according to Elizabeth Weil, writing in “The Needle and the Damage Done, New York
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fetched) alternative conclusion the jury could have reached -  that Youk died from the 
underlying disease of ALS (described earlier in the chapter) in the course of the 
events taped, and was “already dead.” If the jury concluded that Youk had died of 
the underlying ALS, that would have gone beyond the standard of reasonable doubt 
for an acquittal to an actual doubt; however, had the jury embraced the possibility of 
such a death, it would have been legally required to acquit Kevorkian, due to a lack of 
proof of the element of cause of death.
Oakland County Medical Examiner Ljubisa L. Dragovic testified at length 
about the September 17, 1998 autopsy (which he witnessed) and his viewing of the 
Kevorkian tape. In short, he testified that there was enough secobarbital (a barbiturate 
to induce sleep) present in Tom Youk’s body to kill him within a few hours and 
further that the paralysing muscle relaxant anedctadine was present in a sufficient 
quantity to kill him within five to eight minutes. However, the autopsy could not 
determine whether the potassium chloride had been injected because that is present in 
the body after red blood cells die. People v. Kevorkian 248 MichApp. at 299 (2001). 
Kevorkian commented on Youk’s death for Mike Wallace in a portion of the 
prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes programme shown on March 23, 1999
Times Magazine, February 11, 2007 p. 46,49. At the time of this writing, the United States Supreme 
Court is considering a case, Baze v. Rose, No. 07-5439, argued on January 7, 2008, in which the central 
question is whether death penalty imposed by lethal injection (including a three pronged protocol of 
anesthetic/sleep; paralyzing drug; and potassium chloride to stop the heart) is in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. I note that lethal injection is the only method under 
such consideration, which would not affect death penalty by electrocution, gas, hanging, or firing squad 
(Staff Article, Associated Press, “States Methods of Execution,” January 6, 2008). I further note that 
Michigan does not have the death penalty in any event and that it is not available as a punishment for 
any crime at the time of this writing.
242 In 1950, a New Hampshire jury acquitted Dr. Hermann Sander of murdering a terminally ill cancer 
patient by administering four air bubbles into the patient’s veins, in a practical application of this 
unlikely theory, as reported by Daniel C. Maguire, “Death, Legal and Illegal,” in the February 1974 
edition of The Atlantic Monthly (The Atlantic Online), and which I discussed further in my M.Sc. 
dissertation (Pappas: 1992).The purpose of this artifice is simple -  one cannot kill a dead wo/man, and 
hence, there can be no causation supporting a conviction of homicide in a case where the victim is 
“already dead”.
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(Kevorkian Trial Transcript at 28-29) to, and transcribed for, the jury (as show below,
as verbatim and as styled from the trial transcript):
K And we’re ready to inject. We’re gonna inject you in your right arm
now. Okay? Okie-dokie.
K Sleepy Tom? Tom are you asleep? Tom are you asleep? You asleep?
He’s asleep.
W And this—
K Paralyses the muscles.
W But he’s still alive?
K He’s still alive, but, ah, and that’s why I . ..
W Now I can see his breathing just a (inaud).
K That’s why I have to, you know, now that there lack of oxygen getting
to him now, but he’s unconscious deeply so it doesn’t matter.
W Is he dead now?
K I don’t, he’s dying now, cause his oxygen’s cut off, he can’t breathe.
So now I’ll quickly inject the potassium chloride to stop the heart.
K243 Now there’s a straight line (sic)
W He’s dead.
K Yep. The heart has stopped.
K Straight line. The cardiogram will be turned off.
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 23, 1999 at 28-29)(ric).
Taken together, the testimony of Dragovic plus the narration by Kevorkian
could be (and presumably was) construed by the jury as sufficient evidence to prove
the element of causation in Tom Youk’s death beyond a reasonable doubt.244 The
243 Double indentation indicates Kevorkian narrating his own tape to Wallace.
244 Ironically, Defendant’s Exhibit B (stipulated to by the prosecution) was an Oakland County Medical 
Examiner Investigation Report/ Hospice Report dated September 4, 1998, reporting the impending 
death of Youk. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript: March 23,1999 at 84-86). By the Report, Angela 
Hospice faxed the notice of impending death of Thomas Youk, a 52-year-old white male. In addition,
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narrated tape was referred to by the prosecutor in his opening statement (Kevorkian 
Trial Transcript, March 22,1999: Skrzynski Opening at 258), again by the prosecutor 
in his closing statement (March 25, 1999: Skrzynski Closing at 38), and yet again 
compellingly replayed by the prosecutor in his closing statement (March 25, 1999: 
Skrzynski Closing at 39) with further commentary.
Setting up the replay of his clips of 60 Minutes, he argued:
Dr. Kevorkian tells Mike Wallace he [Youk] was very afraid of 
choking to death and he must have -  he must have felt that he was on the 
verge of it. Yet you’re going to look at that scene, I ’m going to show you that 
scene in just a few minutes, and you look at that tape to see if there’s any 
evidence of him choking or his being afraid of choking. This is supposedly 
the rationale of why he did this.
Now he narrates. When you look at the 60 Minutes tape you’ll see that 
they’re watching monitors and they’re watching Dr. Kevorkian’s tape and Dr. 
Kevorkian starts to narrate to Mike Wallace exactly what he’s doing. And we 
know that he’s injected the Seconal, the sleeping drug, and now he’s injecting 
the second drug and Mike Wallace says, “And this and Dr. Kevorkian 
says, “Paralyses the muscles.” “.. .there’s a lack of oxygen’s getting to him 
now....” “... he’s dying now, cause his oxygen’s cut off, he can’t breathe. So 
now, I’ll quickly inject the potassium chloride to stop the heart.” He’s 
narrating this to Mike Wallace. He’s telling him exactly what’s going on in 
Tom’s body. The man who was afraid of choking is now suffocating to death. 
Of course, Dr. Kevorkian says he’s asleep, so it doesn’t make a difference.
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999: Skrzynski Closing at
37-38).
the autopsy report stated “ES/ALS”, which, when asked by Kevorkian on cross-examination, Dragovic 
contended that he did “not know what ES stands for,” although it was reasonable to accept Kevorkian’s 
argument that it referred to end-stage (or imminently terminal) illness. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, 
March 23, 1999: 87). While Kevorkian engaged with Dragovic in a high level version of what I would 
call “dueling doctors” and exposed a “viable argument” or possible claim of lack o f causation (such as 
in the case of 1992 in regard to Nigel Cox in Winchester, England, or in the 1950s in regard to Dr. 
Hermann Sander, who was acquitted in New Hampshire of an injection death on a theory of an 
“already dead” patient), Kevorkian— in a way that a lawyer almost certainly would not have -  all but 
conceded causation in his summation (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999: Kevorkian Closing 
at 56-59), in which he litanized the way in which he created a protocol to put Tom Youk to sleep and to 
stop his heart as part of a “medical service and medical control” (Kevorkian Closing at 56). As an 
aside, I observed that the in-court experience of Kevorkian and Dragovic as dueling doctors appeared 
to be a discussion between equals, more akin to Katz, Scalpel's Edge: The Culture o f Surgeons (1995: 
chapter 5, especially 91-94) than communication to a lay jury (compare, Katz, chapter 6, at 105).
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During the actual playing of the clips, it was the prosecutor who narrated the
60 Minutes tape, in a sense taking a cue from the technique of Mike Wallace and
Kevorkian in the original 60 Minutes programme.
And it’s interesting, ladies and gentlemen, that he had his first meeting 
with Tom Youk on the 16th at around ten o’clock in the evening and on the 
17th at around ten o’clock in the evening Tom is dead. He knows Tom Youk 
for less than 24 hours -  just a few minutes really -  before he kills Tom Youk. 
That’s all he knows about Tom Youk.
Then he tells Mike Wallace -  he injects the potassium -  he’s dead. 
Mike Wallace says, “He’s dead.” Jack Kevorkian says, “Yep. The heart has 
stopped.” “Yep. The heart has stopped.” (sic). He’s very conscious of what 
he’s doing. This is very purposeful conduct. This is a methodical killing of a 
human being. You can’t get around that.
I  want to show you again. You saw what happened. I ’ve narrated to 
you by using the transcripts o f this -  o f the tapes, but this is what happened.
(Portion o f tape replayed, prosecutor comments).
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25,1999: Skrzynski Closing at 
37-39)(emphasis added).
Kevorkian, who for the first time did not testify at trial,245 and who for the first
time acted as his own attorney, took the opportunity in making his closing
statements246 to argue that an EKG (electrocardiogram) provided for:
[bjetter control. If you use a device and try to do assisted suicide, what if the 
electricity fails right in the middle, what do you do then? Or if the needle 
accidentally pops out, what do you do then? You can’t do a medical service 
haphazardly or willy-nilly. That’s why the cardiogram was there to make sure 
the heart had stopped, definitively, and that there will be no more harm for the 
patient, no more suffering, that it was over. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, 
March 25,1999: Kevorkian Closing at 56).
I conclude that had the jury sought a viable causation issue relating to the 
prosecutor’s clips of 60 Minutes or of the Kevorkian tape, they might have embraced
245 Technically, Kevorkian did not testify in the 1997 Ionia trial for the assisted suicide of Loretta 
Peabody; however, that trial ended in mistrial after then-attomey Geoffrey Fieger’s opening as 
discussed in the Juries chapter and no evidence or testimony was adduced or received. Further, 
although that trial never had evidence taken and was for a charge of assisted suicide, the issue of 
causation was of interest in that the autopsy showed needle marks on the arm, suggesting euthanasia, as 
mentioned previously. However, since the trial never proceeded to the taking of evidence, the issue of 
causation was never explored.
246 While there was an appellate issue relating to an objection by the prosecutor during Kevorkian’s 
closing, in which he referenced the defendant’s failure to testify, that is beyond the scope of the instant 
project; in any event, the argument was unavailing and the conviction was affirmed.
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the possibility of novus interveus or intervening cause of death (Fletcher 2000.
pp.361-368), by the underlying end-stage illness, as in the 1950 case of Dr. Hermann
Sander in New Hampshire (Pappas 1996). However, Kevorkian did not argue lack of
causation in his closing to the jury, notwithstanding the fact that he raised it as
possibly failing in reasonable doubt during the cross-examination of Medical
Examiner Dragovic. I would argue that unfortunately for Kevorkian, this wholesale
omission (whether strategic or inadvertent) resulted in forfeiting a viable and, if
successful, complete defence. Lack of causation as a legal issue was argued,
unsuccessfully, for the first time on appeal, when Kevorkian again had counsel.
However, the Michigan Court of Appeals was unpersuaded by this argument, and
determined that (further to the prosecutor’s redirect examination at trial):
[I]n Dr. Dragovic’s opinion, Youk did not die from ALS, ALS was not an 
underlying cause of Youk’s death, and ALS did not contribute to Youk’s death 
in any way. Rather, Dr. Dragovic firmly reiterated that the poisons injected 
into Youk killed him, constituting a homicide (248 MichApp. at 299).
For the jury to have embraced a far-fetched (though legally viable) theory of
lack of causation in the Kevorkian (1999) case, the jurors would have had to parse
reasonable doubt as to the proximate cause of death. To do this, jurors would --
individually and collectively -- have had to conclude by finding that Youk had died
(or could possibly have died) of the underlying ALS, notwithstanding the timing of
Kevorkian’s injections and Youk’s death. By its guilty verdict, the jury indicated that
it chose not to do this, and that it chose to embrace the prosecution’s theory of
causation (conceded by Kevorkian on summation, notwithstanding arguable
testimony elicited from the Medical Examiner, Dr. Dragovic)
This seems a reasonable conclusion in a criminal trial, though one must
wonder whether they were convicting the folk devil who went on television, rather
than the ex-doctor who injected the end-stage terminal patient and potentially waived
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a viable causation issue when in his summation (albeit not evidence), Kevorkian told 
the jury he “caused death. Yes my action caused death.” (Kevorkian Transcript, 
March 25, 1999: Kevorkian Closing at 48). I argue this in view of the physicians who 
were acquitted (New Hampshire’s Sander in the United States) or tried for lesser 
offences of attempt (Winchester’s Cox in England). I likewise argue this view under 
circumstances of injection (Sander for a series of four air bubbles, Cox for two 
separate ampoules of potassium chloride) without a landmark narrative broadcast to 
the country, or excerpts of a tape played to the jury by which a coroner was able 
arguably to ascertain testimony as to an element of the crime. I shall next examine 
some examples pertaining to the issue of Kevorkian’s level of intent, after which I 
shall explore some political and social uses of the excerpted tape at trial.
2. The Element o f Intent as Explored Using the Prosecutor’s Clips o f the 60 Minutes 
Tape
In the last section, I offered quotes from the 1999 Kevorkian trial to examine 
how the prosecutor deployed the Kevorkian tape and the prosecutor’s clips from the 
landmark narrative 60 Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment to further establish the 
element of cause of death. This section offers an opportunity to show how the 
prosecutor was able to make use of his nine minutes of clips247 of the 60 Minutes tape 
to show intent, and also to show how Kevorkian constructed these clips. These 
transcript quotes will show that the distilled clips of the November 1998 media event 
were compellingly used as evidence and in argument at the March 1999 trial.
Using the trial transcript, I shall argue this, in three regards. First, as discussed 
in earlier chapters, although consent is not a defence to euthanasia as a matter of
247 This calculation is based upon the original trial viewing of the morning of March 23, 1999 from 
9:17AM to 9:26AM as transcribed in pages 23-31 of that day, and upon further uses in the trial 
transcript.
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Anglo-American law, Kevorkian’s own account of the consent of Tom Youk was 
self-repudiating. Second, Kevorkian made statements to Mike Wallace that included 
legal terms of culpability, which the prosecutor was able deftly to weave into his 
summations. Third, as the trial summations showed, the case progressed to include 
political arguments, as well as those pertaining to the simple legal elements.
a. Consent and Intent
During Mike Wallace’s interview of Kevorkian for 60 Minutes, the issue of 
whether, and to what, and how Tom Youk consented to euthanasia was discussed. 
Also, Kevorkian provided a narrative of his own September tape as it was played for 
Wallace in the course of the “Death by Doctor” segment. The prosecutor included the 
following excerpt in his clips of the 60 Minutes programme (Kevorkian Trial 
Transcript, March 23, 1999 at 25-28), which I am reproducing in full here (and am 
including the embedded tape within a tape as visually represented by the court 
reporter in the transcript as a double indentation, which recollects my earlier 
discussion in this chapter of Hulme and the visual representation of seemingly 
agrammatical or unpolished writing style) for juxtaposition and discussion, with the 
double indented lines as reflecting the court reporter’s transcription of the Kevorkian 
tape, played during the Mike Wallace interview in an embedded fashion:
w Did Tom know that you were making, in effect, an example -
K Yes.
W — of him?
K Yes.
W He did?
K Yes. And, I  sensed some reluctance in him, I  did.
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W Because he thought he was getting assisted suicide?
K Ya, that’s right. And, and (sic) actually this is better than assisted
suicide. It’s better control. Ah, and ah, ah, then he, he did agree. He, 
which, ah, I think, I didn’t force him to agree. He did agree, (inaud).
W How do you know he agreed?
K I had him sign saying that he chose direct injection and he, and he
signed this, and he signed it. (second indentation in original to show 
two tapes).
K248 Okay, now I’m gonna read it to you and I want you to 
understand, I want to make sure you understand it and 
you gotta, you gotta listen closely and stop me if you 
can’t understand it.
Y Alright.
K This reads this way - 1 Thomas Youk, the undersigned,
entirely voluntarily without any reservation, external 
persuasion, pressure or duress, and after prolonged and 
thorough deliberation, hereby consent to the following 
medical procedure of my own choosing, and that you 
have chosen direct injection, or what they call active 
euthanasia, to be administered by a competent medical 
professional,249 in order to end with certainty my 
intolerable and hopelessly incurable suffering. Did you 
understand all that?
Y Yes.
K Okay.
K You sure you thought about this very well?
Y Yeah. Very much.
K You want to wait a week? How about two weeks? Two
weeks?
Y (inaud)
248 Again, this “double indentation” reflects the transcript and how the court reporter chose to visually 
represent the tape-within-a-tape of the September 1998 Kevorkian tape as played for Mike Wallace in 
the creation of the November 1998 original 60 Minutes programme, in turn edited into the half-length 
prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment for the March 1999 trial.
49 Ironically, Kevorkian was not licensed as a medical professional at this time, as he had been 
stripped of licenses in both California and Michigan. This was discussed in an earlier chapter.
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K One week? Can you wait one week?
Y Yeah.
K Alright. At least we’ll stretch it out one week, Okay?
Let’s not hurry into this.
K But I got a call the next night from his brother saying “Tom
wants it now” and I couldn’t say, “Well, no, “I’m gonna make 
you wait a week.”
W Why? What was happening there?
K He just was terrified in getting, he wasn’t, he was a, a very
afraid of choking to death and he must have felt that he was on 
the verge of it. And I  couldn ’t have him suffer in that kind o f 
frame o f mind because if a man is terrified, it’s up to me to 
dispel that terror.
W Um, hum.
K250 Tom, do you want to go ahead with this?
Y Yes.
K Shake your head yes if you want to go? Alright, ah, I’m
gonna have you sign again your name and I’m, and we’re 
gonna date it today okay?
Y Yes.
K And we’re ready to inject. We’re gonna inject you in
your right arm. Okay? Okie doke.
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 23, 1999, Prosecutor’s 60 Minutes clips at 
25-28)(emphasis added).
This series of clips compiled by the prosecutor covered a short period of time 
of less than two days from first meeting to euthanasia. In addition, it showed that 
Youk had actually requested assistance in his own suicide (although that was also 
illegal in Michigan, despite Oakland County Prosecutor Gorcyca’s dismissal of all
250 This double indentation again is taken as it was visually represented in the original trial transcript, to 
depict visually the tape-within-a-tape construction, discussed earlier in this section.
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remaining pending assisted suicide charges brought by displaced Prosecuting 
Attorney Richard Thompson when Gorcyca took office).251 It was Kevorkian himself 
who pressed forward for performing euthanasia actively. Moreover, I argue that 
Kevorkian’s statement that he “sensed some reluctance in [Youk]” (transcript at 25) 
would be the end of any assisted suicide conversation. That is because this could be 
construed as being a less than enduring request (and would be applicable only to an 
assisted suicide request, since consent is not a defence to euthanasia).253
This was something on which the prosecutor seized during his closing:
That’s the whole mission of this trip, is to get the consent form signed 
because Dr. Kevorkian has an agenda here. He’s got a plan. He’s filming this 
and that film is going to go someplace and it’s going to cause something. It’s 
going to 60 Minutes. ... it’s going to cause a murder charge, it’s going to 
create a trial.... (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999: Skrzynski 
Closing at 29-30).
Now we know that he was supposed to wait -  supposed to wait for a 
week, but this is where he calls -  he tells Mike Wallace -  this is a transcript, 
from the 60 Minutes programme, and he tells Mike Wallace, “But I got a call 
the next night from his brother saying, ‘Tom  wants it now’.” (Kevorkian Trial 
Transcript, March 25, 1999: Skrzynski Closing at 31).
At this point, I remind the reader that the crime Kevorkian was tried for in
1999 was murder (not assisted suicide, although that too was then a crime under
251 In Chapter 3„ I discussed at length the fact that Gorcyca’s campaign platform had as a central plank 
then Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney Thompson’s role and allegedly wasteful spending in 
seeking to prosecute Kevorkian, who in the mid-1990s eluded conviction, to great taxpayer expense.
As previously noted, Gorcyca won the election, ousting the long-term prosecutor Thompson, and 
immediately dismissed any remaining Kevorkian cases, as promised during his campaign.
252 At the time of this writing, Oregon is, by virtue of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Ore. 
Rev.Stat. Sections 127.800 et seq. (2003), pursuant to a ballot measure (Measure 16) in 1997, the only 
state that allows for physician assisted suicide, upon repeated and enduring requests over a prescribed 
period of time, and by prescription only (not direct injection). In particular contrast in regard to the 
“reluctance” Kevorkian described pertaining to Youk’s consent colloquy, I note the pertinent portion of 
the Oregon enactment, “Section 127.840 s.3.06. Written and oral requests. In order to receive a 
prescription for medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner, a qualified patient 
shall have made an oral request and a written request, and reiterate the oral request to his or her 
attending physician no less than fifteen (15) days after making the initial oral request. At the time the 
qualified patient makes his or her second oral request, the attending physician shall offer the patient an 
opportunity to rescind the request. [1995 c.3 s.3.06].”
Likewise it is reasonable to conclude that calling the next day might not be deemed an appropriate 
length of time between requests from first to last, whereas Kevorkian’s answer was that it was up to 
him to dispel the terror between days.
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Michigan law), and that “consent is not a defence to homicide” (Fletcher 2000: 236). 
Indeed, as Fletcher reminded in the 2000 edition of Rethinking Criminal Law, 
[t]hough we are inclined today (sic) to think of homicide as merely the deprivation of 
secular interest, the historical background of desecration is essential to an adequate 
understanding both of the history of homicide and the current survival of many 
historic assumptions.... The reason [that consent is not a defence to homicide] is that 
the religious conception of human life still prevails against the modem view that life 
is an interest that the bearer can dispose of at will” (Fletcher 2000, p.236). As if 
predicting the Kevorkian 1999 euthanasia murder trial, Norman St. John-Stevas, 
wrote in Life, Death and the Law: Law and Christian Morals in England and the 
United States, “[djoctors or others ... are principals in the first degree to murder if 
they administer the fatal dose themselves, whether or not the patient has given his 
consent” (St. John-Stevas 1961, p.263).
In what I conclude was a failed trial strategy by Kevorkian, in an effort to 
have the jury accept an alternative (if unlawful) theory of consent, he argued that 
there was consent by Tom Youk to the euthanasia. He contended in his own 
summation and closing:
Then there’s the implication that Thomas didn’t consent to this 
procedure. I had him purposely sign twice. There is no other way to show 
consent than sign twice. Also, I  didn ’t know enough about him. It was a 
cursory examination, a cursory discussion. That tape wasn't meant for a 
prolonged discussion o f his condition. Do you honestly -  did he honestly 
think I wouldn’t know his medical condition ahead of time, that I wouldn’t 
have doctor’s reports to go over? (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 
1999: Kevorkian Closing at 36-37)(emphasis added).
What Kevorkian raised was a different matter from the “reluctance” to have
euthanasia administered at Kevorkian’s suggestion. As something of an irony, if the
jury had believed Kevorkian’s interview with Mike Wallace, it would still have been
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reasonable to conclude that there had been an equivocal consent -  a consent that 
would not have technically mitigated the crime charged.254
b. Kevorkian’s Statements o f Legal Culpability to Mike Wallace
In what may have been the most masterful of the prosecutor’s editorial 
decisions in constructing his version of the 60 Minutes programme, the tape played 
for the jury opened with what sounded like an immediate acknowledgment of some 
level of criminal culpability.255 
W You killed him.
K I did, but it could be Manslaughter, not Murder. It’s not necessarily
Murder. But it doesn’t bother me what you call it. I know what it is. 
This could never be a crime in any society which deems itself 
enlightened. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 23, 1999 at 23-25).
This exchange from 60 Minutes provided an opportunity to show the jury what
appeared to be a de facto confession, made prior to the involvement of the criminal
justice system. However, I argue that there is an alternative hypothesis regarding
intent here, which Kevorkian failed to fully raise. St. John-Stevas argued, albeit
parenthetically in a footnote, that:
... [wjhile technically guilty of murder, they may be held guilty only of 
manslaughter. Thus, in Regina v. Murton, 3 F. & F. 492 (1862), Byles, J. said: 
‘If a man is suffering from a disease which in all likelihood would terminate 
his life in a short time, and another gives him a wound or hurt which hastens 
his death, this is such a killing as constitutes murder or at least manslaughter.’ 
Under the Homicide Act of 1957, such a killing would be very unlikely to be 
capital murder, (s.5). (St. John-Stevas 1961, p/236 n.2).
254 1 shall leave aside the prosecutor’s rebuttal commentary, as being beyond the scope of the 60 
Minutes clips, to the effect that “euthanasia is not a justified or excused kind of killing. That’s the 
law....” (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25,1999: Skrzynski Rebuttal at 61-62).
255 1 discussed this seeming concession of the element of causation earlier in this Part. This particularly 
regarded the Medical Examiner’s testimony and the possibility of Youk’s end-stage ALS as novus 
intervenus (or an intervening cause of death) that might have resulted in an acquittal due to insufficient 
proof of causation and actus reus.
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Initially, St. John-Stevas’ footnote seemed an interesting theoretical footnote 
and commentary to a case over 100 years before St. John-Stevas wrote this footnote 
passage and nearly a century and a half before the Kevorkian case. However, it 
seemed to be pertinent to the Kevorkian 1999 prosecution, in that Kevorkian told 
Mike Wallace in his 1998 60 Minutes interview that “it could be manslaughter,” 
rather than murder. While it is an open question as to whether Kevorkian had read 
either the 1862 case or St. John-Stevas’s 1961 academic work, all three seemed to 
make an argument that doctors be accorded special status such as to diminish the 
degree of responsibility pertaining to euthanasia as an offense (especially when 
committed by doctors -  and, in Kevorkian’s view, only when committed by doctors).
In any event, whereas Kevorkian was discussing his theory of the law of 
euthanasia with Wallace in the November 1998 interview, the prosecutor was trying 
the evidence and a specific case of euthanasia before the jury in the March 1999 trial.
thProfessor Andrew Ashworth, in the 2003 version of Principles o f Criminal Law (4
ed.), made the following observations regarding the concept of what he called “mercy
killing”(Ashworth 2003, pp.288-289, 292), and which, while Ashworth’s commentary
specified English criminal law, is also applicable to the United States in its
formulation that “mercy killing” (including medical euthanasia within its ambit):
... has no special significance in English criminal law. Where there is a clear 
case of mercy killing by a doctor, he or she is likely to avoid prosecution or to 
benefit from Devlin, J’s concession that to good motive in the Adams256 
case.... The House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics examined 
the issues and decided against recommending an offence of mercy killing, 
largely on the ground that existing provisions are sufficiently flexible to allow 
appropriate outcomes to be achieved. In respect of doctors, this flexibility is 
achieved through such distinctions as that between bringing about a patient’s 
death through omission (which may be lawful) and bringing it about by a 
positive act (which is not) and between intending to cause death and intending 
to relieve pain while knowingly accelerating death, although even then a
256 1 discussed this at some length in Chapter 4.
257 In 1993-1994,1 attended some of the hearings of the House of Lords Select Committee of Medical 
Ethics; however, this is beyond the scope of the current dissertation, except where and as specified.
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‘blind eye’ may be turned to the practices of some doctors. But doctors cannot 
be assured that a ‘blind eye’ will be turned and relatives and friends may be 
exposed to the strict law. (Ashworth 2003, pp.289-290)(footnotes omitted).
I submit that Kevorkian was using the specific medical case of Youk to further
the general issue of euthanasia, whereas the prosecutor was using the law of homicide
to try the specific legal case of Kevorkian.
The prosecutor on summation was also able to argue:
As a matter of fact, when he gets -  now he has taken the tape, this tape 
that he’s made. Now he takes that and he gives it to CBS, to 60 Minutes. And 
the first thing that Mike Wallace says to him is, “You killed him.” And he 
says, “I did, but it could be Manslaughter, not Murder. It’s not necessarily 
Murder. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25,1999: Skrzynski Closing at 
36).
Although the Kevorkian/Wallace murder versus manslaughter colloquy258 was 
first seen in the prosecutor’s clips, and was nearly the first seen on the original 60 
Minutes programme, that order of presentation may have been an editorial decision by 
CBS.259 While that may not have changed the programme or the jury’s views of the 
prosecutor’s clips of the original programme, it is reasonable to conclude that this 
order of presentation was an editorial programme construction -- a media 
construction, rather than Kevorkian’s own.
However, once made, the prosecutor was able to continue to (in a turn of 
phrase that captures my meaning) interpret the media’s interpretation. I observed in 
court the prosecutor’s summation, into which he deftly wove bits of his clips of the 60 
Minutes programme into his closing commentary as he argued, in the following 
lengthy passage (also transcribed by the court reporter):
You know, at the beginning of this case, he got up and made his 
opening statement and he told you in the opening statement that you know, I
258 This colloquy was between two non-lawyers, whose use of legal words may nevertheless have been 
different from a criminal lawyer or a deliberating juror who had been instructed as to terminology.
259 In other words, I cannot determine whether this was the natural flow of the Kevorkian/Wallace 
conversation, or what is commonly referred to as “an abrupt cut out” of the tape (a television or 
audiotape equivalent to a cut and paste).
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certainly wasn’t committing a crime. I wouldn’t have gone to national 
television committing a crime, yet he’s saying it would be manslaughter, not 
necessarily murder, it could be manslaughter instead. That comes from his 
own mouth. He knows what he has done is kill a man, and he know the law 
says you can’t kill, don’t do it. That’s the first thing he says to Mike Wallace. 
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999: Skrzynski Closing at 37 with 
emphasis added, and prosecutor’s closing continuing with quotes from Mike 
Wallace interview of Jack Kevorkian).
Mike Wallace then asked him:
W Did Tom know that you were making, in effect, an example of
him?
K Yes. And, and (sic) I sensed some reluctance in him, I, I did.
W Because he thought he was getting assisted suicide?
K Ya, that’s right. And an actually (sic) this is better than assisted
suicide. I explained that to him. It’s better control.
But Tom Youk didn’t have any control at all. He means it’s better 
control for Jack Kevorkian. Tom Youk was out of control. It was Jack 
Kevorkian at the control once the injections started. Tom couldn’t move. 
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999, Skryzynski Closing, continuing, 
at 36-37).
Dr. Kevorkian tells Mike Wallace he was very afraid of choking to 
death and he must have -  he must have felt he was on the verge of it.... He’s 
narrating this to Mike Wallace. He’s telling him exactly what’s going on in 
Tom Youk’s body. The man who was afraid of choking to death is now 
suffocating to death.
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999: Skrzynski Closing at 36-37). 
Kevorkian offered his own interpretation of the prosecutor’s interpretation of 
this during his own closing argument, conducted after the prosecutor’s own closing 
was completed:
The issue is this. Did Thomas Youk have a choice to end his agony, 
and by helping him achieve that aim did I commit murder, first or second 
degree, or manslaughter? That’s the issue which you’ve got to decide. You’ll 
notice Thomas Youk isn’t very much involved in this, his condition....
There was nothing, no talk -  there was no talk about Thomas Youk’s 
condition. You did see it on the tape, though. I don’t think you needed words. 
Just look at the tape. Couldn’t swallow, fear of choking, can’t move except 
right arm a little bit, no bodily functions controlled, stomach tube, though the 
abdomen feeding, pain. I mean you don’t need much else. You see it on the
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tape and it was all described. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25,1999:
Kevorkian Closing at 58-59).
My comment is that this was a way for Kevorkian to seek to put evidence of 
pain and suffering of hospice and end-stage ALS patient Youk into issue, since the 
Youk family statements were excised from the prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes 
segment, and the Youk family members were not permitted to testify on behalf of 
Kevorkian.
A reasonable conclusion is that the distilled prosecutor’s clips of the 60 
Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment showed that Kevorkian had some criminally 
culpable level of intent -  whether relating to manslaughter, murder in the second 
degree or premeditated murder in the first degree. Another conclusion is that this was 
almost inevitably underscored by the removal of the family interviews with Mike 
Wallace from the version shown to the jury. Legally proper, this was devastating in 
view of the prosecutor’s use of Youk’s purported consent (which was itself no 
defence). Kevorkian’s unsuccessful attempt to have Melody and Terry Youk testify 
further isolated him from the possibility of a buffer to pursue the chance of acquittal 
either on the facts or as jury nullification. Deprived of family testimony and support 
such as that mounted in prior trials by Kevorkian’s former lawyer, and with the Youk 
family statements to CBS excised from the prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes 
programme, Kevorkian was left with his own words from the Mike Wallace 
interview. From these intent could be constructed and established. In another
260 The phrase “end-stage” is consistent with trial testimony and notes on the autopsy, and denotes 
imminent death of days or a week or two, a shorter period than that suggested by the phrase “terminally 
ill,” which is generally construed to mean life that may last six months (Oregon) or a period of months. 
For example, the Oregon Death With Dignity Act articulates:" Terminal disease’ means an incurable 
and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical 
judgment, produce death within six months. [1995 c.3 s.1.01; 1999 c.423 s .l]” In 1994, the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics similarly defined a “[t]erminal illness as an illness which is 
inevitably progressive, the effects of which cannot be reversed by treatment (although treatment may 
be successful in relieving symptoms temporarily) and which will inevitably result in death within a few 
months at most. HL Paper 21-1 London: HMSO , p .l 1).
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compelling cut, the prosecutor closed his nine minutes of 60 Minutes with the 
following exchange, which also pointed toward Kevorkian’s intentions:
W And those who say that Jack Kevorkian, Dr. Death, is a fanatic?
K Zealot. No, not if, sure, you try to take a liberty away and I turn
fanatic. That’s what I’m fi~, I’m fighting for me, Mike, me. This is a 
right I want when I, I’m 71, I’ll be 71. You don’t know what’ll happen 
when you get older. I may end up terribly suffering. I want some 
colleague to be free to come and help me when I say the time has 
come. That’s why I’m fighting, for me. Now that sounds selfish. And 
if it helps, everybody else, so be it.
(Playing of videotape ends about 9:26AM) (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March
23, 1999: 30-3 l)(emphasis in original voice).
Unlike the previous trials and occasions on which Kevorkian testified and 
could be “rehabilitated” by counsel, Kevorkian had no choice but to seek to take his 
case to the jury in his closing argument. In view of the conviction for murder in the 
second degree and drug delivery charges, it is reasonable to conclude that they did not 
accept his argument that causing Tom Youk’s death was not the same as murder -  
medical or otherwise, or even that his level of intent rose at most to that of the lesser 
offence of manslaughter. One might reasonably conclude that Kevorkian had 
erroneously hoped that his merciful motive would serve as justification for his 
conduct and to negate the element of intent. In the next section, I shall argue that the 
prosecutor and Kevorkian used the prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes programme in 
ways beyond the elements of the charges and into the politics of euthanasia, with 
implicit references to assisted suicide, in Michigan.
c. Political Interpretations o f Kevorkian and the Prosecutor's Clips o f the 60 Minutes 
“Death by Doctor ” Segment
Both the prosecutor and Kevorkian made a number of political and social 
statements in the course of the 1999 euthanasia murder trial as the trial progressed.
261 This phrase is a term of art and legal parlance, referring to the process of rebuilding a witness’ 
credibility after s/he has been impeached or has made a statement that could be adversely interpreted.
327
These sometimes went beyond the simple elements of the case, and resonated features 
of the decade-long Kevorkian saga, as I shall show by juxtaposition of quotes and 
arguments at trial. One such example previously discussed in this chapter, was where 
we learned that despite the knowledge that Youk’s September 17, 1998 death was 
caused by intravenous injection, there had originally been no prosecutorial plan to 
press charges against Kevorkian. This did not change until after the original 60 
Minutes programme aired in November 1998. This was something that was amplified 
during the prosecutor’s clips and the summations.
For example, when the prosecutor played his clips of 60 Minutes, the 
following exchange between Kevorkian and Mike Wallace was played (and 
transcripts provided to the members of the jury):
K Everything can be abused. You learn from abuse, you punish 
the abuser, and then, then you, if you want to control, you say 
only certain doctors can do this in certain areas, nobody else. 
Got that? That’s the way to control it.
K Absolutely. Absolutely. I’ve got to force them to act. They
must charge me. Because if they do not, that means they don’t 
think it’s a crime. Because they don’t need any more evidence 
do they? Do you have to dust for fingerprints on this[?]
W Um mum (sic)262 (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 23, 1999,
60 Minutes at 30).
First, I note here that the “...” above signifies edits of the prosecutor’s clips as 
depicted in the Kevorkian Trial Transcript, and thus is a legal construction and
262 This is directly quoted from the transcript, and exemplifies my earlier argument that visual 
representations are important -  “um mum” on its own may appear to sound like jibberish, but it is 
generally accepted as a written representation of an assenting sound of “hum, hum” that often 
accompanies nodding assent (as was the case in the original 60 Minutes programme and the 
prosecutor’s clips).
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reinterpretation of the original 60 Minutes programme. Second, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 previously, prosecutors have discretion in deciding to prosecute and charge 
or to decline to do so -  and given that this prosecutor had dismissed assisted suicide 
charges pending against Kevorkian when he was elected, he could have chosen to 
decline to prosecute Kevorkian again merely for assisting in a suicide.
Third, this portrayed a reason for creating a media event, and the politics of 
euthanasia in Michigan; even if the latter was (and remains) synonymous with the 
name Kevorkian, the trial is for crimes allegedly committed, rather than a subtext.263 
Fourth, if it was true that the Oakland County Prosecutor was “forced” to charge 
Kevorkian, that meant that Kevorkian in 1998 was able to wrest control of the 
Michigan criminal justice system and its policies away from the legal authorities. I 
argue this was similar to the process by which the assisted suicide laws were passed in 
Michigan in the mid-1990s (and as expressed by Senator Fred Dillingham in our 1994 
meeting, with regard to what Dillingham called “the Kevorkian law”). All of these 
were beyond the scope of the elements of the 1999 trial for crimes allegedly 
committed in 1998, although I do note that the element of intent may have been 
underscored.
I further argue that another broad example can be garnered during the 
prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment, a key media 
colloquy between Mike Wallace and Kevorkian, that was included for the jury 
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 23, 1999: 29).
K Either they go or I go.
263 This should not be construed as an argument that the elements of the crime were not met by use of 
the tapes and the evidence relating thereto, as I am not arguing a lack of sufficiency of the evidence to 
prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, nor am I arguing that there was any lack of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, this is an observation of note in a macro sense as to the politics of 
euthanasia and the politics of assisted suicide, and comparing the prosecutor’s reactions thereto as a 
continued theme.
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W What does that mean, they or I go?
K If, if I’m acquitted, they go because they know they’ll never convict
me.
W Um hum.
K If I am convicted, I shall starve to death in prison, so I shall go264. One
of the two of us is gonna go and that’s why I did this. The issue [of 
euthanasia] here has got to be raised to the level where it is finally 
decided.
W You are engaged in a political, medical, macabre, ah publicity venture.
(emphasis added).
K Um hum.
W Right?
K Probably.
W And in watching these tapes, I got the feeling there’s something almost
ghoulish in your desire to see the deed done.
K Well, it could be. I, I can’t argue with that. Maybe it is ghoulish. I
don’t know. It appears that way to you. I can’t criticize you for that. 
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 23, 1999: 29)
This exchange, as with others included in the prosecutor’s clips, was not
necessary to prove the elements of the crime relating to causation or intent. However,
this, as with other clips, was within the prosecutor’s ambit and provided an
opportunity to hint at Kevorkian’s contempt for the law and legal process, and
provided fodder for his summation (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999: 18-
46, especially 41-44). In this part of the argument, I have taken the considered
decision to include the relevant passage in toto, as presented by the prosecutor. I now
offer the following 568-word block quote from the prosecutor’s summation, for which
I have annotated some commentary of my own in footnotes.
264 Although Kevorkian had staged hunger strikes in the mid-1990s when held for bail in cases that 
were ultimately either dismissed or resulted in acquittal, once he was incarcerated for the Youk 
euthanasia, he served out his time until paroled in June 2007.
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In reproducing this block, and offering an accompanying footnoted parallel 
text, I shall show the reader the prosecutorial flow in his closing argument at trial, and 
the deftness with which the prosecutor chose to legally construct the related political 
portion of the original 60 Minutes programme, which by now had gone through two 
legal reinterpretations (italics deliberate). These interpretations were first, the 
prosecutor’s clips as played to the jury, while second is this passage, in which the 
prosecutor read the relevant passage and provided his own parallel running 
commentary.
They will never convict me. In the future tense, like it’s going to 
happen again. H e’s making a political statement. He’s got a political agenda, 
and he killed a man to further his political agenda, to videotape it, to put it on 
national TV to get the prosecutor to charge him because he knows the 
prosecutor must charge a murder, because that’s surely what this is, to go into 
a courtroom. But before all the people, not before all nine million people that 
live in this state, not for a public debate, not so that we can all have our input, 
both pro and con, into this issue.266
What he said is we’re going to bring this into court, and he said, “One 
of the two of us” -- meaning him or the Prosecutor -  is gonna go and that’s 
why I did this. The issue has got to be raised to the level where it is finally 
decided.” And the issue he’s talking about is Jack Kevorkian’s right to kill. 
It’s euthanasia. That’s the issue. He’s bringing that into court. He’s not 
taking that to the electorate, he’s not campaigning, he’s not writing petitions, 
he’s not asking for public debate on this. He’s not asking what the people 
think. He’s not buying airtime or running a campaign. The debate is ended.
He’s stopping the debate. And he’s saying not let’s have a discussion. 
And we’re not going to decide with all of the people of this state, we’re going 
to bring it into a courtroom, we’re going to force this into a courtroom and 
we’re going to have 12 people decide.2 7
And the 12 of you who are left to deliberate it will do it not in the 
comfort of your own home, not conferring with people that you know and 
trust, not conferring with other people that might give you some insight -
265 1 observed this at the time in court, and it was compelling in technique and delivery.
266 Subtext o f this, likely unstated as unnecessary to remind Michiganders who composed the March 
1999 jury, was that the original 60 Minutes programme was aired in November 1998, less than one 
month after the November Election Day in which Proposition B, which would have allowed for lawful 
assisted suicide, was defeated by the voters in Michigan.
267 A reasonable conclusion is that this sub silentio accepted the premise that if there was an acquittal, 
that would be a rejection of the charges against Kevorkian, and a de facto and prospective nullification 
of the law.
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doctors, lawyers, workers, health care workers, people who are handicapped, 
people who are not -  you won’t get any of that input because this matter is out 
of the political process now and it’s into the courtroom and it’s on you, 
because that what he wanted.268 That’s where he wants it decided. He wants 
it on you. You will do it with the whole world watching, because that’s what
96Qhe wants. He killed a man to make that happen.
Mike Wallace says to him -  he tells us at the beginning of this trial - 1 
called him a celebrity. He says, “They made me a celebrity. I don’t want - 1 
don’t want to be a celebrity. I don’t want any fame. I don’t want this 
publicity. And Mike Wallace says to him, “You are engaged in a political, 
medical, macabre” -  strange, weird -  “publicity venture.” And he says to him. 
“Right?”
“Probably.”
That’s exactly what he’s doing here. That’s exactly what he’s doing 
here, (sic, double). You know, I’m cutting you off, you may want to read 
more of the transcript [of the prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes “Death by 
Doctor” transcript]. You’re going to have the transcripts to read, and I urge 
you to read the whole thing. I just want to highlight a couple of things for 
you. I don’t mean to be rude and turn it off, but I just want to show you -  to 
show you that I’m not making this up. That’s what he said and that’s what 
he’s done. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, Skrzynski Closing, pp. 42-44).
Celebrity was a theme expressed by Kevorkian in his opening and closing
statements as well (Rojek 2001). I want to argue one point previously alluded to as I
introduce those passages of the transcript. The opening and closing (and any cross-
examination or colloquy in which Kevorkian participated at trial) listed him in the
transcript as “Dr. Kevorkian,” in stark contrast to the prosecutor’s transcript of the
Kevorkian tape and the prosecutor’s clips of 60 Minutes, which listed “K” for
Kevorkian, “W” for Wallace and “Y” for Youk (as noted in relevant quotes I am
offering in this chapter for readers); the general convention is to use surnames in
268 A plain reading of this part of the passage supports my argument earlier in this chapter with regard 
to the jury being socialized as a jury by the viewings of the Kevorkian tape and the prosecutor’s clips 
of the 60 Minutes programme. Further, there are traditional instructions to Juries not to discuss the 
case or the issues with anyone either on the jury or at home during trial and until after a trial has been 
concluded and deliberations to a verdict had.
269 1 would argue that this part of the passage raised the bar of the jury already charged with the 
responsibility of deciding whether to convict or acquit Kevorkian -  or any person -  of homicide 
charges; it placed the jury and its members in a national and international arena, rather than simply on a 
case. This jury reacted to this in a way different from that of the mid-1990s Juries discussed in the 
earlier chapter.
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transcripts. My interpretation of the disparity here has two elements. First, by 
referring in the transcript to “Dr. Kevorkian,” the court and court reporter accorded a 
professional status, beyond that usually seen in a transcript of “Judge” “Mr. X” 
(prosecutor) and “Mr. Y” (defendant/defence attorney), with “Dr.” reserved for expert 
witnesses with a medical license (M.D.) or Ph.D. (again, Kevorkian no longer had a 
medical license, having been stripped in two states, including Michigan).270 However, 
in creating the prosecutor’s clips of the Kevorkian tape and the 60 Minutes 
programme and assigning one letter of each name to the three participants, without 
prefixes, there was a hint of status change for Kevorkian lowering him from a 
professional doctor to a mere man (or a simple letter of the alphabet) on tape and on 
trial.
In this first and last trial in which Kevorkian represented himself, the first 
thing he did was to comment on his celebrity status,271 in itself an argument, which I 
supplement with my footnotes. As Kevorkian began his opening comments, he 
argued:
First of all, it’s an honor to speak to you because I invited myself here
to speak to you. I’m the guest here. I didn’t do this for publicity as everyone
2701 take as additional support for this commentary a reference from popular culture, Jerome Robert 
Lawrence and Robert Edwin Lee’s 1955 play that was made into the 1960 classic movie, Inherit the 
Wind. This film, a fictionalized account of the 1925 Scopes “monkey trial,” was intended as a 
docudrama of events in which a Tennessee teacher was prosecuted for teaching Darwin’s theory of 
evolution to grade school children. In the movie and subsequent 2007 Broadway revival Henry 
Drummond (the Clarence Darrow-based character) objected to Matthew Harrison Brady {the William 
Jennings Bryan-based character) being referred to (in the courtroom) as “Colonel” a title bestowed by 
the townspeople before the trial with “all the pomp and circumstance that goes with it”; the solution 
was to make Drummond (the Darrow-based character) a “temporary Colonel” for the duration of the 
trial. This may have been an embellishment by the playwrights, and is not included Clarence Darrow’s 
anecdotal autobiography, The Story of My Life, (1932/1996, pp.244-279, regarding “The Evolution 
Case” and related chapters). I would argue that the inclusion of this material in the play (2007 version) 
and movie (1988 version) continue to underscore the importance of this representation of professional 
status in the courtroom (in which the lawyers were not colonels in the fictional version, and Kevorkian 
was no longer licensed as a physician in the end of century trial). I further note that at the time of this 
writing, Jack Kevorkian is the sole physician (or formerly licensed physician) to be tried and convicted 
of murder flowing from medical euthanasia (or physician assisted suicide, for that matter) in the United 
States, so a comparison to similarly situated persons is not possible.
271 Kevorkian’s opening statement started in the bottom 3 lines of page 260, and by the second 
paragraph on page 261, he was talking about his celebrity status. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript March 
22, 1999, Kevorkian Opening).
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says. You haven’t heard me make all kinds of interviews in the last two or 
three months. Publicity is the last thing I need272 and if I’m a celebrity, I 
didn’t want it. I’m a reluctant celebrity. The press makes me a celebrity.
They make me a celebrity by these court actions.273
You have -  you know, you’ve been told and you all understood, you 
have the obligation and honor of representing your community, in particular, 
the consciences of your community and the conscience of society in general274 
and therefore it’s an honor for me to address you. That why (sic) I went to 60 
Minutes, to get into this sanctum -  sanctorum where it’s difficult to lie and get 
away with it. As he said, the press is not the place to debate this. I did this to 
get where I am now, and I appreciate the privilege (Kevorkian Trial 
Transcript, March 22, 1999: Kevorkian Opening at 261-262).
In the closing, Kevorkian returned to the theme of publicity and celebrity:
I had to do something to raise this whole issue to a level where it might 
be resolved, and this is the forum for it. It certainly isn’t the political forum, 
because that will be debated for years and decades.275 But this forum can help 
get it to a stage quickly where it can be decided definitively. And that’s why I 
did it. It wasn’t staged for any other purpose, not for publicity or anything 
else. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 26,1999: Kevorkian Closing at 54-
55).
Then Kevorkian (mimicking Fieger’s mid-1990s highly successful 
summations and closing arguments, but without either the same effect upon the jury, 
which did not have this additional context) moved onto a theme of famous civil rights 
leaders, and argued:
When Rosa Parks sat on the bus, was that a crime, sitting in the front 
of the bus? You saw what happened to her. Did Martin Luther King want to 
go to jail? He did anyway.
272 1 would argue that this sounds inconsistent with Kevorkian’s recruitment of Lessenberry and CBS, 
as discussed in Part I of this chapter regarding the Ann Arbor Conference of February 22, 1999, but I 
shall here accept both statements as earnestly made.
273 This statement, included in the quote of Kevorkian’s opening remarks, is quoted for his argument, 
rather than for the truth of the matter asserted. Whether Kevorkian was a reluctant celebrity or a self- 
promoting evangelist may have been for a juror to conclude, but this is rather to reflect one of the lines 
of argument offered by Kevorkian at the 1999 trial.
274 1 interpret this as an invitation to jury nullification, as expanded upon in the Juries chapter, and 
alluded to in the Youks’ commentary at the sentencing proceeding as discussed in Chapter 5.
275 It might be reasonable to conclude that this was a comment regarding the defeat o f Proposition B 
on Election Day 1998, the day before Kevorkian contacted Lessenberry to arrange for the Youk 
euthanasia to reach a national television audience.
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There are certain acts that by sheer common sense are not crimes. This 
may be one of them. That’s for you to decide. I don’t know. (Kevorkian 
Trial Transcript, March 25, 1999: Kevorkian Closing at 60).276
This last seemed a response to the prosecutor’s argument to the jury during his
summation that:
That’s why I tell you this is a murder trial. This is about the murder of 
Tom Youk, a murder that’s committed to make a political statement. Is that 
any better than murder for hire? Is that any different than murdering 
somebody for money? And then to wrap it up under the guise of mercy when 
it’s a political statement. He’s willing to kill a man to make his political 
statement. Mike Wallace says some people call you a fanatic and he says 
zealot. He’s a zealot and he’s proud of it. He’s willing to sacrifice this man 
for his cause and then he puts it on you to decide the cause -  you decide it.
Give me this right. He’s asking for it. He’s asking for you to give him 
a right that no one else in this state has. He’s asking for you to give him a 
right that even the State of Michigan itself does not have. This state does not 
have capital punishment... the State itself will not even take a life.... You’d 
have to ignore the law. You’d have to ignore all the law. You’d have to 
create a new exception to the murder statute. That’s what he wants you to do. 
That’s the right to kill he’s asking for. (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25, 
1999: Skrzynski Closing at 46)(emphasis added).
As I previously discussed in Chapter 4, the 1999 Kevorkian jury returned a 
verdict of guilty as to murder in the second degree and delivery of a controlled 
substance, but the jury and its members declined to give interviews to the media or 
others discussing the verdict. This verdict may have been what is commonly referred 
to in practice as a “compromise verdict” in that it was less than what the prosecutor 
had sought regarding first degree premeditated murder, and greater than what 
Kevorkian told Mike Wallace during his 60 Minutes interview and included in the 
prosecutor’s clips -  that it “might be manslaughter.”277 On appeal, the Michigan
276 At this point, the prosecutor raised an objection and raised a theme discussed in my Juries chapter, 
though not ultimately at issue in this case of conviction -  that of jury nullification; Mr. Skrzynski 
argued, “Well, objection. That’s not for the jury to decide. Judge, he’s arguing a nullification.” 
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 25,1999: Kevorkian Closing and Court Colloquy at 60).
277 In fact, although Kevorkian was poker faced and composed at the reading of the verdict, he was 
shocked at the result, as in the much published comment to Lessenberry -- "Manslaughter, I could 
understand how they would arrive at that. But murder? This? They must have been an astonishingly 
cruel jury!" Jack Kevorkian told reporter Jack Lessenberry, "[y]ou tell them I said this." He went on, "I 
don’t want to be a martyr. I want to be free. And that’s why I am doing this, and you should print that. I
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Court of Appeals devoted approximately three pages of its lengthy decision (248 
MichApp. 373-443), affirming the conviction, to a factual “Overview” to the 
underlying facts of the case, and of this, less than two pages to the 60 Minutes 
interview and “Death by Doctor” segment, although reference was made in other parts 
of the appellate writing (248 MichApp. 373, 374-382). In the course of researching 
this chapter, I reviewed the appellate writing, which contained a factual error (proven 
by this chapter writing, most particularly Part II). In specific, Judge Whitbeck, 
writing for the unanimous court, stated that:
Defendant twice videotaped himself interacting with Youk. In the first 
videotape, defendant went to Youk’s home to discuss his condition. In the 
second videotape, defendant administered a lethal drug to Youk. Defendant 
later was a guest on the television news show 60 Minutes, during which 
segments from both videotapes were shown. The jury saw the videotapes and 
the 60 Minutes interview at defendant's trial. Nevertheless, defendant 
attempted to persuade the jury not to convict him because the murder he was 
charged with committing was, in his view, a “mercy killing.” (248 MichApp. 
373 at 374-375)(emphasis added).
One must wonder if this does not recreate the landmark narrative, given that 
the prosecutor used carefully pruned clips of but half of the original 60 Minutes 
programme. A reasonable conclusion is that, with the authority of judicial fia t, the 
prosecutor’s clips have become a landmark narrative by virtue of this passage. 
However, this is not what the factual reality at trial was, nor was that the factual 
reality of the original 60 Minutes programme, as the research and writing of this 
transcript based part of the chapter documented and argued. As to the factual reality 
at trial, the input resided in the word “guilty,” although that rested with the jury. In 
this regard, I now wish to posit how the jury might have arrived at that verdict (two 
verdicts, actually, one as to murder and one as to drug delivery).
need to be free to die." Indeed, it would seem that he actually did expect to be acquitted yet again, and 
was taken aback at the verdict, despite his comment to Mike Wallace that seemed to parse the elements 
to the least bad possibility of criminal conviction.
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D. Social Constructions of Kevorkian’s Public Account at the 1999 Trial
Since Kevorkian did not testify in 1999, his account of what transpired 
between him and Thomas Youk was essentially introduced by way of the media, and 
by the arguments of the prosecuting attorney and Kevorkian acting pro se 
(representing himself). Thus, the Kevorkian tape created in September 1998 was sent 
to CBS, where Mike Wallace and his production team took clips and created the 
“Death by Doctor” segment broadcast as the original 60 Minutes programme in 
November 1998. In turn, the Oakland County Chief Prosecuting Attorney, along with 
the trial prosecutor and his staff, decided to charge Kevorkian and to create for trial 
the Kevorkian tape clips and the prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes programme. 
Those tape clips, yet again in turn, formed the heart of the evidence at the Kevorkian 
trial in March 1999. Last, they shaped the interpretations of the arguments that both 
the prosecutor and Kevorkian used to construct opening and closing arguments. For 
Kevorkian, the taped clips served as a vehicle by which he was able to introduce his 
account and interpretation of the events of September 1998 and to expand upon the 
motivations he presented in November 1998, without cross-examination, as 
documented by the transcript.
If. for the purposes of the last section, I invited the reader to walk with me 
down the legal path the prosecutor and Kevorkian proceeded toward the jury’s verdict 
of guilt, then in this section, I invite the reader to assume the verdict while looking 
back at the path. The quotes, the tape clips and the words spoken in court will have
9 78been no different, but the focus now is to consider Kevorkian and his system of 
public accounting from the same trial transcripts with the same words, playing before 
the same audience (jury) on the same stage of court. Different situations have
278 For reasons relating to word count concerns, I am not repeating the actual block quotes in this 
section, but refer the reader to sections A, B and C in this portion of the chapter.
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different vocabularies (Mills 1940, pp. 906-907), and so it is that while the jury was in 
a court of law, it is also reasonable to conclude that its members experienced 
Kevorkian as a member of society who had deviated from its norms or its laws (by 
virtue of the guilty verdict the jury rendered).
Whereas the law regarding homicide is focused upon intent, Mill’s seminal 
writing regarding the “Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive,” was trained 
upon the vocabulary of motive. Condry (2007, p. 95) observed that “[vocabularies of 
motive are historically and culturally specific, so certain motives will be acceptable 
and influential in particular societies at particular times.” Professor Stan Cohen, in an 
homage to Mills, issued the reminder that “the fact that each audience may be offered 
a different account, far from undermining the theory, confirms the radically 
sociological character of motivation [with] accounts that may be justifications or 
excuses” (Cohen 2006, p.59).
What if the same audience (or jury) hears the same account, but a different 
theoretical framework is imposed in considering the listening viewer (or juror)? In 
Rashomon, the viewer was encouraged to see how different people in different roles 
(victim, defendant, witness) experienced an alleged crime. Mills encouraged social 
observers to see that accounts were not simply formed after the fact, but before, 
during and after an occurrence -  and to embrace that “motives are accepted 
justifications for present, future or past programs or acts” (Mills 1940, p.907). The 
Kevorkian trial did the latter with Kevorkian’s own words, before, during and after 
the crime charged, but without testimony.279
279 Motive and intent are sometimes confused, and in consideration of possible compassionate 
motivations that nonetheless do not mitigate intent regarding assisting suicide or euthanasia, I offer C. 
Wright Mills’ elegant answer. “[I]ntention or purpose (stated as a ‘program’) is awareness of 
anticipated consequence; motives are names for consequential situations, and surrogates for actions 
leading to them” (Mills 1940, p. 905).
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Ordinarily, I would protest that without the protections of oath and cross- 
examination, this is of great concern, a lawyer’s bias. However, and as discussed 
earlier in this chapter (as well as others), Kevorkian attested his sincerity and veracity 
without objection; this accorded with my observations over time and argued earlier in 
this dissertation that Kevorkian took honesty very seriously, in his “word” or “vow” 
and in terms of court (regardless of whether he was sworn as a witness). The 
prosecutor was not concerned that Kevorkian was untruthful in his tape or courtroom 
assertions, other than as to matters of form and evidentiary permission in court.280 
Similarly, Kevorkian was not contesting that the prosecutor misidentified him or Tom 
Youk or the acts Kevorkian had engaged in. Rather, I would suggest that Kevorkian’s 
arguments were evocative of the following quote from Sykes and Matza (1957,
p.666):
The normative system of society, then, is marked by what Williams 
has termed flexibility', it does not consist of a body of rules to be binding under 
all conditions.
This flexibility is, in fact, an integral part of the criminal law in that 
measures for “defenses to crimes” are provided in pleas such as nonage, 
necessity, insanity, drunkenness, compulsion, self-defense (sic), and so-on.
The individual can avoid moral culpability for his criminal action -  and thus 
avoid the negative sanctions of society -  if he can prove that criminal intent 
was lacking. It is our [that is to say Sykes’ and Matza’s] argument that much 
delinquency is based on what is essentially an unrecognised extension o f 
defenses (sic) to crimes, in the form o f justification for deviance that are seen 
as valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system at large. Sykes and 
Matza (1957, p. 666, emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
Here, Kevorkian would have found (unauthorised and ultimately ineffectual)
support that his actions in providing a medical service removed him from the ambit of
280 For those who might argue that Skrzynski’s objections to Kevorkian’s attempts to offer evidence in 
the course of his summation were proof that Kevorkian might not have been truthful, I would counter 
that the procedural Fifth Amendment issues concerning Kevorkian’s attempts to introduce information 
which had not previously been introduced as evident and testimony (which appeal Kevorkian lost on 
the merits, during appeal) were just that -  procedural. Kevorkian was inartful and inelegant when 
acting as his own lawyer, but not dishonest. Indeed, there was no objection by the prosecutor when 
Kevorkian told the jury that he did not lie, perhaps because the truth of the matters asserted provided 
the heart of the crime charged. The more truth Kevorkian told, the more convictable he was, in a sense,
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the general law. I would argue that this was a way of “normalising the act,” which 
Condry (2007, p. 119) observed was a strategy that was rarely used by participants in 
her study of accounts by family members. Condry noted that some family members 
of violent offenders argued that, “anyone could kill given the right circumstances” 
(Condry 2007, p. 119). Kevorkian’s argument was actually that only a very select few 
i.e., physicians, could administer medical euthanasia under the right circumstances, 
and that it could be a normalised practice for those specially trained in medicine. A 
doctor would provide for “better control” (a phrase that I would argue Kevorkian used 
in the 60 Minutes interview, p. 25, and in his closing, p. 56, to account for 
professional responsibility, whereas the prosecutor used the same words to depict 
control focused criminal) in euthanasia as a “medical service,” (Kevorkian closing, p.
56) an adjustment of the act per se.m  From Kevorkian’s perspective, his status as a 
physician (albeit stripped of licensure) justified his actions in alignment with 
Downes’ and Rock’s argument that, “[t]he experience of oneself as free to deviate 
depends in part on access to appropriate names and explanations” (Downes and Rock 
1998, p. 189). By further arguing in his summation that he had brought the 
cardiogram to ensure quality control in this medical service, I would argue that 
Kevorkian was seeking to promote himself as establishing protocols and “procedures” 
as a medical matter (including in Youk’s written consent, read into the 60 Minutes 
programme, at p. 26-28).
A reasonable interpretation of this was that that he saw his role as a physician 
as an actor adjustment above an ordinary citizen -  above a juror. I here make the 
observation that Dr. Timothy Quill was successful in doing likewise in the assisted 
suicide of his leukaemia patient (by way of a prescription for a lethal dose of
2811 argue that Kevorkian’s efforts at both act adjustment and actor adjustment were designed to 
elevate his conduct and his status, rather than to be apologetic for them, (in contrast to the argument 
advanced by Condry (2007, p. 104).
340
barbiturates) less than one decade earlier, with the result that after he gave his 
account, the grand jury declined to indict him.
Indeed, throughout the trial, Kevorkian focused upon his medical identity. 
While he took on the situationally specific role of the self-representing “lawyer,” he 
declined to take on the role of defence witness in presenting his account. I argue that 
his statements were reasonably consistent with what a doctor might say (for example 
in the Youk euthanasia descriptions on the Kevorkian videotape), but not consistent 
with a lawyer arguing the case of a doctor accused of homicide. This left “an account 
[as] a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry, 
a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behaviour”
... “which in ordinary life are usually phased” (Sykes and Matza 1957, pp.59-60, 
footnote omitted).
This status shift from ordinary person to physician and Kevorkian’s argument 
that this should permit him to engage in euthanasia for “better control,” was not 
within the law. I question whether Kevorkian’s account would have been treated 
unfavourably (or even prosecuted, according to the prosecutor) if it had appeared, like 
Quill’s, in The New England Journal o f Medicine, rather than on CBS national 
television, where the graphic nature was depicted. As Downes and Rock noted, 
“[w]hen acts and states can be reassessed as worthy or innocuous, when they can be 
presented as not ‘really’ deviant, it is a little easier to accept them” (Downes and Rock 
1998, pp. 189).
In essence, Kevorkian’s account on the tapes and his argument at the trial was 
that he was professionally justified in administering euthanasia. This was regardless 
of (and thereby offering a neutralisation technique as to) the law, in an appeal to his
282 In fairness, I must say that Quill’s hospice physician status is (present tense deliberate) quite 
different than was Kevorkian’s as a pathologist.
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professional loyalties (compare, Sykes and Matza 1957, p.51). By saying to Mike 
Wallace (prosecutor’s clips at 27-28) that it was “up to [him] to dispel the terror” of 
Tom Youk a day after their first meeting, Kevorkian took on a medical professional 
responsibility for his conduct. This might be viewed in contrast to the argument of 
Downes and Rock that “[t]he very absence of an apparent motive can itself become a 
motive, liberating the offender from personal responsibility for his conduct” (1998, p. 
189). I would argue that Kevorkian strode into further rule breaking, rather than 
drifted; he did not offer “excuses attempt[ing] to diminish the responsibility, [but 
continued to offer] justifications [to] attempt to normalise the act” (Condry 2007, 
p.97, citing Scott and Lyman). A further example of the disconnect between 
Kevorkian’s account and the jury’s verdict was where Kevorkian used Feiger’s 
comparisons of Kevorkian to Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, in which he 
analogised his actions to theirs, declaring that “there are certain acts that by sheer 
common sense are not crimes” (Kevorkian Closing at 60). Feiger secured acquittals, 
where Kevorkian sounded as though he had either a martyrdom or God complex (or 
both).
At trial, the prosecutor’s clips of Kevorkian’s interview with Mike Wallace for 
60 Minutes repeatedly depicted him condemning the condemners (Sykes and Matza 
1957, p.51), by saying he had “to force them to act” (prosecutor’s clips of 60 Minutes 
interview at 30). This technique of neutralisation, I now argue, condemned 
Kevorkian himself in advance of the trial. For example, the prosecutor seized upon 
Kevorkian’s emphatic comment in the course of the 60 Minutes interview for the 
original programme (and included in the prosecutor’s clips):
Dr. Kevorkian told Mike Wallace, I’ve got to force them to act. He 
means the prosecutor. “They must charge me. He tells him, “Either they go” -  
meaning the prosecutor -- or I go. If I’m acquitted they go because they know 
they’ll never convict me.” And then he goes on to tell Mike Wallace, “One of
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the two is gonna go and that’s why I did this. The issue has got to be raised to 
the level where it’s finally decided.”
And the issue that he’s talking about is his right to kill. Jack 
Kevorkain used the death of Tom Youk to publicize his own political agenda 
which is the legalization of euthanasia — that’s killing -- and he did it in such a 
way that there will be no debate on this issue by all the people of this state. 
There won’t be any vote on a ballot by all the people of this state about this 
important issue. He did it in such a way that he forced the Oakland County 
Prosecutor to charge him with murder by having a murder broadcast all over 
the country, and that’s exactly what the Oakland County Prosecutor did. 
(Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 22, 1999: Skrzynski Opening, 252- 
253)(emphasis added).
The prosecutor was able to show Kevorkian condemning the condemners as 
well in the prosecutor’s clips of the 60 Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment, a key 
media colloquy between Mike Wallace and Kevorkian, which was included for the 
jury (Kevorkian Trial Transcript, March 23,1999: 29).
K Either they go or I go.
W What does that mean, they or I go?
K If, if I’m acquitted, they go because they know they’ll never convict
me.
W Um hum.
K If I am convicted, I shall starve to death in prison, so I shall go. One of
the two of us is gonna go and that’s why I did this. The issue [of 
euthanasia] here has got to be raised to the level where it is finally 
decided.
W You are engaged in a political, medical, macabre, ah publicity venture.
(emphasis added).
K Um hum.
By presenting this material (and properly doing so), the prosecutor was able to 
use Kevorkian’s account to show a politicised campaign that was publicity seeking in 
nature. I would argue that by condemning the condemners (Becker (1991: 28-29), 
Kevorkian condemned himself. Likewise, Kevorkian’s self-repudiating account of 
Youk’s consent, in which Kevorkian had “sensed some reluctance” (prosecutor’s clips
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of 60 Minutes interview at 25-26) in Tom Youk undermined the claim of professional 
justification. Ultimately, Kevorkian’s “account” failed to have its own “currency” 
(Cohen 2006, pp. 61-62) and was unsuccessful in its attempt to depict his 
justifications “as socially approved vocabularies that neutralize an act or its 
consequences when called into question ... and to assert its positive value in the face 
of a claim to the contrary” (Scott and Lyman 1957, p.51).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown how the 60 Minutes programme segment, “Death 
by Doctor,” came to be created by actors in the media and subsequently used by 
actors in the law. In addition, I have shown how the media viewed themselves as a 
factor in precipitating the charges leading to the 1999 Kevorkian trial for the 
September 1998 murder of Tom Youk. This the prosecutor would otherwise not 
have pursued, but for the media event in November 1998.
That the death of Tom Youk became newsworthy two months later, in the 
wake of the 60 Minutes contact and original programme segment, perhaps says 
something about the way in which people live and die. The intimate moment of 
death, which brought a private matter into a public sphere, was one factor in the 
1998/1999 prosecution of Jack Kevorkian. However, the breach of social and legal 
order was what created a story -  a crime story of this “exceptional homicide” (Rock 
1998, p.225). This may have been even more powerful, given that the 60 Minutes 
“Death by Doctor” segment was neither enacted nor partly documentary, but rather 
composed of the Kevorkian/Youk euthanasia tape and interviews with Kevorkian, 
family members, and others.
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The “story” as portrayed on 60 Minutes generated not only other stories, but 
also a criminal prosecution and trial. However, the story at trial had significant gaps 
and edits in the prosecutor’s clips of the original 60 Minutes programme, so that the 
jury was presented with a different narrative. The Michigan Court of Appeals chose 
to overlook this fact, with the prosecutor’s redacted reinterpretation now legally 
considered a complete programme segment, rather than revisionism (cf. Livingstone, 
Allen and Reiner 2001, p. 182). CBS also reinterpreted the original landmark 
narrative in its programme celebrating the parole of Jack Kevorkian in 2007, and 
creating a new story in what approached a hybrid consisting of reality television and 
documentary. As with reality television, “in actuality, most of what reache[d] the air 
... [was] highly planned, enacted, edited, and ... fabricated to look like spontaneous 
and tension filled action”; while unlike a reality show, the 60 Minutes depictions and 
segments were not “entertainment creations in which dialogue and action often need 
to be made up to create the desired element of drama” (Trend 2007, p. 101).
Perhaps the sense of moral and social order was breached by Kevorkian’s 
conduct and the media construction of the euthanasia he administered to Tom Youk. 
If so, the prosecution and trial to conviction restored the sense of legal order, 
notwithstanding Kevorkian’s attempts to account for and justify his action (both 
specifically and generally). Ultimately I have shown how the same information was 
interpreted and reinterpreted by the media and the criminal justice system as regards 
Kevorkian’s account of the Youk euthanasia, each with different goals, each 
successfully by an objective measure -  be it an audience share or a criminal 
conviction.
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Conclusion
Before proceeding with my conclusions, I make a disclaimer of what this 
conclusion is not. It is not going to set forth a position either in favour or in opposition 
to assisted suicide. Legal at the time the original thesis was drafted in one state 
(Oregon) and in one more when the revised version was submitted (Washington 
State), it remains outside the law in the remainder of the country. Euthanasia is 
against the law in the entirety of the United States. I have been asked many times 
(too numerous to count) if I was “pro” or “con.” If I have written this thesis as I 
intended, a reader should come away with a sense that I have illuminated many 
aspects of the debates involved, but also that I have not taken a position on either side 
of the debate. One former flatmate, who read the galley proof of my “Bitter Pill” 
(1996) piece said that it read like a mystery, because I said that I had been tested for 
Huntington’s Disease, but not revealed the result (which I did in a later writing, 
entitled “Am I My Father’s Daughter,” in 1996). Here, I want the reader to solve the 
mystery -  not my position in the debate, but to consider any information that may 
illuminate their contemplation of the debate. My job, as I have seen it, was 
ethnographically to investigate and discover new facts, offer a framework consistent 
with legal and sociological writings, but not to superimpose my opinions or beliefs. 
One person I met shortly after the viva asked if I “got away with that,” to which I 
replied that there are as many answers as there are stories. As one woman on the 
Michigan Commission on Death and Dying told me in private conversation,
“everyone has a story,” a statement equally true of everyone involved in the 
Kevorkian cases.
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This thesis has sought to tell the story of a group (or more accurately, several 
subgroups) of people involved in the Michigan politics of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide as a comparative case study of emerging criminal law and the criminal trials 
of Jack ‘Dr. Death’ Kevorkian during the 1990s. Before I specify chapter by chapter 
conclusions, I would argue a decade long vocabulary lesson. Prior to the 1990s, the 
phrase “physician assisted suicide” (either with or without) a hyphen between 
“physician” and “assisted” was neither a medical nor legal term of art (nor a phrase in 
the popular culture nor dictionary). By the end of the 1990s, this phrase was subject 
to great debate in medicine (whether considered in terms of medical ethics or applied 
medical practice), law and sociology (as one example, I had a heated discussion with 
a woman who insisted that there was in the mid-1990s “voluntary euthanasia” of 
infants, whom in law have no capacity of consent or voluntariness, in the Miranda 
sense of the word). It was the topic of litigation (discussed throughout this 
dissertation) and legislation (as alluded to in pertinent part during my arguments).
The man on the Clapham omnibus debated the pros and cons, along with legislative 
task forces and anyone who picked up a newspaper and found themselves confronted
' J Q Aby front-page articles. National news reported on variations of this conduct, and 
YouTube posted videos.
For my “lexicon,” I make three comments on the labelling of physician 
conduct in assisted suicide, particularly in the Kevorkian prosecutions and appeals. 
First, I found myself referring to “physician assisted suicide” (no hyphen), in what I
283 This is a linguistic homage to the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, which was rendered 
unlawful as a body before its final report in 1994, which was then referred to as a “Report by a Group 
of People,” although it was divided in final rendition, unlike the unanimity voiced by the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics (1994). However, the group of people I have focused upon 
in this dissertation was the group (and subgroups) involved in the Kevorkian prosecutions, as examined 
in this dissertation.
284 This is, in my case, a literal statement -  in June 1995,1 went on a conference trip to Singapore, and 
the day after the plane landed my travel companion handed me a copy of USA Today provided by the 
hotel; on the front page was an article about a new Kevorkian case.
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realized developed as independent clauses relating to the doctor and the act (or the 
doctor and the suicidant). While the grammatically correct (dictionary) term is 
“physician-assisted suicide,” I argue that this subordinates the doctor to the act (and 
indeed, this may be a deliberate linguistic construction). That said, for Kevorkian, the 
conduct perhaps could be constructed as “Physican assisted suicide,” with the clear 
emphasis on the doctor (and, as he argued in the 1999 Youk trial, doctor control).
Second, I suggest that in referring to Kevorkian as “Doctor” or “Dr.” in court 
or in transcripts, language bolstered what in fact had been a stripped credential of 
licensure, conferring a professional status that he was no longer entitled to, regardless 
of his training as a physician. The transcript provided a visual cue to a further 
research topic, relating to visual imagery of that which is oral (Hulme 1984). Third, 
language interpretations such as the “embedded” transcriptions of the prosecutor’s 
clips of the 60 Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment, containing K/Y/W for Kevorkian, 
Youk and Wallace, may perhaps have been the most technically correct, yet available 
only in viewing the literal transcripts (whether in the jury room or subsequent analysis 
of the trial transcript). This visual representation may have emerged from sharing 
office space with a group of court reporters, yet found academic support from Hulme 
(1984).
This last was focused on the act, rather than labeling the actors. I suggest that, 
coming together, these three linguistic matters may have explicitly or implicitly 
furthered Kevorkian’s conviction. This is important as Kevorkian was (as Judge 
Cooper noted at sentencing) no longer a licensed physician. His death penalty-like 
lethal cocktail was not within the ambit of palliative care, nor was it within the 
category of drugs permitted by states which do allow for assisted suicide (generally 
oral depressants). I began to impute political connotations into the words, the same
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words, in different contexts, perhaps consistent with the fact that physician assisted 
suicide and medical euthanasia were much debated during the decade.
Conversely, there were words that were seemingly axiomatic in the United 
States that were not so in the United Kingdom. One such example is the word 
“segment,” which referred to a piece of a talk show or newsmagazine (most notably 
“Death by Doctor” on 60 Minutes) that was a specific bit and generally between 
commercials and advertisements. In the United States, this seemed a given of a piece 
of material, whereas colleagues in the United Kingdom asked me if I was likening the 
Youk euthanasia to an orange being divided (in fact, the language seems to be a 
“colloquial term of art” in the media. A more granular example of this was the way in 
which the phrase “jury nullification” came to be used in Michigan, and commented 
about in pertinent portions of the juries and families chapters -  nullification in the 
mid-1990s Kevorkian trials became a term of colloquial art so much so that it was 
generally bandied about by prosecutors and members of the Youk family in advance 
of trial in 1999. Delineations and definitions of what was (or was not) either assisted 
suicide or euthanasia seemed to emanate from the Kevorkian cases, and make their 
way around the world. This was the case both in the practical application of the law 
and in the media. At the same time, applications of theoretical law (such as the 
construction of jury nullification) seemed to be condensed into the Kevorkian cases 
for Michiganders.
In the first chapter, I introduced recent historical perspectives and pointed 
toward some of the interlacing academic literature and debates relating to medical 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, and a methodology discussion, which I also 
alluded to in subsequent chapters. I conclude that the value of the ethnographic study, 
which here used, inter alia, in court observations, transcripts, and interview, was a
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real-life and real-time opportunity to engage in the construction of my own version of 
David Hare’s Murmuring Judges. It was a fascinating, but incredibly expensive, 
opportunity. Someone once told me that my PhD was costing me a million dollars, 
despite scholarships, fellowships, jobs and cost cutting efforts during research; he 
then showed me some of the numbers based upon travel expenses and projected 
income that I had not earned. In a pre-viva meeting, Paul Rock invited me to consider 
if there was anything I would have done differently. While I might not have engaged 
in 10 years of research and continually re-opened my field work and writing efforts, 
in all candour, I wanted a completed body of research. The appellate lawyer in me 
held out for moments of conclusion, a costly proposition in terms of both money and 
missed opportunities. Whatever the abnegation, it was self-imposed and in retrospect, 
I do not regret it, although I confess I thought I was going in for a couple of years of 
research (as I did with a similar methodology researching anti-stalking measures in 
Minnesota and New York in Pappas 1997; Pappas 2000) and not a dozen years.
While I do believe I had a relatively complete corpus of material, I do need to 
note that the life of assisted death marched on. The week after I filed the original 
dissertation, Kevorkian lost a campaign for Michigan state legislature. Washington 
State approved a ballot initiative to allow for physician-assisted suicide on the same 
day. I wanted my dissertation back, to add more, and was desolate that the original 
draft was filed for the viva. A month later, on December 10, 2008, a documentary on 
Sky Television “Real Lives” television showed the Swiss ’’Dignitas” clinic 
euthanasia of Craig Ewert, a 59-year-old retired professor and ALS patient, was 
broadcast on British television; which I would have liked to compare to the 60
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Minutes “Death by Doctor” segment.285 By May 31, 2009, there was a waiting list of 
800 Britons for the Dignitas clinic (guardianco.uk) and Debbie Purddy, a 46-year-old 
with multiple sclerosis was scheduled in June to go to the House of Lords to ask 
whether her husband, Omar Puente, would be prosecuted if he helped her to travel 
abroad to die (under the Sucide Act 1961). This, I would have liked to compare to the 
1994 case of Tony Bland, and consider the extension that Purdy sought supported by 
Dignity in Dying. Prosecutorial issues regarding a potential generalised new right, to 
assisted dying abroad, was included in an interview by Sir Ken Macdonald, former 
Director of Public Prosecutions (www.news.bbc.co, 2 June 2009).
In Chapter 2 ,1 discussed Kevorkian’s campaign for physician- assisted 
suicide and how it had an enormous impact upon society on many levels. Among 
other things, Kevorkian caused a re-appraisal of medicine in patient end of life care, 
and a further re-appraisal of the role of law (and particularly the criminal justice 
system) regarding doctors who were in transgression of the (emerging) law.287 In this, 
I found an opportunity to examine the roles of Kevorkian and his legislative nemesis, 
Senator Fred Dillingham -  a former mortician and fellow death worker, a pairing that 
I suspect both would eschew.
During the period of research, I found myself having to adapt my research 
methodologies in shifting legal sands (an unanticipated and reportable finding in and 
of itself) of litigation and legislation in Michigan. This may have reflected an
285 1 am grateful to Ms. Lisa Haddock, who sent me a link regarding this, and which I verified at 
www.timesonline.
286 1 note that at the time that I submitted my dissertation for my M.Sc. in Criminal Justice Policy in 
late 1992, the common phrase was still medical euthanasia, whereas by 1993/4 both Kevorkian and the 
phrase “assisted suicide” were known, and by 1995/6 popular television shows used phrases such as “to 
Kevorkian” or “Kevorkian’s place.” I would argue that this was an emerging phrase to identify new 
conduct, in contrast to my arguments (Pappas: 1994, 1996, 1999) regarding stalking as a pre-existing 
conduct given a new name.
287 By this, I take as a given that the transgression of law takes place in a public space or arena, rather 
than as a private patient matter at home, or in a hospital setting, as I discussed at great length in Chapter 
6.
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emerging collective social consciousness borne of personal/family experiences of 
changes in the perception of what Glaser and Straus (nearly 30 years earlier) labelled 
“death trajectories” as much as the media’s "construction of a story and precipitation 
of an issue. I have argued throughout the field work chapters of this dissertation that 
a reasonable conclusion was that assisted suicide (as either a patient or as a physician) 
was a widespread “coming out” issue (not unlike women’s suffrage in the 20th century 
or same sex marriage in the current century). People (such as family members) who 
one might have expected to be shy of interviews were very open, and some in fact 
sought them out. Likewise, others in the public eye (for example, judges and 
members of the media) sought to tell their own personal stories (which encouraged 
me to tell my own in a 1996 lecture and related essay). I found that people -  ordinary 
and extraordinary people -  wanted, and sometimes needed to talk, about these issues 
and their personal stories that a polite conversant might have thought too personal or 
“sensitive.” My original aide memoir of 1993288 developed into the IRB statement of 
1996 — by which I advised interviewees of the interview, what it was for, where my 
affiliations were, explaining that confidentiality could not be assured in this high 
profile series of cases, but that requests for confidentiality or going off the record 
would be assured.289 The one-page, single-spaced IRB statement, which I read prior 
to interviews, and gave copies to interviewees, was dubbed by one interviewee as 
“Miranda for academics.” In the IRB process, I learned to give a phone number and 
other contact detail, and to offer interviewees the opportunity to ask further questions 
or contact me or present other concerns. (Some interviewees, such as line prosecutor 
John Skrzynski, cut me off early in the IRB colloquy, saying “yeah, yeah, I consent.”)
288 1 am grateful to David Downes, who originally suggested this plan to me in the LSE Tuesday 
Mannheim Centre for Criminology seminar.
289 1 was required to gain IRB approval for my first field trip in 1996, since I was then a Post-Doctoral 
Fellow at the University of Minnesota, Center for Biomedical Ethics.
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What astonished me most was that I expected nobody to talk to me, except perhaps 
Kevorkian, yet nearly everyone I met (in court, in lobbies, while in restaurants with 
other interviewees) wanted to talk, perhaps to purge or to seek a cleansing ritual. I 
conclude that this led to unanticipated, and perhaps unprecedented, access.
Some doctors in the early 1990s used writing and/or medical documentation as 
a mechanism to bring matters previously considered private to exposure in the public 
sphere. These included Timothy Quill who went from writing a personal essay of 
how he gave drugs to a patient to assist in a 1990 suicide, to his participation in a U.S. 
Supreme Court case unsuccessfully seeking a declaratory judgment striking New 
York’s assisted suicide law, to the book and conference circuit. Winchester 
rheumatologist Nigel Cox, perhaps invited prosecution by his patient notes in 
hospital. However, one might (if not inevitably) conclude that Quill made a political 
statement by writing his essay for publication in The New England Journal o f 
Medicine, whereas Cox engaged in a private family matter and was “exposed” by 
hospital nursing staff in response to his documentation on a patient’s chart.290 I infer 
an inevitable extension of Judge Cooper’s remarks in interview that everyone 
involved in the Kevorkian cases (i.e., not only Kevorkian) was a “zealot.”291 This I 
say to the extent that challenges to the medical and legal culture were as much about 
style as about substance. ’’Good” doctors (who were not incarcerated), while deviant 
doctors were. An example is that Kevorkian was punished by loss of licensure years 
before he was prosecuted to conviction. This was in sharp contrast to Cox, who was
290 When I attended hearings of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics in 1993/4,1 
repeatedly heard witnesses ask rhetorically why Cox wrote “it” down, which seemed to show a cultural 
construction of common practice of euthanasia sans documentation and which also seemed to suggest 
that the medical culture did not abhor the practice of medical hastening of death, but rather abhorred 
the public exposure of “it.”
291 The linguist construction of “zealot” in American criminal prosecutions is generally with regard to 
inflammatory comments by prosecuting or defense attorneys in argument, and regards prosecutorial 
error most frequently (with phrases such as “prosecutorial zeal” or “overzealous prosecutor” used in 
appellate briefs and decisions so frequently as to be passim  in the culture of the criminal justice 
system); however, one might reasonably analogize this phrasing to religious zealotry or to witch hunts.
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given a suspended sentence of one year by the judge, and only subsequently was 
punished by the General Medical Council, which imposed a requirement to take 
palliative care instruction and had his medical care supervised for one year.
During the period of research and then during the periods of analysis and 
writing, the terrain shifted so abruptly and repeatedly that I ultimately gave up hope 
that I would be able to include everything in my findings. Editing, refining and 
focusing are, as Paul Rock says, central disciplines in academic research; however, 
this was in conflict with my lawyer’s sense of being complete in the case. I hoarded a 
great deal of related research that will have to go into other projects and writings,292 
and at the time of this writing, I was still unable to open a newspaper without a new 
development that seemed to change a feature or update.293 Further, the week after the 
initial submission of the thesis, Washington State by voter initiative approved 
legislation of physician assisted suicide regulations (Initiative 1000, “The Death with 
Dignity Act”) on the same Election Day that Jack Kevorkian lost a Michigan bid for
292 In later draft revisions, when it became clear that I had to learn more and more to write up less and 
less, I took solace from Stan Cohen’s Preface to his 2001 States o f Denial: Knowing About Atrocities 
and Suffering, when he wrote that he “collected and hoarded all sorts o f material -  newspaper cuttings, 
Oxfam appeals, Biafra and Vietnam war photos, quotes, book titles, bits o f conversation [with the] 
fantasy that one day [he] would integrate all this” (Cohen 2001, p.x)(emphasis added) and later offered 
that the result was not what [he] had planned ,„ [and that] someone else will have to write” some of the 
other aspects (Cohen 2001, p.xiv).
293 One such example was on September 9, 2008, when The Star-Ledger printed a front page “above 
the fold” article by Maryann Spoto and Rick Hepp, entitled “Shore RN Accused of Murdering a 
Patient: Authorities Say Nurse Killed Man with Injection.” The article lead was “a nurse from Jersey 
Shore University Medical Center was charged yesterday with killing a 72-year-old patient by injecting 
him with an unprescribed paralytic drug” (Spoto and Hepp, September 9, 2008). This article alone 
could have found a place in my Juries chapter (39 year old Lorie Hentges is contending that all she did 
was sit next to her dying patient and hold his hand so that he would not be alone, which would fit 
within the nurses mini-study and Glaser and Straus’ trilogy; or Chapter 6 (with a note that the nurse 
was accused of the murder in September 2008, regarding a death that occurred on April 13, although 
not as a result of a tape or interview, as with the Kevorkian/Youk case); or might have made for a note 
in conjunction with discussion of Winchester’s Cox case (the New Jersey Department of Health and 
Senior Services fined the hospital $475,000 for failing to report the incident the day it occurred on 
April 17, 2008 until August 1, 2008), or within a discussion of the changing roles of medical 
professionals with advances in medical technology (the alleged intravenous was within one day after 
life support was withdrawn from the decedent); or perhaps a note of changes in the criminal law in 
response to transgression of medical professionals (for New Jersey, in 2003/4 five years prior to the 
Hentges case, nurse Charles Cullen confessed to surreptitiously killing some 40 patients by lethal 
injection in New Jersey and Pennsylvania hospitals where he worked, which prompted a series of 
reforms including prompt reporting of suspected criminal events to state authorities, a response 
reminiscent of the Michigan response to Kevorkian’s activities).
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an elected state office;294 within one month, there was press that BBC would be airing 
an assisted suicide of a British citizen who sought assistance in Switzerland (where 
the conduct was lawful and regulated). Whereas in Oregon, doctors are being 
regulated to allow for assisted death and 2009 will see Washington State follow as the 
second state to do so, in other states (such as New Jersey), the criminal justice system 
is tightening regulation of nurses. I believe that a comparative study of why this 
dichotomy occurred is merit worthy. An additional way forward for further research 
would be in the arena of “regulation.”
This project, however, has been a sociological study of a series of criminal 
trials featuring a particular defendant in a particular state accused of a particular fact 
pattern of allegations. I have not sought to directly address policy or policy 
implications except insofar as to further the narrative. Condry (2007, p. 183) in 
similarly delimiting her work observed, “these findings do raise particular policy 
implications and leave open a number of questions.” I have noted throughout this 
dissertation areas where I now have more questions, and it is an uncomfortable 
intellectual space for me. My professional analogy has been to imagine writing a 
legal brief on a particular point of criminal law on behalf of a particular defendant (or 
on behalf of the state); although one has learned a great deal about a related area, one 
cannot use it to argue your case. So it was with reluctance that I decided to relinquish 
a full comparative study of the contemporaneously sitting Michigan Commission on 
Death and Dying and the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics 
(although I attended hearings of both, reviewed documents of both, and submitted 
evidence to both). Such a study, had I ended my field research in 1994 (when both 
bodies concluded) would have placed me within the mainstream of the emerging
294 As an aside, I note that on Election Day 2008, the United States also elected Barack Obama to be 
President, and that there was a record voter turnout across the country.
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sociology of death (Howarth 1994, 2007) by discussing end-of-life debates, but would 
have left me bereft of the chance to study the actual criminal trials.
On the other hand, engaging in this comparative study of the Kevorkian cases 
gave me an opportunity to do something that a brief writer or judicial body is rarely 
able to do -  to go outside the record of any one trial and to look at comparatives 
elements between trials. In Chapter 3, regarding Chief Prosecuting Attorneys and 
Trial Judges, I “got”295 something that most lawyers in their professional (trade) role 
would not have dreamed -  access. The immediacy of the access, especially with 
regard to the judges (within days or weeks of trial, excepting the 1994 case I was 
unable to attend and the 1999 conviction) astonished lawyers who asked me about the 
work. For me as a lawyer, a judge was someone on a raised bench (literally) 
embodying justice; for me as a doctoral candidate, a judge was a source, someone 
who could give insight and information, rather than rulings and pronouncements.296
What I discovered in the analysis of this chapter, and only after reviewing my 
yellow pads and the tapes repeatedly, were emerging themes regarding prosecutorial 
discretion and judicial demeanour. Until I had reviewed the judicial interviews I had 
no idea that for the judges, I was to represent a safe space in which they could give 
voice to what had perhaps hitherto been unspeakable. For example, in 1996, Judge 
Cooper gave voice to the stress of her Kevorkian trial and Judge Breck gave voice to 
his Kevorkian trial as an issue forum for assisted death. In contrast to the Chief
295 This is an allusion to a phrase commonly used by members of the media, “the get” refers to access 
to a source of information that is difficult to attain, or to be the first one “to get” an interview or topic 
published or on the air. For example, I would argue that while Kevorkian was “the get” in the early 
1990s, it was the euthanasia that was “the get” for CBS and 60 Minutes in 1998, as discussed in 
Chapter 6.
296 One former colleague whom I invited to read an early draft of my Chief Prosecuting 
Attorneys/Judges chapter chastised me for referring to judges by surname in the chapter, rather than as 
“Judge” or “Hon.”, which had been a deliberative decision on my part. However, the hypersensitivity 
in this regard is common in the legal setting when a judge is someone above, as contrasted with the 
academic setting in which a judge is someone under examination (and I hasten -  as a lawyer — to add 
here that this is not intended in any disrespectful sense of “The Honorables,” either individually or 
collectively).
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Prosecuting Attorneys, I was perhaps just another outlet for the academic equivalent 
of a press release or agenda setting opportunity. For Judge Cooper and Judge Miel, 
this regarded the media, for Judge Breck, this regarded his wife’s illness and passing. 
In this conclusion, it was only fair that I should acknowledge that during the mid- 
1990s, I had no plan to construct an entire chapter on the media, nor did I intend to 
have a chapter regarding the Kevorkian families,297 both of which became not only 
chapter topics, but inextricably interlocking themes among chapters.
Further, it was only in hindsight that I realized that the mid-1990s Chief 
Prosecuting Attorneys were savvy users of the media in creating their Kevorkian 
cases. In the late 1990s Chief Prosecuting Attorneys had their respective Kevorkian 
trials essentially foisted upon them, in Gorcyca’s case by and because o f the media.29* 
In a related vein, the early Chief Prosecuting Attorneys brought clear personal 
agendas to the Kevorkian cases, whereas the later chiefs were lawyers “just” doing a 
job. This was as opposed to the early chiefs, who sat on legislative committees or 
seeking to promote changes in the law. I concluded that the later chiefs actually 
demonstrated a role of professionalism that the judges echoed in their own
299interviews.
This carried on in Chapter 4, which discussed the Kevorkian juries. By 
definition, the jurors were coming to their trials as ordinary people. In a very palpable
297 Indeed, it was during the drafting of this dissertation that what was to have been one chapter 
regarding “ordinary people” who were in the Kevorkian juries and decedent families clearly became 
two distinct (though interlaced) chapters presenting different opportunities for discussion and analysis.
298 For the record, it would be unfair to assume that Voet and Gorcyca were youthfully inexperienced, 
since they may have had elders family members in decline; however, it was a matter of record that 
O’Hair was concerned with the whittling of family resources in the wake of his father’s illness and 
death, and that Thompson was concerned with adequacy of health insurance.
299 This invites a (rhetorical) question that I alluded to in the chapter when discussing Judge Breck’s 
reaction to Fieger’s summation, which had been adapted from a prior Kevorkian trial -  did the judges, 
coming to the work as lawyers doing the job of managing trial, come to the work as neophytes in a way 
that the Chief Prosecuting Attorneys of the mid-1990s did not? While this is not a dissertation on 
judicial administration, a fair question for general research later might be to examine the chief 
executive officer of a criminal trial bureau as compared to judges on similar cases.
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way, their role for the days or weeks of trial was to the judges of the facts.300 
However, both in the voir dire transcript study and in the empirical information 
derived from the press conferences and interviews indicated that the jury pool brought 
in more than their common everyday experiences. As an infamous example, Bishop 
Ott had written a pro-assisted suicide piece, in 1993, prior to his jury service as the 
foreman of the first 1996 trial. Ott was identified as a primary voice favouring 
acquittal, notwithstanding his clerical status, which might have suggested a 
conclusion to the contrary. One might conclude that Bishop Ott brought his family 
experiences to the jury room, and that these overrode what the parties might have 
assumed to have any religious or theologically based bias.301
As another example, the 1997 Ionia jury, where Fieger looked into the box and 
saw no friendly faces, may have been the Michigan equivalent of Twelve Angry Men, 
had Fieger not prompted a mistrial with the highly inflammatory opening colourfully 
alluded to by Chief Prosecuting Attorney Voet as “jury arson.” One might reasonably 
ask this (unanswerable) question, as did the Ionia trial judge (in different phrasing) 
regarding the jury’s disappointment not to be allowed to hear the evidence and come 
to their own conclusion. Because the 1999 jury granted no press conferences or 
interviews, and eschewed media communication, it shall remain an open question 
whether the jurors brought in their own family experiences (as did Cameron Beedle in
1996) or whether they considered the media involvement in furthering the Youk
300 This phrase is consistent with pattern jury instructions, such as that issued in the final Kevorkian 
trial, to the effect that the judge decides the law and the jury decides the facts in the trial.
301 One unanticipated finding for me was that the men of the cloth involved in these cases were so 
much more sympathetic to the issue than I had expected. While it would perhaps be overreaching to 
offer a conclusion that Ott and Phifer presented as more akin to pastoral care, and perhaps similar to 
nurses in philosophy of ministering to their flock and members than theological executives similar to 
the doctors, I would argue that there is a whiff of an indicative, though not conclusive finding (see 
Pappas 1994).
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publicity. I conclude that the jurors did, and in a negative way, given their ushered 
departure from the courthouse and refusal to discuss the conviction.
While the 1999 jury spoke only by verdict, the voir dire transcript was 
instructive as to thematic issues of family, religion and belief systems, medicine and 
health care. The most surprising of the findings was the nurses’ mini-study. There, 
the nurses expressed reluctance to adhere to the law insofar as determining guilt or 
innocence of Kevorkian as a doctor (albeit one stripped of license) accused of 
euthanasia murder. A common theme among them, expressed more strongly than the 
physician, led to an interesting possibility. Would nurses (who are involved in the 
constant care of patients) relate to physician assisted suicide or medical euthanasia 
differently than doctors (who generally had brief interaction with patients)? Glaser 
and Straus might have predicted this, but I had not (and I did not, this was an 
unanticipated finding). Another question emerged -  was there an underground culture 
in which the caring profession was critical of the failings of the curing profession?
My answer to this was implied by the way in which the question developed in my 
mind, not as an intentional device -  the doctors were CEOs of the patient cases, while 
the nurses were left in the position of implementing with patients they knew and knew 
ongoingly. I argue that nurses might be particularly critical of Kevorkian as someone 
who knew his patient for a matter of a couple of days, with a couple of interviews and 
chart reviews (Katz 1999; Glaser and Strauss 1970). To the nurses, without having 
heard the name Quill or Cox, Kevorkian and his criminal trials might have been a 
place for them to be the “anti-Ott.” That is to say that these women (they were all 
women in the 1999 voir dire) used their jury questioning to express that which their 
profession required to be silenced and subordinate to doctors, they may not have been
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seated, but they did get to express judgment about health care delivery, euthanasia, 
hospice and comfort care, and implicitly, of Kevorkian.
If the criminal law depersonalised victims of crimes (even consenting ones), 
then so too did at least one jury. As juror Cameron Beedle (1996) attested to in her 
interview, another juror asked to have the photos of “those dead women” turned 
around, away from the deliberating jurors; I would argue that the phrasing, and the 
request, were examples of “othering.” Conversely, I would argue that the prosecutor 
in the 1999 case personalised Tom Youk as a patient robbed of his dignity, a family 
member treated disrespectfully, and simultaneously personified Kevorkian as the anti­
doctor, the publicity seeking and uncaring medical professional, Kevorkian as the 
“other.” Ordinarily, such vilification might have been within the objectionable 
culture of prosecutorial error, but Kevorkian’s 60 Minutes interview and arguments at 
trial invited response. While it was a methodological limitation that I did not have the 
opportunity to inquire of the jurors (who again, declined all interviews post-trial), I 
would argue that this was compelling argument in 1999, made to a jury that, for the 
first time, had no benefit of testimony from the family members in support of 
Kevorkian.
In Chapter 5 ,1 had the opportunity to explore the families, and their 
perceptions of the Kevorkian trials. I argued earlier that that it was reasonable to 
conclude that the judges felt unencumbered and at liberty to speak after trial, then this 
was doubly so for the family members. The Youk family members did so, 
vehemently and elegantly, at the sentencing proceeding, alleging that they had been 
robbed -  by the criminal justice system -- of their ability to speak of Tom Youk at 
trial, to come to Kevorkian’s defence and step forward as witnesses for a man they 
felt was a caring medical professional in ending their loved one’s life. The
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discrepancy between the bare facts o the case delivered at trail and the families’ 
preference for wider context and history has analogies (Rock forthcoming 2009).
Ironically, the narrative the Youks gave at sentencing, while prepared in 
advance, was unencumbered by the limitations of direct examination of a lawyer 
(even a pro se Kevorkian, acting in his own defence) or the rigours of cross- 
examination. I have argued, and conclude, that the unfettered ability to speak at 
sentencing, while not replacing what would surely have been compelling (and 
possibly saving) testimony at trial, remains the most intact record of any of the 
Kevorkian families. This conclusion is based in part based upon the uninterrupted 
narratives the Youks offered at the sentencing hearing, and in part based upon the 
(negative) experiences of the criminal justice system as described by the Sherry 
Miller’s and Merian Frederick’s family members and clergy in our interviews.
Family members who testified during the mid-1990s trials expressed that they 
were offended by the way that attorneys (on both sides) shaped and limited what they 
could and could not say in court. These family members (and Frederick’s clergyman 
Rev. Phifer) expressed themselves in unfettered ways during our interviews, which 
were semi-private (or, as I respectfully and accurately referred to them, the “kitchen 
table interviews”). While I may have chosen what comments to use and how to do so, 
the fact remains that the interviewees had the option to characterize their comments, 
which almost invariably led me to new and uncharted terrain (such as the commentary 
on the media and the commentary on the criminal justice system generally)
In retrospect, the Kevorkian family members and the Kevorkian judges (two 
of whom met me in their chambers which I would liken to a semi-public space akin or 
the professional equivalent of a living room, and the third of whom actually did invite 
me into her literal living room) had something in common in this way. Both family
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members and judges could not speak freely during the Kevorkian trials, both groups 
had severely circumscribed roles. While the judges were symbolic of power in the 
courtroom, they in fact had to deal with issues that they could not speak of in court, 
but took an opportunity to after trial. While I always considered it a methodological 
limitation that I did not get an interview with Judge Cooper after the 1999 trial 
(because the matter was going forward on appeal), neither did I have an on-the-record 
interview with the Youks after the trial (although I met and spoke with them on more 
than one occasion, and with Melody on repeated occasions in both Michigan and New 
York; these were requested to be off-the-record, likely for the same reason as Judge 
Cooper’s reluctance to grant interviews in 1999). However, Judge Cooper’s 
unfettered comments (in our interview in 1996) and those (unfettered narratives) of 
the Youks (in 1999 at sentencing) had in common frustration with the limitations that 
the criminal justice system put upon them in their respective roles.
The Youks had the rare historic opportunity to become “families proclaimed” 
(I use this phrase as an homage to Condry 2007) at the sentencing, and to use their 
status as a sword, rather than as the defence shield it might have been at trial. This 
conclusion, I must acknowledge, is literally academic, as it became moot in the case.
In thematically considering the fieldwork chapters, I noted that the Youks and 
Judge Breck expressed complimentary comments about medical care and hospice 
during the decline of their family members, and pointed to medically hastened death 
as a last possible resort. Many of those I interviewed (including people who were 
professional interviewers, whether lawyers or media) had compelling family 
experiences; some seemed to be taking back their power by way of an interview in 
which they could control the narrative, even if I went in with an aide-memoire outline 
of questions. Further, Kevorkian became embraced as a member of the families of the
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clients for whose deaths he was tried, and was not expelled after he was convicted and 
sentenced (cf. Condry 2007).
In Chapter 6, this apparent set of themes carried on, although it was the media 
themselves who were under the microscope. In Ann Arbor, members of the press 
unburdened themselves in considering the social and legal consequences of the 
original 60 Minutes programme. Again, as with the interviews with the judges, I 
found myself so immersed in being present at the events that I only saw in hindsight 
the miracle of the access I had, and only so marvelled when others asked pointed 
questions about matters I now take as axiomatic. At first blush, this may sound 
descriptive as a conclusion, but I would argue that access was a recurring theme that I 
was very fortunate with. Just as I concluded throughout that some individuals spoke 
to me because I was the “other” (to those in the Untied States, that meant working on 
a doctorate in the United Kingdom; to those in the United Kingdom, that meant being 
a lawyer from America, with an accent from Brooklyn) and going “back” to another 
place, which created a geographic or academic or intellectual or emotional safe space 
away from them. Thematically I offer the conclusion that some of my extraordinary 
access was because, like members of the press (in the broad sense of the phrase) I 
went to where the story was, and “when” the story was (although this later cost me in 
methodological limitations, as I indicated in the missed opportunity to seek an 
interview with Chief Prosecuting Attorney Marlinga).
Just as the judges and family members criticized the lawyers for the questions 
they asked, so too were the media subject to criticism. As I argued, the creation of the 
“Death by Doctor” segment for the original 60 Minutes programme prompted the new 
Oakland County Chief Prosecuting Attorney David Gorcyca to seek indictment for 
both assisted suicide and euthanasia murder charges. The trial prosecutor and
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Kevorkian both relied upon the same programme segment in their case presentations 
and arguments in 1999. Thus the trial became of Kevorkian as the man, his conduct 
and his legal intent at the time of the crime and for the future (rather than of the issue 
and debate as a whole). As I conducted analysis of the tapes I “rediscovered” John 
O’Hair’s comments predicting such a potential outcome, some half dozen years 
before the 1999 trial. However, this still begs the question, was Kevorkian tried for 
his private conduct or his public provocation? I have argued that the 1999 trial was in 
large measure a media event, as much as it was created by a media event, criminal 
conduct notwithstanding.
There was more than one pathway to being a doctor who engaged in medical 
euthanasia or physician assisted suicide during the 1990s. Being a doctor who 
engaged in what was criminal conduct was, I learned, quite another thing from being a 
doctor who was prosecuted (let alone to trial). In a world where medically hastened 
death was more a matter of acting in a grey zone, the criminal trials of Jack “Dr. 
Death” Kevorkian did ultimately boil down to black and white. At the time of this 
writing, Kevorkian was on parole, a “tether” as he called it on the day he was 
released. I had a somewhat sceptical view of what would happen on the day after his 
parole was completed, given that he told Mike Wallace that he gave his word that he 
would not engage in medically assisted death while on parole. In a room full of 
clients, that might have been called potential for compassion; I would argue that it 
was potential for recidivism. That, however, is the beginning of another project, and 
the end of this thesis.
I do have some additional conclusions to add to this dissertation. First, while I 
spoke of an emerging vocabulary earlier, a conclusion I drew at the end of this project 
was that there was a shift from the term “euthanasia” to “assisted suicide,” and (in the
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last trial) back to euthanasia. I conclude that the shift from the term euthanasia to 
assisted suicide showed an emerging legal issue that had its roots in a progressively 
more consumer-oriented patient base. Instead of doctors ending the lives of patients, 
doctors were being called in to facilitate in a process that included a general medical 
team, perhaps social support structures and family. One reason I conclude that the 
Youk euthanasia was such a public affront was the media and the national broadcast 
of the “Death by Doctor” segment. Surely this is true, but is it not also possible that 
as the law was providing legislative mechanisms for assisted suicide with social and 
legal constraints, a reason to prosecute Kevorkian was because he was unrestrained? 
He was no longer in license (a professional sanction), and sought “more control” of 
the patient at a time when patients were taking more control from doctors.
Line prosecutor John Szkrzynski made an interesting argument that 
Kevorkian’s closing arguments in the Youk prosecution, arguing for more control, 
meant more control for Kevorkian. I conclude that the jury took offence to this. 
However, the original Kevorkian tape that was sent to CBS showed a medical 
protocol, perhaps not unlike medical protocols generally, except that it is offensive to 
show the moment of death.302 Kevorkian’s narration for Mike Wallace may have 
seemed innocuous had it been a knee surgery and Kevorkian an orthopaedic surgeon, 
explaining to a non-physician, as is often the case in reviews of medical procedures 
generally. However, because the state has an interest in protecting the sanctity of life, 
the criminal law has a piece of inculpatory evidence, rather than a medical protocol, to 
examine.
Likewise, there is a broader implication with regard to the issue of victim 
consent as a neglected aspect of killing. Because one cannot consent to his/her own
302 1 am grateful to Olga Sekulic, Esq. for pointing this out to me.
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death as a matter of Anglo-American law, this falls flat. However, purported consent 
could have been a factor in mitigation of Kevorkian’s sentence (as it was in the case 
of Cox), particularly with a judge who continued his liberty after verdict with pleas to 
discontinue his practice. While Youk’s consent would not have reached a level of 
legal necessity or duress, it would have been a sympathetic fact of extraordinary 
circumstance in a legal system that does not allow for justifiable consensual homicide 
and with a judge who indicated (by bail status) an inclination to depart from the 
sentencing guidelines. I conclude that because Kevorkian told probation authorities 
that he “could not be stopped,” Judge Cooper’s decision to so do and sentence him to 
prison was an exemplary sentence. This was for flouting the law and the court’s 
authority, as much as for the criminal conduct of which he stood convicted.
Another broader conclusion is that Kevorkian’s self-promotion and 
dramaturgical staging was unacceptable coming from a defendant pro se, rather than a 
lawyer. While defence attorney Fieger had his detractors, nobody argued his ability 
to secure a verdict. After I observed Fieger and Szkrzynski sum up in 1996,1 
concluded that the latter’s superior technical skill was trumped by the dramatics 
(some cinema influenced, as in the canned summations using the cadence of To Kill A  
Mockingbird). However, in 1999, and in keeping with the law school adage “he who 
knows the rules, wins,” Szkrzyzki was able to use the 60 Minutes tape, and the 
underlying Kevorkian tape, to great effect -  and excise the portions of the tapes that 
would have included material of family support for Kevorkian. By deploying 
procedural rules of law, the prosecutor was also able to exclude evidence of family 
support for the defence. Whether the court is the most suitable place to decide the 
issue or not may be uncertain, but the court ultimately was the most suitable place to 
decide a simple fact pattern of substantive evidence under procedural rules of law.
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The Kevorkian trial trajectory proved to be inversely proportional to the 
acceptance of assisted suicide as an issue, as the cases proceeded from 1994-1999 
with acquittal after acquittal after acquittal, followed by a defence-precipitated 
mistrial in 1997 and the final conviction for murder in 1999. I conclude that this is in 
keeping with what Paul Rock wrote in Drugs and Politics: “[a] 11 history shapes and is 
shaped by publicly available reflection, but the scientific and political commentary on 
drugs has been most intimately fused with the manner in which their control and use 
has developed” (Rock 1977, p.21), by inserting the words assisted suicide instead of 
drugs.
An uneasy conclusion is that the dilemmas posed by the medical hastening of 
death were not resoluble. There were superimposed and competing constructions of 
what was proper for the law to mediate and, failing that, to adjudicate. Well-intended 
efforts to litigate and to legislate fell short with juries. The inevitable conclusion was 
that the juries, inextricably intertwined with the legal professionals and Kevorkian 
himself, repeatedly indicated that there were competing constructions of what should 
and should not be permitted by the law. There were sympathetic claims to be made 
by, and on behalf of, patients in a slow spiral toward death.
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